MOSCOW IN THE MAKING

This book, published in 1937, reported on a four-week visit to Moscow in 1936 to study the making of Moscow as a showpiece Soviet capital. At its core was the 1935 *General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow* but the book was a study of planning in the Soviet rather than the Western sense. Thus it covered many aspects of the city's social and economic life including industry and finance, education and housing production as well as governance and town planning. Much first-hand detail is included, based on the visit and the authors' meetings with Soviet officials and citizens that illustrate various points, usually in praise.

The book made a significant contribution towards the growing arguments in 1930s Britain and other parts of the Anglophone world for a bolder, more comprehensive and more state-led approach to planning. In turn these arguments had an important impact in shaping the policies adopted in the 1940s.

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INTRODUCTION

Stephen V. Ward

Moscow in the Making represents the fruits of a relatively short but intense 1936 research visit to the capital city of the Soviet Union by four English experts in urban and regional affairs. Their aim was to discover how Moscow, the showpiece city of socialism, was governed, its people educated and housed and the city's future planned. The outcome, this book, appeared in 1937 and was the most substantial foreign work that had then been published on Soviet city governance and planning. It also brought a new perspective to the growing debate of the late 1930s in Britain and other Western countries about how cities and their surrounding regions should be planned and administered. It showed what could be achieved when city governance and planning had wide powers, adopted bold programmes and were pursued comprehensively. But though the results were or promised to be impressive, Moscow also posed a problem for Westerners – if (and how) similar policies adopted elsewhere might ever be reconciled with democracy. As such *Moscow in the Making* gives a unique contemporary insight on the choices facing Western societies in the 1930s.

The Soviet Union and Western intellectuals

Such visits were not unusual by 1936. During the interwar years, especially in the 1930s, it became fashionable for Westerners, particularly those holding progressive views, to see the Soviet Union at first hand. Many returned impressed, even 'starry-eyed', at what they had seen, happy to share their impressions over dinner tables, in lectures and conferences, newspaper and journal articles, pamphlets and books. Most of the visits lasted no more than four weeks, the normal duration of a Soviet visa. A few stayed longer or returned for later visits. Some, those with specific skills useful to the young Soviet state, were hired or at least offered their services as foreign experts to help in the construction of the new socialist society.

The phenomenon was a truly remarkable one when considered alongside the palpable mistrust at the time of the Soviet Union and everything that it represented for conservative and even moderate opinion in most Western countries. There was also some (though not yet complete) awareness, even

amongst some visitors, of the repressive aspects of the Soviet state, especially under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. Its tendencies to humiliate publicly, imprison, or in various ways cause the deaths of its imagined domestic enemies was bizarrely at odds with the regard in which many intelligent and humane Westerners simultaneously held it. Not surprisingly, there have been many attempts to explain this paradox. Until recently these have focused almost completely on the Western visitors themselves. Some have stressed the naïve gullibility of visitors, aided by the cynicism of Western journalists based in Moscow (Muggeridge, 1972: 205–76). The latter enjoyed a pampered lifestyle as long as they promoted favourable images of Soviet achievements.

Others have discerned within Westerners' Soviet admiration a quest for a more perfectly rational society, where scientific expertise shaped governance, rather than private interest (Caute, 1988). Another interpretation posits a quasi-religious search for the new certainties and hopes of a secular Utopia (Hollander, 1981). These various sentiments were all the more potent for generations that had directly experienced or grown up in the aftermath of the Great War and had lost faith in the ideologies and institutions that had sustained the old order. They were reinforced by the present realities of a worldwide depression and mass unemployment, which the parliamentary democracies of the capitalist countries seemed signally unable to combat. In some countries, capitalist democracy was being supplanted by extreme nationalistic and corporatist forms of authoritarian or totalitarian governance. In such circumstances, a Soviet system that apparently transcended nation, class, race, privilege and the vagaries of the market might well seem worthy of investigation, even emulation.

While evidence can be produced to support all these interpretations, none are wholly convincing. Their credibility tends to depend on portraying visitors as uncritically eulogising what they encountered in the Soviet Union. Yet, although some visitors, often the most well known, did actually behave in this way, many others, particularly those with specialist expertise, voiced criticisms and suggested improvements (eg Ward, 2012). It was quite common for Soviet hosts informally to encourage this. And as noted, some Western experts were actually recruited to help build the new society. All this highlights the main silence in older accounts, concerning the Soviet role in these links. Recent work has, however, seen greater use of Russian sources, particularly by Stern (2007) and David-Fox (2012), detailing how Soviet agencies actively cultivated their Western contacts. Whereas earlier accounts could merely infer that Soviet management of visits and information flows must have occurred, it is now well documented.

The key agency was VOKS (Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagranitsei – All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), created as a formal entity in 1925 (Stern, 2007: 86–131; David-Fox, 2012: 28–97). This body's principal aim was to enhance Soviet 'soft power' by facilitating and stage managing its international cultural, scientific and professional relations to foster positive impressions of the USSR in other countries.

One important strategy to achieve this was to encourage the creation of national networks of 'friends'. 'Friendship societies', comprising Communists and leftish progressive thinkers, soon appeared in many Western countries. These were based on the pattern of the first, the German *Gesellschaft der Freunde des neuen Russland* (Society of Friends of the New Russia), founded in Berlin in 1923. The London-based Society for Cultural Relations between the British Commonwealth and the USSR (usually known as the Society for Cultural Relations or SCR) followed in June 1924. Similar organisations appeared in other countries in succeeding years (the USA's in 1926, for example).

VOKS also played a central role in controlling the flow and nature of information about the Soviet Union which reached foreigners. Through its national friendship networks, it supplied information and publications, often in translations (of varying quality), and responded (sometimes erratically) to requests for specific information. Visits by foreigners were carefully orchestrated, ensuring the Soviet experience was showcased in as positive a manner as possible. The agency specifically identified key sites as positive models to highlight Soviet achievements in all aspects of life, adapting through experience to include more 'authentic' insights into Soviet life (for example visiting 'typical' families in their homes). Part of the approach involved encouraging criticisms and seeking advice. While there was probably some genuine basis for this, it also served to flatter the vanity of visitors and encourage their complicity in the great Soviet project to build a socialist society.

In its early years, there were also proposals from the VOKS leadership that the agency might become an 'export' service, earning valuable hard currency for the USSR. This option was not pursued in earnest until after 1929 when a second organisation concerned with foreign visitors, Intourist, was formed. This body was more completely organised as a tourist agency and was, to some extent, a rival of VOKS. The general intention to show the Soviet system in a very positive light remained but now with the extra aim of earning as much as possible from foreign visitors. VOKS remained an important agency particularly in dealing with the more specialist aspects of contacts. But its role was certainly diminished and it found, for example, that its interpreters, except for the most specialist tours, now had to come from Intourist.

Overall therefore, better understanding of Soviet priorities regarding their contacts with the West has meant that less emphasis is now placed on the insecurities and gullibility of the visitors themselves. These broader considerations give a more balanced basis for understanding and assessing the more specific circumstances that directly shaped Anglo-Soviet contacts in this period.

Anglo-Soviet contacts prior to *Moscow in the Making*

In several respects, British cultural and similar contacts with the Soviet Union were less close and slower to develop during the 1920s than those with other

major countries. There were, however, some important trading links, notably those of the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Company. This played a key role in facilitating Soviet electrification from 1923 until 1933 and some 350 of its engineers worked there (Morrell, 1994: 525). Soviet engineers were also trained at the firm's main works at Trafford Park in Manchester. The initial signs were also promising in other fields and the SCR was certainly established at an early stage, following the Labour Government's diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in 1924. Yet the SCR proved more independent-minded and less compliant to the wishes of VOKS than its equivalents elsewhere (notably France) (Stern, 2007: 133–8; David-Fox, 2012: 81–4). Its first President, Margaret Llewelyn-Davies of the Women's Co-operative Guild, resisted the early efforts of VOKS to manipulate the new organisation. She argued that it would be impossible to attract cultural, intellectual and professional figures of any standing to an organisation that was simply a Soviet front.

The wider weakness of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) compared to its equivalents in other Western countries was also important. During the 1920s its appeal was limited within intellectual and cultural circles (though this changed during the 1930s). Not least, the British government and the establishment more generally became increasingly and at times hysterically fearful during the mid/late 1920s of supposed Soviet activity within Britain. This anti-Soviet mood was fuelled by a great deal of industrial conflict during the early post-war years.

In 1924 the already failing first Labour Government was further damaged by the publication in the *Daily Mail* of a forged letter purportedly from Grigori Zinoviev (Bennett, 1999). He was President of the Communist International, Comintern, and the letter (later revealed as the work of MI6 agents) his supposed call for those within the Labour Party who were sympathetic to Communism to promote revolutionary activity. Conservative paranoia grew further in 1926 when the General Strike, seen by some as a possible prelude to wider revolution, heightened fears about Soviet support for strikers. In 1927 the Metropolitan Police raided the London offices of the Soviet Trade Delegation and the Anglo-Soviet trading company, Arcos, seeking evidence of Soviet subversion (Flory, 1977). Though nothing incriminating was found, diplomatic links with Moscow were severed until 1929 when another Labour Government restored them.

A few Britons did still manage to visit the USSR through the SCR, the CPGB or other sympathetic bodies. For example, the children's author, Amabel Williams-Ellis, an ardent Communist sympathiser, and her brother, John Strachey, one of the leading British Marxist intellectuals of the period, visited in 1928, she to study Soviet schools (Ward, 2012: 501). But such movement amounted only to a mere trickle compared with the growing numbers of Germans, Americans, French and others who visited and worked in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s/early 1930s (Kopp, 1990). Stalin's instigation of the first Five Year Plan in 1928, intended to accelerate the industrialisation and

state-led collectivisation of the Soviet economy, created the demand for their services. Thus American engineers designed and constructed new industrial complexes, such as the Ford-style truck plant at Nizhny-Novgorod or the giant iron and steel works at Magnitogorsk (Cohen, 1995: 81–3; Kotkin, 1995: 41–51; Cody, 2003: 100–9). The German architect-planner, Ernst May, also established a sizeable brigade of architects and planners, largely comprising those he had worked with in Frankfurt (Flierl, 2011). Their role was to plan the towns and provide the housing for the rapidly growing urban population, so that May and the Hungarian planner, Alfréd Forbát, planned the new city at Magnitogorsk. Others, including some there because of ideological sympathies, undertook similar tasks elsewhere.

With only a few exceptions, their British equivalents came rather late to these Soviet possibilities and, indeed, any first hand sense of the urban changes that were occurring under Stalin. In the main, their links remained those of spectators but their numbers grew rapidly in the 1930s as early reports of visits further quickened interest. In November 1930, for example, the Principal of the Manchester School of Technology and another technical education specialist visited the USSR and reported to the Board of Education in favourable terms about the extent and quality of Soviet technical education (UK NA FO 371/15621a). Reading their report, the then Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Hugh Dalton, saw it as a clarion call to the West: 'Unless Western capitalism wakes up, it will be badly beaten by the Bolsheviks in the competition of the future'.

This growing sense that the rapidly changing Soviet Union might in some respects be superior to and thus a source of positive lessons for Britain intensified the growing interest. Other fields were soon attracting governmental and wider interest and the Soviet authorities were skilful in exploiting these. During 1930, an attractive illustrated Soviet propaganda magazine, *The USSR in Construction* (1930–41), began to appear. Its striking photography and design fed the growing appetite for Soviet knowledge. What it promoted was a heroic and inspirational image of a union of diverse people undergoing massive transformation into a modern socialist society. The deepening economic crisis in the West heightened the interest. 1931 saw more notable visits, including George Bernard Shaw's during which he was fêted, had a private interview with Stalin and reciprocated by extolling the virtues of the Soviet system. On the eve of his departure, he left a message in the visitors book of his hotel in Moscow often held to typify what many visiting intellectuals at this time thought of the Soviet Union: 'Tomorrow, I leave this land of hope and return to our Western countries of despair' (quoted Stern, 2007: 25).

Yet there were also expanding opportunities for exports of goods and services to assist in this dramatic Soviet transformation. In June 1931 the British Embassy in Moscow advised the Foreign Office about growing Soviet interest in housing and planning and the intention to construct an underground railway in the capital city (UK NA FO 371/15621b). This spurred other

involvements, especially of officials and engineers from the London Underground and private civil engineering consultants. Originally the Soviets had favoured German 'cut-and-cover' methods for construction but these proved impractical in the central core of the city (Robbins, 1997). One of the principal Soviet engineers of the Moscow system had inspected the London Underground system. He had been especially impressed by the recently redesigned Piccadilly Circus station, with its underground booking hall and escalators. Stalin himself authorised deep tunnels and escalators, intent on making the Moscow system a showpiece of Soviet achievement fully the equal of the most advanced systems elsewhere. He also saw the potential of deep tunnels for civil defence use in the event of air attack.

Soviet housing, architecture and planning also became other areas of growing interest in Britain during 1931. In that year, the extraordinary cosmopolitan figure of Berthold Lubetkin appeared on the British professional scene (Allan, 2004). He was a Georgian architect and planner who had trained in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, with extensive knowledge of both Soviet and historic Russian architecture and planning. This and his impact through Tecton, the renowned modernist architectural practice he soon formed in London with several British architects, ensured that he was soon in demand as a lecturer and writer in professional journals. His own sympathies were Leninist rather than Stalinist and he resisted the entreaties of some of his relatives to return to his homeland (only doing so for a visit following Stalin's death). His career in London and marriage to a British colleague led to his UK naturalisation in 1939.

Meanwhile, thanks to his own wife's use of her Soviet contacts, the noted British architect and planner, Clough Williams-Ellis was invited, with Amabel, to visit the Soviet Union in June 1931, the first of many in his profession to do so over the next few years (UK NA KV 2/784; Williams-Ellis, 1971: 183–7). Though he praised the scale and boldness of Soviet actions in his field, he had detailed criticisms and did not entirely share his wife's enthusiasm. Nor did he take up his hosts' invitation to work there, largely for financial reasons – being paid in non-convertible roubles understandably had little appeal. (The most prized foreign experts such as May were well paid, although many who went out of political sympathy received only local rouble stipends.)

At much the same time as the Williams-Ellises' visit, there were also signs of a parallel official interest. A young planning inspector in the Ministry of Health, Kenneth Dodd, began to collect detailed evidence on Soviet urban and regional planning, learning Russian as part of this process (UK NA HLG 52/923). In May/June 1932 he visited the USSR and the following year published a long article reporting the workings of the Soviet urban planning system (Dodd, 1933). He also presented evidence about Soviet new towns to the Ministry's Departmental Committee on Garden Cities and Satellite Towns, chaired by Lord Marley, another Soviet visitor (UK NA HLG 52/725; UK NA HLG 52/734). By this time, however, governmental attitudes to

the Soviet Union were shifting. The replacement of Labour by a Conservative-dominated National Government had obliged Dodd to publish his findings and give evidence in a purely private capacity.

But if government attitudes were subject to political changes, the arrival of Intourist had meanwhile combined with more widely growing interest to encourage a proliferation of many less official and wholly private visits (Ward, 2012: 502–3). Several British travel agents began to specialise in Soviet tours, including the Workers Travel Association which organised visits by trade unionists and other left-of-centre bodies. The SCR had begun to organise annual 'We-have-been-to-Russia' dinners in 1931 where the latest visits could be reported, discussed and compared. But what had been relatively rare experiences at the start of the decade now became more common. Over the next few years, SCR income was boosted by its fees for arranging visits, especially those of a more specialist nature, using its unique links with VOKS. By 1937, close to 30 per cent of its revenue was coming from this source. Other visits occurred through political contacts in the CPGB or direct personal contacts with the Soviet Embassy in London.

Sir Ernest and Shena Simon

The September 1936 visit which led to the publication of *Moscow in the Making* had much in common with many other Soviet visits during the 1930s. Lasting four weeks, it was arranged by the SCR, with personal facilitation from the charming and sociable Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky. VOKS and Intourist gave their usual assistance at the Moscow end, identifying specific people to interview and sites to visit and providing interpreters (pp. v–vi). And the actual members of the group, remarkable though they were in several ways, were otherwise fairly typical of many other progressively minded figures who were sufficiently curious about the USSR to visit it during the 1930s.

The leader and instigator of the visit and the book was Sir Ernest Emil Darwin Simon (Jones, 2004a). He rarely used the first of his middle names, usually styling himself as Ernest Darwin (or simply Ernest) Simon until he was ennobled (as Lord Simon of Wythenshawe) in 1947. A Manchester man, he had been born in 1879 into an industrial family originally from Prussian Silesia (Stocks, 1963). His father had arrived in Manchester in 1860 and within a few years had founded two companies which later became the Simon Engineering Group. When his father died in 1899, the young Ernest was still at Cambridge, studying engineering. But when he graduated, he felt obliged to join the family company and, as a very young man, take over the reins.

Like his father, Ernest proved a successful industrialist, far more so than either his elder half-brother (who preferred a more leisured life) or three younger brothers. These last three were in any case all killed in action during the First World War making him the effective head of his wider family before

he was forty. Yet, despite continuing throughout his life to play an important role in the running of the Simon companies, Ernest had ambitions in public service, becoming a member of Manchester City Council in 1912. Virtually from the outset his business experience ensured that he played a key part in its affairs and later served as Lord Mayor. He also had two short and not entirely happy stints as a Member of Parliament for a seat in the city in 1923–4 and 1929–31. At both local and national levels, his main political interests were public health (including smoke abatement), housing and town planning. He became a widely acknowledged expert who lectured and wrote extensively on these themes. Although he was not the principal driving force, his name became associated with Manchester's great project to build a municipal garden city at Wythenshawe, towards which he gifted a sizeable parkland estate and historic house to augment the City's holdings.

As this suggests, he played many roles in Manchester's intellectual, cultural and political life, as leader, patron and benefactor. His political perspective was progressive, initially expressed in Liberalism, combined with a humanist agnosticism that bore no trace of the Simon family's Jewish roots (Rubenstein, Jolles and Rubenstein, 2011: 916–17). A friend of the famous editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, C.P. Scott, he championed the city's higher education institutions, supported the Hallé Orchestra and much else of its cultural life (Stocks, 1963).

He also became very interested in the London-based Fabian movement before 1914 and was a great admirer of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. For their part, they welcomed this intelligent and progressively minded young man who combined great success in business with a commitment to enlightened governmental intervention to promote human welfare. The Webbs saw Fabianism as promoting an alternative to the unbridled economic liberalism of the nineteenth century 'Manchester School' and Ernest Simon was well placed to help promote that shift. His wealth was also useful in supporting their favoured causes, notably the *New Statesman* magazine. For some years, however, his resistance to wholesale nationalisation prevented him sharing their support for the Labour Party. In the 1930s, however, he began to shift away from Liberalism and in 1946 joined the Labour Party, by then more selective in its targets for nationalisation.

His partner in public and private life was his wife Shena Dorothy (Jones, 2004b). Many compared them to the Webbs with whom they were good friends and had much in common. Shena Potter was born in Croydon in 1883 (coincidentally having the same maiden name as Beatrice Webb, but unrelated). Like Ernest, Shena was from a wealthy family (her father was a shipowner). Like Ernest too, she took a serious interest in public affairs from what was originally a Liberal and humanistic agnostic standpoint, though she moved to Labour in 1935, well before her husband. In the years immediately before she married, she became keenly involved in the women's suffrage campaign, earning her own family's and Ernest's disapproval by supporting the

militants (without becoming one herself). She also undertook research to enhance women's rights especially in employment matters.

These concerns continued, though after she married Ernest (in a Register Office) in 1912 she involved herself just as deeply as her husband in public life in Manchester. She played a more direct political role than Ernest in leading the early development of Wythenshawe in the 1930s but her main interest was educational reform. This was her main contribution, especially to Manchester through its schools, colleges and the University, and it became an interest taken up by the Simons' younger son.

Unlike the Webbs, the Simons raised a family with two sons, Roger and Brian, though their daughter died in childhood. The spacious and comfortable Simon home in Didsbury was permeated by a strong sense of serious endeavour to improve human life in all its dimensions and at both individual and collective levels. The younger son Brian recalled the great emphasis placed by his parents on education in all aspects (Corbett, 2002). Thus the conductor of the Hallé orchestra was persuaded by Ernest to help his sons with their music lessons and the players of Lancashire County cricket team to coach their sporting development. One of their sons and a nephew (neither of whose identities is completely certain) accompanied the Simons on their 1936 trip to Moscow (Robson, 1965: 67). To their father's chagrin, though perhaps unsurprisingly given the setting and the times in which they grew up, both sons became Communists, Brian in 1935 and Roger in 1936 (Corbett, 2002; Devine, 2002). More remarkably they both remained party members until the CPGB itself expired in 1991.

William Robson and John Jewkes

The other two active members of the *Moscow in the Making* group were both academics, combining between them the Simons' links with London-centred Fabianism and Manchester-based intellectual life. The former was represented by William Alexander Robson, at the time reader in Administrative Law at the London School of Economics (Crick, 2004). Born in 1895 to a Jewish family and initially raised within the faith, he shifted to the humanist agnosticism that characterised the Simons and many other Fabians. He was drawn into Fabian circles towards the end of World War I, following an improbable encounter with George Bernard Shaw whom Robson, then a Royal Flying Corps (RFC) pilot, took on his first ever aeroplane flight.

Robson's own connections with flight had begun some years earlier when his father's death, leaving the family in financial straits, had forced him to leave school as a youth and go to work as a clerk to an aircraft company at Hendon aerodrome. Such was his organisational ability that he became assistant manager of the aerodrome while still a teenager. At the age of 21, by then in the RFC, he published a book about aircraft which attracted the attention of Shaw who was eager always to prove himself a prophet of the times. Having

landed safely, Shaw suggested that this remarkably able young man, on leaving the RFC, should attend the London School of Economics, providing him there and then with a letter of introduction to Sidney Webb.

Following this advice, Robson progressed rapidly. Despite becoming a barrister at Lincoln's Inn in 1922 and with a glittering career in either law or Labour politics a real possibility, he decided to return to the LSE in 1926 and remained there for the rest of his working life. He specialised in administrative law and by the early 1930s had developed a major interest in local government and planning. It was this in particular which made him an obvious figure to work with the Simons. His published output was prolific, already having a string of important books and articles to his credit. In 1930 he co-founded the influential journal *Political Quarterly* (with much support, financial and otherwise, from Ernest Simon) co-editing it, for many years with Leonard Woolf, until 1976 (Woolf, 1959).

The final figure of the *Moscow in the Making* quartet and in some ways its most distinctive member was John Jewkes, Professor of Social Economics at the University of Manchester. He was born in Barrow-in-Furness in 1902, his father a sheet-metal worker and foreman at the Vickers-Armstrong shipyard (Cairncross, 2004; Ricketts, 2004). Educated at the local grammar school and University of Manchester, he worked first for the Manchester Chamber of Commerce before embarking on an academic career at the University in 1926. He soon became an expert on industry and labour in the North West, authoring several very detailed industrial, labour or area studies during the 1920s and 1930s. Through these studies he developed an acute understanding of the relationships between market conditions, investment, employment and wages.

This understanding also sometimes led him to a pragmatic advocacy of governmental intervention in economic affairs when circumstances warranted it and always with an economist's understanding about how it would impact on markets. In this, he exemplified the way the 'Manchester School' of thought, facing the severe economic strains of the interwar years, shifted towards more interventionist positions. However, though this would have provided common ground with Ernest Simon, Jewkes was not drawn to Fabianism, remaining at heart a classic liberal in his economic thinking. This more traditional perspective became more evident in his career after 1945 but something of it was apparent in his contribution to this book.

The making of *Moscow in the Making*

This was not, however, the main thrust of *Moscow in the Making* which from the very outset was dominated by Fabian thinking. In his preface, Ernest Simon is explicit that the book was stimulated, like so much of the Simons' work, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. In this case, the principal inspiration was their two volume work *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?* which was

published in 1935 (and re-issued two years later without the question mark) (Webb and Webb, 1935). It is clear that the Webbs also helped more directly by encouraging and making suggestions about the investigation (pp. v–vi). In essence, it was a detailed investigation into some of the matters dealt with by the Mossoviet, the Moscow City Government.

Little is known about exactly how the visit unfolded and how the evidence used in the book was gathered. Some Soviet printed material was secured but with great difficulty, even during the visit, and this was not an important source. On the other hand, it is clear that meetings with Mossoviet and central government officials were a major source. Sometimes these encounters involved all the visitors while others were conducted individually. However, it is not known who the officials they met were, what they said in their presentations and what the visitors gleaned from subsequent questioning. The encounters with these officials were apparently of 2–4 hours duration though, since none of the visitors spoke Russian, translation must have accounted for a large part of this time. Overall, the group felt that the people they met had been frank and open in their responses.

Further information came from visits to inspect and observe activities at relevant sites such as schools or housing. There was some use of the opinions of anonymous Russian professionals working at these locations. The experiences of unnamed Western foreigners living or working in Moscow were also utilised (eg pp. 161, 179). In addition, the visitors saw and, to some extent, experienced Soviet life for themselves. Its rigid inflexibilities were evidently amply displayed even in the hotel where the party stayed. How they recorded and made sense of all the information they uncovered is not clear, though it may be assumed that detailed notes were taken. During the visit the group met each night to discuss their findings. Later, they also compared their own findings with the impressions of other visitors, not just the Webbs. Thus Ernest Simon (p. 183) contrasted his own views with those of Walter Citrine, the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress who published his own account in 1936.

As might be expected of this group of visitors, these four weeks were a time of serious hard work. They resisted the temptation to engage in sight-seeing (which their Intourist guides would doubtless have indulged). Ernest Simon may incidentally have pursued some business interests, visiting a flour mill (one of the Simon companies specialised in manufacturing milling machinery) (p. 224), but this was probably a 'local industry', controlled by the Mossoviet. Some of the party, though it is not known who, undertook short side visits to Leningrad (St Petersburg) and Kharkov (p. v). It is not clear what purpose these trips served but the two cities are referred to briefly for comparison in a few chapters.

Moscow in the Making: an equivocal verdict

Turning to the book itself, the focus of the individual chapters essentially reflects the specialist knowledge of their respective authors. This was generally

derived from British experience and each author made explicit comparisons between this and what they discovered in Moscow. The coverage of the Mossoviet's activities was not exhaustive, however, and Ernest Simon regretted the omissions, particularly of public health. However, several aspects were covered in great detail. Thus Robson gave a lengthy overview of the machinery and processes which comprised the Mossoviet. Jewkes investigated its industrial role (radically different to any British local authority) and its financing. Shena Simon provided a chapter on education. Ernest added six shorter chapters, amounting to about a third of the book, including within these a further chapter which comprised Stalin and Molotov's decree approving (and summarising) the 1935 General Plan for the Reconstruction of the City. His own chapters covered his interests in housing, construction and planning (including a commentary on the 1935 plan). They also included two concluding chapters which posed overall questions about how democratic and how efficient the Mossoviet was.

The detailed evidence and interpretations contained in the book speak for themselves, though some general points can be made about its overall tone and broader features. The first is to emphasise that there were some differences in the understandings of the four contributors about how Mossoviet operated. Ernest Simon stressed that each author was responsible for his/her own chapters, pointing out that Robson and Jewkes had each disassociated themselves from statements made in the other's chapter. Though nothing explicit was said about the nature of these differences, they can reasonably be guessed. Thus Robson, noting the absence of any concept of *ultra vires* (that a local government could only act within powers explicitly authorised by national government), emphasised the degree of autonomy from central control enjoyed by the Mossoviet. While acknowledging the very great importance of Communist Party control from the very top, he also found there to be more scope, especially than Jewkes, within the system for other views to influence the decision-making process. He also believed that it was not an inherently repressive system and saw a possibility that in time it might shed its repressive aspects leaving the many positive features for efficient metropolitan government which he clearly admired.

Jewkes, by contrast, was the most pessimistic of the quartet about the nature of the Soviet system. He portrayed it starkly as a Communist dictatorship and regretted the way that the Soviet people had little way of showing any preference in how the financial resources of the Soviet Union and the city of Moscow were used. The almost complete subjugation of market processes and the absence of any clarity over how the Soviet state raised its revenue left its people no option but to accept spending decisions made on their behalf by the leaders of the Communist Party. It meant that the Soviet state and the Mossoviet could lavish immense funds on what was perhaps the finest Metro system in the world as a showpiece of Communism. Yet Muscovites (and other Soviet citizens) had no way of showing whether they wanted this or a

more rapid improvement in the dire housing conditions in which so many of them lived. His mordant conclusion was that the Soviet system had liquidated any notion of consumer discrimination. For a classic liberal economist this was a very depressing finding.

The Simons were closer to Robson and found important things to admire in what they had seen in Moscow. Yet both were deeply perturbed by the Communist party's dominance and the repressive, anti-democratic nature of the Soviet system. Shena's conclusions express this very clearly. On the one hand she highlighted the sheer exhilaration of being in a society where the education of all children was evidently given such a consistently high priority and that all those involved appeared undaunted at the huge scale of the task involved. Yet, on the other, she could not entirely accept that what she had seen really was education rather than political indoctrination. 'It is magnificent – but is it, after all, education?' (p. 142).

Ernest Simon was similarly impressed by the enormity of the housing task taken on by the Soviet Union. He found overcrowding existing on a scale well beyond that found in British cities such as Manchester. Yet he recognised that its solution would take a radically different form to that in Britain. For climatic as well as political and social reasons Soviet city dwellers at least would be housed in apartment blocks rather than the low density cottage with private gardens that had become usual in English cities. More serious, though, was the disappointing progress towards addressing the housing target, particularly compared to Britain's (historically very high) contemporary house building rate. Elsewhere in the book (p. 234) he describes housing as the 'outstanding failure'. The Soviet military programme and other priorities had to some extent pre-empted housing expenditure though he also blamed the organisation of the building trade, not least the exceptionally short working day.

What most impressed Ernest, however, was the approach to the planning of Moscow. The long (and genuine) debate about how Moscow would be planned had led to clear decisions. For the first time a great city was to be limited in size (a maximum of five million inhabitants) enforced by an internal passport system. No private land ownership existed so that land use could be determined solely on planning merits, rather than land values. The issue of compensation to private landowners for loss of value, arguably the greatest single handicap to effective planning in Britain at that time, did not arise. Different options for Moscow's development had been considered including a satellite town approach and the idea of preserving old Moscow and building an entirely new city alongside it. The chosen approach (about which Ernest clearly had some doubts) was essentially one of city extension, although many open spaces and a forest belt were secured as part of this. There would be large investment in new major infrastructure, most notably the Metro, and other projects, including a colossal Palace of the Soviets, as featured on the book's dust jacket cover and frontispiece. This was to be on the site of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, demolished in 1931. (Though construction

was begun in 1937, the Palace was never completed. The Cathedral was reconstructed from 1995.)

In the final two chapters, Ernest Simon gave an overall verdict on what he had seen in Moscow. Viewed together, they showed his (and it seems his fellow authors', certainly Shena's) misgivings especially about the weaknesses of democracy in the Soviet Union. He referred to the 'extraordinary atmosphere of suspicion' (p. 224) that permeated all aspects of the city, so that making notes in a public place or visiting a factory were subject to challenge and heavy-armed security checks. He was also disturbed at the way certain sites were barred (notably the Moscow-Volga canal which was being constructed to allow Moscow to develop as a port). Here he reported the use of convict labourers, many incarcerated for political crimes such as failure to be sufficiently enthusiastic about the regime. 1936–7 also saw a growing Western awareness of the 'show-trials' and associated humiliating public confessions of those formerly senior figures in the Soviet hierarchy who had fallen from favour. This was something which Ernest also found shocking and repellent.

Ultimately though, he was still prepared, like Robson, to acknowledge that, in view of Russian history, particularly the years after the Revolution, and the legacy of backwardness, that this might be merely a transitory stage. The challenge for those involved in British urban affairs was to capture something of the leadership and enthusiasm of Moscow while maintaining the freedoms and 'kindly tolerance' of England (p. 227). Finding an answer to this problem held the key, in his view, to the future of British democracy. He never fully articulated how these things might be reconciled, perhaps because he did not, with any confidence, know. However, a persistent strand of his interests during this period and beyond was education for citizenship (eg Simon, E.D., 1938). As in all aspects of his own life, he considered education at all levels had the capacity to bring enlightenment. To this end he had founded (in 1934), funded and generally inspired the Association for Education in Citizenship (Howard, 1959; Stocks, 1963: 104–7). This was a body which undertook research and created a network of powerful support for its ideals and their realisation. Pursued properly at all levels, he felt these had the capacity not to indoctrinate, Nazi- or Soviet-style, but to give the people the ability to reach collectively rational decisions out of a process of free discussion based on genuine understanding.

Dealing with the question of efficiency in metropolitan governance, however, his final chapter is less equivocal. In housing, certainly, the results had been disappointing. There were also other weaknesses. But the book left the reader with a very positive impression of Moscow and its probable future. Coincidentally a party of very senior officials from the Mossoviet, headed by its leader, Nikolai Bulganin, also visited London in September 1936 (*Times*, 1936). (In contrast to Westerners visiting the Soviet Union, visits in the opposite direction were quite rare at this time.) The visit prompted much British discussion about the challenges facing the two cities and their

respective capacities to meet these. Ernest drew on some of this debate to preface his final thoughts in the book. Essentially he found Moscow far better equipped to tackle the problems of metropolitan planning than London or any other major city in the world. In his final paragraph, after making several important conditions, he expressed his belief that ten years on, Moscow would be well on the way to being 'the best planned great city the world has ever known' (p. 234).

The impact of *Moscow in the Making*

In the event, several of Ernest Simon's conditions were not met, largely because of the war which changed many things, though it was to be over fifteen years before this became clear. During the intervening period, relations with the Soviet Union underwent several dramatic changes. The outbreak of hostilities in 1939 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 abruptly closed the window on the Soviet Union which had opened during the 1930s. When German invasion in June 1941 drew the Soviet Union into what was there termed the 'Great Patriotic War' there were several years of extraordinary closeness between it and Britain. The Soviets were glorious allies, respected for their courage and tenacity in a common struggle against Hitler. But this closeness was not based on the direct contacts of visits, at least for non-essential purposes. Without this hiatus ever ending, relations again deteriorated from 1947 with the onset of the Cold War. It was not until after the death of Stalin in 1953 that there was any hint of a 'thaw', allowing professional contacts to resume.

By that stage, *Moscow in the Making* was much less relevant. But its impact was very significant in the years immediately following its publication. It fed the growing appetite within progressive circles for more detailed knowledge about the Soviet Union during the 1930s. The specific examination of Communism's model city, promoted as a showpiece, went well beyond previously available accounts. The expert knowledge and reputations of its authors and their balanced assessments, identifying weaknesses and negative as well as positive features, enhanced its wider credibility. *Moscow in the Making* thus made it increasingly possible to draw positive lessons from Soviet experience without automatically being labelled as a Communist or fellow-traveller. During later 1936–1937, the Simons spoke about their Moscow research at a variety of events, often reported in the *Manchester Guardian* (*Manchester Guardian* 1936; 1937a; 1937b; 1937c; 1937d; Simon, E., 1937). They often dramatised the matters at stake by posing the striking question 'Moscow or Manchester?'.

In this way, the findings and conclusions of the book were inserted into the growing late 1930s debate about the proper role of the British state in welfare provision and the spatial development of the national territory. *Moscow in the Making* provided ammunition to those pressing in Britain for a bold national

and comprehensive approach with clear targets for housing, education and economic development, backed by wholehearted political support. It showed how much more effective town planning could be if it also included powers to control the development of factories and other sources of employment. Above all, it showed the effectiveness of eliminating private real estate ownership and the land market so that land became simply a neutral platform upon which a more rational, efficient and healthy spatial pattern of activities could be placed.

Even as some of these issues began to be addressed officially in Britain in the late 1930s, there was reluctance to acknowledge how far they drew on Soviet lessons. Thus the 1939 report on planning in foreign countries prepared by the Chief Planner of the Ministry of Health for the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, which had been established in 1937 made no reference to the planning of Moscow or other Soviet cities (Ward, 2007: 372–8). (It was not as if totalitarian states were to be excluded since Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were considered in some detail.) However, the salience of the Soviet model grew inexorably during the Second World War. Britain became to a large extent a centrally planned economy, and government-orchestrated targets and allocation procedures largely replaced or greatly modified market processes. Many wartime publications highlighted Soviet achievements in fields such as planning, even mainstream professional journals which hitherto had given them little attention (eg Ling, 1943; Ward, 2012: 506–8).

The evolving views of *Moscow in the Making*'s authors

Moscow in the Making's authors themselves also became part of the more Soviet-like British wartime state. Like many others Ernest Simon, Robson and Jewkes were recruited as temporary officials into the burgeoning government machine to help shape and operate its new functions (Stocks, 1963: 112–23; Crick, 2004; Ricketts, 2004). Ernest Simon fulfilled a variety of roles in publicity, manufacturing and the building industry (as Deputy Chairman from July 1941 of the Central Council for Works and Buildings in the Ministry of Works). These roles, especially the last, gave him a significant place in planning for post-war reconstruction, in which he was already interested. Remembering his Moscow research and encouraged by the appointment of the Uthwatt Committee on Compensation and Betterment in planning, he began pressing in January 1941 for the abolition of private land ownership.

Land nationalisation had been a significant strand of reformist concern within the early planning movement in Britain before 1914 (eg Ward, 2002). Between the wars many cities, not least Manchester, had greatly increased their land holdings through their housing, slum clearance, parks and other programmes. But the campaign for public ownership of all land had largely languished, until the changed circumstances of war breathed new life into it.

In an attempt to strengthen the case, Ernest contacted the (very short-staffed) British Ambassador in Moscow, Stafford Cripps, in March 1941, seeking an update on the 1935 plan for the city. Not surprisingly he did not get one but turned his attention to the Deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, who was also the leader of the Labour Party. Simon argued that wartime, when the land market was at its lowest ebb, was the ideal time to institute public ownership. Attlee doubtless agreed but the Conservatives dominated the wartime coalition and the moves in this direction remained more cautious, even after 1945.

The most enduring fruit of his wartime work was *Rebuilding Britain: A Twenty Year Plan*, published in 1945, which called, amongst much else, for accelerated municipal land ownership as a prelude to complete nationalisation. He drew on foreign examples, starting with the USSR and referring to Moscow as 'the planner's paradise' (Simon, E.D., 1945: 129–33). Again the absence of private land ownership in the Soviet Union was a critical advantage and a positive lesson for Britain. Despite having received no new information since 1936, he confidently predicted the 1935 Moscow plan would be nearly complete by 1950.

Yet by then he also had positive democratic examples which achieved good planning results under democratic systems, notably Stockholm and Zurich, examined for his 1939 book, *The Smaller Democracies* (Simon, E.D., 1939: 35, 89–114; Simon, E.D., 1945: 157–62). He had also discovered planning in the United States while on a three month official tour with Shena in Autumn 1942 to boost awareness of British wartime efforts on the home front. Like others at that time, he was hugely impressed by the Tennessee Valley Authority which he judged as 'probably the world's most successful experiment in large-scale and long-term democratic planning' (Simon, E.D., 1945: 133). Despite these discoveries, however, his judgement on Soviet planning was more admiring in 1945 than in *Moscow in the Making*. The darker side of the Soviet Union was not mentioned but the magnificence of its war efforts were, for him, seeming confirmation that it really could achieve what it set out to do.

However, this wartime generosity of spirit was certainly not shared by one of his fellow Moscow authors. Rather more than Ernest Simon (or indeed any of the others), Jewkes had worked at the very heart of the wartime government machine (Ricketts, 2004; Cairncross, 2004). Successively he was Director of the Economic Section of the War Cabinet Secretariat (1941), Director General of Statistics and Programmes at the Ministry of Aircraft Production (1943) and Principal Assistant Secretary at the Office of the Minister of Reconstruction (1944). This intense experience of the operations of state planning agencies in these years had a dramatic effect on his thinking, but travelling in exactly the opposite direction to most of his peers. Rather than being impressed, as was Ernest Simon, by the greater rationality and efficiency that could be achieved by state planning, Jewkes feared instead its great capacity for waste, inefficiency and undermining of cherished freedoms.

He presented these views in a polemical but highly informed book called *Ordeal by Planning*, published in 1948 (Jewkes, 1948). In this he combined his observations of the British scene with frequent glances towards the Soviet Union, other totalitarian systems and the democracies which now seemed to be attracted to national economic planning. (Though Simon's 'planning' was more town- than economic planning, his proposals for housing, the building industry and land brought them together.) Along with Friedrich Hayek, whose 1944 book *The Road to Serfdom* (Hayek, 1944) had been a strong influence, Jewkes became an early prophet of the anti-collectivist economic liberalism that eventually triumphed in British policy thinking more than three decades later. By that time the Soviet Union, once the land of hope, was already nearing the point of terminal collapse.

Conclusions

Moscow in the Making remains a remarkable document of its time, a detailed and expert insight on one very important facet of what was still a largely unknown, but for progressive minds a fascinating, land. Some of the book's judgements now seem over-optimistic and over-charitable though they were certainly less so than many of the other accounts that were then also in circulation. Many positive aspects of Moscow's governance and policies are identified, particularly emphasising the boldness of the social programmes and the decisive powers and policies which existed to plan the city effectively. Also admired were the leadership and commitment and sense of exhilaration which animated all these policies. Although there were some differences in emphasis between the four authors, all acknowledged the severe weaknesses of a Soviet 'democracy' that relied on indoctrination through education and repression of counter-argument. Yet, with the exception of Jewkes, all the authors appear to have accepted the assumption that the market system was less efficient than rational state planning and associated loss of economic freedom.

The book was also an exercise in international lesson-drawing by the authors, using the Soviet knowledge which they had derived to inform and fashion arguments about the future role of the state in relation to Britain's urban future. It was part of an evolving policy debate during a very formative period, as new approaches to combat the perceived weaknesses of the prevailing system were being rehearsed. These ideas briefly became part of the mainstream during the 1940s. Increasingly however, a middle way that was closer to a market system was restored during the 1950s with this aspect becoming much more dominant from the later 1970s. In view of this, there is perhaps a temptation today to discount ideas whose salience may now seem completely depleted. Yet, as the book which follows shows, this is to close our eyes to forces which did much to shape the character of the last century, even in settings such as Britain which chose another path.

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

THE PALACE OF THE SOVIETS, MOSCOW

The model reproduced here shows what is apparently to be the tallest building in the world, 1,350 feet high, surmounted by a 260 foot statue of Lenin, and one-and-a-half times the height of the Eiffel Tower. The building has foundations that cover about 24 acres and a hall to accommodate 20,000 people.

MOSCOW IN THE MAKING

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PREFACE

By Sir E. D. Simon

My wife and I had long felt that the best way to attempt to understand something of the great Russian experiment would be to study a single aspect of Russian life which would bring us into effective contact with Russians dealing with a kind of work which we understood. We decided, therefore, to investigate the city government of Moscow, my wife dealing with educational administration, while I tackled housing and town planning. We were fortunate in securing the collaboration of Professor Jewkes and Dr. Robson to deal with the wider aspects of the work of the Mossoviet in finance and administration respectively which we thought would be necessary to a proper understanding of education and housing. We regret that it was not possible to deal with other important aspects of the work of the Mossoviet, particularly public health.

We found it exceedingly difficult to get printed information; in spite of efforts continued for many months, we got almost nothing in advance of our visit, and even while in Moscow we got comparatively little. But we were received in the most friendly manner by leading members and officials of the Mossoviet, who gave us, in some cases individually, in some cases jointly, interviews lasting from two to four hours, during which they explained the work on which they were engaged and answered our questions not only patiently, but, so far as we could judge, quite frankly as regards all matters dealing with the affairs of the Mossoviet.

We spent four weeks in Moscow, and so far as it was practicable each of us interviewed those officials of the Mossoviet and of the national government who were concerned with our own specialities. Some of us also paid short visits to Leningrad and Kharkov. We met each day to talk matters over, and found the mutual discussion and criticism helpful. But we did not always reach full agreement: for example, Professor Jewkes and Dr. Robson both dissociate themselves from some of the statements and views of the

other, and indeed we are perhaps none of us fully agreed as to the exact extent of the responsibilities and powers of the Mossoviet in relation to the central government. Many other differences of emphasis and interpretation can no doubt be found in the various chapters. *It should be made clear that each member takes responsibility only for his own chapter or chapters.* In many ways our investigation was carried out under great difficulties: we none of us spoke Russian, nor had we visited Moscow before. We apologize for any inconsistencies and inaccuracies that the book may prove to contain.

We owe our sincerest thanks to Mr. Maisky, the Russian Ambassador in London, to the Foreign Office in Moscow, who did much to help us, and to the numerous members and officials of the Mossoviet, who freely gave us much of their valuable time. Intourist looked after our travel arrangements admirably and provided us with excellent interpreters, who were in every way helpful and efficient. Voks were kind enough to provide us with an admirable interpreter for our more important interviews. We are most grateful to Dr. S. P. Turin, who was very helpful in finding Russian sources of information and summarizing or translating them for us.

We owe to Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb not only our thanks for encouragement and suggestions in our preliminary discussions; our whole investigation was due to the stimulus of their book *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*, which provided us with an invaluable background for understanding the work of the Mossoviet.

GLOSSARY

As the names and functions of the various organs of government are different from those to which we are accustomed, we give below a short list of the names which we propose to use throughout this book, and where necessary an explanation of what these names represent. Information on the constitution and functions of most of these Government organs can be found in *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

The Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R.

R.S.F.S.R., the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics.

The Council of People's Commissars or Sovnarkom, roughly equivalent to our Cabinet.

Commissariats of Education (Narkompros), Finance, Municipal Economy, Internal Trade, etc., roughly equivalent to our Ministries.

Commissars, equivalent to our Ministers.

State Planning Commission, known in the Soviet Union as GOSPLAN.

The Party, the Bolshevik or Communist Party.

The Central Committee of the Party, the Committee of the Party which signs national decrees. Stalin is general secretary.

The Moscow Party Committee, the organ of the Party which deals with Moscow affairs.

The Mossoviet, the Moscow City Council.

Plenum of Mossoviet, the whole body of elected members of the Mossoviet (over 2,000).

Sections of Mossoviet, equivalent to committees of an English city council, but much larger in number and without executive powers.

The Presidium of Mossoviet, a committee of fifteen; the executive body—head of the official hierarchy.

Departments of Mossoviet, groups of officials, each controlling some definite part of the work of Mossoviet, responsible to the Presidium. Similar to the department of an English local authority.

Trust, a self-contained administrative unit authorized to carry out some constructive or trading work on behalf of Mossoviet. Responsible to the Presidium, and often supervised by a department.

District Soviets, known in Moscow as Rayon Soviets, to whom are delegated certain local functions of the Mossoviet.

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CHAPTER I

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF MOSCOW

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

IF one were transported to Moscow blindfold and in ignorance of one's destination, and then set down with the bandage removed, it is unlikely that one would be able to infer from external manifestations that here was a city run on purely socialist lines, the capital of the only society in the modern world which has eliminated commercial trading for private profit, the employment of one man by another for personal gain, and the private ownership of land. The main highways are paved, cleansed, and lighted like those of any Western city, although some of the streets and squares are abnormally wide; the tramcars and trolly-buses rattle through the streets for all the world like similar vehicles in a capitalist country, save that they are incredibly overcrowded; the waterworks, the drainage system, the electrical generating station, the underground Metro, all fulfil their appropriate functions in a manner indistinguishable from similar appliances elsewhere. In short, much of what is done in the capital of the Soviet Union closely resembles what is done in any large city in Western Europe or America, at any rate so far as the end-result is concerned.

But the methods by which that end-result is obtained differ in many important respects from anything which is known in the West. Moreover, the city government of Moscow, in addition to the services which are commonly recognized in capitalist countries as being suitable subjects for municipal administration, is responsible directly or indirectly for a mass of functions whose range, magnitude, and importance far exceed anything which exists elsewhere in the field of local government. There is no city in the world where the local council has so much to do as in Russia; and yet local government has an entirely different connotation in the Soviet Union from what it has elsewhere.

THE MOSCOW CITY SOVIET (MOSSOVIET)

The principal body responsible for local government in Moscow is the City Soviet (Mossoviet). This body consists of a fluctuating number of persons elected in the usual soviet manner by voters grouped mainly in factories, transport undertakings, government offices, schools and colleges, trading units, and other vocational organizations. There is, however, little analogy between the Mossoviet and an ordinary local authority in other countries. A soviet is the organ of the governmental reigning power. It represents the government to every one and to every organ in Moscow, including the police, the courts, and the procurator. All the orders and many of the functions of the central government are carried out by the local soviet. Nevertheless, it would be a fundamental misconception to regard Mossoviet as a mere local instrument for the execution of central policy, comparable, let us say, to the prefecture in France. The student of political science can make no greater mistake than to conceive the government of Moscow and other cities in U.S.S.R. as examples of "deconcentrated" administration.[1]

The number of representatives to the full assembly or plenum is not fixed, but varies according to the number of voters, there being in Moscow and Leningrad one delegate for every 1,500 voters.[2] In 1936 the plenum of Mossoviet contained 2,116 persons, while that of Kharkov, for example, numbered 1,900. But in other cities the number of representatives and also the number of voters which each one represents is generally much smaller. To these totals must be added the alternates or substitutes which it is usual for the voters to elect to the city soviet. The number of alternates must not exceed one-third of the number of members.[3] In the Moscow plenum 578 members (27 per cent) were women.[4]

[1] See below pp. 42–3.

[2] The new draft constitution for R.F.S.F.R. provides that in Moscow and Leningrad the city soviet shall have one member for every 3,000 voters.

[3] The alternates may attend the meetings of the plenum by permission but not as of right. They may deliberate if asked to do so, but have no vote. They may automatically be appointed to replace members who are absent from sickness or some other cause.

[4] The age composition of the 2,116 deputies was as follows in 1936. 224 members were between 18 and 25 years old, 1,116 between 26 and 40 years, and 776 over 40 years. The occupation groups were as follows: 1,372 workmen, 159 higher employees, 321 engineers and technicians, 55 students, 66 soldiers, and 143 others.

Members of the soviet usually receive no salary as members, since they draw from their employers the normal wages or salary payable in respect of time spent on the business of the plenum. They are not merely entitled to take time off from their ordinary occupation to attend the sessions of the plenum, but are required to do so, since attendance is compulsory. Persons not normally employed at wages or salary may receive remuneration (at a rate fixed by the city soviet) out of municipal funds for time spent on the public business. This does not apply to married women supported by their husbands.

The Franchise

Under the new constitution the soviet is elected every two years. All citizens of either sex over the age of 18 in the year of the election, have the right to vote. Each employing organization which is sufficiently large is given separate representation. Shops, factories, offices, government departments, educational establishments, army units, and so forth serve as electoral constituencies. Persons who are not in employment, such as housewives, independent handicraftsmen, free-lance journalists, artists, and the like, meet and vote on premises assigned for this purpose in the neighbourhood of their residence.

The Method of Election

The election process has been so adequately described by Mr. and Mrs. Webb[1] that it is unnecessary to deal with it here at any length. There are, however, one or two aspects of the matter which deserve emphasis.

In the first place, much time and trouble is devoted to the preparations for the election, and especially to the task of selecting the candidates. This, no doubt, is one of the causes for the great popular interest which is taken in the elections. The usual practice seems to be for a joint meeting to be held of the party cell and the workers' committee in each electoral unit, for the purpose of drawing up a preliminary list of candidates. This list is then submitted to the assembly of the voters in that unit for election. The list is intended to be no more than a tentative or provisional selection, and it is frequently added to or revised during the course of the full meetings. The personal merits of the candidates are

[1] *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*, pp. 37–50.

discussed at great length and their past records scrutinized frankly and freely. Each candidate is expected to speak to the electors about himself and his qualifications for representing them in the local soviet. These meetings are often supplemented by articles in the newspaper or in the wall paper either by candidates or voters. The important point to note is that candidature for election is in no sense confined to nominees of the Communist Party nor to persons who have been chosen at the preliminary meeting, but is open to all who desire it, provided they can convince their fellow-workers of their suitability. The Party leaders in Moscow have, indeed, taken pains to explain to the people that they must elect a proportion of non-Party delegates, in order to avoid an excessive concentration of work and responsibility on the Party members.

The second point on which emphasis may be laid is the great importance attached to the Electors' Instructions which are formulated during the course of the election. Prior to the election the Communist Party drafts a programme in more or less general terms. This occupied on the last occasion about twenty printed pages. The Electors' Instructions may be regarded to some extent as a detailed expansion or interpretation of the government programme in terms of local needs. These Instructions, numbering a hundred thousand items or so, are subsequently printed in a large official volume which becomes, in the words of a high official, "the delegates' bible" during their term of office. The following extracts are taken from the volume current in 1936. First come some of the items in the government programme for Moscow:

THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET[1]

From the Instructions of the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party

In the sphere of the Communal Economy

We instruct the representatives:

To fulfil the Plan of the Reconstruction of Moscow in accordance with the instructions of Comrade Stalin:

[1] Based on the *Additions to the Instructions of the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), approved at the Election Meetings of the Mossoviet, in December 1934.* Published by the Mossoviet, 1935, pp. 366.

To accomplish and to put into operation the first section of the Moscow Metro in February 1935.

To fight for further development of the main drainage and water supply and to help the construction of the Moscow-Volga canal.

To pay special attention to the housing problem, repairs of houses and flats, to the building of new houses, and to assist the Housing Co-operatives.

To liquidate the existing workmen's homes and to replace them at the end of the Second Five Year Plan by comfortable flats for workmen (pp. 5–15).

In the sphere of Trade and Co-operation

We instruct our representatives to follow the directions of the leader of the Party, Comrade Stalin and

To develop as much as possible the turnover of goods, to improve the State, Co-operative, and Kolkhoses' trade, to increase the number of shops and stores and to enlarge the trading basis.

Yet special attention must be paid to the development of the individual workmen's vegetable gardens (i.e. allotments).

We instruct also our representatives to increase the local industry and to improve the quality of goods, especially the repair of boots, shoes, and other objects of domestic use (pp. 11–12).

In the sphere of Education and protection of Health

We make it the duty of the representatives to carry out in full the Resolution of the TSIK. and of the Party as regards the improvement of the quality of the whole educational work in the schools, the increase of the number of teachers (cadres) and the introduction of strict discipline in the classes.

We instruct our representatives to take great care of the health of toilers and their children, to increase medical assistance to the population, especially in villages, by building new hospitals and improving the existing ones; to increase the supply of medicines, to insist on rendering more careful and attentive assistance to the patients and to raise the qualification of medical staffs.

The representatives must pay constant attention to the improvements of cultural conditions of work and rest in the schools, clubs, reading houses, public baths and laundries, as well as to the improvement of village and city life in general.

These are followed by a number of recommendations coming from the local districts into which the city is divided:[1]

[1] The additions suggested by the factories and other electoral organizations in each district occupy pp. 19–349. They were summarized at the end of the book (pp. 349–67).

1. To abolish the ration cards and to increase the supply of bread.
2. To increase the supply of musical instruments and cameras.
3. To increase the production of watches and clocks and to improve their quality.
4. To prosecute the speculators.
5. To increase and to improve the trade of goods for "mass consumption."
6. To develop sports and to increase the sports industry.
7. To install telephones and radios in every house.
8. To increase the supply of bicycles.
9. To build swimming pools in every district.
10. To lay down special tracks for bicycles along the pavement.
11. To reduce the price for tickets in the theatres and cinemas.
12. To open more dining-rooms and cafés on the outskirts of Moscow.
13. To build more mechanical laundries and to reduce the rates for washing.
14. To introduce more strict discipline for drivers.
15. To build one more gas-works in Moscow.
16. To build more theatres and cinemas on the outskirts of Moscow.
17. To introduce uniform dress for pupils and students.
18. To supply the suburbs of Moscow with main water and drainage.
19 (and 26). To improve conditions in the summer villas (dachas).
20. To finish the construction of the Metro.
21. To publish more works of Lenin and Marx and to increase the Marxist-Leninist literature.
22. To publish more copies of all daily newspapers.
23. To light the streets in winter in the early morning, when workmen proceed to the places of their work.
24. To increase the supply of electricity and to reduce the charges for its consumption and the prices of electrical appliances.
25. To increase the number of taxis in Moscow.
26. (See 19.)
27. To increase the number of crèches, children's homes, etc.
28. To increase and to improve the workshops for repair of boots and clothes and to reduce prices for their repair.
29. To prohibit riding in the buses in dirty workmen's clothes and dresses.
30. To introduce electric lighting in the side streets.

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31. To build more houses for workmen and to increase the existing area of floor space for each individual.

32. To improve the tramway service.

33–34, and 42. To increase the publication of children's books, to produce more toys, bicycles for children, etc.

35. To fix lower rates of rents in private houses.

36. To improve the sanitary service and to increase the number of inspectors. All houses must be disinfected regularly in order to kill mice, bugs, etc.

37. To improve conditions of teaching in the schools.

38. To build more rest-houses (i.e. holiday homes).

39. To increase and to improve hospitals and render better assistance to the patients.

40. To bring into workable condition all the existing lifts in the houses.

41. To rename Sokolnichesky district Kaganovich district.

42. (See 33.)

43. To take more effective measures in fighting drunkenness and hooliganism.

44. To increase the number of shops selling food, to introduce paper bags for goods sold and to organize delivery of goods to the houses.

45. To introduce permits for motor-bicycles and for loud speakers.

46. To take care of the existing trees, to plant new ones, as well as fruit trees.

47. To decrease the number of homeless children, to prohibit children from riding on the steps and buffers of the tramways and from selling cigarettes.

48. To build a school for mentally defective children.

49. (See 47.)

50. To increase the number of policemen in the suburbs and to introduce night-watchmen there.

51. To allocate common rooms for children in the theatres.

52. To increase the number of public lavatories.

53. To build a new bridge at the Rzhevsky station.

54. (See 24.)

55. To improve the postal service.

56. To asphalt roads and by-passes round Moscow and to make pavements in the suburbs.

57. To pay more attention to the architecture of buildings.

58. To introduce the hire-purchase system for buyers of furniture.

59. To control regularly the passports (*permis de sèjour*) in Moscow.

60. To increase shops for the sale of building materials.

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61. To increase the supply of text-books and to reduce their prices.

62. To build special vegetable stores in order not to store vegetables in the basements. To open local stores for potatoes.

63. To increase the number of auto-buses and trolly-buses and to extend their service till 2.0 a.m.

64. To improve the service of local trains.

65. To build more institutions for the deaf and dumb and for incurables.

66. To increase the number of libraries and reading rooms.

67. To regulate the Moscow traffic and to diminish the noise of the traffic.

68. To instruct the representatives of the Mossoviet to make their reports to the electors not less than three or four times a year.

69–75. To deal with local improvements of certain places in Moscow.

76. To produce a larger assortment of toilet soaps.

77. To increase the number of maternity homes and homes for abortion.

78–79. To build a new Pioneer House and a cinema theatre in the Stalinsky district, as well as a new theatre.

80. To erect a new building for the Stalinsky district soviet.

81. To transfer the chemical workshops in the Pugachev str. on the outskirts of Moscow.

82. To issue a new loan for the needs of cultural construction.

83. To increase the production of boots and galoshes.

84. To increase the ration of fuel.

85. To lay down a new auto-bus line from the centre to the Sokolinaya Gora.

86. To close down three more churches in Moscow.

87. To develop the experiments done by the electro-works.

88. To increase military training in order to be able to defend the country.

These Instructions are not left in cold storage nor regarded as pious hopes intended only for election purposes. They are analysed according to their subject-matter, and it is then the duty of the various sections and departments of Mossoviet to take them into consideration and to see how far they are capable of being carried out. In every case a decision must be given stating whether the proposal can be adopted and if not, why not. The representatives report back these decisions to their respective constituencies. A statement showing the extent of fulfilment is published at regular intervals explaining

the manner in which the Electors' Instructions have been dealt with.[1]

Every representative is expected to meet his electors for the purpose just mentioned at least once a year; in some cases meetings are held as often as once a quarter, but there is no fixed interval. If the electors are dissatisfied with their representative they can recall him at any time; and in Moscow some fifteen delegates were recalled during the four years prior to 1936. The grounds of complaint on which the recall is based are not necessarily confined to shortcomings in the performance of official duties. Occasionally a member of Mossoviet has lost his seat as a result of slackness in his ordinary work.

Another matter which may be noted in connection with elections is the appointment of an Electoral Commission which is set up on the occasion of each election and dissolved thereafter. The Commission is organized by Mossoviet and consists of about twenty-five members of the plenum. It works under a similar body which is set up to supervise the elections to R.S.F.S.R., and this latter body is in turn under an *ad hoc* Electoral Commission for the whole Soviet Union. The task of the Commission is to see that the election is carried out properly in accordance with the constitutional law and practice and in harmony with Soviet views concerning democracy. The Commission has, in addition, certain specific functions. Hitherto it has been required, for example, to examine the lists of persons nominated for election in order to see that they contain no members of the deprived classes.[2] It is responsible for seeing that election meetings are held in each electoral unit, and a member of the Commission is expected to be present at each meeting. It is required to compile election statistics.

[1] *Additions to the Instruction of the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, which were fulfilled by the departments, trusts, and other organizations of the Mossoviet on the 15th April 1935.* Moscow, Mossoviet, 1935, p. 32. This pamphlet contains a detailed list of the works done in accordance with some of the instructions of representatives.

[2] This feature of the Commission's work will presumably be greatly reduced now that the new constitution has come into operation, for the deprived classes are therein admitted to full civic rights. Article 136 of the constitution declares that every citizen has a right to elect and be elected irrespective of race or nationality, religion, standard of education, domicile, social origin, property status or past activities. There will still be certain persons deprived from voting, such as those certified to be of unsound mind or those deprived as part of a judicial sentence.

Up to the present elections have been decided by a show of hands, but under the new constitution a secret ballot has been introduced.

A General View of the Administrative Structure

The organization of Mossoviet differs considerably from that of an English municipality. The supreme body for administrative purposes is the presidium, a committee of fifteen persons elected by the plenum and directly responsible to it. There are thirteen departments dealing with the following matters:

Finance
Education.
Public health.
Town planning.
Construction projects.
Land.
City trading (department stores, cafés, restaurants, inspection of prices, location of stores).
Veterinary.
Housing (allocation of rooms, dwellings, etc.).
Parks and green belt.
Social insurance.
Roads and river banks.
Underground construction (i.e. sewers and other works below street-level).

In a separate category are nine management divisions dealing with the following subjects:

Local industry.
House management.
Construction.
Building inspection.
Telephone service.
Transport.
Savings banks and state credit.
Entertainments.
Arts.
Post and newspapers.
Broadcasting.

The distinction between the departments and the management divisions is not easy to grasp. The main difference

appears to be that the former are for the most part engaged in directly administering the services for which Mossoviet is responsible, while the latter are occupied in supervising or controlling the activities of the numerous operating trusts which carry on so much of the work in the Soviet Union. For example, the construction division is responsible for the erection of all the buildings which Mossoviet undertakes under the plan for the reconstruction of the city. But the work is carried out through such bodies as the school building trust and the house building trust. This division also manages ten construction trusts operating in the ten rayons or districts into which Moscow was until recently divided.[1] Again, the transport division is in charge of trusts dealing with the tramways, the trolly-bus system, motor vehicles, and so forth. The local industry division is responsible for fourteen city trusts engaged in manufacturing a wide variety of commodities ranging from musical instruments to excavators, and eighteen district trusts operating in the several rayons. The building inspection division is concerned with ensuring that construction works are carried out in conformity with the city plan. Its approval has to be obtained before and after a building has been erected; it has to be satisfied that the use of the land for that purpose has been duly authorized, and that the persons in charge of the construction are properly qualified.

It would take me far beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into a discussion on the nature of a trust in the Soviet Union. But it may be said that most of the productive and distributive work is carried out through organs of this type. Each trust is a commission or board, a legal entity with its own budget, plan of work, personnel, and management. The director is personally responsible for the results of its work.

Standing apart from both the departments and the management divisions are fourteen local organizations or institutions, such as:

The Mossoviet bank (for use in connection with the municipality's own operations).
The pawnshop.
The planetarium.
The Zoo.

[1] There are now twenty-three districts; and the number of local construction trusts may be increased to this figure.

The institute for the study of traffic problems.
The machinery for the arbitration of disputes between public bodies.
The co-operatives engaged in house building.
Park of Culture and Rest.

Next come the sections, of which there are twenty-five. A section is a committee of the elected members of Mossoviet (to which may be added, by co-option, "activists" and alternates or substitutes) charged with the supervision of a particular service. The sections do not correspond precisely in their subject-matter with the departments or the management divisions; but nevertheless every executive organ is in relation with one or more sections. The list of sections is as follows:

Building.
Housing.
Schools.
Roads, bridges, and river banks.
Public health.
Main drainage.
Railway transport.
Culture.
Tramways.
Local trading.
Communal economy.
Sewage, lighting, green belt and parks.
Public feeding.
Court, prosecution, police, and fire.
Local industry and co-operation.
Homeless children.
Communication.
Elimination of adult illiteracy.
Metro.
Motor and horse traffic.
Finance.
Defence.
Fuel.
Anti-aircraft defence.
Agriculture.

Mention must also be made of about a dozen miscellaneous offices devoted to various special tasks which cluster

round the presidium and are in more or less direct relation with it. Typical instances of these are the Staff Committee, the Inventions Bureau, the editorial office of *The Reconstruction of Moscow*, and the inspectorates of adult schools, libraries, and town planning.

Finally, there are two bodies which occupy a position of special importance in the general scheme of administration. First, there is the City Planning Commission, which is responsible for drawing up the great plan for the reconstruction of Moscow now in process of being carried out. Second, there is a body known as Orgotdel, which organizes the sections, co-ordinates their work, and in general supervises all work connected with the delegates.

With this general picture in mind we can now examine the various parts of the system in greater detail.

The Presidium

The most conspicuous feature of the government of Moscow is the concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of the presidium. This body is elected by the plenum for a period of two years. It is quite common to re-elect the members, and in 1936 about half of them were serving their second terms of office. There is no recall.

Of the fifteen members, only the chairman, three vice-chairmen, and secretary devote their whole time to the work of the presidium, and even these five occupy in addition certain other leading positions in the work of the city. Thus, the present chairman (Mr. Bulganin) is head of the tramway trust, which in view of the overcrowding of vehicles has become a service of great importance. The principal vice-chairman (Mr. Mailbart) is chairman of the City Planning Commission. The acting secretary is head of the water supply trust, which is closely concerned with the vast undertaking to connect the Moscow and Volga rivers by means of a series of canals.

The remaining ten members are (with one or two exceptions) engaged in full-time administrative work under Mossoviet. Among them are such leading officials as the head of the finance department, the head of the construction division, and the head of the public health department. One of the exceptions mentioned above is Mr. Kaganovich, who

at the present time occupies the position of Commissar of Transport for the U.S.S.R. While all the members of the presidium are full-time salaried officials, only the five mentioned above receive salaries for their work on the presidium.

It is no doubt highly desirable that the presidium should include the principal executive officers in charge of the most important departments of the municipality. But there is nothing in the constitution which requires this to be done. The normal method of electing the presidium is for the Party to nominate a list of candidates which is submitted to the plenum and discussed in detail by that body. Any one is free to propose an alteration or to offer himself for election. In general, however, the party list is usually accepted; and my impression is that the ablest administrators with whom we came in contact were members of the presidium.

Even a cursory glance at the presidium reveals the fact that the distinction between the elected councillor and the professional official, so deeply rooted in English local government, is entirely absent in the soviet system. The members of the presidium, and many of the officials in various departments, are at one and the same time representatives elected to the plenum and paid servants of the city soviet. Large numbers of the schoolteachers, doctors, and engineers employed by Mossoviet are also members of the plenum and members of one of its sections.

The presidium resembles a cabinet of ministers on the English model more closely than it does any feature of British municipal institutions, although even here the analogy must not be pushed too far. But there is the same kind of responsibility to the elected assembly, a similar concentration of power, the same opportunity for energetic leadership and closely co-ordinated action, which is found in the British Cabinet system. Among municipal institutions the closest analogy is perhaps to be found in the *Stadskollegiet* in Stockholm; but an important difference is that in that body several of the principal members are chosen not from elected members of the city council but from outside persons.[1]

The presidium is the supreme executive organ of Mossoviet.

[1] See my article on "The City Government in Stockholm," in *The Municipal Journal*, July 17th 1936.

It has full authority to carry out the policies of the plenum and to implement its plans. This means, of course, that it has to make frequent decisions on its own initiative and in practice is largely responsible for formulating the plans on which the plenum bases its policy. The entire administrative machine is subject to the actual or potential control of the presidium; and any one who contemplates the magnitude and diversity of the tasks which are entrusted to the city government, and the comparative infrequency with which the plenum meets, will appreciate the immense concentration of authority which exists under this form of organization. The members of the presidium with whom we came in contact did not deny the difficulty of endeavouring to control so vast a range of functions as those performed by Mossoviet.

The presidium meets every few days. The five full-time members are, however, in frequent informal conference with each other in between the meetings. Much of the business is disposed of by written minutes circulated to the members individually and on which they record their assent to a proposed course of action. Where any one disagrees, the matter goes to the full presidium for discussion. Voting is unusual in the presidium, partly because the exploration of matters coming before it is so thorough that it is possible to obtain general consent to a course of action.

There are no sub-committees of the presidium, but each of the full-time members takes charge of certain functions as a matter of day-to-day administrative convenience, although the presidium as a whole remains collectively responsible for the work of the soviet. Thus, the chairman at present takes the Metro, the Volga-Moscow canal, land, fuel, tramways, local trade, embankments, city constructions, planning projects, while one of the vice-chairmen takes the city planning commission, finance, local industry, co-operatives, housing, etc. This means in practice that where the head of a department or trust has a question to be decided by the presidium, or which is at any rate beyond his own competence, he goes to the particular member of the presidium to whom that particular department or trust has been allocated. It is usual to invite the head of a department, management division, section or trust to attend a session of the presidium when the affairs of his unit are being discussed.

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The Plenum

The plenum is the supreme organ of Mossoviet, the highest legislative and policy-making body for Moscow. "The soviet," states Kaganovich, "is a permanently functioning legislative organization, which controls and supervises not only the enterprises belonging to the city, but all other economic activities carried on within its territory."[1]

The soviet system provides small constituencies and a very large council, while the English system results in large constituencies and a small council. Those who are accustomed to the institutions of Western democracy are easily tempted to assume that an assembly of more than 2,000 elected delegates can be of small importance or value as an organization for deciding the main lines on which a city shall be governed. In England it is often felt that a town council of even a hundred members or so is too large for effective discussion. But it is dangerous to argue from one country to another, especially when the economic, social, political, and psychological background is entirely different. One of the most surprising results of my inquiry was the gradual realization that this vast assembly of delegates does in fact play an important and active part in the city government.

The plenum meets every six or eight weeks, and its session may last several days. It usually sits from about 5 p.m. till midnight. Any member may bring a matter before it, but obviously major questions require adequate preparation beforehand and are submitted by the presidium. At the time of our visit steps were being taken by the presidium to prepare a winter programme for submission to the plenum at its autumn meeting. This included such matters as the repairing of houses, the storage of vegetables, wood, and coal, the provision of warm clothes, the clearing away of snow, and other items needing attention with the arrival of the cold weather.

The plenum determines the plan of construction for the whole year. It decided, *inter alia*, to build 152 schools in 1936 and approved the total size of each, the number of children to be accommodated, the cost per cubic metre and the number of classrooms and floors—within the limits of discretion permitted by the Commissariat of Education. The

[1] *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow*, pp. 77–8 (English translation), published by the Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1931.

actual plans for each building did not go before the plenum but were left to be settled by the presidium. The plenum could, however, demand to see any design it desired, or, for that matter, can call for any document or information relating to any aspect of the city government.

The Budget is doubtless the most important piece of business coming regularly before the whole assembly. The budgetary procedure is elaborate and complicated owing to the large number of separate enterprises and accounting authorities whose finances have to be included. Briefly, the budget is prepared in the finance department, from there it goes to the City Planning Commission, and thence to the presidium. It goes from the presidium to another body (not yet described) called the Ispolkom and then to the plenum. Changes in the draft may be made by the presidium, by Ispolkom, and by the plenum. But the plenum is the final authority. It can rescind alterations introduced by the other organs and must always be informed of any changes that have been made or proposed by them.

For the purpose of examining the budget the plenum organizes itself into four committees (comprising about sixty delegates in all) whose duty it is to conduct preliminary inquiries. These committees deal respectively with (1) general economy, (2) public health, (3) education, (4) public utilities. The head of the finance department presents the budget to each of these committees, and they report to the full plenum, which remains in session.

The plenum is by no means a mere rubber-stamping body as regards the budget. It acts, indeed, as the chief centre of criticism as well as the final court of appeal. Representations from the sections, from trade unions, from factories and other organizations pour into the committees and the plenum during the budget discussions; and substantial changes are sometimes made. For example, in the budget for 1936, among other alterations, the appropriation for children's parks was increased from 1 million roubles to 2½ millions; the housing programme was increased by two blocks of flats for tramway employees—inserted on the motion of the employees in question; the expenditure on linen at a children's hospital was increased; and provision made for providing part of the cost of uniforms for motor-bus drivers.

The mechanics of budget-making and the limits within

which change is permissible are dealt with by Professor Jewkes elsewhere in this volume. I am concerned here only to indicate the role played, within those limits, by the plenum. That role is certainly not a minor one. The head of an important trust explained to us that if he requires more money for capital construction than he has been allocated in the draft budget, he must go to the plenum and demand it. The delegates then will almost certainly ask him, "From where shall we take this extra money for which you are asking?" If he can tell them, he may get it! The plenum, it must be noted, contains the heads of most of the Mossoviet trusts and departments.

The plenum is active in many other directions. It decides where blocks of flats or houses shall be built and how many of each type shall be constructed. It was asked to approve the plans (in principle, not in detail) for five new bridges required in connection with the raising of the Moscow river by the Moscow-Volga canal. It receives an annual report on the work of the public health department from the head official and criticizes the work of the department. If it is dissatisfied with the progress made in any direction it may order building to be speeded up, material to be provided, or an enlargement of the programme of work to be undertaken.

The plenum, remarked one chief official, is a very powerful body. "When it meets, the fireworks begin." One side of its work is to investigate individual complaints and to perform something not unlike what in England would be called the redress of grievances. The following is an instance of this. It is a rule that all delegations which desire to lodge complaints at Mossoviet must be received forthwith by a member of the presidium or a responsible official. This was not complied with on one occasion. A member who was present with the delegation reported the incident to the plenum together with the names of the offending parties. The failure to receive the delegation was criticized and the subject-matter of the grievance discussed by the plenum.

The plenum is, then, a genuine working body which decides many important questions of policy and acts as the principal arena for the ventilation of grievances. One of the leading figures in the Soviet Union, L. M. Kaganovich, has recently declared that "ceremonial plenary sections" of the city soviets should be discontinued in order that the

plenum should be free to devote itself to more serious tasks and raise its work to a higher level.[1]

The procedure is much less strictly regulated than one would expect in such a large body. Speeches are short, the usual length being about ten minutes. The plenum itself decides how long each speaker shall be permitted to occupy the time of the assembly. Members of the presidium enjoy no prior rights of speech or other privileges over the rank and file of the delegates.

The efficiency of the plenum is largely determined by the fact that there are no party divisions among the members to obscure or impede the discussion of the matters coming before it. An understanding of the spirit of the plenum is necessary to an understanding of its functioning. It is said to possess, like all units of government in the Soviet Union, a "natural discipline" arising from the single common interest of the members and the absence of sectional divisions. So that, despite frequent criticism of the presidium in particular matters, it is inspired by a genuine unity.

To judge the accuracy of this claim would require a prolonged study involving a considerable period of residence in Moscow. But there is nothing inherently improbable about it when the special circumstances of the social and economic environment are taken into account. A great part of the struggles and dissensions which occupy the time of the local authorities in most countries is due to conflicts of interest between taxpayers and the recipients of social services, between the competing rights of property owners and the needs of the poorer classes. When these are removed, much of the dissension inevitably disappears also. The point of view which was frequently expressed by leading administrators is that every meeting of the plenum brings some definite help to the presidium and the executive organs, in the form of encouragement, support, suggestions or criticism. The representatives do not seek to reverse or revise the activities of the presidium but rather to assist and further its aims.

Ispolkom

Mention has been made above of a body known as the Ispolkom. This is a committee of the plenum consisting of

[1] *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow* (English Edition, Moscow, 1931), p. 78.

about seventy representatives to which important questions are sometimes referred. Its function is presumably to enable a more detailed examination to be made of matters on which the plenum is required to make a decision than is possible with a large assembly. It is an organ of the plenum and reports to that body. The Ispolkom is somewhat anomalous, coming as it does between the plenum on the one hand and the presidium on the other. It appears to occupy a position of declining importance.

The Departments

A department of Mossoviet closely resembles one of the departments in an English local authority. It is an administrative branch possessing specialized functions, manned by a paid full-time professional or clerical staff acting under the instructions of a chief officer.

We may take as an example the public health department which is, as elsewhere, engaged in one of the most important spheres of work for which Mossoviet is responsible. It deals with the whole mass of activity directed towards the prevention and cure of disease in all its aspects. This involves the operation of a vast network of medical institutions in the city, comprising hospitals, clinics, polyclinics, dispensaries, and ambulatoria. It includes maternity and child welfare work, the inspection of food, sanitation and drainage, the treatment of mental disease, and many other services. Some of the highly specialized hospitals employing eminent physicians or surgeons serve a wider area than the city of Moscow, and in some instances are available for patients coming from any part of the Soviet Union. The public health department also sends out doctors to the provinces to assist local practitioners.

The magnitude of the work of the department may be gauged from the size of its staff, which numbers 40,000, including 8,000 physicians and surgeons. There is, indeed, scarcely any medical work in the city which falls outside the public health department. The entire service is provided free of charge from top to bottom.

Another department which is worth noticing is that for local industry. This department is responsible for some fourteen industrial trusts engaged in manufacturing a great variety of products, including bricks (for which there are

ten factories), building materials, central heating apparatus, cranes, gas cookers and stoves, kerosene cookers and lamps, glass and table ware, furniture, musical instruments, overcoats, shirts, haberdashery, razors, medical equipment, excavators, cranes, and many other articles. These trusts employ at present 80,000 workers. Some of them serve only the local market while others manufacture for a wider public.

The department of local industry is also responsible for supervising the work of eighteen industrial trusts operating in the rayons or districts into which Moscow is divided. These district trusts employ a further 22,000 workers in some fifty-two workshops. They are organized on a territorial basis, whereas the city trusts are organized according to industries. They produce knitwear, shoes, beds, window frames, electric reading lamps, and many other commodities, and are also engaged in repairing shoes, watches, clothing, etc.

The Sections

It has already been pointed out that the delegates to Mossoviet are organized in twenty-five sections dealing with various services or functions.[1] These sections are less powerful than the committees of an English local authority, since the executive control lies with the presidium; but they nevertheless occupy an important place in the soviet structure.

The sections are organized by Orgotdel, and they vary in size to a surprising extent. The one dealing with public health has 600 elected representatives of Mossoviet, and in addition 1,000 so-called "activists," i.e. persons of energy and public spirit who are anxious to devote their spare time to assisting a particular part of the work of Mossoviet. The section dealing with local industry has 170 members. The school section comprises 88 delegates together with 10 alternates or substitutes and 9 activists.[2] The finance section consists of only 30 members.

Every representative is required to become a member of

[1] A few of the sections are compulsory, in particular those dealing with communal economy, finance, education, public health, and local trading. Other sections are created by resolution of the city soviet as and when required. See Regulations as to City Soviets of October 24th 1925, Articles 46 and 47, reproduced in Sidney and Beatrice Webb's: *Soviet Communism*, Appendix to Chapter II, p. 471.

[2] Activists and alternates are present at meetings and take part in discussion but do not vote.

a section, but he can choose the one he wishes to join. It is not customary for representatives to belong to more than one section; the idea is looked on with disfavour on the ground that representatives could not do the work of more than one section thoroughly. Service in a section is unpaid.

The absence of a hard and fast line between the elected representative and the paid official is emphasized to a marked extent in the personnel of the sections. The members of the plenum who are employed by Mossoviet tend to seek service on the sections which deal with their particular fields of work. Thus, there are no less than forty teachers and pedagogical experts in the school section, while the public health section includes many doctors, sanitary workers, and other persons employed by the public health department. The chief official in a department or management division engaged on the work with which a section is concerned must always be included among its members.

The central idea underlying the formation of the sections is to enable a large proportion of the masses to participate in municipal work and to attract people to become members of the city soviet. The sections are, on the one hand, organs for inculcating interest, enthusiasm, propaganda into the citizens as regards the work of the city soviet; on the other hand, they act as lines of communication between Mossoviet and the electors, enabling it to become informed of complaints, deficiencies, new ideas. They probably operate most effectively in the sphere of cultural, educational, health and welfare services, but even in a technical field like transport the section plays a part of indubitable importance. This is indicated by the fact that M. Kaganovich, the Commissar of Transport for the whole Soviet Union, finds it worth while to be a member of the transport section of Mossoviet and to attend its meetings.

The legal regulations state that the sections assist in the work of the city soviet in general, and also supervise the work of the executive organs of the soviet.[1] But the sections themselves are not in their corporate capacity executive bodies in the ordinary sense. Nor can a section infringe the executive functions of an administrative department. Hence, any matter calling for the exercise of executive power, such as the expenditure of money, the construction

[1] Webb, loc. cit.

of buildings, and so forth, must be dealt with by the department concerned acting under the authority of the presidium.

The functions of a section are laid down by law as follows:[1]

A section:

(*a*) Considers the plans of work in its branch of economy and administration.

(*b*) Hears the reports of the corresponding organs and gives their conclusions upon them to the plenum or presidium.

(*c*) Considers the fundamental problems of the current work of the executive organs and gives its conclusions upon them.

(*d*) Studies the work in institutions, undertakings, etc., in the corresponding branch of economy and administration.

(*e*) Attaches members of the section to undertakings and institutions, who serve the city in their branch of work, in order to supervise and assist their work.

(*f*) Hears the report of the bureau as to the carrying out of the plan and of the resolutions of the section.

(*g*) Appoints standing commissions (sub-sections) to ensure closer contact with separate branches of the executive apparatus in the corresponding department of administration and economy.

(*h*) Appoints temporary commissions to work on separate problems.

(*i*) Considers the proposals, resolutions, etc., brought forward by various institutions, organizations, and individuals in the corresponding branch of work.

(*j*) Considers similar projects and resolutions brought forward by various institutions, organizations, and individuals in the corresponding branch of work.

(*k*) Takes part in the working-out of plans and projects relating to the fundamental problems of the work of corresponding executive organs in meetings and conferences, etc., called by them.

From this it will be seen the function of the sections is to inspect, advise, inquire, and propose. Their resolutions go direct to the presidium where they are accepted, rejected, or modified. In practice, of course, each department is

[1] Webb, loc. cit., Article 52.

aware of what the relevant section is doing, for the departmental head is a member of the section; but the section is in direct relation with the presidium and does not have to go through the department. Conversely, the head of a department can, if he desires, report direct to the presidium or the plenum, but the presidium must invite the representatives of the section to attend its meeting when a decision is made on such a report. And if the representatives have not had notice of any proposal arising therefrom prior to the meeting they can demand to have it removed from the agenda.

In general, each section works in organic relation with the presidium on the one hand and with a department on the other. The suggestions or proposals of the presidium are often the basis of the work of a section, and problems which require investigation are sent by the presidium to the appropriate section. For example, the presidium emphasized in the autumn of 1936 the great importance of the opening of the school year on September 1st, following the construction of a hundred and fifty new schools; and in pursuance of this lead the members of the school section spent much time inspecting new schools, seeing how the children were received, noting the conduct of teachers, finding out how the special schools were working, and performing similar tasks. Conversely, the presidium is frequently engaged in working out problems or remedying complaints which have come to its attention through the reports of the sections.

The section recommends, advises, complains, and even demands. The presidium decides. There is, however, a strong tendency on the part of the presidium to give the sections support and encouragement, and to work in close harmony with them. There seems even to be a willingness to give the views of a section preference over those of a department. When the presidium is about to consider business coming from a section, it is usual for the chairman and vice-chairman of the latter to be asked to attend the meeting of the presidium. The final authority, in case of a disagreement, is the plenum of Mossoviet; but I was not able to discover any instance where a matter had been taken beyond the presidium.

The relations between a department and its section are

normally quite harmonious. The department submits a plan of its work to the section at regular intervals and keeps the members informed of its work from time to time. A good official in charge of a department will naturally seek to carry the section along with him on all major issues of policy, even in regard to matters on which the sections have in theory no right to interfere. The section can in its turn require the head official to give full information about everything coming within its field of work.

A "close-up" view may be given of the work of the school section.[1] Among the matters which have recently engaged the attention of this section the following may be mentioned: the selling of educational books in the schools instead of in book-shops; the requirement that the trust for feeding children should provide its own fuel in each school instead of relying on the school to do so. In each instance the presidium agreed to the recommendation of the section without demur. Another function of the school section is to investigate complaints as to the running of a school. If they found a school was badly managed they would recommend that the director of the school should be removed.

Where a matter concerns two or three different sections it is usual for a joint meeting to take place between members of the various sections. Thus, vacation treats for children at theatres or cinemas are dealt with at joint meetings of the school and culture sections; the feeding of children is arranged at a joint session of the school and public feeding sections; the question of school books at joint sessions of the school and local trading sections. The full section usually meets every month for one or two evenings. Voting is part of the normal procedure of a section; but adverse resolutions on the work of the presidium, or votes of censure on a department, are unknown.

The Bureau

The sections are too large to act effectively through the whole body of members. In consequence, each section is required to appoint a bureau, consisting of a small group of members amongst whom the chief official of the department

[1] There are two other sections which deal with other aspects of education: the culture section, which at present is concerned with the training of teachers for higher schools, technicums, etc., and the section for eliminating adult illiteracy.

must be included, although in no circumstances may he act as chairman. A bureau consists of about five persons elected by the plenum of the section from its own members, who continue to act on a part-time basis without remuneration. They in turn elect the chairman, vice-chairman, and the secretary (who is paid). The bureau meets every few days.

The bureau is the executive organ of the section. It is responsible for the preparation of matters to be laid before the full meeting of the section; it collects and systematizes material, keeps the register of members of the section and its sub-committees, records the attendances at meetings, draws up reports as to the activities of the section, forwards its resolutions to the proper quarters, observes whether they are accepted, and takes part in the meetings of the presidium through its chairman or vice-chairman, when invited to do so.[1] The bureau is thus engaged partly in acting as a secretariat, partly in conducting inspections and partly in preparing plans for submission to the section or to the presidium. It is both the driving force within the section and the organ for carrying out its policy.

The following is an official record of a meeting of the bureau of the school section held on September 2nd 1936:

Minutes of the Meeting of the Bureau of the School Section of the Mossoviet held on September 2nd 1936

(A SUMMARY)

The following were present: six members of the Bureau, seven brigadiers, representatives of the Mossoviet, five elected representatives of the Mossoviet, and representatives of a number of organizations, including:

The Education Department of Mossoviet (Mosgorono).
The Moscow Public Feeding Organization (Mosnarpit).
Public Feeding Section.
38th School of the Octyabrsky rayon.
The School of the Metrostroi at the Station Los.
15th School of the Kirovsky rayon.
Children's Garden N 2.
42nd School of the Fono (a local district).
24th School of the Bono (a local district).
Education Department of the Stalinsky district.

[1] Article 59 of the Regulations, loc. cit.

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF MOSCOW

AGENDA

1. Com. Dubrovina (head of the education department of Mossoviet).
   On the fulfilment of the instructions of the representatives by the Mosgorono (education department of Mossoviet).
2. Com. Volchenkova.
   On the agreement of the Mosgorono with the Mosnarpit (public feeding organization).
3. Com. Vishnevskaya.
   Sorevnovanie (emulation) in teaching Russian.
4. Councillor Gussev.
   Teachers' lodgings in the Stalin district.
5. Com. Kaplanova.
   School libraries.
6. Complaints of the citizen Gorelikova whose children were refused admission to the children's home.

1. The Report of Com. Dubrovina.

The following resolution was passed:

The Bureau, taking into consideration

(i) That the Mosgorono have fulfilled 167 instructions of the representatives out of a total number of 250.

(ii) That the Gorono have paid due attention to the instructions of the representatives and

(iii) That only some of the accomplished works were not of the required quality.

(1) Approves the Report of Com. Dubrovina and her statement as to the remaining 83 instructions.

(2) Agrees that, as a rule, written reports as to the fulfilment of the instructions of the representatives have to be presented.

(3) Supports the petition of the Gorono for two new houses for the teachers.

(4) Asks Councillors Nodel and Ivanova to investigate the financial arrangements as to the work with children in the Zhakts and to present to the section their considerations concerning this work.

(5) Agrees that the teaching in the new schools must be done in one shift only.

(6) Instructs the brigadiers to keep a systematic control over the work, to see that it complies closely with the instructions of the representatives and to present regular reports as to the fulfilment of the instructions.

2. The Report of Com. Volchenkova.

(1) To note that Mosnarpit delays the conclusion of the new agreement;

(2) That the agreement of 1935 was not satisfactory, as it imposed on the school authorities the duty of providing repairs to the dining-rooms, lighting and heating.

(3) To approve the draft of the new agreement and to add the following paragraphs to it:

(*a*) That the transfer of the dining-rooms and restaurants to their directors must be done in writing and that after that only the directors are responsible for them.

(*b*) That the fuel must be delivered by the Raynarpits (feeding organization in the districts) (arts. 19, 20, 21).

(*c*) That the electric lamps must be supplied by the Raynarpits.

(*d*) That strangers must not be admitted to the children's dining-rooms.

(*e*) To ask the brigadiers to deliver reports as to the feeding of children in the schools.

(*f*) To discuss at the next meeting of the section the reports of the Mosnarpit and of Mosgorono as to the conditions of feeding in the schools.

(*g*) To ask the "Moscow Association of the dining-rooms" to present in ten days' time a draft of the agreement with Mosgorono.

3. The Report of Com. Vishnevskaya.

The bureau of the section considers that the Stakhanov movement must be introduced in the practice of the schools, that competition must be replaced by emulation and that Mosgorono and the district education departments do not pay enough attention to this problem.

The bureau of the section taking the above into consideration, instructs:

(1) The Mosgorono to see to the work of the district education departments in the sphere of socialist emulation in teaching.

(2) To attach some elected members of Mossoviet to certain schools in order that they can control the progress of the work in the sphere of emulation.

(3) To ask some schools and three district education departments to deliver reports on the Socsorevnovanie (socialist emulation).

4. The Report of Councillor Gussev.

To ask Com. Dubrovina owing to the existence of some defects in the management of lodgings for teachers to impose a fine on Com. Vigdorov for the false report and to ask Com. Brandcaln to see to the conditions of living in the lodgings and to instruct Councillor Gussev to see to the fulfilment of this resolution of the section.

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5. The Report of Com. Kaplanova.

To approve the memorandum on school libraries prepared for the Mossoviet and to ask Com. Kaplanova to report on it at the next session.

6. Complaints of the citizen Gorelikova.

To report to the presidium of the Mossoviet on the bureaucratic dealing in the case of Gorelikova's children and to ask Com. Dubrovina to put her children in one of the children's homes.

Orgotdel

Orgotdel is the organization department of the Mossoviet. It controls the sections and all work connected with the elected representatives. For example, if a member were sent away to another town, Orgotdel would see that the necessary arrangements are made to replace him.

Orgotdel sees that soviet ideas of democracy prevail in the elections, in the districts, in the avoidance of bureaucracy. (Incidentally, "bureaucrat" appears to be the worst term of abuse that can be hurled at an administrator in the Soviet Union.) It sees that the district soviets work in compliance with the orders of the presidium of Mossoviet—a most important function. It aims at associating the masses with the work of Mossoviet, and seeks to secure their full participation at elections,[1] etc. After an election is over, the responsibility for analysing and publishing the hundred thousand or so proposals made by the electors falls on Orgotdel, which also allocates them to the various sections.

In addition to these general duties Orgotdel is sometimes entrusted with specific tasks of a more concrete nature by the plenum or the presidium. In the autumn of 1936, for example, it was charged with seeing that all communal houses were supplied with wood for the winter. It obtains information for this or similar purposes from the appropriate administrative organs.

Elected representatives are attached to Orgotdel, which is an organ both of the plenum and of the presidium.

Minor Authorities

Like most other giant cities, Moscow has a double-deck municipal structure. The secondary authorities consist of

[1] The actual conduct of the elections is in the hands of the Election Commission, an *ad hoc* body appointed for each election, and dissolved at the conclusion thereof. *Ante*, p. 9.

the district soviets known as rayons. (The rayons into which Moscow is divided are not to be confused with the much larger areas, found elsewhere in Russia, which are also called rayons.)

Until recently Moscow had ten districts, the population of which varied between about 200,000 and 500,000 persons. These were found to be too large and cumbersome for efficient administration, so the city has now been divided into twenty-three districts of smaller size, to which must be added another district situated outside the city boundary.

Each district has a district soviet elected at a separate election, held independently of that for Mossoviet but carried out concurrently on the same franchise. The scale of voting under the existing constitution is on the basis of one representative for every 500 electors in large units or institutions, one representative for every 100 electors in small organizations and one member for every 1,000 electors not belonging to any factory, office, or other electoral unit. The term of office is the same as for Mossoviet.

The total number of representatives comprised in all the district soviets in Moscow is (September 1936) 5,935, of whom 3,895 are men and 2,040 women. Of these, 3,502 are workmen, 1,486 higher employees (including 476 engineers and technicians), 236 soldiers in the Red Army, 184 students, with a miscellaneous residue of 527. The age composition is as follows: 876 are between 18 and 25 years; 3,340 between 26 and 40; and 1,719 over 40 years old. Many of the members of the district soviets are also members of Mossoviet.

A typical example of a district soviet is the Leningrad district of Moscow. This district contains 200,000 persons and comprises 3,000 hectares (7,000 acres). The plenum contains 226 deputies.

The plenum in each district soviet elects a presidium; and in the Leningrad district this consists of seven members together with three candidates or substitutes. All the members of the presidium are engaged on full-time work as paid heads of departments in the district. The presidium meets every week. The chairman happens to be a member of TSIK. (the Central Executive Committee of U.S.S.R.) —a most important body.

The district soviets exist principally to carry out functions delegated to them by Mossoviet or assumed by them with the

permission, express or implied, of the principal city authority. Much of the detailed administration of the city, especially in regard to the management of institutions and public health services, is carried out through them. Their finances form part of the budget of the city soviet, and this ultimate financial control assures administrative subordination to the larger organ in case of disagreement. Like all soviets, they have a general power to deal with the local needs of their area provided that any action they take does not conflict with the work or policy of the higher authorities or with the tasks that have been assigned to them by Mossoviet. They are in general responsible for the beauty and good order of their districts. They plant trees, clean and repair streets, and run parks for children.

The district soviet is in practice free in its day-to-day work so long as it obeys the directives of Mossoviet. It can establish new departments, trusts, and other organs if it desires, subject to the approval of Mossoviet when a substantial outlay is involved. In matters not requiring a considerable expenditure, the district soviet can go ahead on its own initiative without referring to higher authority; and I was assured by the chairman of the Leningrad district of Moscow that in actual practice only two or three projects out of five hundred embarked upon by the district soviet were submitted to Mossoviet for approval. Even the building of a small factory to manufacture shirts was undertaken without invoking higher authority. But the moment the district exceeds its budget, it cannot move a step farther without obtaining permission from Mossoviet.

Each district has about a dozen administrative departments dealing with such functions as education, public health, finance, social insurance, land, veterinary matters, house renting, district planning, architecture, and local trading. The district soviet also controls local trusts for building, road construction, communal economy (i.e. parks, open spaces, water supply, drains, etc.), cleansing, public feeding, and food stores. There are also eighteen trusts dealing with local industries in the Moscow districts.[1] These trusts are organized on a territorial basis, so that each local industry trust includes all the industrial enterprises

[1] It is probable that the number of local industry trusts in the districts will be increased to twenty-four, so as to give each district a trust.

owned by the district soviet in which it is situated. These local industry trusts in the districts produce a multitude of different kinds of commodities, among which may be mentioned knitwear, parquet flooring, window frames, electric reading lamps, clothing, furniture; and they also operate workshops for the repair of shoes, watches, garments, and other articles.

The district industrial trusts at present control more than fifty workshops or factories employing about 22,000 workpeople. They are quite distinct from the local industry trusts operated by Mossoviet, which have already been described;[1] but the head of the local industry department of Mossoviet gives directions as to the operation of the district trusts in certain important matters. On the other hand, the manager of each district trust must be a member of the presidium of the district soviet. And each district retains the profits or surplus accruing from the work of its local industry trust. (The aggregate profit for 1936 was planned to be forty million roubles.)

In some respects the relations between the Moscow districts as a whole and the city are similar to those subsisting between the city and the central government, especially in the fields of public health and education, although in other respects the Mossoviet is a much more powerful and independent body. The general organization and policy in regard to health functions is laid down by Mossoviet, while a great deal of the actual administration is carried out by the districts. An exception is made, of course, in regard to specialized institutions which must serve the whole area and are necessarily under the exclusive control of the city. The head of the public health department in a district is responsible to the head of the public health department of Mossoviet; and the latter has an office in each district, with a corps of inspectors to see that the districts carry out their functions properly. If a district public health department refused to adopt any of the proposals or requirements of the Moscow public health department, the district would be called upon to defend and explain its attitude before the presidium of Mossoviet. In the sphere of education, Mossoviet gives directives about education policy while the districts actually administer the schools. The district soviet appoints the

[1] *Ante*, pp. 20–1.

directors of the local schools and pays their wages, but it must submit the names of teachers and directors to the education department of Mossoviet for approval. Inefficiency on the part of the districts in any field can be reported to the presidium of Mossoviet; while any savings of money or resources effected by economies or efficiency in a district enure to the benefit of the district soviet.

The general tendency is towards the decentralization of functions on to the districts rather than in the opposite direction. For example, the work of house decoration and beautification was handed back to them recently after having been centralized for six months.

The general rule is that all the districts must be accorded similar treatment by the Moscow soviet. It is worth noting that there is no machinery, either in the way of an association, a joint standing committee (similar to that of the metropolitan borough councils in London) or even combined sessions, for the purpose of enabling the whole mass of districts to formulate common demands or to defend common "interests." Hence there is in Moscow an entire absence of the narrow parochialism, the debilitating conflict between the large city council and the district authority, which has been the bane of London for decades. Rivalry and hostility do not exist between Mossoviet and the district soviets; or if they exist, they are kept under strict control by the overriding authority of Mossoviet.

On questions of principle, it may safely be said, there are no conflicts between the districts and the city soviet. But in practice difficulties are bound to arise and many problems require adjustment. Where a disagreement occurs between a district and a department of the city, the matter goes in the first instance to the presidium of Mossoviet, which is said to be not in the least biased in favour of its own officials. The chairman of a district soviet told me that the presidium, on the contrary, tends to favour the district soviets. In the somewhat unlikely event of a district being dissatisfied with an adverse decision by the presidium it would lay the matter before the plenum of Mossoviet. This is the only meeting-ground for all district interests throughout the capital. It is also the place where the interests of the whole city find their fullest expression.

A good illustration of the attitude of the highest authorities

towards the districts prior to their recent reform is to be found in a pronouncement by L. M. Kaganovich[1] to the plenum of the Moscow soviet in 1934:

> The bureau of the Moscow regional and city committees of the Party and the presidium of the Moscow soviet deemed it the most important economic and political task in line with the beautifying, improving, and cleaning up of the whole network of central streets, to introduce a minimum of order into the rest of the streets of Moscow after eliminating the unendurable insanitary condition of the separate lanes, blind alleys, courtyards, old buildings, to repair the half-crumbled buildings, which can be restored, to rid the city of the hastily knocked-together shanties which still stand in some parts of the city.
>
> The presidium of the Moscow soviet and the bureau of the city committee of the Party, the district Party committees have undertaken this work. The closest assistants in carrying out their instructions are the district soviets. However, we must say frankly that the district soviets are still working poorly on the improvement of their districts, they still do not show and do not feel themselves that they are the masters of their districts in the full sense of the word.
>
> A most important task is to bring the district soviets closer to the masses of the population which they serve. In every corner of the district there must be a master, who would know all the needs of the district, and make them his daily concern. There should be a master who pays attention to the good order of his street and house; there should be a master who, loving his section, his street, would make it his concern to fight against hooliganism, bad house management, untidiness, and lack of culture.
>
> If the Moscow soviet and the district soviets are to begin this big undertaking, it is apparent that sub-district soviets must be created. The districts containing up to 400,000 population are too big—each district is a whole large city in itself. It is hard to cover and keep account of the need of such a big district from one centre. If there are sub-district soviets covering several streets, if the soviet deputies and the soviet section leaders work actively in the sub-district soviets, becoming fighters for their street, their sidewalk, their court, the improvement of Moscow will go on apace.
>
> The successful reconstruction of Moscow demands that each citizen, each worker, each city inhabitant and social

[1] L. M. Kaganovich: *The Construction of the Subway and the Plan for the City of Moscow* (English Edition, Moscow, 1934), pp. 56–7.

> activist should love the street in which he lives, should work unceasingly to create cultural conditions in his house, court, lane, and street and the places bordering upon them, the squares and parks.

Here we see a large addition being made to the duties and responsibilities of the district soviets and at the same time frank criticism made of their existing efforts and organization. Shortly after this the entire city was reorganized so far as the minor authorities were concerned, the number of districts being increased from ten to twenty-four. The new districts are far more satisfactory than the old ones.

It is worth while noticing the manner in which this reorganization was carried out. The initiative came from the government of the Soviet Union, which naturally takes an exceptional interest in the affairs of the capital city. The City Planning Commission of Mossoviet first made an outline of the proposed new areas, which was submitted to the plenums of the districts. The district councillors then discussed the matter with their electors. The plenums of the old districts sent delegates to Mossoviet when the question was under discussion; and the Mossoviet plenum in turn sent some of its members to attend district plenums when they were dealing with it. The final approval and decision was made by the plenum of Mossoviet.

The relations between the city soviet and the district soviets in Moscow seem to me admirable and could scarcely be improved. On the one hand, Mossoviet lays down the general principles of policy and has full power to see that they are carried out; on the other hand, the district soviets are not only entrusted with a large amount of administrative detail, but they are also encouraged and expected to exhibit a considerable degree of spontaneous initiative. The budgetary control gives the city soviet ultimate control of a decisive kind, and its authority is, indeed, indisputable and undisputed; but at every point the districts are given an opportunity to state their case and to appeal against an arbitrary decision by the presidium or a department of Mossoviet. The pettifogging jealousy, fruitless conflict, and sense of self-importance on the part of minor bodies which have done so much to frustrate the government of London have in Moscow been subordinated to the wider needs of the city as a whole.

The subordination of the rights of the district to the larger interests of the city in the matter of areas seems to me particularly desirable. In the English metropolis there has been for more than a century an urgent need for drastic reorganization of areas. But the vested interests of the City Corporation and the city guilds, the narrow outlook and lack of imagination of the metropolitan boroughs, and the jealousy and suspicion of the authorities outside the London County Council boundaries have not only prevented anything being done but have made the problem almost insoluble politically. If the London County Council were given the same powers in this matter as those which the Moscow soviet possesses, the advantages which would result to London would be enormous.

Powers and Duties

The general principle which applies to all governing authorities in the Soviet Union is that no specific limitation is placed on their powers. There is nothing corresponding to the English doctrine of *ultra vires*, nor is an express authorization by some legal enactment or sovereign body necessary to permit action being taken. On the other hand, every soviet or other organ is subject to the overriding control of higher authorities, there being no absolute autonomy in any sphere whatever. Every unit of government is potentially liable to have its decisions overridden, set aside or modified in the event of its failing to conform to the general line or to any particular decision of a higher authority. Moreover, every organ can be called upon to carry out the instructions or policy of a superior body. The result is that, in the case of local government in Moscow, the city soviet has far more extensive powers than any English municipality, but at the same time it is not in possession of an absolute autonomy or an untrammelled discretion in regard to any of them.

Mossoviet is obviously conducting a far wider range of functions than the council of any English or American city. In that sense, there is far more local government in Moscow than in Manchester or London or New York. But can it be said that Mossoviet is merely administering locally a number of services and industries in accordance with policies laid down by the central government? The answer, broadly

speaking, is in the negative. Maxwell[1] suggests that there is "rigid supervision" of all activities from above, and that nothing may be done unless expressly permitted by higher authorities. But he is definitely wrong on this point. It is obvious, however, that the directives of a higher authority must take precedence over the decisions of a lower body.

The system outlined above does not preclude governing bodies from being charged with the carrying out of specific functions of either a compulsory or a permissive character. A large number of functions are, indeed, specifically entrusted to the city soviet, but this does not in any sense exhaust their powers. The decree regulating city soviets of January 1933 enumerates a lengthy list of "Fundamental Functions." A summary of these is printed in the Appendix to this chapter on pages 235-8.

A matter of exceptional importance such as the construction of the Metro would be considered too large to be left to local determination. In this particular instance the project was suggested by a group of engineers in Moscow, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) gave expert advice, the government of the Soviet Union made the decision, members of the Academy of Sciences helped to work out special problems of a technical nature, and the construction was carried out by Mossoviet under direction from the central authorities. The undertaking involved an adjustment of the Moscow house-building programme; but there was virtual unanimity as to the desirability of the project.

Relations with Central Authorities

There are about half a dozen central departments concerned in one way or another with the supervision or direction of the work of a city in U.S.S.R.

It should be explained in this connection that Moscow, as the capital of the Soviet Union, is in an exceptional position in relation to the higher authorities. In the first place, it is in direct contact with the organs of the R.S.F.S.R. and is not required to go through intermediate bodies (such as those of the Oblast or Krai), which is the normal procedure for other towns. Secondly, the leaders of the national government in Russia, no less than in other countries, take

[1] Bertram W. Maxwell: *The Soviet State*, p. 74. See also p. 71, ibid.

a special interest in the administration and appearance of the capital; and hence no picture of the relationship would be complete which left out of account the influence of suggestions or requests coming to the presidium of Mossoviet from the highest political personalities of the U.S.S.R. Stalin himself, we were informed, has taken a personal interest in certain items in the Moscow city plan. This imponderable element in the situation tends to make relations between the central and local governments more close in Moscow than elsewhere. It is, however, counterbalanced by a third factor tending in the opposite direction. In Moscow the city authorities are on the whole more competent, better qualified, and with a more extensive experience than elsewhere in the Soviet Union. They are, so to speak, the advance guard in the fight for higher standards, better social services, and greater efficiency in administration. The problem of keeping them up to the mark, of insisting on a minimum standard, scarcely arises in the case of Moscow, since Mossoviet is considered to be doing as much as can reasonably be expected in the circumstances. Hence, in regard to some matters, Mossoviet is trusted to a greater extent by the central government than are the smaller and more backward areas, and is given a greater amount of freedom and subjected to less interference. (This is apparently not true in regard to education.)

For the purposes of city administration the "central" authority, in the case of Moscow, is the government of R.S.F.S.R. But in order to make the position clear it is necessary to explain the organization of the higher bodies.

The constitution divides the Council of Commissars of the U.S.S.R.—the highest executive organ in the Soviet Union —into two groups. First, there are the All-Union Commissariats, seven in number, responsible for defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade, railways, posts and telegraphs, water transport, and heavy industry. These commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the Soviet Union either directly or through bodies appointed by them.[1] Second, there are ten Union-Republican Commissariats in charge of food industry, light industry, the timber industry, agriculture, state grain and live-stock farms, finance, internal trade, internal affairs, justice, and public health. The Union-

[1] Articles 75 and 77 of the New Constitution.

Republican commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them through commissariats of the several republics bearing similar names.[1] Thus, the former group of departments have no counterparts in the constituent republics, while the latter group are duplicated in each one of them.[2] In addition, every republic in the Union has commissariats of education, local industry, communal economy, and social maintenance.[3] The Council of Commissars of a republic consists of the chairman and vice-chairman, the commissars for that republic of the ten unified departments and of the four additional ones just mentioned, together with the representatives of the seven All-Union Commissariats, the chairman of the state planning commission and one or two other high officials.

It will be seen that none of the All-Union Commissariats is ordinarily concerned with city government. The only departments of the U.S.S.R. which are at present even indirectly concerned with the work of Mossoviet are those responsible for finance, internal trade, and public health, and since these are Union-Republican commissariats they normally transact their business with the corresponding commissariats of R.S.F.S.R., which is thus the effective central authority with which Mossoviet is in contact.

There are six principal ministries or departments of the R.S.F.S.R. whose work relates to local government in Moscow and elsewhere. These are the commissariats of public health, education, communal economy, finance, local industry, and internal trade. In addition, there is Gosplan, the very important state planning commission, whose organs, both for the whole Soviet Union and for the R.S.F.S.R., are in frequent contact with the Mossoviet departments.

The degree and character of the central control is neither uniform nor static in R.S.F.S.R.; and in this respect it resembles the position in England. It varies from service to service, from time to time and, perhaps, from place to place. It is impossible within the confines of this brief study to give an exhaustive account of its operation. I shall attempt no more than a brief outline of one or two major aspects.

The Commissariat of Public Health is in frequent

[1] ibid., Articles 76 and 78.
[2] Maxwell: op. cit., p. 135.
[3] Constitution: Article 83.

consultation with the public health department of Mossoviet. It collects data and formulates standards, such as, for example, the normal quantity of food required in hospitals, the normal cost per bed, the number of children to be accommodated in crèches, the various types of hospital to be provided. The commissariat promulgates *directives*, or statements of the line of policy which should be followed on various questions, especially on medical matters. It also inspects the work of the Moscow public health department and reports thereon in the usual way. Again, the public health department, like most other institutions in the Soviet Union, works on the basis of a five year plan, and the Commissariat of Public Health both assists in the formulation of the plan and advises as to the annual instalment to be achieved each year.

The control exercised in the sphere of education appears to be greater than in public health. The Commissariat of Education (Narkompros) settles the cost per child in the various types of school, and this involves determining the expenditure on teachers' salaries, books and equipment, free meals, and school maintenance (heating, lighting, cleaning, etc.). It is also responsible for formulating the specifications for school buildings through the R.S.F.S.R., although the local authority can make its own designs according to its needs or preferences so long as they comply with the specifications. Most important of all, the commissariat determines the curriculum, the syllabus in the different subjects, and the teaching methods to be adopted; and it decides what books shall be printed for the use of children. Finally, Narkompros is directly responsible for certain types of educational institutions such as the teachers' technicum.

The Commissariat of Communal Economy (Narcomkhos) deals with a wide range of functions and may be regarded as the residuary legatee of all services other than those supervised by other commissariats. Among the functions which it supervises are the construction, repair, management and letting of houses; town planning; drainage; gas, water and electricity supply; parks, squares and open spaces; lighting; tramways; baths and washhouses; hairdressers' shops, and laundries.

The main part of the work of Narcomkhos consists in practice in laying down norms, although in principle it can

interfere with the work of local authorities in many other ways. In regard to housing, for example, the commissariat lays down the norms for the height of buildings and ceilings, the cost per cubic metre, the number of rooms, the staircase, windows, sanitary fittings and fixtures, and so forth. Provision is made for several different types of apartment houses or flats; and it is left to Mossoviet to decide how many blocks of each type shall be built, the number of stories, the general architectural design, and the sites.

In regard to tramways, to take another example, the norms give the running time between overhauls, the cost of repairs and the length of time they should occupy, the wages of tramway workers, etc., while fares, time-tables, replacement of rolling stock, and general management are all within the province of the local authority.

The norms must, of course, be observed by all city soviets and constructional or operating trusts. They very often comprise an upper and a lower figure, the local authority having full discretion within these limits. In some matters, such as costs, it is usual to state only a maximum; and if Mossoviet can do the work more economically it may dispose of the money saved as it pleases.[1]

The formulation of norms is by no means the only method of controlling or influencing local government. The Commissariat of Communal Economy furnishes information, makes suggestions in regard to particular matters, and issues circulars of an advisory character. It approves the most important plans, and also itself creates the plans for new cities and works out the cost of executing them. Narcomkhos has its own building inspectors in all cities of the R.S.F.S.R., and in this way becomes advised of all failures and defects. The chief architect of the city soviet stands in a special relationship towards the central department, for he is not only the servant of Mossoviet but also the representative of Narcomkhos. In 1937 the commissariat will take over the chief engineers and architects in all cities under their jurisdiction in order to be in a better position to overcome the parochial outlook and low standards which exist in many small provincial towns. Moscow, a centre of enlightenment

[1] In regard to expenditure on education, local authorities are apparently not free to devote moneys saved by economical administration to other purposes without permission from the higher authorities.

by comparison, presents no problem in this respect, but will nevertheless be treated in similar fashion.

Although Narcomkhos, like the commissariats of education, finance, local industry, internal trade, and public health, is in direct relation with the appropriate department of the city soviet, it is not quite accurate to assume that Mossoviet is "responsible" to Narcomkhos. Mossoviet is an organ of government, and as such is not responsible to a particular commissariat of the R.S.F.S.R. but only to Sovnarkom, the whole cabinet of ministers of the Republic.

The essence of the relationship between central and local authorities may be described as unification. The various soviets are ranged in a genuine hierarchy of power, with the result that each one exercises unquestioned authority over those in the next lower rank within its jurisdiction and observes implicit obedience towards those above. The constitution expressly declares[1] that the executive organs of a soviet are directly accountable both to the elected representatives who appointed them and to the executive organs of the superior soviet above them. There is no aspect of a soviet's work which is theoretically immune from interference by the higher authorities, although in practice supervision is usually confined to the kind of action already described. There is said to be a remarkable absence of friction or disharmony between central and local government; and no known instance of conflict between the city plan and the proposals of the republic or union authorities.

The principle of unification must not be confused with mere centralization. In the dictatorships of Germany and Italy the local administration is carried out by officials appointed and dismissible by the central government; and even in France a considerable amount of local administration is in the hands of the prefect, who is the representative of the central government in the local *département* or county. A system of this kind, in which government is carried out locally by officials of the central government, is known as deconcentrated administration; and it is usual to contrast it with the method of decentralization adopted in the English-speaking countries whereby blocks of functions are devolved upon the shoulders of locally elected authorities.

The distinguishing feature of the Russian system is the

[1] Article 101.

existence of democratically elected councils or soviets combined with the principle of hierarchical control. And the democratic element is no empty formula although it is subject to certain limitations which I shall describe later. The entire organism is permeated by a desire to secure the participation of the masses on a wide scale in the city government, and this is accompanied by an attempt to encourage criticism and suggestions from below. It is incorrect to regard the local government of the Soviet Union as a thinly disguised form of centralization.

It is true that in some fields, such as education, the central control is very far-reaching and rigid, and it seems excessive compared with the English practice. But in England public assistance is in many respects quite as minutely regulated by the Ministry of Health; and the Ministry's legal powers are so great that the local poor law authority has been described by the Court of Appeal as a "subordinate administrative body"[1] charged merely with carrying out orders received from above and without independent responsibility.

One must be very careful to distinguish mere legal or constitutional forms from the living substance. For example, in England the local authorities are required to submit housing, slum clearance, and town-planning schemes to the Ministry of Health, who can approve, revise, reject, or refer them back for reconsideration.[2] Thus, formally the decision lies with the Minister; but it would be a great mistake to imagine that these services are centrally run or that the local authorities merely carry out centrally determined policy. On the other hand, no one who observed the events following the financial emergency of 1931 in England would be disposed to contradict the statement that the central government sometimes exercises the greatest influence in spheres where its legal power is conspicuously small or even entirely lacking.[3] The legal position is apt to be a poor guide to the realities of the situation in this matter.

My general impression of the position in Moscow is that the centre of gravity is in the town hall and the main initiating impulse comes from Mossoviet, although central

[1] *Tozeland* v. *Guardians of West Ham* (1907), 1 K.B. 920.

[2] See, for example, the Housing Act, 1936, sections 26, 29, 35, 57, 71, 171, 178, 179; Schedule III, Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, section 8.

[3] See my article, "The Central Domination of Local Government," *Political Quarterly*, Jan.-March 1933.

approval is continually required. The general line of development and the tempo of construction must, of course, accord with the national plan as determined by Gosplan. Not only is there great scope for local initiative and spontaneous effort on the part of the Moscow Soviet and the district soviets, but they are definitely encouraged by the government of R.S.F.S.R. and its planning organs to go ahead in various directions, such as, for example, the expansion of local industry. The government, we were assured on all sides, never hampers the initiative of Mossoviet. It is concerned to foster energetic action rather than to restrict it; and this one can well believe having regard to the general economic and political system of the Soviet Union and the stupendous burden carried by the public authorities.

I have already emphasized the varying degree of control which exists between different services. In regard to housing, for example, Mossoviet is free to build according to its own choice so far as design, type, etc., is concerned, provided they comply with the norms laid down by the Commissariat of Communal Economy; while in regard to schools there is no such freedom, the specification being laid down more or less rigidly by the Commissariat of Education.

No attempt has been made in this general outline to consider the relations between Mossoviet and the commissariats of finance, local industry, and internal trade. The chapter by Professor Jewkes, dealing with their specific fields of work, throws some light on these relations, though from another angle.

In several instances where these and other commissariats are concerned there is a complex relationship existing between several different organs of government. For example, the prices of articles manufactured by the local industry trusts are fixed by the Commissariats of Local Industry and Internal Trade, the costs of production are determined by Mossoviet, and the rate of profit by Gosplan. Again, in determining the housing programme, Mossoviet proposes a provisional figure, and Narcomkhos then decides in consultation with Gosplan how much material and resources can be allocated for the purpose. The city budget, after being settled by the plenum of Mossoviet, is confirmed by Sovnarkom, once again in consultation with Gosplan.

This central planning agency, Gosplan, is at once the

co-ordinating body and the consultative organ of the central commissariats in regard to the most important functions of the city soviet. A short account will therefore be given of its activities in so far as they relate to local government.

The State Planning Commission (Gosplan)

The State Planning Commission known as Gosplan (U.S.S.R.) is an expert body which advises the government of the Soviet Union. It has no executive functions. It has a staff of 700, of which some 300 are highly qualified officials. It has a special division which deals with municipal affairs; and the head of this division is a member of an advisory committee which has been formed in Moscow to comprehend all technical subjects. This committee is quite unrelated to Gosplan, which has no formal organization dealing with Moscow or other specific areas. There is a bureau of statistics associated with Gosplan but not forming part of it.

The distinctive feature about Moscow is that Mossoviet is in direct contact with Gosplan (U.S.S.R.). The capital city is unique in this respect. All other cities in the R.S.F.S.R. (including Leningrad) must go through the Gosplan of R.S.F.S.R.[1]

In the making of the plan for the reconstruction of Moscow Mossoviet played the part of an organization which voiced the needs of the inhabitants and proposed methods of satisfying them, while the State Planning Commission gave advice in working out financial and material possibilities having regard to the available resources. Thus, Mossoviet originally framed the plan for twenty years, but the State Planning Commission reduced it to ten years. Again, Gosplan analysed the plan and selected the essential features which must be performed within stated periods (e.g. rebuilding of bridges to cross the river at its new level) while less important items were cut down in scope or relegated to a later date.

Various commissions or departments of Mossoviet worked out different parts of the plan, in consultation with the appropriate experts in Gosplan. When complete, the plan as a whole went before the president of Gosplan, who looked at it "with a single eye." Gosplan is not represented on the

[1] Formerly twenty-six towns were in direct relation with Gosplan of U.S.S.R.

City Planning Commission of Mossoviet, nor are there any joint organs. But there is continual informal consultation.

Gosplan co-ordinates the plans for all towns throughout the Soviet Union. In particular, it seeks to equalize the resources of rich and poor areas by means of taxation. If Moscow asked for too much in its plan, to the detriment of other cities, its demands would not be conceded. At the same time, every effort is made to encourage local initiative. Each town formulates its own plan; and much emphasis is laid on the value of local initiative, although the degree to which local freedom can be developed is limited by the amount of competence and skill available. There is a tendency towards decentralization rather than centralization, though it is not easy to attain this for the reason stated.

Gosplan is not an inspecting body. If a city is in default on its plan, the government of the constituent republic (Sovnarkom) would be asked to inspect and report—not Gosplan.

The Communist Party

The unification of central and local government described in the preceding pages is supported and implemented, and indeed made possible, by the powerful organization of the Communist Party. It is scarcely too much to say that the Party is the unifying link, the life-blood which animates the whole structure from top to bottom; and without it the principle of unification would be no more than an empty formula.

A dissertation on the party machine lies outside the province of this modest study. Those in search of information on the subject may be referred to the illuminating chapter in Mr. and Mrs. Webb's work entitled "The Vocation of Leadership."[1] It may be of interest to record that our own inquiries bear out the general thesis that the direction of the whole governmental apparatus is permeated and dominated by the Communist Party.

This can be illustrated by a few simple facts. A majority of the elected representatives in the plenum of Mossoviet are members of the Party.[2] All the members of the presidium

[1] *Soviet Communism*, Chapter V, pp. 338–418.

[2] According to Mr. and Mrs. Webb (op. cit., p. 52), in 1934, out of 2,206 elected delegates and 450 elected alternates or substitutes no less than 1,750 were Party members while about 900 were non-Party. We were unable to obtain the exact figure in 1936.

are party men or women. The chairmen of all the sections belong to the Party, and the same is true of most of the heads of departments, management divisions, and trusts. In the school section, no less than forty members out of eighty-eight are members of the Party; while three of the five members of the bureau of this section are enrolled in the Party. A similar state of affairs exists in the districts of Moscow. The entire presidium of the Leningrad district Soviet in Moscow consists of Party members; and the Party commands 55 per cent of the delegates to the plenum.

There is, of course, an elaborate organization of the party machine not only in the city of Moscow, in the Moscow region, and in the districts, but also in every trust, department or undertaking for which Mossoviet is responsible. The party cell within each administrative unit plays a role of great importance both as regards the general management and in regard to personnel matters. It can challenge the decision of the chief official in respect of appointments, promotions, and dismissals. In case of disagreement the question goes to the district committee of the Party, from there to the republic committee of the Party, and eventually to the committee of the Party for the whole Soviet Union. The head official can ultimately be expelled from the Party if his action is severely censured.

The Party also exercises a predominant influence over the process of election in two different ways. First, by preparing a programme containing a broad outline of the demands which the governmental organs are expected to fulfil during the ensuing period.[1] Second, by drawing up, in conjunction with the workers' committee in each electoral unit, a preliminary list of candidates. This list is by no means always accepted by the electors, nor is it confined to Party members —efforts are made, indeed, to encourage outside persons to offer themselves for election—but it is obvious that the wishes of the Party exert a predominant influence in determining who shall be elected.[2] Again, the Party nominates a provisional list of candidates for the presidium which is placed before the plenum. This list has hitherto always been accepted without amendment.

I had no opportunity to investigate the internal working of the party organization in Moscow; but there is no reason

[1] *Ante*, pp. 4–5. [2] *Ante*, p. 14.

to think that it operates in a manner essentially different from that of any other closely knit party machine which has obtained power, except that it is less occupied with political strategy and manœuvring for position, in view of the absence of any organized opposition, and more occupied with constructing plans and cultivating leadership, in view of its immense responsibility and undisputed control.

Although the Communist Party undoubtedly permeates and dominates the Moscow soviet and, indeed, the entire fabric of government throughout the Union, it would, I believe, be a great mistake to imagine that the democratically elected assembly is a mere façade of no practical importance behind which the Party decides questions in accordance with its own wishes without regard to the views of the elected representatives. Such a conception is neither realistic nor convincing.

A political party in power resembles other forms of large-scale "committee" organization in that it must, as a general rule, and especially if it is to remain permanently in office, follow the advice and trust the judgment of those of its members who are in a position to know most about any particular matter with which it has to deal. Of the large volume of business coming before the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, perhaps only a fifth or a quarter concerns the affairs of the city government. The persons who are most likely to possess adequate knowledge concerning those affairs are obviously the members of the presidium of Mossoviet, who are continuously responsible for the whole of its administration. One may assume, therefore, that the views of the members of the presidium would carry special weight in the party committee and would be disregarded only in exceptional circumstances.

It is equally obvious that the members of the presidium would themselves be influenced to a large extent by the feelings of the plenum and the sections. Only stupid or politically incompetent administrators would fail to take account of strong currents of public opinion when these had been manifested by the elected representatives of the citizens; and the members of the presidium are persons of exceptional ability and acumen. Hence we may conclude that although it is true to assume that ultimate power resides with the Party, this does not mean that the democratic

organs are disregarded or of small importance. On the contrary, the very strength of the party machine must depend to no small extent on the degree to which it elicits, evokes, and defers to the wishes or demands of the citizens as and when they are expressed in the plenum or the sections. Yet public opinion in these popular organs is itself in turn organized and moulded in large measure by the energetic leaders who constitute the Party. Thus, the relationship between Party, presidium, and plenum is one of action and reaction. The party machine and the democratic organs are not in watertight compartments; there is a process of interpenetration going on all the time.

If the various forces were not harmonized in some such manner as this the situation would be full of potential danger to the stability of the régime. A government which did not intend to pay attention to the trends of public opinion would be suicidally reckless to set up an elaborate system of popular representation. To provide opportunities for the public expression and formulation of criticism, to encourage the discussion of the public's desires or complaints by their elected representatives, without giving heed to the views put forward, would indeed be storing up trouble for even the most despotic government. If this were done, the plenum and the sections would be liable to become hotbeds of opposition and discontent which no government could withstand, no matter how strong the Party might be nor how ruthless or arbitrary its secret police.

One has only to analyse the position with a little common sense to demonstrate the absurdity of the statements frequently made concerning the attitude of the Communist Party towards the elected soviets. The general conclusion arrived at does not, however, preclude the possibility of an occasional decision being made by the Party in the face of strong opposition by the popular organs; nor—what is perhaps more likely—of certain matters on which the Party is determined to pursue a particular line of action, regardless of public opinion, being withheld from discussion in the plenum until after action has been taken or a decision announced.[1]

It is worth mentioning that no attempt is made to conceal

[1] It is difficult, for example, to believe that the eviction decree referred to on p. 200 could have conceivably met with the approval of any substantial section of the community in Moscow. It was not discussed in the plenum.

the position of the Party or to veil its activities in mystery. Its status as the dominant directing group is frankly asserted. Thus, the general reconstruction plan for the city of Moscow was openly declared to be passed on the resolution of the Council of Commissars (Sovnarkom) of U.S.S.R. and of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. It was signed by Molotov as chairman of the Council of Commissars and by Stalin as secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Its contents include approval of a specified housing programme "presented by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party and by Mossoviet"; and its concluding paragraph instructs the State Planning Commission, together with the Moscow Committee of the Party and Mossoviet, to present estimates of the necessary expenditure on constructional works, materials, and loans required and to submit them to TSIK. and the Council of Commissars.

The disadvantages of a single party in a state which tolerates no political opposition are more conspicuous than the advantages to those who are accustomed to Western democracy. The absence not only of fundamental criticism, but of its very possibility; the lack of an alternative government; the disastrous consequences to an individual of resignation or expulsion from the Party—these and many other disadvantages merit fuller treatment by political scientists than they have so far received. It is evident, however, without underrating these shortcomings, that the system has its qualities as well as its defects.

"We are disciplined workers," a high official remarked in my presence; "we have a flexible organization which can readily be turned on to any task or problem which demands attention." Discipline, flexibility, concentration of power—these are characteristics making for efficiency, which the Communist Party has introduced into the administration of government in Moscow city no less than in every rayon, oblast, or republic throughout the Union.

Public Opinion

Just as the formal relations between central and local authorities cannot be fully understood without considering the unifying influence of the Communist Party, so the extent

to which the system accepts or rejects the ideas of Western democracy cannot be grasped except in the light of the restrictive and intolerant attitude of the Party towards any actual or potential opposition.

The leading members of the Moscow city government emphatically declare that the whole system is based on the most democratic principles, and there is no need to mistrust the sincerity of their belief. Discussion and criticism of proposals before a decision is arrived at are welcomed and encouraged; and what is called self-criticism is regarded as a device of the highest importance for increasing efficiency, whether in the plenum, the presidium, the section, or in the party organizations. There is little doubt that active discussion on these lines does in fact take place with beneficial results. But there are at least three fundamental impediments to the attainment of a genuine democracy.

In the first place, criticism must be confined to matters which have not yet been finally decided. No one, it is openly stated, is permitted to "obstruct the working of the government machine" or to impede the execution of plans. This is a euphemistic way of stating an unpleasant feature of the situation: namely, that no one is permitted with impunity to criticize policies which have been already laid down or to disparage efforts or work which are already accomplished or aims that are in process of being carried out. Criticism of this kind would promptly be suppressed by severe and ruthless methods as an "obstruction" to the working of the government machine or an "impediment" to the execution of its plans. Of course, criticism of policy and a frank admission of error have not infrequently been publicly made in the past; but it has emanated from the highest executives and the party leaders who have presumably already convinced their colleagues of the need for change or who occupy such exalted stations as to be immune from the perils and intimidations to which the ordinary citizen would be subject.

In the second place, the absence of any alternative government places severe limits on the effectiveness of criticism, whether before or after the determination of policy. This is less marked in the case of city administration than in the higher realms of government, but to some extent it applies all along the line. The existence of opposing parties in an

English city is to a large extent due to the conflict of interest between the better-off ratepayers and property owners on the one hand, and the needs of the poorer masses of the community on the other. With the disappearance of this conflict in a socialistic society where private property in land and buildings no longer exists, much of the opposition which produces the opposing parties would also disappear. But not all of it. A politically educated and free electorate would still be likely to produce groups of representatives advocating divergent policies in regard to the various social and economic services, the aims and methods of planning, priorities, and so forth. But this does not exist in the soviet cities. There is a unanimity which is both impressive and depressing, an absence of discord which is at once inspiring and ominous. How far is it due to mere political immaturity and how far to a deep-seated fear of unorthodoxy? It is impossible for an outsider to answer this question.

Thirdly, there is an almost complete ignorance among most of the delegates and officials, not to mention the ordinary citizen, of what is done abroad; and this lack of knowledge makes informed criticism difficult if not impossible. It is true that groups of high officials from Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities occasionally visit London, Paris, and other centres for the purpose of investigating special features or accomplishments, and some of the officials and scientists are able to obtain foreign technical journals; while visitors from foreign countries are cordially welcomed and received with interest and hospitality. But the fact remains that foreign books, newspapers, and periodicals are liable to be stopped by the censorship; that soviet citizens are not at liberty to travel abroad as they please; and that even correspondence with persons in foreign countries is believed to be a somewhat risky undertaking not commonly indulged in except by persons whose official business necessitates their doing so. The result is that the general public has practically no knowledge of any standards of achievement other than those actually prevailing in U.S.S.R. A representative to Mossoviet who contrasted the housing or transport facilities of Moscow with those of London or Manchester would not be marked out for early promotion to a more responsible position. But even if he took the risk he would have great difficulty in obtaining the information. Measurement and

publicity, Mr. and Mrs. Webb pointed out in one of their best-known works, are essential to a satisfactory socialist régime. "The deliberate intensification of this *searchlight of published knowledge*," they wrote, "we regard as the corner-stone of successful Democracy."[1] It is pertinent to remark that knowledge of foreign experience and achievements is highly relevant in public administration; but this is deliberately concealed from the general public in Moscow. The fact that the Soviet ignorance of foreign municipal organization and experience is paralleled by an equal ignorance in other countries of Soviet structure and function, does not lessen its disadvantages.

Having stated quite frankly these important reservations, I can now go on to consider the extensive and widely utilized opportunities which exist for criticism, complaint, and suggestion of a less fundamental nature.

The ventilation of grievances in written form takes place through two different channels. There are letters of complaint sent direct to the local authority (either the district soviet or the city soviet or one of their sections). A large number of these are received; most of them, it was candidly admitted, call attention to genuine grievances, though not all can be remedied forthwith. The other channel for written communications consists of letters written to the newspapers. These are forwarded to the local authority for inquiry and report within a specified time (ten days would be a normal interval). If no answer is received within this period a "control" letter is sent by the newspaper asking why the matter has not been dealt with; and further neglect may become serious. The newspapers are regarded as a definite agency for voicing complaints and investigating criticisms, and they have special departments for this purpose. They print regular columns of paragraphs explaining the action taken or promised as a result of these complaints. There are special legal provisions to protect the writers of such letters from victimization by the local soviet and to prevent the disclosure of their names.

These written complaints appear to move in waves. One year a large number of them related to articles of food; at the time of our visit, housing had become a common topic of dissatisfaction.

[1] *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, p. 196.

Oral criticism can also take two forms. One of these is the deputation, which may wait on Mossoviet, on the district soviet, or on a section or department. The deputation may come from a factory or a trade union, from a group of citizens, from an electoral unit, from the children attending a particular school, from the inhabitants of a street, or from various other possible sources. There is an inflexible rule at Mossoviet that deputations must be received forthwith by members of the presidium or the responsible official; and this practice is followed even when no notice is given beforehand of the deputation's arrival.

The other form of oral criticism comes from the workers inside a municipal enterprise or department. Every industrial, commercial, or service unit in U.S.S.R. has a trade union in which all the workers of every rank and grade are included. At the periodic meetings of the union every worker, down to the humblest charwoman or floor-cleaner[1] is free, not merely in theory but in practice, to ventilate his or her grievances against the management; and it is a very serious offence to try to stop a worker from exercising this right. To do so may lead to dismissal or demotion of the person responsible.

This development of the vocational organization of the workers into an organ of complaint is regarded as one aspect of the idea of "self-criticism," of which one hears so often in U.S.S.R. I was given many examples of its effective application, not only in remedying abuses, but also in securing the removal of inefficient or tyrannical head officials. When one considers the vast mass of enterprises for which Mossoviet is responsible, and the large proportion of the inhabitants of the city employed therein, the trade union must be recognized as an important instrument for enabling the pressure of public opinion to be brought to bear on the responsible officials. The constructive aspect of this part of the system is always emphasized by soviet leaders. The trade union branch meeting, they declare, is not merely a device for making articulate any discontent which may exist among the workers. Its more important function is to provide a means of bringing to the management the many fruitful proposals by which the workers seek to assist the government authorities in carrying out their

[1] *Post*, p. 56.

tasks, and which in other systems are entirely absent owing to the antagonism between the workpeople and their employers.

Personnel Policy

At this point it may be appropriate to interpose a short description of the relations between Mossoviet and the official staff under its control. I was not able to ascertain the size of the staff; it is obvious that the total would depend largely on whether the workmen and employees of a number of semi-independent institutions and trusts were included or excluded. But in any event the size of the staff is not only enormous in the aggregate, but far larger, both absolutely and relatively, than that of any other city in the world. The public health department alone employs 40,000 persons, which is twice as many as the entire staff of the Manchester city council. The department of local industry is in charge of productive trusts employing 80,000 workers; and the local industry trusts in the districts account for a further 20,000 workpeople.

The city authorities of Moscow can scarcely be regarded as having anything in the nature of a personnel policy, in the English sense of the term. The Soviet Union is intended to be a republic of workers and soldiers; and the treatment of municipal officers and workmen forms part of the general system applicable to the vast majority of employed workers. There is a staff committee of the presidium, composed of members of the plenum and co-opted members, with the head of the finance department (who is a member of the presidium) as chairman; but the functions and powers of this committee are not impressive. It meets at the beginning of each year and at periodic intervals to consider the staff of every department and trust of the city soviet. The committee decides the strength of each department in consultation with the head official. An appeal lies to the presidium, which can authorize an increase of staff at any time.

The chief officials are appointed by the presidium, while the lower officials and wage-earners are appointed by the head of each department. There is no regular system of examination, nor, indeed, systematic recruitment of any kind. Vacancies are merely notified as they occur to the

information bureaux which are run by the city for the purpose of advising workers of employment opportunities.

The whole scheme of recruitment is extremely decentralized. For example, the head of the public health department appoints the head officials in charge of hospitals and similar institutions or branches within the department. These chiefs then appoint the assistant head officials and doctors in charge of medical departments. Head doctors in turn appoint the medical men on their staffs, and so on down the scale. Each rung in the hierarchy apparently appoints the staff in the grade immediately below. A similar principle applies in regard to dismissal.

There is said to be no problem of patronage. The law forbids the immediate relatives of the head of an institution or department or branch from working under him. If a case of jobbery occurs, or if favouritism or victimization is suspected in the making of an appointment or a promotion, the matter can be brought up before the shop committee or trade union and a thorough inquiry demanded. An understanding of the status and functions of the workers' organizations is essential to an insight into the personnel side of the Moscow soviet; a short description will therefore be attempted based on an investigation into two or three widely different sources.

In the public health department there are two kinds of staff organization. First there is the shop committee elected by the whole mass of workers in each institution or branch, from the floor-washers to the head official. Second, there is an association of the doctors in each hospital, etc., to advise on matters of professional conduct, ethics, or medical practice. These two associations are strong, vigorous bodies and are regarded by the head of the department as a help to him in his work. He relies upon them to prevent favouritism, victimization, or jobbery, and to act as instruments for securing the maximum amount of co-operation from the staff. If a controversy or a dispute or an abuse is ventilated in one of these associations it is widely reported in the medical journals or trade union press; and the matter thus not only comes to the notice of the presidium but it also becomes a public affair with all the safeguards which that entails.

As an example of how the doctor's association works, we

may suppose that on some occasion a particular doctor has been singled out for special praise or reward as a result of exceptionally good work; and that another doctor feels that he had done equally good work which has been overlooked. The latter could raise the matter at a meeting of the professional organization which would look into the question and see whether an injustice had occurred.

The chief official in any department, trust, or institution can appoint and dismiss freely, subject to the approval of, or right of challenge by, the trade union concerned. The chief official can dismiss for incompetence, negligence or misconduct without impediment, but not for criticism levelled against his administration. The onus of showing that dismissal is justified lies on the chief official, especially when an employee has served for a substantial period. In case of disagreement the chief official and the representative of the trade union would meet in a "conflict committee." If the matter were not solved amicably at this stage it would go to the trade union organization for the whole city, which has power to determine the question conclusively. If they considered there had been an attempt at victimization they could complain to Mossoviet. Promotion is also within the authority of the chief official; and in this matter it is a common practice to consult the Party secretary in the undertaking.

Despite the exceptional status accorded to the workers' associations and the elaborate safeguarding of the employee's rights, there is said to be no serious problem of discipline. The administrative chief remains in authority—"the head is the head"—and all these opportunities for appeal and rights of challenge are considered not to hinder efficiency but, on the contrary, actually to promote it by securing a high degree of confidence among, and co-operation from, the rank and file of the service.

Salary scales are fixed throughout the U.S.S.R., in general, as the outcome of annual discussions between the head central authority of the specific trade union and of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions on the one hand, and the representatives of the State Planning Commission and of the commissar concerned on the other. Their application to particular districts or cities, and thus to Moscow, would be adjusted in the discussion between

the local organization of the trade union and the presidium of the local soviet. But great latitude is permitted within the total approved for salary and wages for the ensuing year —which is what the State Planning Commission is most interested in—and its distribution by scales or otherwise, among grades and even among individuals. In Moscow the salaries of head officials are decided by the presidium of the Mossoviet. It is quite common for an eminent expert or an unusually gifted official to receive an exceptional stipend. But departments are required in general to keep within their budgetary allowances so far as salaries are concerned.

Not only manual workers in productive industry, but also some of the higher creative officials, are paid according to their output, at least in part. Architects and artists often earn double their scheduled salary by this means. And it is quite common for such professional workers to earn far more than the administrative head of the department. In one trust which I investigated, several of the technical experts were earning between 3,000 and 4,000 roubles a month on piecework compared with a fixed stipend of 1,500 roubles for the head of the trust. Such an arrangement would not be tolerated for a moment in an English municipality, but in U.S.S.R. it apparently gives rise to no ill-feeling. This may be due in part to the fact that members of the Communist Party occupying leading positions are not dominated by the money incentive in any important sense. A public-spirited devotion to the socialist cause, love of power, an ambition to achieve big things, vanity and self-conceit, a desire to serve or to lead—these and similar motives play their part in varying degree. But love of money appears to be notably absent among the directing heads and to be regarded with some contempt. Even the most important members of the presidium receive only about 1,000 roubles a month; and though some of the leading positions carry perquisites such as a country villa outside the city, free meals at the office, and the use of a car, practically all the chief officials work desperately hard and live simply.[1]

It is quite a common thing for the head executives to work until midnight and the early hours of the morning;

[1] It is a definite rule of the Party that no member of the Party may receive more than a specified maximum per month. The amount of this maximum, which has been varied from time to time according to the price-level and other considerations, is not published.

and on the night of August 31st 1936, prior to the beginning of school term next day, members of the presidium were inspecting the newly built schools at four in the morning! Overwork and tremendous pressure goes on at the top while the rank and file are working only six or seven hours a day. In such a situation there is little room for an avaricious regard for high salaries on the part of those who are bearing the heat and burden of the day—and night. I made the most searching inquiries as to the prevalence of jealousy among the staff and was informed on all sides that it scarcely exists. The Soviet Union offers unlimited opportunities to all who seek them, and the absence of unemployment has removed the fear of there being only a limited number of jobs. It is possible that jealousy in its vocational aspects is to some extent a by-product of restricted opportunity. Another positive factor tending in the same direction is the consciousness among the staff of working together for the common end of building up a great city.

There is a pension scheme for officials desiring to retire on reaching the age limit. The amount of superannuation depends on the length of service. Many officials do not retire on reaching the qualifying age but prefer to go on working.

In regard to qualifications, the principal emphasis is laid on scientific and technological training. Executive ability is greatly prized, and an effort is made to give those who possess it full scope for their powers. But there is no recognition at all of the desirability or even the possibility of training men for administration. The Soviet Union has, in fact, the same sort of outlook in this respect as we had in England up to about fifteen or twenty years ago, when there was no appreciation that the principles of administration could be either learned or taught, the assumption being that a good administrator is born and not made. Hence, while U.S.S.R. is training men furiously as doctors, teachers, engineers, sanitary experts, architects, lawyers, and so forth, there is no training at all in public administration or the technique of government. One of the results of this policy is that the ablest administrators are desperately overworked and have in many cases impaired their health. It is probable that the shortage of executive officials of high calibre will become increasingly acute during the coming years.

The general tendency towards technical and professional qualifications is illustrated by the case of the head of the public health department of Mossoviet. This man worked up to the important position he now holds by ten years service as Commissar of Public Health in the Ukraine republic followed by service in a rayon. He then became qualified as a doctor, which is not legally necessary for the head of a public health department, but is becoming customary. In Moscow the head of a hospital must be a doctor, although there is usually an administrative assistant to help with the economic and administrative problems. Thus, the Soviet Union is tending towards the insistence on "professional" qualifications for administrative heads which in England we have been opposing for the last fifteen years.[1] There are nevertheless quite a number of important officials in charge of divisions in the public health department who are not doctors.

Research

In the field of research there is a similar emphasis on technology and natural science and a corresponding neglect of the administrative and economic aspects of local government problems.

The principal research institute is the Academy of Municipal Economy in Moscow, which was established in 1932–3. This organization is mainly devoted to scientific research, but it also trains men and women for research or for practical administration. The course lasts for about $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 years and combines theoretical instruction with practical training.

The Academy has eight research sections dealing with the following subjects: (1) town planning, (2) housing and community buildings such as clubs, theatres, and schools, (3) sanitation, waterworks, and street cleansing, (4) street lighting, gas, central heating, and electricity supply, (5) city transport, (6) construction material, (7) public utilities or city enterprises, (8) construction of parks, open spaces, etc. Number 7 in this list approaches most nearly to the

[1]See the Report of the Hadow Committee on Municipal Officers: E. D. Simon: *A City Council from Within*, pp. 130–50; W. A. Robson, *Development of Local Government*, pp. 269–72; *The British Civil Servant*, edited by W. A. Robson.

social sciences, since much attention is given by this section to the economic aspects of public enterprises.

The Academy has recently concentrated its efforts on producing an elaborate treatise dealing with town planning, which includes both the planning of new cities and the reconstruction of existing cities in accordance with socialistic ideas. The results of the inquiry have been published in a large volume laying down the norms and methods suited to the requirements of engineers and planners. This particular project was ordered by the Council of Commissars (Sovnarkom) of R.S.F.S.R. In general, the Academy is directly responsible to the Commissariat of Communal Economy.

The work of the Academy is itself regulated by a plan which was formulated by the staff in consultation with outside bodies and submitted to the Council of Commissars for approval. The plan determines the general line of work, but urgent problems can be investigated even though they fall outside its scope. The Academy itself fixes the time for completing each theme. It also offers a consultant service to cities which are in need of specialist knowledge, in much the same way as some of the municipal research bureaux in U.S.A. Nearly half of its revenue (1,200,000 roubles out of a total 2,840,000 roubles) is derived from fees paid for such services, the balance being paid as a government grant. This work, and also the normal research projects, involves the staff in work in the field; and laboratory investigation is also required in regard to such matters as the purification of sewage.

Much of the research is done through groups of investigators working under a leading scientist. The full-time staff numbers nearly 200 and includes 112 scientists. In addition there are about 80 part-time specialists engaged to participate in particular matters. The Academy is at present inadequately housed, but a vast new building will shortly be constructed for it. The Academy has expanded rapidly in the three or four years of its short life, and ambitious plans for its enlargement are in existence. There are similar institutions in Leningrad, Kharkov, and one or two other cities. There is a great shortage of qualified research workers and the Academy is itself absorbing most of the men and women who have been trained within its walls. There is no dearth of candidates, but the problem of obtaining entrants of sufficiently high quality has still to be solved.

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The output of published material coming from the Academy is large in quantity—about forty monographs and books were issued during the first nine months of 1936. These dealt with a variety of topics, from the preparation of bitumen emulsions for dressing highways to the planning of buildings for physical culture. I am not able to estimate the quality of these publications. The conspicuous weakness of the whole organization for research lies in its exclusive concentration on questions of a technological or scientific character; or rather, in the absence of any similar activities in the sphere of the social sciences. The suggestion which I made on several occasions that administrative problems as such call for research in terms of the social sciences appeared almost meaningless to the officials with whom I conversed in Moscow.

Legal Liability

It may be of interest to inquire how far the responsibility of the Mossoviet towards the public is recognized in terms of legal liability. I shall not attempt to describe in detail any of the legal provisions, but will merely state shortly what is the broad effect of the arrangements.

Where any act or omission on the part of the Mossoviet, or any of the enterprises for which it is responsible, results in physical injury or death to an individual, the victim or his dependants would be entitled to claim a pension or compensation through the system of social insurance. This, in the eyes of a soviet lawyer, would be a form of payment by or on behalf of the government. Where damage to property of a material nature occurs, then the particular institution which is responsible can be made liable either in a court of law or through the arbitration machinery. The arbitration machinery deals with a claim only where both the parties are government institutions. It is a relic from past days when only part of the economic system was socialized and the special arbitration machinery existed to deal with the socialized institutions.

The Mossoviet itself is never liable as an entity to be sued either in the courts or through arbitration; but many of its departments or trusts can be made liable, and a citizen or organization proving damage may recover compensation. Any institution or enterprise which is treated as a separate

entity and has its own budget can be made legally responsible for damage to property. But departments of the city council which are not self-supporting economically (i.e. the spending departments) are not responsible for wrongful or accidental injury to property. Hence if, for example, the public health department committed damage to property, the injured party would not have a right of action in a legal sense, but would apply to the presidium of the Mossoviet for an *ex gratia* payment, and if this was not forthcoming he could appeal to the presidium of TSIK.

The procurator plays a considerable part in supervising the legality of local government work. When he apprehends that some legal error has been committed he makes a complaint to the presidium of Mossoviet; if he does not obtain satisfaction he would take the matter further to the presidium of TSIK., and ultimately the matter could go to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. This line of ascent is, of course, by way of political or administrative control, rather than by judicial review. It is only in exceptional cases that a matter would go beyond the Mossoviet, such as, for example, if the Mossoviet were to issue a decree beyond its powers. This has never actually occurred in the case of Moscow, but in smaller towns the local authorities have sometimes been required to withdraw ordinances which were considered too far-reaching in their terms. Despite the fact that there is no *ultra vires*, local authorities are always liable to interference even from the legal point of view.

The departments or trusts of Mossoviet are liable for the wrongful acts of their employees. The official himself is also liable to criminal punishment in case of wilful negligence resulting in injury to members of the public. The contracts entered into by Mossoviet are enforceable either in the courts or through the arbitration machinery, and cases of litigation in this connection are quite common.

In some matters Mossoviet officials such as policemen can themselves impose fines if and when they see an offence committed. For example, it is forbidden by the city ordinances to jump from a tramcar while it is in motion. If you do so and a policeman observes you he can collect the fine forthwith, and a similar procedure can take place in regard, for example, to wrongful use of the telephone, stealing

electricity, etc. There is an appeal to the court by an individual who claims that he has been wrongfully fined. This type of procedure, in which the executive both charges the offender and sentences him, exists in certain other European countries, but is in opposition to English ideas of justice.

The land department of Mossoviet has a special legal department which makes contracts in prescribed form with all organizations that are permitted to build on land belonging to the city soviet. The contract includes a description of the parties and of the land in question, and it specifies the building to be erected, the latest date for its construction, the cost of the building, the use to which it is to be put, and so forth. A fine up to 20,000 roubles can be imposed by the land department without recourse to a court for breach of such a contract. All contracts made with the land department are in a prescribed form, but the tenure is of indefinite duration, there being no specified term of years for which the land is granted.

Summary of the Main Characteristics

The outstanding features of the city government of Moscow, from the point of view of administrative organization and general functioning, may be summarized as follows:

(1) The intimate relationship between the elector and his representative before, during, and after election. This is possible only where the constituency is a small, compact and closely knit group, as it is under the soviet system.

(2) The concentration of power and leadership in the presidium and its resemblance to a body of ministers.

(3) The absence of any clear line of demarcation, comparable to that which exists in English local government, between the official and the elected councillor.

(4) The immense scope of the activities undertaken by Mossoviet, especially in the spheres of local industry, municipal trading, and public health.

(5) The absence of *ultra vires* or any similar restrictive doctrine. The city soviet possesses no absolute autonomy in any direction but is permitted in general to embark on any form of enterprise subject to (*a*) the observance of the Ten Year Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow and the Five Year Plan, (*b*) the avoidance of activities already

carried out by higher authorities unless specially permitted, (*c*) compliance with the directives, instructions, standards, or norms laid down by the central authorities.

(6) The unification of central and local government. This is not to be confused with mere centralization. It affords great scope for local initiative and spontaneous effort combined with unquestioned acceptance of central directives and instructions.

(7) The obligation of every city, including Moscow, to fit in with the general plan and to take no more of the available resources than the share allotted to it from time to time by the higher authorities.

(8) The subordination of the district soviets to the overriding authority of the Moscow city soviet in all matters of general policy.

(9) The lack of rigidity and legalism in the system despite a clear regularity of procedure. The consititutional arrangements are highly flexible and the organization depends for its successful working, as in England, on the unwritten law rather than on the written. The responsible officials are required to work the local government system with a due regard to common sense and the avoidance of unnecessary overlapping by the various authorities. They are not permitted to embark on ambitious schemes beyond the competence and resources of the local authority.

(10) The infusion throughout the system of a common aim for the fulfilment of the city plan and the building up of a great metropolis worthy to be the capital of the Soviet Union.

(11) Implicit confidence all along the line in the correctness of decisions made by superior authorities, which are usually arrived at after prolonged consultation with interested bodies.

(12) A complete absence of criticism or opposition on fundamental issues combined with considerable opportunities for criticism and complaint on minor questions by (*a*) the individual citizen, (*b*) the electing group, trade union, etc., (*c*) the employee of the local authority.

(13) The permeation and control of the whole organization at its key points by the Communist Party.

(14) The participation in the city government of an exceptionally large proportion of the lay public.

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Conclusion

It is difficult to summarize my main conclusions more succinctly than I have attempted in the preceding paragraphs. Yet these are unsatisfactory in that they deal with the city government in terms of its several leading characteristics. And in the last resort it is necessary to consider the whole government of Moscow—indeed, the entire structure of the Soviet Union—as a single organism.

The Soviet Union has evolved a system of local government for Moscow and the other great cities which embodies all the requirements necessary for a high degree of efficiency. There is a well-articulated and closely knit organization which combines in a remarkable degree the advantages of concentrating power and leadership in a small group of executive chiefs with the benefits of widespread popular participation in the subordinate parts of the administration. The methods by which responsibility, decentralization, and multiformity have been obtained are at once novel and successful.

The relations between the city soviet of Moscow and the minor authorities in charge of the districts seem to me almost ideal and incomparably superior to those existing in London, Paris, or New York. The relations between the Mossoviet and the higher authorities are theoretically attractive in a society where great government activity is called for. The practical working of those relationships varies between the different services and makes a common judgment difficult. It appears most satisfactory in regard to public health and least satisfactory in regard to education, which is excessively centralized.

One of the most notable advantages of the system is the almost complete consistency of aim and method pursued by the various organs of government. This is due partly to the high degree of integration between district, city, and central authorities; and partly to the control over policy exercised by the Communist Party at all the various levels. Whatever the cause, the city possesses a flexible, coherent, and adaptable administrative organization. It is indisputable that many of the services are at present operating at a low level of performance; but the fault does not lie in the machinery of government but in the absence of resources, preoccupation

with other tasks, a lack of skilled workers, and so forth. Similar difficulties or deficiencies impeded local government in the English towns for about half a century after the establishment of potentially efficient town councils by the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835.

The weakest aspects of the Mossoviet are its unscientific handling of the personnel question and the emphasis laid on technological considerations in training and research, to the exclusion of the social sciences. One of the strongest aspects is the fact that somehow, so far as one can judge, they have succeeded in getting the ablest men into the most important positions.

Last of all one comes to the imponderables. The moral conviction, the sense of unity, the optimism, the belief in themselves, the devotion to public work, the enthusiasm for the common cause—all these are beyond the power of description. The flavour and atmosphere of the social environment in which the building up of Moscow is taking place can only be captured by the personal experience of a visit. The impact of these forces almost takes away one's breath by its tremendous strength.

But there is another side to the matter. It requires a personal visit to appreciate not only the spiritual fervour which is driving the Bolsheviks forward to great accomplishments, but also the fanatical intolerance which is holding them back. The absence of anything approaching free discussion on vital public issues, the rigid party pronunciamentos on this and that and the other thing, the exclusion of foreign newspapers and books, the overlapping of political control into every conceivable sphere—these are the instruments of repression rather than of creation.

This repressive side of the system is immensely important, especially to those who are accustomed to breathe the freer air of the West. But it is, I believe, only an incidental by-product and not a necessary ingredient. It is a hangover from the period of revolutionary struggle with hostile interests and partly, perhaps, a heritage from the tyranny of the Tsarist régime. There is no reason why it should not gradually fade away and be replaced by conditions more likely to encourage the fullest expression of those creative impulses in the whole mass of the population which is the highest aim of the soviet leaders.

CHAPTER II

INDUSTRY AND FINANCE

By J. JEWKES

IN its economic and financial activities and, so far as they are related to the economic system, in its social activities also, the Moscow city soviet exists to give administrative effect to decisions arrived at by the central power in Russia. The opening sentence of the financial plan for the city of Moscow for 1936 runs as follows: "In the third year of the second five year plan the workers and toilers of the city of Moscow, in the energetic fight to carry out the decisions of the central committee of the Communist Party and the decisions of the great leader of the masses, Comrade Stalin, and under the Moscow committee of the Communist Party, have contributed a notable part in the socialist reconstruction of the country. . . ."[1] The last sentence in the introduction to the same plan is: "The special attention and day-to-day care of the central committee of the party, the government and Comrade Stalin himself and the direct guidance of the Moscow party committee render it probable that the Moscow city budget for 1936 will be fulfilled."[2] Whatever may be the views of outside observers, there are no illusions in Russia as to where power resides. There is no mention, in the city financial plan, of presidium or Ispolkom. Even the plenum is referred to only on two occasions. The first makes it quite clear that the rayons must carry out instructions in detail—"the central figures of the rayon budgets are submitted to the plenum of the Moscow soviet for approval and . . . the rayons are obliged to fulfil all their directions [instructions] under each separate item of expenditure." The wording in the second makes evident the minor role of the plenum in the framing of the financial plan—"the budget submitted to the plenum of Moscow for approval is a compulsory programme for financing the people's economy. . . ." This form of government, in which the local authority acts merely

[1] *Financial Plan of the City of Moscow*, p. 4.
[2] ibid., p. 20.

as an organ of the central and in which the nominal government runs alongside and is strictly subordinate to the party, is, of course, perfectly consistent with the concept of the state in Russia. For local independence in any significant sense is as inconceivable in the economic field when there is a properly executed general plan as it is in the political field with the one-party system.

I. Industry

But if the autonomy of the city soviet is restricted, the range of its administrative activities is much wider, particularly in Moscow, than in cities in other countries. On the social side, apart from its responsibility for education, health, and the extension and maintenance of the general social equipment of the city, Mossoviet operates theatres and cinemas, provides for "political" education, and is concerned with systems of communication, such as telephones. On the economic side it extends even farther into fields which, elsewhere, are not usually regarded as belonging to the local authority. In addition to water, sewerage, gas, tramways, and a host of minor services frequently carried on by local authorities, Mossoviet operates banks, engages upon house building and other forms of construction through its own building trusts, owns fleets of lorries and automobiles, runs hotels and warehouses and, most unusual of all, administers a large and varied group of industries and a substantial section of the retail distribution of the city.

LOCAL INDUSTRIES

The great bulk of industry in the U.S.S.R. is administered through a number of people's commissariats whose control runs down, through chief administrations and trusts, to the individual enterprises and factories. But there is an increasing tendency to encourage the establishment of local industries responsible, in each republic of the U.S.S.R., to the Commissariat for Local Industries, but administered in detail by the local soviets. This encouragement of decentralization is of interest in itself, but of particular moment in Moscow, where the local industries are exceptionally important.

The Commissariats for Local Industries were established

in 1933. Before that date the four industrial commissariats—Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Food, and Timber—were responsible for both large- and small-scale operation in their respective fields. Many local soviets were running small factories, and these were directly responsible to one or other of the industrial commissariats. That system appears to have operated badly. The smaller trusts and enterprises found their claims crowded out as against those of the bigger, and the task of administering effectively from the centre a multitude of small enterprises was formidable. In 1933 the local industries were handed over to a commissariat in each republic. There are over fifty different industries now under the control of the commissariat. In the case of certain products the output of the local industries represents the whole, or a very high proportion, of the national output. Practically the whole of the clothing and musical instruments, for example, and the greater part of the chinaware, pottery, and stationery made in the U.S.S.R. are produced by local industries. But with some products only the smaller, older factories are brought under the control of the Commissariat for Local Industries, e.g. small coal-mines, iron-ore mines, chemical works, flour-mills, and the larger enterprises are responsible to the Commissariats of Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Food, or Timber. Clothing is by far the most important product of the local industries, accounting for nearly one-fifth of the total output; next in importance come metal ware, knitted goods, and shoes. The local industries are much more highly developed in some parts of the U.S.S.R. than in others. Of the total output of local industries in the U.S.S.R., 75 per cent, which gives employment to some 600,000 workers, is found in the R.S.F.S.R. In the past three years the number of operatives employed in local industries has been increasing by about 30 per cent per annum. Even in 1935, however, local industries accounted for only about one-tenth of the total industrial production of the country.

It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to find any hard and fast line of distinction between local industries and industries of national importance. One factory in Moscow has passed from the one class to the other several times. Local industries are mainly engaged in making goods for the final consumer. But not wholly so. The Moscow local

industries produce a great deal of material and many machines, such as excavators, for constructional purposes. Nor does the size of the enterprise provide a sharp line of distinction. In many cases the factories of the local industries are smaller than those controlled nationally. All the big and modern flour-mills are run by the Commissariat for Food, whilst many of the smaller, older plants are controlled by the Commissariat for Local Industries. But there are important exceptions to this. Some of the clothing factories in the U.S.S.R. employ as many as 5,000 workers; nevertheless they rank as local industries. Again, whilst local industries for the most part produce goods for consumption in their immediate locality, this is by no means the invariable rule. Only about one-half of the goods made by such industries in Moscow are sold there; the remainder are taken up by the Commissariat for Internal Trade and sent to all parts of the Union. There cannot, therefore, be any clear-cut division between the two groups of industries by the size of the factory, the character of the product, or the area of the market. Each case seems to be decided on its merits, and the area of local control seems to have been growing wider in recent years.

The anxiety to expand and diversify local industries in the U.S.S.R. has many causes. Transport facilities have, in recent years, not kept pace with the growing demand for them, and, from time to time, urgent measures have been taken to speed up the carriage of goods and lessen the waste which the breakdown of transport was producing. The establishment of local industries, by placing the source of the supply near to the consumer, lessens the pressure upon transport, particularly where the raw materials are widely scattered. The expansion of local industries seems also to be the result of growing doubts about the real efficiency of gigantic industrial enterprises. In the early years of the first five year plan it appears to have been assumed that nothing could possibly be efficient unless it were big,[1] and the concentration of the production of all industrial goods in very large units was taken as the logical outcome of

[1] "We must overcome the resistance (frequently passive, which is particularly stubborn and particularly difficult to overcome) of the numerous remnants of small-scale production; we must overcome the tremendous forces of habit and inertia which attaches to these remnants."—LENIN.

technical progress. Those views, although they are still strongly held in the major industries, have been considerably revised for the minor consumption industries, and it is now accepted that there are many classes of goods which can be made just as cheaply in many small plants as in a few large units. Thirdly, it is now believed that local interests should exercise more influence than formerly over the detailed specifications of consumers' goods. Local peculiarities in demand in a country as large as the U.S.S.R. are numerous. Central decisions regarding the details of the articles to be produced are bound to be wide of the mark. There are also social and political reasons why a wide dispersion of industry, particularly in the agricultural regions, should be sought. The wage-earner is much more reliable politically than the peasant. The factory as a social unit can be much more easily handled than can the collective farm. If mechanization of agriculture continues, large numbers of people working on the land will not be needed in the future, and if they are to be prevented from crowding into the cities, outlets must be found for them in other directions. All these are obvious reasons for the encouragement of local industries.

There are, however, other possible causes about which it is not possible to speak with the same certainty. In any general industrial plan the failure to fulfil the plan at any one point creates dislocation at many other points by creating surpluses of raw materials or semi-finished products. Where large numbers of relatively small enterprises are allowed to operate, particularly if their scale of output and their need for raw materials are not fixed in advance, but are left, at least in some degree, to be decided in the light of the raw materials available at the moment, some waste, otherwise inevitable, may be avoided. The local industries may serve to mop up the mistakes of the plan, to turn a complete into a partial loss. One interesting illustration can be drawn from the clothing industry in Moscow. On occasions, it appears, the clothing factories exceed their planned output. When I asked how that could possibly happen, since it would involve an abnormal consumption of raw materials, such as cotton cloth, it was pointed out that from time to time cloth is offered for sale in the shops which does not appeal to the customer and is not bought. This cloth becomes available for making up into garments in which

form, presumably, it can be disposed of. Further, the centralized control of production is likely to lead to waste of raw materials, because of the enormous difficulties in watching the details of production carefully, and in seizing upon every opportunity for saving raw materials and utilizing by-products. Such minor economies can only be made on the spot. A furniture factory, for instance, in Moscow had a certain amount of scrap wood which formerly had been thrown away. It was suggested by the rayon that this raw material could be utilized for the making of toys, and, the Commissariat for Local Industries approving, a new small factory was established. Here, again, by increasing the measure of local enterprise, the interstices of the economic system, as laid down in the plan, are filled out and waste perhaps avoided.

The central authority responsible for local industries is the Commissariat for Local Industries. But Mossoviet undertakes the detailed administration and operation of the local industries within its boundaries. The local industries in Moscow fall into two groups: the local industries of the rayons over which Mossoviet exercises only general supervision, and the local industries operated by Mossoviet itself. The Moscow rayons operate a miscellaneous group of factories, most of which seem to be quite small. In 1934 these factories employed about 10,000 persons; in 1935, 15,000 persons; and in 1936, 22,000 persons. The goods produced included knitted goods, shoes, clothing, furniture, and paints. In addition, there are a number of workshops for repairing shoes, watches, etc. All the local industries in each rayon are grouped together in one trust. There are at present eighteen such miscellaneous trusts in Moscow, the largest of which employs 5,000 workers and contains six factories. The Mossoviet local industries are much more important. In 1934 they employed 65,000 workers; in 1936, 80,000 workers. These industries, unlike the industries of the rayons, are grouped together in specialized trusts, i.e. each trust contains only factories of one type. Some of these trusts are very large. The clothing trust in Moscow contains 30,000 workers, and the largest factory finds employment for 5,000 workers.[1] The goods produced in the Mossoviet

[1] Most of the clothing factories in Moscow work double shifts. The figure quoted includes workers in both shifts.

local industries cover a very wide range: bricks and building materials, machine construction, elevators, oil engines, radiators, boilers, cranes, gas stoves, meters, sewing-machines, excavations, knives and forks, pins, fish-hooks, motor-car bodies, needles, clothing, pottery, furniture, radio sets, and musical instruments.

The manner in which the plan for local industries is decided upon for each year was explained to me as follows. The State Planning Commission lays down a small number of important figures as "directives." The Commissariat for Local Industries for each republic is informed, in September of one year, what must be the total production, the decrease in cost of production, and the capital investment in local industries for the following year. Within the framework of these fundamental figures the Commissariat for Local Industries must work. It draws up a detailed plan for each of the fifty-one industrial groups into which local industries are now divided. Meanwhile the local soviets have been asked to prepare, through their own planning commissions, estimates for their local industries. Clearly, the aggregated figures of all the soviets may be considerably in excess of figures for the republic arrived at by the commissariat. In such cases some or all of the estimates of the soviets have to be reduced. But I was not able to obtain any information of value as to the manner in which decisions are made in such circumstances. The soviets do discuss their estimates with the Commissar, and there must be a good deal of debate on the rival claims of the different soviets. But it is at such vital points as this that explanations of the working of the economic system in Russia tend to become vague and unsatisfactory. In any case the decisions are finally made and, after approval by the Gosplan and the Council of People's Commissars, each soviet is given figures to which it must adhere.

The local industries operate under the controlled system of prices in the U.S.S.R. The prices of the raw materials consumed by these industries, the wages of labour, and the prices at which the finished articles are to be disposed of are fixed centrally.[1] The selling prices are determined by

[1] I was told of one case in the Moscow local industries where so much of one article had been produced that it could not be disposed of. The price was lowered but, before this was done, permission had to be obtained from the central authority. Such cases, I was informed, were rare.

aggregating the estimated costs of production and adding to this the rate of profit which is to be earned by the industry and the various state taxes, notably the turnover tax, which are added directly to the prices of goods. The profits of local industries are divided into two parts. One part is earmarked for social services within the city. The remainder passes to the revenue side of the local soviet budget, from which, of course, funds may subsequently be drawn for the extension of the capital of the local industries. The profits of a local industry may prove to be larger than was anticipated if the efficiency of operation exceeds expectation. In such cases one-half of the surplus profits are earmarked for social services within the city. There is, therefore, an inducement, even within the framework of fixed prices, for enterprises to work energetically, but I was unable to determine how immediate and effective this incentive was. At the present time, in order to stimulate the industries in the rayons, they are allowed to plough back an abnormally high proportion of their profits or surplus profits.

A great deal of attention has been devoted in recent writings on Russia to the expansion and the increasing independence of the local industries. This tendency is widely regarded as evidence of growing decentralization and, indeed, of the appearance of a type of private enterprise within the economic system. But it would be unwise to overestimate the importance of this movement or to regard it as a notable departure in principle. Local industries are responsible only for 10 per cent of total national production. In the unified budget of the U.S.S.R. for 1936 the total capital investment in industry is given as 15,000 million roubles; the capital invested in local industry was only 291 million roubles. The local industries of the rayons, which are being especially encouraged, are, of course, much less important than this; in Moscow, the industries of the rayons constitute only about one-fifth of the total of local industries there. The spread of local industries in the U.S.S.R. does not appear to involve a departure from the practice of granting autonomy to local bodies only if this is consistent with the rigid control of basic decisions at the centre.

LOCAL TRADING

The total turnover of retail goods in Moscow in 1936 was about 10 billion roubles, 1 billion of this going in public feeding. The sale of the remaining 9 billions' worth of goods goes on through 3,500 stores and 8,500 small booths. About 20 per cent of the total sales are effected through shops controlled by the Commissariats of Light and Heavy Industries. A further 15 per cent of sales are made through stores owned and operated by factories themselves. The Invalid Handicraft Co-operatives are responsible for 5 per cent of the total. The remaining 60 per cent are under the control of the Commissariat for Internal Trade. The commissariat is directly responsible for the operation of the larger departmental stores, but the remainder is administered by Mossoviet. The trading department of Mossoviet in 1936 was immediately responsible for about 40 per cent (4 billion roubles) of the total retail sales in the city, and it employed for this purpose some 36,000 workers. The Mossoviet shops are organized in twenty-five trusts, each trust specializing in a particular type of shop.

The relation between the Commissariat for Internal Trade and the trading department of Mossoviet is a close one. Actually the head of the trading department in the city is also a member of the commissariat. Each year Mossoviet receives from the commissariat directives laying down what volume of goods will be available for the city, and giving instructions as to the general selling policy and the broad system of organization. Mossoviet is responsible for such decisions as the choice of the location of new shops, staffing, and the detailed internal arrangement of the stores. The prices, of course, at which the goods are to be sold are fixed by decrees from the commissariat. The Mossoviet authorities have the power to question the actions and decisions of the commissariat, and even, ultimately, to take points of dispute for settlement by Sovnarkom, but I was informed that such differences of opinion rarely arise and are always settled to the satisfaction of all parties.

The total number of workers in retail distribution in Moscow is 90,000, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the population. This, of course, is a much lower proportion than that found in cities in some other countries. In Manchester, for instance,

the figure is 7 per cent. The Mossoviet officials expressed themselves as content with their low figure, and they asserted that there was no intention to raise it substantially in the future. It is, in consequence, easy to understand the marked overcrowding in many of the shops and the time which must be spent in shopping.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

The generation and supply of electricity in Moscow is not under the control of the city, and the two most interesting public utilities in operation are, therefore, the supply of gas and the operation of tramways.

Gas

The production of gas in Moscow has increased by nearly 100 per cent since 1932. In 1936 the daily production was 115 million cubic metres. This is, per head of population, about one-third of the production in the city of Manchester. Moscow, indeed, is at present very badly supplied with gas. The plant is old and inefficient; a large proportion of the houses in the city are not attached to the gas network and obtain heat from wood stoves. I was informed, however, that a new gas plant is in process of erection which will increase the output threefold.

The gas tariff is a single-price one. Apart from an insignificant number of special consumers (such as order bearers and invalids) and industrial users, all consumers pay a standard rate of 11·2 kopeks per cubic metre. The officials were not inclined to attach importance to multi-part tariffs. Apparently these had not even been considered in Moscow. There seemed to be no great interest in the view that, since the cost of providing gas to some consumers was higher than to others, there might be a case for graduated prices. This attitude to costs also came out in other directions. It is difficult to determine what profits are made by the Moscow gas trust, because capital costs are not included in total costs. But in 1936 the trust appears to have made a profit of 15 per cent on its turnover and about 10 per cent on its invested capital. When I inquired why, with such high profits, the price of gas was not reduced, the answers made it clear that the officials were not accustomed to think in

terms of the relationship between the two. Their answer was that they "thought the price of gas was low enough." When I asked whether it was considered equitable to gas consumers, as against those who burnt wood in stoves, to make large profits out of them which would go to the revenue side of the local budget, it became quite apparent that I was discussing the question of prices in terms which were strange to the officials. Their reactions to the question of the competition between gas and electricity were also interesting, although rather perplexing. The officials appeared to think that gas and electricity prices were fixed quite independently. I was told that under the Moscow ten year plan a definite system of heating and lighting had been decided upon. The heating of houses is to be carried out by steam generated at central points. Electricity is to be provided for lighting and gas only for cooking purposes. The choice of the consumer is to be restricted so that the system which is regarded as best, on technical grounds, may be introduced.

Tramways

The tramway system is shrinking slowly with the development of other forms of transport, notably omnibuses, trolly-buses, and the Metro. Actually, the mileage of track, which in 1936 was 517 kilometres, has been declining slightly in recent years and, with it, the number of passengers carried. Large capital investments have been made in rolling stock, etc., in the past three years. In 1936 new investment totalled 41 million roubles.

The fixing of fares is carried out by Mossoviet itself. In principle the Commissariat for Communal Economy supervises these fares, but in practice it rarely raises objections to fares on the ground that they are too high. As in many cities in other countries, the Mossoviet policy is to discourage travel by tramcar in the centre of the city. To that end the fares in the centre are fixed higher than elsewhere. I asked whether this was not a hardship on those who happened to live in the centre and were forced to use the tramways, but this point apparently was not considered when the decision was made. At the present time it seems to be the policy of Mossoviet to make large profits on its tramway system. In 1936 the tramway trust is planned to make a profit of

98 million roubles on a total capital investment of 260 million roubles and on a total running cost of 141 million roubles (excluding payment for capital). This policy, of course, can only be carried out by charging each passenger much more for each journey than the cost of that journey. The following are the figures of income and expenditure per passenger:

	Income per passenger	Expenditure per passenger
1933	10·4 kopeks	4·7 kopeks
1934	12·15 ,,	6·5 ,,
1936	12·25 ,,	7·5 ,,

The expenditure per passenger is rising owing, perhaps, to the provision of better services and reduced crowding on the tramcars, but, even in 1936, income exceeded expenditure by over 60 per cent. It was urged by the officials, in support of this policy, that much capital investment had recently been made in the tramway system. But those who at present use the Moscow trams, in addition to the travail that that in itself involves, have to provide out of income for large capital expenditure, the advantages of which will mainly accrue to posterity. I asked the officials if there had been any complaints of the prices charged. They answered "No," and continued, "Passengers are always telling the conductors that they marvel at the low fares." Actually, the fares do not appear to be high; the high profits are due to costs which are low because the tramcars are nearly always crowded. The load factor is very high and empty seats reduced to a minimum, but this, of course, involves almost incredible overcrowding and waiting at the times of peak load. This is probably one reason why fares have not been reduced, since such reduction would have increased the overcrowding.

It seems possible to draw two conclusions concerning the Moscow public utilities. Firstly, the price policies of the utilities are framed to yield a substantial profit; they constitute an additional method of imposing saving upon the community. And, secondly, the consumer appears to be subordinate to the technical expert with his definite views of the best way of doing things, and with his natural desire to be free of the inconvenience of giving the consumer what he wants.

II. Finance

To the English observer local authority financing in the U.S.S.R. is, at first sight, novel and perplexing, and I cannot claim that I was able to resolve all my own difficulties or hope that, in the account which follows, I have altogether avoided mistakes. So far as Moscow is concerned, however, there are two peculiarities in the method of budgeting which must be borne in mind from the outset.

(*a*) Purely local taxation, analogous to our own rating system, is relatively unimportant. Direct taxes on the resources of individuals in the U.S.S.R. provide only an insignificant proportion of the total resources required by the state. The greater part of the funds raised by the state take the form of levies on industry which, of course, are passed on to the consumer in higher prices for goods. In 1935, for example, in the unified budget for the U.S.S.R., of a total revenue of 65,900 million roubles, more than five-sixths was raised from industry directly. In the Moscow city budget for 1935, of a total revenue of 735 million roubles, only 61 million roubles consisted of taxation, the rates of which were decided by Mossoviet and the raising and expenditure of which were, within certain limits, matters for its own decisions.

(*b*) The system of raising resources by loans for capital works is also relatively unimportant. Mossoviet does, in fact, obtain loans in two ways. In the first place, the government raises considerable sums in state loans, in 1935 the total reaching 3,550 million roubles. The collection of such loans is in the hands of the local soviets, and the present arrangement in the case of Moscow is that 10 per cent of the state loans raised in the city shall go into the revenue side of the city budget. In 1935 this item amounted to less than 5 per cent of total revenue. Secondly, the city may raise loans for communal enterprises, housing and construction work mainly, from the Tsekombank, a state banking organization which exists for assisting in the financing of such enterprises throughout the Union. Short period loans, up to five years, are granted at 3 per cent per annum, and long period loans, up to forty years, at 1 per cent per annum. It will be seen that such loans differ vitally from those raised

by local authorities in this country. In the U.S.S.R., since there is no public market and therefore no competitive price for capital, the rate of interest charged is an arbitrary one. A loan at 1 per cent per annum is only one step removed from an outright grant. I attempted, in vain, to discover why 1 per cent was the rate charged for the long period loans or why, if some enterprises could be approved as borrowers at 1 per cent, other enterprises, perhaps not quite so desirable on social grounds, should not be allowed to borrow at rather higher rates. In any case, such loans are closely controlled from the centre; they fall within the plan for the year, and, although they perhaps give some flexibility of action to the local authority, it is strictly limited. Of the capital investments coming within the Mossoviet budget in 1936, about 13 per cent consisted of credit raised through the Tsekombank or the City Communal Bank which, for this purpose, acts as the agent of the Tsekombank.

For the greater part of the extraordinary capital expenditure of Mossoviet direct and non-repayable grants are made from the state. Thus, although the local industries, either directly or through the city budget, may plough back profits into extensions, the cost of building new factories for local industries would in many cases be met by the state. I was told that the new gas-works and clothing factories now being erected in Moscow were to be wholly financed by the state. The Metro is being paid for in the same way. It is perhaps understandable that such enterprises as the new Palace of Soviets, the Academy of Science, the Moscow section of the Moscow-Volga Canal, and the Lenin Library should be financed wholly by the state, but the state also makes itself financially responsible for construction and services which will be administered by Mossoviet and enjoyed only by the inhabitants of the city. It is very important to realize the degree of this state financing within Moscow. In 1936 the total capital investment falling within the Mossoviet budget was 630 million roubles. The total capital investment in all enterprises (industrial, commercial, and cultural) in the city of Moscow in that year was about 3,000 million roubles.

I was not able to obtain any satisfactory information as to the principle observed by the state in making its direct

grants for constructional purposes to local authorities. But I obtained the impression that Moscow was in a privileged position in this respect. The government is anxious to turn Moscow into a great and beautiful city. Indeed, Moscow is perhaps hardly a representative Russian centre for the studying of the means by which local authorities raise and spend money.

The annual budget of Mossoviet falls into two parts: the financial budget concerned with incomes and receipts expressed in roubles and the material plan which lays down in quantities and specifications what is to be produced within the year as a result of the various activities controlled by Mossoviet. The material plan is, in some senses, more fundamental than the financial budget, since decisions as to the total goods to be produced, the total number and character of schools and houses to be constructed, etc., must, under a plan, precede the purely monetary arrangements made to guarantee that the necessary transfers of goods between groups and individuals will be smoothly carried out. The material plan is given in very great detail, in each case the planned and fulfilled figures for 1935 being shown against the planned figure for 1936 and the appropriate percentage increase placed in a third column. Trouser buttons, for instance, were planned to increase by 2·2 per cent, pairs of trousers by 3 per cent. Saxophone production increased by 11·3 per cent, violins by 251·5 per cent, but violin bows by 285·4 per cent. Even the experimental machines and goods are planned. In 1936 one experimental dry-pressing machine for trousers was to be constructed, and 400 experimental vacuum cleaners. These quantities, along with all the others in the material plan, are decided upon in the manner described above in the section on local industries.

THE MOSSOVIET BUDGET

The revenue of Mossoviet is derived from five sources:

(*a*) Direct grants by the state, as explained above. Up to 1936 these grants were not included in the published Moscow city budget. I was informed, however, that from next year onwards they would be included.

(*b*) Profits of local enterprises, such as industries and public utilities.

(*c*) State taxation specifically earmarked for use in Moscow.

(*d*) Local taxation.

(*e*) Allocations by trade unions for specific social services.

Revenue

The Moscow Financial Plan for 1936 is given in Appendix I. Some of the items require elucidation. On the revenue side of the budget the first item is that of income from local industries. The local industries keep their own budgets. After meeting all expenses (including the payments to the workers' welfare fund, depreciation, allocations for scientific research, and repayment of interest and capital on loans, etc., but not including allowance for interest on the general body of the capital of the local industry trusts), a residue remains. In 1936 this amounted to 130 million roubles. About two-thirds of this is transferred to the revenue side of the city budget.

Similarly, each of the communal enterprises (i.e. the public utilities) keeps its own budget. In Appendix II the budget of the tramways trust is shown for 1936. Of a profit of 147 million roubles on all communal enterprises in 1936, 85 million was transferred to the revenue side of the city budget, the remainder going to increase the capital of the enterprises or for social services.

The next item requiring comment is local taxation. This is a relatively small item; local taxation of this kind apparently exists only in Moscow and Leningrad. The greater part of the money raised under this head consists of a kind of "octroi" tax on goods coming into the city and a tax on automobiles.

The next group of revenue items consists of a series of government taxes which are collected by the city, but a part of which are transferred to the city by the state. A part of the state turnover tax on industrial enterprises is retained by Mossoviet. The state tax on services (e.g. the turnover of workshops which make up goods on commission) is likewise retained in part. The whole of the state cultural tax, which roughly amounts to 1·8 per cent of the incomes of all individuals, is credited to Mossoviet. One-tenth of the state loans raised in the city pass to the Mossoviet revenues. There is also a state income tax. This is graduated according

to the size of the income and the size of the family. All incomes of less than 140 roubles per month are exempt. Those of 141 roubles per month are taxed at the rate of 0·8 per cent. The rate rises to 3·3 for incomes of 600 roubles per month, and thence remains constant. It appears, therefore, to be non-progressive after this point. Formerly 20 per cent of the total income tax raised in Moscow was transferred to the local budget. In 1936, however, 100 per cent is to be so allocated. All the other items on the revenue side are self-explanatory.

Expenditure

The greater part of the expenditure side of the Mossoviet budget is devoted to social services. In 1935 62 per cent of the total of 763 million roubles went to education, health, assistance to the poor, and physical culture; in 1936, 58 per cent of a total of 1,124 million roubles was assigned to these purposes. As will be seen from Appendix I, the other important items are allocations from the budget or communal enterprises, for trading services, and for housing.

Of the total expenditure in 1936, 32 per cent went for capital expenditure. It is not, however, possible to draw conclusions from these figures as to the rate of saving among the inhabitants of Moscow, since the financial budget does not include some of the saving effected by the local enterprises, and some of the capital investment in Moscow may be made possible only through the saving of persons in the U.S.S.R. outside Moscow.

A study of the expenditure side of the Mossoviet budget is perhaps the simplest and most conclusive method of testing the degree of autonomy granted to this local authority. The expenditure on education, as is brought out in another chapter, is laid down by the state, and no important departure from this is possible. The same is true of health also, and the other social services; the norms of expenditure are established by the central power. With nearly two-thirds of its expenditure, therefore, Mossoviet is not in a position to modify the figures laid down for it. Mossoviet is responsible only for about one-quarter of the housing construction carried out in Moscow. Its quota is laid down as a part of the general plan for housing, and is, therefore,

decided by the state acting through its advising body, the State Planning Commission. There remain the local enterprises. In the case of the public utilities, such as tramways and gas, it is clear from the account given earlier that they are free within limits to fix prices as they wish. The Commissariat for Communal Economy has, indeed, ultimate jurisdiction over these prices, but it does not appear to interfere much with Mossoviet decisions. It does not follow, however, that these public utilities can develop at will. If, for instance, the tramways wish for more rails for extension or reconstruction, they can only obtain these provided this is conformable with the state plan for the production of rails in that year. The freedom to increase profits either by increasing prices or by increasing efficiency does not necessarily carry with it a corresponding freedom to expend these profits on the tramway system. The development of the public utilities in any city can only go on as a part of a national plan to which all localities must submit.

This also is true of local industries. Some flexibility is granted to them in that if, through increasing efficiency, they make larger profits than those laid down in the plan, a proportion of the increased profits can be devoted to social services, housing, and the like. This in fact is not a concession of great importance. The total planned output of goods in Moscow local industries in 1936 was 867 million roubles and the planned profit 130 million roubles. If costs of production, because of increasing efficiency, ultimately prove to be 5 per cent below those planned, a simple calculation shows that profits would, instead of 130 million roubles, be about 170 million roubles. The present practice is that one-half of this surplus would be available for additional social services, i.e. about 20 million roubles. This, however, is less than 2 per cent of the expenditure of Mossoviet.

The conclusion seems inescapable that Mossoviet expenditure is rigidly prescribed by decisions of the state.

The Rayon Budgets

So far only the consolidated financial budget of the city of Moscow has been discussed. Moscow, however, is divided into twenty-three rayons, each of which has specific administrative duties, and each of which prepares a budget centred

upon its functions. The budget of a typical rayon is shown in Appendix V. The activities of the rayons are largely confined to the social services of education and health. In the rayon, of which details are provided in the Appendix, 88 per cent of the total expenditure falls within this group. But the rayons do operate small local industries and public utilities and they are also concerned with trading and housing construction. In budgeting for education and other social services the rayons must adhere to the norms laid down by the central government. In practice Mossoviet transmits these central decisions to the rayons. On the income side the rayon budget closely resembles that of Mossoviet. A certain proportion of the profits of local industries, of public utilities, and of trading are transferred to the budget. Local taxation and earmarked government taxation are included in the same manner as explained earlier. The rayon budgets are, of course, included in the Mossoviet budget. In 1936 the total of the rayon budgets amounted to 37 per cent of the full city budget.

A COMPARISON WITH MANCHESTER

It would have been extremely interesting if a comparison could have been made, particularly for the social services, of expenditure in Moscow and some city in this country. Unfortunately, for most branches of expenditure this is impossible. The expenditure on public health, for example, by the Mossoviet represents the vast bulk of such expenditure by the inhabitants of the city; most people obtain medical services free, and there is only an insignificant amount of private practice by doctors. In a city such as Manchester, on the other hand, the expenditure on medical services takes many forms. The local authority does, of course, spend large sums for this purpose. In addition, much public money, for example, under the National Health Insurance scheme, is spent which does not enter into local authority finances. And there is a very large expenditure by individuals who consult private practitioners. A reliable comparison in the face of these obstacles is quite impossible.

With educational expenditure the difficulties are not so great. In Manchester much is spent upon education by

bodies other than the local authority—notably the University, private schools, adult educational bodies, and the like —whilst in Moscow the figure of educational expenditure includes all such expenditure and also money spent on libraries, museums, theatres, social and political education, etc. For this reason a direct comparison would tend to put Moscow in too favourable a light. Further, in Moscow, the whole of capital expenditure in any one year is counted as expense for that year, whereas in Manchester most capital expenditure is provided by loans, and only the interest and sinking fund is counted as a cost for the current year. Moreover, 1936 was a year of exceptionally high capital expenditure on new schools in Moscow. On the other hand, the cost of land would not be included in the Moscow figures as it would in the Manchester costs.

A final difficulty lies in the absence of a reliable exchange rate between the rouble and the pound. Various estimates have been given recently of this. Reddaway,[1] in 1934, came to the conclusion that the rate would vary between 100 and 200 roubles for different goods. Citrine[2] collected a mass of prices and appears to believe that 100 roubles to the pound would be roughly correct, and my own observation whilst in Moscow led me to conclude that this figure was near to the mark. But, in order to be on the safe side, I have taken a rate of 80 roubles. The expenditure in 1936 on education per head of population in the two cities appears roughly to be:

	s.	*d.*
Manchester	47	6
Moscow	23	6

This estimate almost certainly shows Moscow in a too favourable light. The corresponding figure for Moscow for 1935, when capital expenditure was much smaller and much nearer to what will be the expenditure in the next few years, was 16*s.* 5*d.* Such calculations as these have only a very limited value. But they are accurate enough to reveal rough orders of magnitude. And they do appear to be of value to check against the reckless and fantastic statements that are often made with impunity at the present time.

[1] *Russian Financial System.*

[2] *I Seek the Truth in Russia.*

III. Conclusions

Mossoviet is much more than a system of local government, in the sense in which we understand that; it is also a vast trading and industrial organization. I was not, however, able to discover why these industrial and commercial activities should be entrusted to local soviets. Boundaries which are ideal for local government do not necessarily enclose areas suitable for economic operations. There are, apparently, good reasons why electricity should not be wholly generated or distributed by local authorities in the U.S.S.R. It is all the more surprising that they should be used as suitable units for the production and distribution of manufactured products.

The financial and economic subordination of the local authority to the state is maintained by a double control over expenditure and revenue. The local authority is not in a position to increase, in any important degree, its money resources. But, even if it were, it would normally find it impossible to dispose of that increase, since the expenditures it must undertake are laid down for it by a state which can enforce its wishes through a control of the supply of labour and of raw materials. The freedom of the local authority is restricted to two kinds of activity: full and unfettered liberty to force its employees to work harder, increase efficiency and reduce costs below those planned, and complete jurisdiction over any kind of economic or industrial enterprise which needs neither labour nor raw materials for its operation.

It seems to be almost impossible to discern even the broad results of the system of taxation in the U.S.S.R. The use of the term "taxation" in connection with the financial system is, perhaps, in itself misleading. It might at first sight appear that, since the great bulk of the resources collected by the state take the form of a turnover tax, the richer people were not paying their fair share. The Stakhanovite with 2,000 roubles a month would pay just as much turnover tax on (say) a pound of apples as the unskilled worker with 200 roubles. But the state also controls prices. It may be placing upon the kind of goods which the richer man will buy a higher turnover tax than is imposed upon those purchased by the poorer. It may be controlling prices so that the apparent differences in incomes are partly ironed

out by price control which limits the goods which the richer man can purchase with his surplus income. Only after the most elaborate study of prices could it be decided how far variations in money incomes correspond to variations in real purchasing power. Two conclusions, however, may be advanced. First, the Russian financial system is complicated. In 1930 the taxation system was considerably reformed; the number of different kinds of taxes, which at that time actually totalled seventy, was reduced and a few major taxes instituted. But there are still many vestigial remains. Why, if the state fixes incomes, should it bother about taxes on incomes? Why not fix wages at a lower level and save the cost of collecting taxes? Why a separate income tax and cultural tax, both based on income? Would it not be simpler and cheaper to raise the turnover tax by (say) 0·5 per cent? Why the curious local taxes such as the tax on automobiles (of which there are very few in private hands in the U.S.S.R.) and the tax on produce coming by rail into Moscow, both of which yield little and must cost much to collect? In capitalistic countries variety in taxation is perhaps unavoidable if the taxes are to be designed to reduce inequality of distribution; but where, as in the U.S.S.R., incomes are determined by the state this surely is unnecessary. The presence of state loans raises the same kind of query. Why state loans, to which every one is virtually forced to subscribe one month's salary, instead of a reduction in wage levels by 8 per cent? It may be that these are illustrations of the "multiformity" of which the Webbs speak so highly, or they may constitute a failure to plan the taxation system scientifically.

Second, the individual is never in a position to know what he is paying in taxation. The only taxation which falls directly on him is the income tax and the culture tax. These are not inconsiderable. Taken together they amount to 30 roubles per month on an income of 600 roubles. But both these taxes are deducted at source, and the few persons with whom I was able to discuss this did not know how much they were paying. The impact of the state loans is more direct. But the income tax, the culture tax, and the state loans constitute only about one-tenth of the total revenue of Mossoviet. The remainder is paid for by the population in their purchases of commodities and services.

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The fundamental question to an outsider interested in the Russian system is the process by which economic decisions are made. How are priorities established among the infinite number of directions in which labour and capital can be employed or, to use other words, what guarantees are there that the consumer will get what he wants? The character of the Russian economic system restricts the consumer in many ways. He cannot decide how he will spread his expenditure through time. Borrowing for consumption, apart from the co-operative building associations, must be virtually unknown in Russia, and, presumably, private money-lending would be considered as private enterprise or speculation and therefore illegal. Since the state decides what part of national income must be saved, the present consumer, in making his purchases, is forced to provide for the future consumer. All this arises from the absence of a public market for capital. It may be that, in its decisions concerning national savings, the state is merely carrying out the wish of the consumers. The recent expenditure in Moscow provides at least one interesting illustration of the mechanism underlying such decisions. In another chapter of this volume the extraordinary lack of housing in Moscow is described. Yet, in these circumstances, enormous resources have been devoted to such relative luxuries as the Metro and the Palace of Soviets. Between 1932 and 1934 800 million roubles were expended on the first section of the Metro in Moscow. In 1935 and 1936 a further 700 million roubles were spent on the second section, and before this is complete a further 500 million roubles will be required. Now, at 400 roubles per square metre of housing, the sum of 1,500 million roubles already spent would have rehoused over 470,000 persons in Moscow at 8 square metres per head, nearly twice the present average accommodation. Alternatively, it would have increased the average accommodation from 18 square metres per family of four to 22½ square metres. The Palace of Soviets which is now under construction will also use up great resources. The preliminary work of excavating the site in 1936 cost 30 million roubles, but I was not able to obtain estimates of the total estimated cost.

Why was the decision made to build a Metro rather than houses? One of the answers given to us was that the

traffic congestion made the Metro absolutely necessary; that the difficulty in moving about in the city was endangering efficiency. But there were alternative methods of increasing transport facilities, as, for instance, the provision of more buses, which would have been much cheaper. Is not the present appalling overcrowding also endangering the efficiency of the population? Another answer given to us was that the Metro was a symbol, an expression of the power of the people to create gigantic and beautiful things, a foretaste of the wealth to be at the command of all as the successive plans unfolded. The Metro has, in fact, been constructed on the most luxurious scale. But the perplexity which remains in one's mind is this: if the government had declared in 1931 that it would postpone the construction of the Metro and use the resources to house over half a million people in Moscow with some degree of comfort would the people have murmured? The answer must surely be no. And if the people are content with a Metro instead of housing and also content with housing instead of a Metro does this mean that, along with so many other groups, the discriminating consumer in the U.S.S.R. has been liquidated?

CHAPTER III

EDUCATION

By LADY SIMON

FOREWORD

IN the following chapter I have tried to give a brief account of education in Moscow, mainly from the administrative point of view, and, in order to make it of more interest to English readers, I have compared it in certain respects with education in Manchester. I do not mean to suggest that Manchester is typical of English education, for under our widely differing conditions it is impossible to say that any city or any village is "typical" of the country as a whole. Neither do I wish to compare the actual achievement of Moscow, in the brief time that has elapsed since the Revolution, with that of Manchester after a much longer period, although the disadvantages of such a comparison would not by any means be all on the side of Moscow. My only claim to write even an impression of Moscow education is, that I have studied Manchester education for the last twelve years.

This sketch is merely an impression, gained after a brief stay in a foreign country whose language was unknown to me. Readers with greater knowledge of education in the U.S.S.R. may, and probably will, find much to criticize. No one can be more conscious than I of its imperfections. If I had stayed longer, visited more schools, and talked to more people, I might have modified many of my statements, or even discarded some of them altogether. I can only hope that in spite of its obvious limitations, this brief impression may be of some interest to those who feel with me, that education is the most fundamental of all services in a socialist as in a capitalist community.

I have dealt only with children and young people up to eighteen years of age, and, with the exception of the training of secondary school teachers, I have made no reference to the universities nor to the various institutes of university standard. Neither have I attempted to give any account

of adult education, which covers a wide field, nor of the cultural work amongst the national minorities. I have assumed that any one who is interested enough to read this article will have read *Changing Man*, by Beatrice King.[1] This extremely interesting and comprehensive account of the soviet educational system is written by one who not only speaks Russian, but who has visited the U.S.S.R. from time to time and who is able therefore to trace the development both of the ideas and of the practice of the educationists.

Introduction

One of the most stupendous tasks which the government of the Soviet Union undertook after the Revolution was that of educating the whole nation. It set out to "liquidate illiteracy" amongst adults, to establish compulsory education for children, and to provide facilities for varied kinds of further education for both young and old, all at the same time.

In Tsarist Russia 78 per cent of the population was illiterate; there was no compulsory education, and only 7,800,000 children in school. To-day illiteracy is said to have been reduced to 8 per cent, and there are 28 million schoolchildren.[2] Although I only propose to deal with education in Moscow, it is impossible to estimate fairly the position in that city without realizing that Moscow, although the capital of the Soviet Union, is only one unit in the vast educational organization that stretches from Leningrad to Vladivostok and comprises one-sixth of the earth's surface. Every part of the Union, country as well as town, is included in the educational advance. This year, for instance, 4,309 new schools were built in the U.S.S.R. with accommodation for 1,500,000 pupils; 1,500 of these are in towns, and 2,800 in rural districts. The allocation of the urban schools shows 1,054 in the R.S.F.S.R., which is the largest of all the republics, 270 in the Ukraine, 37 in White Russia, 71 in Transcaucasia, 48 in Uzbekistan, 44 in Kazakstan, 11 in Tadzhikistan, and so on. Teachers, materials, and labour for building these schools, furniture, and equipment have all to be provided, and it is not until 1938 that the two-, and sometimes three-shift system will be abolished.

[1] Published by Gollancz, 10*s.* 6*d.*

[2] *Changing Man*, by Beatrice King, p. 269.

By that date still more schools will have been built, and all children will attend during the ordinary hours, i.e. 8.30 a.m. to 12.20 p.m. or 1.25 p.m. for the older children.

"You cannot build a communist state with an illiterate people" said Lenin. The masses of the people of Tsarist Russia, mainly peasants, were not only illiterate but ignorant and superstitious. Education—even elementary education—had been the lot of the few, and higher education, even more than in most countries, confined to a privileged class. The entire reversal of this state of things —complete now that discrimination against the children of the deprived classes has disappeared—and the provision of opportunities for all kinds of technical education, has engendered a widespread enthusiasm for learning, that has probably had no counterpart since the Renaissance. Middle-aged men and women attend courses after the day's work in the factory and office. Working hours are only seven a day, in some cases six, so that there is time and energy to spare for education. Crèches and kindergartens enable working mothers to attend classes. It is considered of first-rate importance that children should live in a literate home; otherwise their own progress at school would be hampered. For the first time in the history of mankind, one hundred and seventy millions of men, women, and children are given the opportunity of the best education that the nation can provide—free, universal, and with complete equality of opportunity.

The rulers of the U.S.S.R. are not only inspired by Lenin's teaching, "without books there is no knowledge; without knowledge there is no communism," but they are still hampered in their development of the vast country by a lack of skilled workers. Not only must the rising generation, the Red army, the peasants, and the industrial workers, be made and kept good communists, but they must also—if communism is to survive—be made skilled workmen and efficient technicians. The university institutes, as well as the lower standard technicums, find their annual product absorbed as quickly as it is turned out, and still the demand is unsatisfied. No one with whom I discussed the question in Moscow could foresee the time when there would be a surplus of university-trained students, and no one responsible for industry deplored the fact that, now that more

places in the full secondary schools are provided, fewer boys and girls left school at fifteen plus, either to enter industry part-time, or to go to a strictly vocational training at one of the technical schools. "We want all the workers to have as much education as possible," was the general opinion.

It is difficult for us, an old developed industrial society, to realize not only the unlimited demand for workers of all sorts—that, incidentally, is the most reasonable explanation of the recent anti-abortion decree—but the particular shortage of skilled technicians. The U.S.S.R. is doing in twenty years what we did in a hundred and fifty, namely, transforming an almost completely agricultural society into a largely industrial one. It is carrying through simultaneously a political, an economic, and an industrial revolution, and it realized from the first that a nation-wide education is essential for success. Everybody believes in education, from Stalin to the ordinary factory worker, and all the incomparable forces of propaganda are brought into play to make this belief universal. Parents want their children to have the best education because that means better jobs and better pay. Children are continually exhorted by the leaders of the party to work hard and to acquire knowledge "in order that they may help to build socialism"; those in control of industry realize the need for educated, intelligent workers who are ready to continue their vocational education in order both to earn more money and to take part in the "Stakhanov" movement for quicker and better production.[1]

All publishing is done by the state, and since it wants people to read, books are cheap and bookshops crowded. As an instance of this demand for knowledge, I may mention a highly technical book on problems connected with the milling of flour, which sold a thousand copies in England in several years. In the U.S.S.R. it sold ten thousand copies in a few months. When all allowances have been made for the close connection between education and earning power and the effect of the unceasing propaganda, there can be no doubt that there is a genuine enthusiasm on the part of the ordinary citizens to drink of the fountain of knowledge, so long withheld from them, and now flowing so abundantly.

Compulsory education is from eight to twelve years in the country, eight to fifteen plus in the cities. It is free in

[1] See p. 175.

the schools, in the technicums, and in the universities, and maintenance allowances, varying according to need, are almost universal beyond the compulsory age. There is complete equality of opportunity, and complete equality between races and between the sexes.

Moscow. Type of Schools. Accommodation

Before the Revolution, the population of Moscow was 1,750,000. There were two hundred and seventy-four schools containing 129,000 pupils, 7·3 per cent of the population. To-day the population is 3,600,000 and there are five hundred and sixty-six schools containing 545,000 pupils, i.e. 15 per cent of the population, equal to the total number of children between the ages of eight and fifteen in the city. But some of these schools are still running two shifts. By 1938 there will be two hundred and forty additional schools, and then the shift system will be abolished.

The distribution of the existing five hundred and sixty-six schools is as follows:

Primary	8 to 12 years	90 schools
Seven Year School, sometimes called the Incomplete Secondary	8 to 15 years	42 schools
Ten Year School, sometimes called the Middle School. .	8 to 18 years	342 schools
Schools for different nationalities i.e. Anglo-American, German, Gipsies, etc.		92 schools

Special schools for the deaf, dumb, blind, and mentally and physically defective children, are additional to these.

Although education was tackled immediately after the end of the civil war, it was not until 1934 that the special drive for new schools began. Between 1927 and 1934 only thirty-five new schools were built in Moscow. These were large, containing on an average 2,200 pupils. In 1935 seventy-two were built. In 1936 a hundred and fifty-two were built, each with accommodation for eight hundred and eighty pupils. All the new schools are ten year schools, that is, they provide for children from eight to eighteen years of age. The authorities have found from experience that the earlier schools were too large, and that a unit of eight

hundred and eighty pupils is the best. These schools are standardized, not only all over Moscow, but all over the R.S.F.S.R. There are several designs, but the accommodation is the same. They are built of red, brown, or cream colour brick, four stories high, and architecturally are quite pleasing. There are twenty-two classrooms, three laboratories, for chemistry, physics, and biology, a canteen in the basement, and sometimes, but not always, two workshops, one for metal and one for woodwork. Before the great drive to build schools, which began last year and is to continue until 1938, the schools had more generous accommodation. There was a hall, a gymnasium, a library, two workshops, and a dining-hall. It is hoped to add all these later to the schools now being built. These are put up at an almost incredible speed even when allowance is made for their standardization and lack of finish and equipment. They cost between 800,000 and 1,000,000 roubles each.

The classrooms are light and airy; large corridors, which are common to all Russian schools, fulfil the joint function of a hall and a playground, as places in which the pupils spend the intervals between lessons. A site of one or two hectares —two and a half to five acres—is considered desirable, but this is impossible in the built-up portion of the city, and although a big reconstruction scheme for the city of Moscow is planned, the opportunity is not apparently being taken to give playgrounds to all the schools in the centre. There is usually not even an asphalted space, and these new, four-story schools are crammed in amongst existing buildings, wherever there is enough land for a building site.

Fresh air and organized games play a much smaller part in the Moscow schools than with us. This is largely due to the climate, where intense winter cold necessitates double windows, and where thick snow for five or six months makes a playground of little use except for ski-ers. In a new school on the outskirts of the city, where there was a site of three or four acres, I saw children's skis in the entrance hall, and was told that they were used in the winter. But although the day when I was there in the early part of September was sunny and mild, none of the children went into the playground in the intervals between lessons. The other reason why so little emphasis is laid on outdoor activities in connection with schools is that, owing to the hot summer, the

holidays stretch from the end of May for the primary children, and from 20th June for the older ones, to September 1st. Summer camps or organized activities in the parks of the city occupy the summer months.

Although Narkompros,[1] advised by Gosplan,[2] arranged for Moscow to build a hundred and fifty-two schools in 1936, only a hundred and forty-five of these were built by Mossoviet. Five were built by factories for the children of their workers. This curious method of spreading the burden of public services instead of increasing taxation and paying for them all out of the general budget is adopted also with regard to houses and to kindergartens. Once the schools are built they are maintained and controlled by the city, as are all the others. The remaining two, of the hundred and fifty-two schools, were built by Narkompros as experimental schools. There are already three such schools in Moscow. They are directly under the control of Narkompros. They are carrying out various experiments, i.e. on the best age to start learning a foreign language, and in methods of individual study.

Administration and Finance

It will perhaps be easier to explain the organization of education in the city of Moscow, if I begin with the individual school.

The school is the administrative unit. Every school has a director as head. He—or she—has usually two assistants: one is head of the teaching side, and the other helps with the administration. In the smaller schools, there is only a director and a head teacher. The director, who has always been a teacher, is responsible for the whole school; even the doctor, who is under the health authority, is subordinate to the director, when working in the school.

The financial year begins on January 1st, and before that date the director has to make out his budget for the coming year. The cost per child is settled each year by Narkompros. This cost differs for the primary, incomplete secondary, and full secondary child, and consists of the following items:

1. Salaries and wages. Ratio of one teacher to forty pupils.
2. Maintenance, heating, lighting.

[1] People's Commissariat of Public Education. [2] See Glossary, p. vii.

3. Repairs.
4. Text-books and polytechnization.
5. Free meals and free books.

It may interest some readers to compare this allocation with that for Manchester according to the Board of Education's classification. The items there are:

1. Salaries of teachers.
2. Loan charges.
3. Administration and inspection.
4. Other expenditure.
5. Special services.
6. Superannuation.

There are no loan charges in the Moscow costs, because schools are paid for out of revenue. In both cases salaries are by far the largest item, being 62·2 per cent in Manchester, and 72·5 per cent in Moscow. The figure in Moscow includes superannuation contributions and wages, whereas the Manchester figure is for salaries and superannuation contributions only. The cost of administration and inspection, which accounts for 3·6 per cent of the Manchester costs, is excluded from the Moscow costs, and I was not able to get any figure for it.

These costs are sent to the director of each school each year, and he makes up his budget on that basis, and sends it in to the rayon department of education.[1] There is not much opportunity for variation, but each director discusses his budget with the rayon soviet, which approves it after, if necessary, alteration. It is the duty of the director to see that his expenditure during the year is kept within this amount, which is paid to him by the rayon. The director pays the salaries of his staff. Although, since costs are fixed by the central authority, there is no possibility of an increased income from the rayon for any school, there is another source from which the director can get financial help.

Each school is under the patronage of a factory or industrial undertaking of some kind. This association is part of the scheme for linking industry with education, and for ensuring that children, whilst at school, shall be in touch with productive labour. It is also an example of the method

[1] See p. 85.

of multiformity in bearing national expenditure. The factory gives help to the school in various ways. If the school is a new one, the factory may send some of its workers to help with the building, but usually it gives a sum of money each year. A few years ago, when things were more difficult and school budgets were often cut, the money from the patron factory was used for equipment, but now it is usually spent on out-of-school activities, pioneer clubs, summer camps, etc. One clothing factory that I visited had given 60,000 roubles to enable two hundred and fifty of the children to go to a summer camp. In return, some of the teachers and older scholars help to teach the adult factory workers reading and writing. Members of the factory committee visit the school on special occasions, and the children are taken to see the factory. The connection with a factory does not necessarily mean that the children from that school necessarily go to work in that particular factory, although this is often the case.

The director gets what he can from the factory, and agrees with their representatives how the money shall be spent. He must show this amount in his budget, although it is independent of any control by the rayon soviet. The rayon soviet collects the budgets from all the schools and sends it to the Mossoviet. A rayon cannot vary the cost per child, or give anything extra to one school. It cannot increase its local taxation in order to spend more on its schools, because that would upset the "plan."

There are twenty-three rayons in Moscow, and each contains about thirty-five schools, and is responsible for their management under the control of the Mossoviet department of education (Gorono). Each rayon has its culture section[1] which consists of twenty-two members, and which includes the head of the rayon education department, and the chief inspector of that department. The section deals with preschool age, school age, and adult education. It has a staff of three inspectors, so that each has about ten schools under his care. The sections ensure close contact between the schools, the members of the rayon soviet and the parents, many of whom are members of the section. They help with school meals and out-of-school activities, activities which, as I shall describe later, are more official than our out-of-school

[1] See p. 30.

activities. They have no control over the school budgets. They can, if they wish, recommend the dismissal of a director, but they have no power to dismiss him.

The rayon department of education, on the other hand, appoints the director, subject to confirmation by Narkompros, but he cannot be dismissed without the consent of Narkompros. The rayon department also nominally appoints the staff, including the head teacher, but, in fact, certain selected teachers are sent to the director, and he makes his choice, which is confirmed by the department. The rayon inspectors, on the other hand, although responsible to the rayon department, are appointed by the city department of education. Thus, the staff of the school is appointed and dismissed by the rayon department of education, the director is appointed by the rayon, but cannot be dismissed without the consent of the highest authority of all—the Commissariat of Public Education for the whole republic—and the inspectors are appointed by the city department of education. The qualifications for teachers, inspectors, and directors are laid down by Narkompros.

Most of the work of inspection is done by the rayon. The city inspects occasionally, and special inspections are made by Narkompros.

The city department of education carries out the policy of Narkompros. At its head is a woman, who combines the function of chief official with that of elected member of Mossoviet. She is also a candidate of the Presidium.[1] She was first elected six years ago, and was re-elected in 1934.

This department controls the schools in the more important matters and supervises the work of the rayon education departments. It has a staff of about thirty inspectors. Its main function is to see that the various instructions of Narkompros are carried out, so far as the city of Moscow is concerned. The procedure with regard to the present school building programme will make this clear. When the government decided that, as soon as possible, every child was to be in a one-shift school, Gosplan, which has to allocate the material and labour, called upon Mossoviet and every other city and rural authority for a return

[1] See p. 13.

of the number of children, number of existing schools, and the number of new schools that would be needed, assuming the standardized school of 15,000 square metres for eight hundred and eighty pupils. This type of building had previously been decided upon after consultation between the commissariats of education for each republic, and Gosplan. Gosplan then settled the date of the completion of the programme. In the case of Moscow the date is 1938. Mossoviet was told how many schools it could build each year of the standardized type. It then, in consultation with the rayons, settled upon the sites, and was responsible through its building department for seeing that the schools were built to time. This year, when the schools opened on September 1st, fourteen of the hundred and fifty-two schools were not completed. Mossoviet had to arrange for temporary accommodation—by prolonging the two-shift system —of the children who were left over. It was confidently expected that the schools would all be finished by the end of October.

The capital cost of the Moscow schools, all paid out of revenue which comes out of the budget of the whole Union, is allocated by Narkompros to the city education department, and becomes part of the Mossoviet budget, which, when passed, is sent to Sovnarkom[1] for confirmation. The expenditure on education, both capital and revenue, is approved by Sovnarkom, after consultation with Narkompros. If any saving is made by the city education department, as was the case this year in the capital cost of new schools, it is left in the bank to the credit of the department, and will go towards the cost of building schools next year. It can only be used for any other purpose after application to Sovnarkom. Gosplan would then inquire how the saving has been made, whether through scamped work or through increased efficiency. If through the latter, and if the object upon which the department wants to spend the money is very urgent, it will advise Sovnarkom to consent.

This very strict control of local expenditure, and of any saving that might arise even when the "norms" have been settled beforehand by the central authority, is similar to the refusal to allow any substantial variations in local taxation. There are very few ways in which money can be spent on

[1] See Glossary p. vii.

education that do not involve materials of one sort or another, or labour. (Staffing is strictly allocated by Narkompros and salaries fixed for the whole of the U.S.S.R.) If local authorities were free to raise money and spend it on these things, what would become of the "plan"? Once the cost per child and the cost of building and equipping new schools has been settled by Narkompros in consultation with Gosplan, there is little that any city or rayon can add, apart from what it can get from the patron factories. This amount has to be shown in the budgets approved by the central authorities to ensure that this source, also, is kept within the plan.

This financial control is so different from our system, where less than 50 per cent of the total expenditure comes from the government, and where there are wide variations in expenditure on all items between the various authorities, that I found it difficult to understand, until I realized the fundamental difference between "costs per child" in the R.S.F.S.R.[1] and in England. In England those costs, published by the Board of Education each year for the *preceding* year, are based on the returns from each authority. An average cost is given, but it is merely an arithmetical average. In Moscow, those costs are communicated *in advance* for each year, and represent the total amount that must be spent—no more and no less. It ensures equality all over the R.S.F.S.R. Leningrad spends as much as Moscow, and the smaller towns as much as Leningrad. The costs of rural schools are less, because salaries are less, but they, too, are uniform in all villages. No authority can spend more, because its power of local taxation is strictly limited, and because only in very special circumstances can it use savings on one item for another. We grumble about the rates, but if the power to levy them were abolished and the cost of local services had to be met by an allocation of a portion of the national taxes, nationally assessed, according to "norms" of expenditure for education, health, etc., settled by the central government for all parts of England and Wales alike, we should soon agitate for our lost local autonomy, even if it means higher rates, and more generous services in some localities than in others.

There is an education section[2] of Mossoviet, corresponding

[1] See Glossary, p. vii. [2] See p. 21.

to the culture section of each rayon soviet. Its chief function is to enable the education department, which is the responsible executive organ under Mossoviet, to keep in touch with the public. It fulfils two purposes, that of a check on bureaucracy—a word made hateful to the present-day soviet citizen by memories of the Tsarist rule—and that of enabling a certain number of people—parents, teachers, and elected members of Mossoviet who are specially interested in education—to discuss and take part in decisions on minor matters, to make recommendations to the Presidium, and to hear from the department what it is doing, and why. It considers the instructions[1] given to the deputies by the electors, dealing with educational matters, and when the head of the department gave her report to the section a few months ago she dealt with these, and reported that out of two hundred and fifty, one hundred and sixty-seven had been fulfilled, and the rest had "received attention." The report had previously been submitted to the bureau, i.e. executive committee of the section. The instructions ranged from suggestions for improving the food in specific schools, to improving the quality of the teaching. They dealt also with lodgings for teachers, the need for the abolition of shifts, school libraries, and a complaint by a citizen of bureaucratic dealing in the case of non-admission of her children to a home. The head of the education department also told the members that one of their most important tasks was to prepare playgrounds in the city parks and squares for the summer season, so that the children could spend their days under supervision.

Whether the section is an aid or a hindrance to good administration is a question that could not be asked, because one could not expect to get a candid opinion. But as the official is a combination of director of education and chairman of the education committee rolled into one, he probably regards his relation to the section in the same way as our chairman would regard his relation to the committee, and values it for the same reasons. When, as was the case in September of this year, the section instructs the department to introduce the "Stakhanov Movement"[2] into the schools and appoints some of its members to see that this is carried out, its activities can only be harmful, but one hopes that the department will be able to protect the teachers from

[1] See p. 4. [2] See p. 175.

such gross interference by ignorant outsiders. You can calculate the value of the Stakhanov movement in the building trade by counting the number of bricks laid in an hour; but a similar test in the schools would be fantastic.

Types of Schools. School Age. Pre-School Accommodation

As I have explained on page 96, there are three kinds of ordinary schools in Moscow. Elementary, eight to twelve years; incomplete secondary, eight to fifteen; and the ten year school, eight to eighteen.

The compulsory age is eight to fifteen plus, that is to say, the child must have passed through the seven classes before leaving. If he only enters when he is nearly nine, or if he loses time through illness, or if he is rather slow, he may be sixteen before he leaves. The normal age is fifteen plus, but the bright child whose birthday is convenient may finish at fifteen.

Between the ages of three and eight, children attend kindergartens, if their parents wish, and if there are vacant places. At present 21·5 per cent of children of pre-school age are attending kindergartens, but a hundred and ten new ones are to be built by 1937, and that will provide accommodation for twelve thousand extra children. It will then be possible for 26 per cent of the children to attend. This big building programme combined with building, on the part of the various commissariats of industry, of kindergartens for the children of their workers, is one of the ways—increased number of crêches and maternity hospitals are others—by which the government hopes to ease the situation caused by the recent decree making abortion much more difficult. Whatever may or may not have been the medical results of easy abortion which has been practised in the U.S.S.R. for some years, this decree, if it is observed, will not make the lives of women any easier. The rulers of the country have decided that they want a large population, but at the same time they need the work of every able-bodied adult. Up to the present, women have been freed from excessive childbearing, and have been able to work in the factory, office, workshop, roads, and in all the undertakings

in which men work, with proper provision before and after childbirth, and with facilities for feeding their babies. Now, women are to carry the double burden; produce large families and at the same time work outside the home. There is, of course, no compulsion to work, but the housing conditions are so appalling, the possibility of earning—at equal pay for equal work—is so alluring, that I find it difficult to believe that many women would *voluntarily* sacrifice their life outside the one crowded room—which is all that the majority can call home—in order to add to its overcrowding by producing more children. Kindergartens and crèches give a preference to children whose mothers are working, and, indeed, those children who can spend their whole day in one of these institutions have a much better chance of growing up healthy than those who have to stay in one room, or who can only get fresh air if carried out into the streets, as perambulators are non-existent.

The existing kindergartens have all been built and equipped by various organizations—factories, co-operative societies, etc. The annual cost is shared between the factory, which gives about 50 per cent, the state (30 per cent), and the parents, whose payments amount to about 15 per cent. The hundred and ten new kindergartens, however, will be built by the state, in the same way as the ordinary schools are built.

I visited two kindergartens, one connected with a clothing, and the other with a rubber factory. Although they were both in adapted buildings, the arrangement and equipment were excellent. Toys of all kinds, especially large and light bricks, abounded. One had accommodation for eighty, and the other for a hundred and fifty children. They are open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., which means two shifts of teachers, assistants, etc. Children can also stay for the night, when their mothers are working on night shifts.

There are usually twenty-five children to a teacher, and maids help with the meals. There is a director with two assistants in charge of each. She must have had training at a teachers' institute, where there are special courses for heads of kindergartens equal to a university degree, but the staff need only have the teachers' technicum training. This means three years after the age of about sixteen. It is, however, considered desirable that they should take a

university course in the evenings. They are obviously not so well trained as our teachers, and I could not help feeling —although I ought not probably to generalize after visiting only two schools—that a good deal of the time is wasted, and that the children could do more formal work without any danger, if the staff were more skilled. I was told that the seven-year-olds much enjoy their formal daily lesson, but the transition from the kindergarten to the elementary school at eight, with its four, forty-five minute lessons, must be very severe. The authorities recognize this, and are hoping that preparatory classes for seven-year-olds, attached to the ordinary schools, will help to soften it. Those in England who advocate nursery-infant schools from three to seven will have to consider very carefully the question of transition. When, in Moscow, I went from a kindergarten to the first class in the elementary school, I could not help feeling that our infant school, if the midday sleep were extended to the five- and six-year-olds, would be a better method of dealing with young children, than the clear-cut division between the kindergarten, chiefly play, and what in England would be the junior school.

The arrangements for medical inspection are much more lavish than even in our nursery schools. At the kindergarten which has a hundred and fifty children, a doctor comes every morning, and a nurse is there all the time. At the smaller one for eighty children, the doctor comes three times a week, and again there is a full-time nurse. If the teachers were more expert and able to detect early symptoms, doubtless some of the doctor's time could be saved. Still, this lavish provision is proof that the U.S.S.R. attaches great importance to the health of the children.

As many as possible of the children of pre-school age attending kindergartens are taken to summer camps. There is the same long summer holiday of June, July, and August for them as for the primary school children. Last year 43,000 out of the 64,000 kindergarten children were able to go, and some others went away with their parents. But the 43,000 only represents 14 per cent of the total number of children between three and eight in the city. Arrangements for looking after the small children in specially prepared squares and gardens account for another 17 per cent, but it is

clear that the majority of children between three and eight are still unprovided for, both during the school term and during the long summer holiday. A drive for kindergartens as strong as the recent drive for schools, will be needed if the provision of places for the pre-school child is to meet the demand. At the rate of 12,000 places a year it will be twelve years before there is provision for 75 per cent of the children. It is, of course, expected that, in obedience to the recent decree, the various commissariats will also provide kindergartens, although what number is not yet known, but those places may be offset by the increase in the population, if the abortion decree produces the results that its authors expect.

With housing conditions as they are, and with little immediate prospect of their improvement, one cannot help wondering why the provision of places beyond the compulsory age of fifteen was considered more urgent than the provision of places below the compulsory age of eight. The need for educated workers has meant undoubtedly some sacrifice of the interests of the younger children. When one admires, as one does whole-heartedly, a system which, with an immense need of workers, refuses to exploit juvenile labour, encourages as many as will to postpone entry into industry until eighteen, and only allows those between sixteen and eighteen to work less than the full adult hours, one has to admit at the same time that the lot of the pre-school child is much less happy. It is, of course, true that kindergartens as run in Moscow are much more expensive than schools, and it would be impossible to run them in shifts, but one is tempted to contrast the high quality and small quantity of the pre-school provision, remembering that "pre-school" extends up to eight years old, with the immense quantity and lower quality of the provision beyond that age. If a compromise were made, on the lines of our infant schools with nursery classes, with, in addition, provision for the midday meal, both the cost and the number of buildings needed would be less. In Manchester, although housing conditions are not nearly so bad as in Moscow, 30 per cent of the children of pre-school age, i.e. three to five, are accommodated, either in babies' rooms or in nursery classes, and of course 100 per cent of the children between five and eight are in school. In Moscow, kindergartens will be

provided for only 26 per cent of the children between three and eight by January 1937.

I could not find that any one proposes to lower the compulsory age, although eight is higher than that of any other educational system in Europe, but in the new, standardized schools there is room for preparatory classes of seven-year-olds, and it is hoped soon to have these, still on a voluntary basis, in every school.

I was told that most of the children who enter at eight have learnt their letters, even those who come straight from home, and that some can read. In the kindergartens, the seven-year-olds have a formal lesson of thirty minutes each day. By the time they leave they are expected to read simple sentences, write, count up to ten, and to understand addition and subtraction up to ten.

At eight years old compulsory education begins. The elementary stage is eight to twelve, four classes, and at the age of twelve plus, all children pass automatically to a secondary school. If they have been attending a primary school, they go to the nearest seven year or ten year school. If they started in either of these schools, they simply move into the fifth class.

There is no selective examination, as there is with us, and all children in the cities must complete the seven-year course. There is thus secondary education for all, in the sense that all children have identically the same course between twelve and fifteen.

At fifteen plus, there is the first external examination, but it is much less external than is our school certificate, and was described to me as more in the nature of a general consultation. The children are examined in all the subjects covered by the last year's work. The written papers, of which there are few, are sent to the school by Narkompros, but they are marked by the teachers. The oral examinations are conducted by the teachers, with some outside help from inspectors. In connection with this examination, there is a medical examination, and a talk with a psychologist. The child is then given a chart showing the results of this examination, and is given advice about his future. The chairman of the rayon soviet and the chairman of the local party are usually present at the final stage of the examination.

Choice of Courses after the Compulsory Age

There are four courses open to him, and it is at this age, sixteen, and not, as it is with us, at the tender age of eleven plus, that the first decision has to be taken. Even so, as I shall show later, it is not so irrevocable as the decision which, under our system, determines the length of his school life and his chances of a university career.

I. SECONDARY SCHOOL TO UNIVERSITY

If he passes the fifteen plus examination classed "very good" or "good" he can enter the eighth class, and so go on to the end of the secondary school course. This is at present the aim of all the children and all the parents, because it opens the door to the university. The university in Moscow includes the separate institutes where engineers, doctors, teachers, chemists, and technicians of all kinds are trained. As there is no unemployment, a university degree does not give greater security, nor does it necessarily mean higher pay. Many a Stakhanovite worker earns more than teachers, professors, doctors, and engineers; holidays and pensions are universal, but still the university attracts, as it does in a capitalist society. It leads to more responsible posts, and one of the ways in which outstanding Stakhanovite workers in a coal mine and in a dairy farm are rewarded, is by being brought to Moscow and specially coached, so that they can enjoy a university career.

Unlike the examination that admits to secondary schools in England, which is severely competitive, the examination in Moscow is merely a qualifying one. As more children qualify each year, more places are provided, by filling up the classes to forty and over. The upper classes in a ten year school in Moscow are as crowded as the lower ones, because children, who pass in from the incomplete secondary schools which finish at fifteen plus, have to be accommodated in the existing ten year schools. As there is no specialization in the secondary schools, there seems to be no reason why the upper classes should be smaller than the lower ones.

Classes are still between forty and forty-five in all schools, but thirty to thirty-five is the goal to be reached as soon as possible.

In 1935 about 55 per cent of the children aged fifteen plus stayed on at secondary schools, and there is reason to believe that the percentage had considerably increased this year, owing to the improvement in teaching, and to the larger number of available places. It is interesting and instructive to compare this figure with the corresponding figure in Manchester, where only 11·3 per cent of the children had places in the secondary schools. Maintenance allowances, on an income basis, are available for those able children whose parents could not afford to keep them at school. These are administered by the school.

For the children who do not pass high enough to remain in the secondary school, there are three choices. They can apply to enter one of the technicums, and if they pass that entrance examination, they will remain there for three or four years.

II. TECHNICUMS

Technicums are separate institutions attached to the various industries, where a course of technical instruction preparatory to that industry is provided. Students of all ages can attend these courses, which are various, but the majority of students come at fifteen plus. There are teachers' technicums also, where training is given for elementary schools. The standard is, of course, lower than in our two year training colleges, as the students come between fifteen and sixteen after only seven years' education.

I visited the technicum in Moscow belonging to the flour-milling industry. There were five hundred students, and the ordinary course lasted three years ten months. There was an entrance examination in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and Russian language. Education is, of course, free, and also residence in a dormitory for those—the majority—who come from outside Moscow. Scholarships are also given to those who work well. The amounts varied between eighteen and eighty roubles a month. The curriculum, which contains some general subjects as well as technical ones, includes practical work on machines, and two and a half months' work in a flour-mill under a special instructor. Music, literature, and art are pursued mainly out of the ordinary hours of study, as in the schools, and under special teachers.

These technicums, except those for teachers, which are under Narkompros, are not under the education authority. They are financed by the appropriate commissariat—in the case of the flour-milling technicum, it is the Commissariat of Food Supply—and the appointments of director and staff are made, and the curriculum is settled, by the education department of the commissariat. Girls as well as boys attend them—there are women in the U.S.S.R. in charge of flour-mills and of other factories. They turn out workers who are more highly skilled than those who have only attended a factory school, and less skilled than those who go to a university institute. They are probably equal to our foremen. For instance, when we visited a large clothing factory, the girl, who came in answer to a summons to repair one of the sewing machines, had been trained, we were told, in an engineering technicum. When a student leaves the technicum, he must work for two years in the industry that has trained him. Then he is free, if he likes, to go to the university for further training, if he can pass the university entrance examination.

III. FACTORY SCHOOLS

The next choice for a pupil of fifteen plus is to enter a factory school. There is no entrance examination, but children who show no prospect of becoming skilled workers would usually not be taken. These schools are of two kinds. Those associated with heavy industry, coal mining, steel works, etc., provide a two-year course. Seventeen is the minimum age for employment in heavy industry, and then only for six hours in an industry where the normal working hours are seven, and only for five hours where the normal working hours are six. In light industry, where part-time employment can begin at sixteen, and in those industries where the processes are simpler, the factory school course is six or nine months, sometimes a year.

The course is a vocational one. In a clothing factory the apprentices are given practice on sewing machines, but there is some general education, and also theoretical instruction in the different parts of the machines, and in the raw materials of the cloth. The idea that all workers should not only understand the machine that they are working, but its share

in the manufacture of the whole product, is part of the Soviet philosophy of labour. It is carried so far that every worker in a factory must pass an examination called the "technical minimum" within a few months of joining. If, after one or two attempts, he fails, he cannot be kept on. Each factory must provide courses in the "technical minimum" for their adult, as well as for their juvenile workers. Only those who have passed through the factory schools with a good record, are exempt.

To return to the factory apprentice, he either earns, if he is working part-time, or he is paid a maintenance allowance if he is attending the factory school full time. Many of the factories provide dormitories for those apprentices who come from outside the area—about 50 per cent of the apprentices in factory schools in Moscow come from outside. The factory schools, like the technicums, have no connection with the state education authority. They are provided and maintained by the factory, under the supervision of the education department of the appropriate commissariat. They are regarded as the main channel by which skilled workers—of less skill than the products of the technicum—are recruited.

The following statistics of the U.S.S.R. (1935) will give some idea of the various methods of entry into industry, excluding that from the University:

Total number of industrial workers . .	24,750,000
Total number in factory schools . . (2 years' or 6 to 9 months' course)	325,000
Total number in technicums . . . (3 to 4 years' course)	700,000

Every year, about one and a half million of those reaching the age of eighteen throughout the whole Union enter industry. If we take one-third of those at technicums, and one-half of those in factory schools, as the average yearly entry from these sources, we get 395,000, which is 26·3 per cent of the total number entering. That is to say, over a quarter of the total number of industrial workers have had some vocational training before they enter industry.

IV. DIRECT INTO INDUSTRY

Those who are not accepted in a factory school go straight into industry, working part-time until they are eighteen. They will have to attend courses in order to pass the "technical minimum."

In this country, co-operation between education authorities and representatives of industry has always been a feature of our technical education, but we should hesitate to hand over entirely to industry the responsibility for the education of the worker. But in the U.S.S.R. there is no danger of exploitation of the juvenile; neither is the value of general education underrated by the leaders of industry. Some general education is provided even in the factory schools and in the technicums, and no one responsible for industry seems perturbed at the increasing number of boys and girls who elect to stay on at a secondary school in order to go to a university. I found this passion for general education on the part of industry surprising, but very refreshing, and the explanation seemed to lie not only in the absence of a population with any industrial tradition, but also in the desire to encourage the ordinary worker to make suggestions for improving production. Suggestions from below are eagerly received, there is, as the Webbs[1] point out, no "enemy," and everybody, from the heads of the various commissariats of industry controlling millions of workers, down to the least skilled individual in the factory, is expected to co-operate in increasing production for the good of the community.

Full Secondary School Course. Entrance to the Universities

Those who remain at the ten year school[2] or who join it at fifteen plus, if they have previously attended an incomplete secondary school, stay for two more years. They then take the leaving examination. This consists of written papers in the Russian language and mathematics, which are set and corrected by Narkompros. An oral examination in the other subjects of the curriculum is held by the teachers,

[1] *Soviet Communism—a New Civilization?* by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.
[2] See p. 96.

with outside examiners from the university. Students who pass this examination with "excellent" in the basic subjects, and not less than "satisfactory" in the others, are admitted to the university without further examination. All others, including those who have been at technicums, or who have worked up through "Rabfac"—courses of instruction provided by the factories for adult workers who have had no chance of a secondary school education—must take an entrance examination in Russian language, literature, political science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and one foreign language. I was told by a man who knew English standards, that the standard of the Moscow university entrance examination had been raised considerably in the last year, and was now equal to matriculation. As the standard of teaching is raised, this standard will also rise, but there is as yet no suggestion that it should be raised in order to keep the number of university students at any given figure. There is still an unlimited demand for university graduates, and the Institutes manage to cram in many more than the number for which their accommodation was originally intended. I visited one of the five teachers' institutes, where secondary school teachers for the U.S.S.R. —excluding Moscow—were being trained. It was in a building that in pre-revolutionary times had served for the training of five hundred women teachers. It now had two thousand five hundred men and women students. It is going to be enlarged—meanwhile they manage somehow!

This is another instance of one of the greatest contrasts between the educational policy of the U.S.S.R. and that of England. We prepare buildings and teachers before we raise the school age even by a year; they establish compulsory education for seven years—in the towns—all at once, even although this means two or three shifts in the schools. Teachers are collected from every possible source, and many have to be trained on the job, even although training facilities are increased. We provide a smaller quantity of education of a higher quality, they provide a larger quantity at a lower standard. This statement applies to education over the age of eight years. Below that, the opposite is the case, as I have pointed out.

Length of School Life

It is important to remember that although the compulsory leaving age is fifteen plus as against fourteen plus with us, children who leave then have only had seven years' compulsory schooling, against the nine years of English children. However, as I have shown, the large majority either stay on at a secondary school, or enter a technicum, which means at least three more years of education before earning. Even those who go to a factory school have at least six months more education, and many of them have two years, and those who go straight into industry must attend courses in order to pass the technical minimum examination. In any case, nobody under eighteen years of age can work even the full legal working day of seven hours. When we realize that in England to-day, with one and a half million unemployed, boys and girls of fourteen to eighteen are working ten and sometimes twelve hours a day, and that children of twelve years old are allowed, under certain conditions, to work before and after school, we can appreciate the care that is bestowed on the young worker in the U.S.S.R., even although there is a great shortage of workers.

Technical Courses

There are also special courses for adults at the technicums, and innumerable courses provided by the individual factories, for extension courses, courses for "masters of socialist labour," and courses, equivalent to that of the incomplete secondary school, so that workers who grew up before enough provision was made, or who come from the country where the compulsory age is twelve plus, can still qualify for entrance to a technicum. So great is the demand for technical education and so eager is industry to provide it, that the government had to step in to protect the worker-students by limiting the number of hours of the courses during the week! Heavy industry is this year employing 3,400,000 workers and 21·9 per cent of these are studying in one or other of the courses provided for the ordinary worker, that is, excluding those who have been either to a technicum or to a university.

EDUCATION

Time-Table. Curriculum, etc.

The school day starts at 8.30 a.m. and ends at 12.20 p.m. for the first four classes—that is, for children from eight to twelve—and 1.25 p.m. for the older pupils. All lessons last forty-five minutes, even for the eight-year-olds, and there is an interval after each lesson, sometimes for ten, and sometimes for twenty minutes. Children of eight to twelve have four lessons a day, and the others five. During the intervals, different classes go in turn to the canteen where they have lunch. This consists of rolls or buns and tea, sour milk, fruit purée, or cocoa. Some of the children bring their own lunch, the majority buy it. They all sit at tables, and the opportunity is taken to teach table manners. The main meal of the day in Russia is usually in the afternoon, any time between two and six o'clock. The children who are not in the canteen, spend the interval in walking about the broad corridors or dancing in the hall, when one is available. Sometimes they play table billiards or chess or draughts. Hardly ever is the time spent in the open air, even when there is a playground available. The classrooms are aired during the intervals, but the children are indoors even on warm sunny days, from the opening of school until the end of the session.

All the schools have a room where the children have their mid-morning lunch, but not all, nowadays, provide a hot dinner. When the system of rationing was in force, and when foodstuffs were difficult to obtain, many children had dinner at school, but now that these restrictions have disappeared I was told that most children had dinner at home with their parents. Only necessitous children are now fed, and these are selected on an income basis. Free mid-morning lunches are also given to necessitous children. I thought that it would be interesting to compare the numbers fed free with those in Manchester. Last year, 1935, 4·5 per cent of the schoolchildren in Moscow were given free meals, whilst in Manchester 10 per cent were fed. In Manchester, children are given free meals if the total family income after deducting rent is less than 7*s.* per head per week, or 28*s.* per month. In Moscow, children are given free meals if the income per head, after payment of rent, is less than 25 roubles a month. In Manchester, we count the

TIME-TABLE, 9–10 YEARS OLD, MOSCOW

Time	First Day	Second Day	Third Day	Fourth Day	Fifth Day
8.30	Drawing	Reading	Reading	Reading	Copy Book
9.15	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval
9.25	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic
10.10	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval
10.30	Grammar	Grammar	Reproduction of a Story	Grammar	Natural History
11.15	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval
11.35	Reading	Physical Culture	Natural History	Manual Work	Singing
12.20	Dismissal	Dismissal	Dismissal	Dismissal	Dismissal

TIME-TABLE, 9–10 YEARS OLD, MANCHESTER

Time	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
8.50	Assembly	Assembly	Assembly	Assembly	Assembly
9.0	Marking of Register	Marking of Register	Marking of Register	Marking of Register	Marking of Register
9.5	Religious Instruction	Religious Instruction	Religious Instruction	Religious Instruction	Religious Instruction
9.45	Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training	Physical Training
10.5	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic	Arithmetic
10.45	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval
11.0	Girls—Needlework	Drawing	Geography	English	English
11.30	Boys—Geometrical Drawing (40 min.) English (20 min.)	Geography	Handwriting	English	Music
12.0	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval
1.30	English	English	English	English	English
1.40	Registration	Registration	Registration	Registration	Registration
1.45	English (40 min.) Music (20 min.)	English	English (40 min.) Music (20 min.)	Girls—Needlework Boys—Practical Arith. (40 min.) English (20 min.)	Arith. (15 min.) English (15 min.)
2.15	—	History	—	—	Nature Study
2.45	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval	Interval
2.55	Nature Study	Handwork (40 min.) English (20 min.)	History	Drawing	Physical Training (20 min.) English (30 min.) Music (10 min.)
3.25	English	—	English	—	—
3.55	Hymn, Prayer, Dismissal	Hymn, Prayer, Dismissal	Hymn, Prayer, Dismissal	Hymn, Prayer, Dismissal	Hymn, Prayer, Dismissal

earnings of all the members of the family in applying the scale, but this actually affects less than half the cases. In Moscow, only the earnings of the father and mother are counted. Although it is impossible to make a correct comparison between wages in Manchester and Moscow, no one who has seen the children in both cities could doubt that Manchester is feeding children on a much more generous scale than is Moscow; or that the need for a much extended service of free meals in Moscow is great. Perhaps nothing brings out more clearly the different standards of living in the two cities than this difference in the percentage of children considered to require free meals, although in Manchester there are 37,800 unemployed, and the U.S.S.R. claims to have abolished unemployment altogether.

During the intervals, the children stay in the corridors, upon which their classrooms open, and the noise of eight hundred or a thousand children, all walking about and talking at the same time, is very great. Since the intervals are spent indoors, one realizes the necessity for them to occur at the same time. It would be impossible to teach during one of them.

The curriculum for all schools is drawn up by Narkompros, and the total time spent as intervals is also settled by it, although a certain amount of variation in length can be made. The hours spent on school-work are hours of hard work at, for the most part, formal lessons. It is true that singing, drawing, and physical culture are included in the curriculum, but even the children in the second class, aged nine to ten years, have only one lesson in each of these subjects during the week. Most of the work in art, as well as extra work in other subjects, is done in the "Circles," which are groups of children who stay voluntarily after school hours. I will describe these later.

Home-work starts at once. Children of eight years old have a maximum of half an hour, and the oldest children are supposed to have not more than three hours.

I have printed on pages 118 and 119 the time-table of a class of children aged nine to ten years in a Moscow school, and one for children of the same age in a junior mixed school in Manchester. Our school day, with the long midday interval, lasts longer, and during it the children have five hours of lessons compared with three of the Moscow children. In

Moscow because the chief meal in the day is late, the school-work is finished in the morning. The small children have three hours of school-work, but in addition to home-work, which is not given in the Manchester school, practically all the Moscow children will stay on about twice a week for a "circle."

Out-of-School Circles

"Circles" usually last for one and a half to two hours. The small children start their circles immediately after school, and the older ones return at four o'clock. At one school that I visited the following was the list of circles: literature, mathematics, chemistry, biology, woodwork, metalwork, physical culture, photography, radio, aviation study. At another school there were circles for needlework —which I understood only girls joined, although boys have to do sewing in school—music, drama, sculpture, and drawing. In fact, the circles provide opportunities either for study of a subject that is in the curriculum, or of subjects that are not included, and that we usually call "hobbies." These circles are usually organized by the "Young Pioneers,"[1] but they are led by teachers, and the work is co-ordinated with the work of the school. Sometimes the teachers on the staff conduct them, for which they receive extra pay; sometimes specialist teachers from outside are brought in. It is a privilege to join a circle. When a child first comes to school he is told that unless he works well at his lessons he will not be allowed to join. He can also be excluded for bad school-work, but this does not often happen, for the Komsomol organizer, who is attached to each school, helps both with the organization of circles and with the discipline and work in the school. A young pioneer, which practically every child wishes to become when he reaches the age of ten, is one who works well and is well disciplined. The immense power of the party is used to encourage hard work in the young children.

These circles and out-of-school activities are linked up with the Central House of Pioneers in Moscow, just opened—a beautifully adapted building in a garden. The decorations

[1] For the part played in schools by the organizations of Young Pioneers and Komsomols see *Changing Man*, by Beatrice King, Chapter XVII.

of the various rooms had been entrusted to a group of young architects, and no detail had been overlooked that could make it suitable for its purpose. The children who show the greatest promise in the work of the circles are recommended by their teachers for membership of the Central House of Pioneers, where there is better equipment and better teaching. Most of the children come after school hours, but while some schools are still working on two shifts, the older children, who go to school in the second shift, can spend their mornings there.

Linked up with all the pioneer houses in the different cities is the Bubnov Central House of Children's Art, in Moscow. This has classes for specially gifted children, and also organizes the art activities all over the U.S.S.R. in the schools, circles, children's clubs, houses of pioneers, etc. It sends a travelling motor-car with puppet shows through the country in the summer, and it is consulted about special films, broadcasts, and plays for children. It draws up, for Narkompros, the curriculum for the art and music lessons which are compulsory in the schools, and recommends the methods to be employed.

The circles and out-of-school activities have no actual counterpart in our schools; some of the work done in them is, with us, incorporated in the ordinary time-table, some is done in out-of-school activities, and some of it corresponds to the work in evening classes, boys' and girls' clubs, evening play centres, Boy Scout and Girl Guide activities. It must always be remembered that in the U.S.S.R. there are no such organizations outside the official ones—the Young Pioneers, and Komsomols. Factories provide clubs for their workers, and tenement houses have rooms for use for recreation and education.

If the ordinary time-table seems to us to contain too little variety, we must always remember that the actual school year is shorter than ours—September 1st to May 31st for elementary schools, and September 1st to June 20th for secondary schools. There is a holiday for both from December 30th to January 10th, and for six days at the end of March. During the summer months, as many as possible of the schoolchildren go away to camps. Last summer, eighty thousand or 16 per cent were able to go, and this provision is being increased every year. At the camps,

which are supervised by teachers, much of the time is spent on nature study, drawing, painting, handwork, and of course, physical culture. For those children who cannot get away from Moscow, special arrangements are made in the parks, where there are open-air theatres, and in the museums.

POLYTECHNIZATION

From what I had read about Soviet education, I expected to find great importance attached to the lessons in manual work, as the chief way by which children are taught the principles underlying industry, and its meaning and importance in the socialist state. In each school that I visited I asked to see the workshops. In the new, standardized schools there were usually, but not always, two—one for woodwork with benches and simple lathes, and one for metalwork with only one kind of metal lathe. In an experimental school that I visited, the workshops were much better equipped, and there were several big, electrically driven machines, but the equipment of the other workshops that I saw was far below that in our Manchester schools. There was room for about twenty children in each room. The small children usually do their handwork, needlework, cardboard cutting, raffia, and plasticine in the classrooms, and work in the workshops does not begin until twelve years old. Children have one hour of handwork, and that also is the average amount of time given to workshop practice by children between twelve and fifteen. In the time-table of the junior mixed school in Manchester there is forty minutes given to handwork, and another forty minutes for needlework (girls) and for geometrical drawing (boys), whereas in the Moscow time-table, there is only one lesson in manual work. In our senior schools, to which the children go at eleven plus, every one has two and a half hours of manual work. Between eleven plus and fourteen plus, therefore, our children get more manual work than do the Moscow children, but the reverse happens later. Those who stay on at a secondary school in Moscow get two hours a week, and those who go either to a technicum or to a factory school, of course get more. The amount of handwork in our secondary schools depends largely upon whether the subject is taken in the school certificate examination. I did not see the variety

of handwork, even amongst the young children, that one sees in our schools, but that is probably due to the lack of trained teachers.

Classrooms

Another feature that struck me very forcibly was the bareness of the walls of the classrooms, and the lack of flowers. There were a few plants in pots, but the lack of gardens, or of any sources of supply of flowers, was most striking. The classroom of an English school—so far at least as the junior children are concerned—is full of colour. Posters, pictures drawn by the form teacher, or examples of the children's handwork, decorate the walls, and there are always vases of flowers, berries or coloured leaves, or bulbs in pots. The use of some of the schools for two shifts of pupils explains, perhaps, the absence of examples of children's work, but I found it also in the schools that are only working one shift. Altogether, I received the impression that school life in the U.S.S.R. is much more austere than with us. "That the schools are meant for the building of socialism" is never allowed to be forgotten by pupils or teachers. In the circles, probably, the atmosphere relaxes; they had not started when I was in Moscow, so I was unable to see them working, but they are also held in the ordinary, bare schoolrooms.

Uniformity of Curriculum

The curriculum is rigid and uniform. It is settled by Narkompros and is the same for all children, boys and girls, not only in Moscow, but throughout the whole of the R.S.F.S.R. The only difference is, that in the schools of different nationalities, i.e. the Anglo-American, German, etc., where teaching is conducted in the native language, the children all have to learn Russian and a foreign language in addition. This means an extra two hours on the week's time-table. But with this exception, all children learn the same subjects, according to the same syllabus, throughout their school career. The only choice allowed is that of a foreign language—it is compulsory to learn one—where existing facilities make a choice possible. This is begun at the age of twelve plus. From eight to fifteen there is no

differentiation of curriculum, either between boys and girls or between academic and non-academic children. The Soviet Union does not recognize these nice distinctions. "Equality" in education means "identity." At fifteen plus children are distributed to the factory or the factory school, to the technicum or the full secondary school, according to their capacities and inclination. Those who stay on at the secondary school continue with the full course; there is no specialization until the university is reached, and no alternative courses. The problem of the multilateral school does not trouble Soviet educationists; all the schools are unilateral.

This simplification is not chiefly due to the claims of economy, although large, undifferentiated schools are obviously cheaper to run than our smaller units with different "sides" within them, and with different heads controlling them. It is almost anti-Marxian to suggest that children differ in capacity and interest with regard to the ordinary subjects of the curriculum, or that there may be different ways of approaching mathematics or science. Equal opportunity, for Soviet educationists, means a similar curriculum. The recent and extraordinary outburst against "pedalogical methods," i.e. measuring, testing, and assessing the individual child has its roots in the conviction that only by treating all children alike can you ensure that the child of the erstwhile *bourgeois* or intelligentsia is not given preferential treatment over the child of the proletarian. According to our ideas this must mean the sacrifice of the individual child. Perhaps convincing evidence that the Soviet system feels secure will be the emergence in the schools of differentiated courses. It must not be forgotten in this connection that freedom of choice is exercised in the circles, but these only occupy, at the most, three hours in the week.

This uniformity of the Soviet system strikes an English observer very forcibly, because our system of infant, junior, senior, junior technical, selective central, and secondary schools, all under different head teachers with fewer pupils, and with different choices of curriculum for those over eleven plus, carries variety farther than most other countries. In my opinion it is one of the best features of our system, and I should be sorry to think that it is incompatible with the complete equality of educational opportunity which is such an inspiring feature of the Soviet system.

Children's Theatres and Cinemas

It is impossible to leave out from an account of the administration of education in Moscow, any mention of the children's theatres and children's cinemas.

These are, perhaps, the greatest contribution that the Soviet civilization has made in the sphere of education. There are three children's theatres in Moscow, and a hundred altogether in the U.S.S.R. These are theatres where professional companies of adult actors and actresses perform plays specially written for children. I saw a performance of *The Wandering School*, and never have I seen such acting of schoolchildren. The play was full of propaganda—that one takes for granted in Russia, and merely notices with surprise when it is absent—but it held the attention of the audience, several hundreds of children from twelve to fifteen years old. Tickets are distributed by the schools, and either given free or sold at a very small cost.

There are three children's cinemas in Moscow, and one hundred and fifty in the whole Union, where films, specially produced for children, or adult films that are considered suitable for children, are shown. Children under sixteen are excluded from the ordinary cinema, but every child in Moscow goes to the children's cinema about once a month. The tickets are also distributed through the schools. Never before in the history of mankind has the power to control what children shall read, and what they shall see at the theatre and at the cinema been possible. It is a magnificent opportunity, the responsibility of which would daunt most of us. Only the future can prove if the experiment has been justified.

Teachers' Salaries and Training. Control by the People's Commissariat of Public Education

I have left to the end any reference to the teachers. Readers of Mrs. King's book will find that, for the first few years after the Revolution, their lot was not a very happy one. The authorities have realized, however, that teachers are even more essential than good buildings; that is to say, in the U.S.S.R., as in capitalist countries, good teachers can work wonders in bad buildings, but up-to-date buildings are useless without good teachers.

By a decree last summer, salaries were raised, and teachers are now well paid, if one takes into account that the salary scale is for three hours' teaching a day, including the preparation of the lessons, and that extra payment is made for correcting home-work and for supervising out-of-school activities. Also, while the two-shift system continues, teachers who wish can earn a double salary by teaching six hours instead of three. The result of the decree settling salaries was not only to attract recruits to the profession—and both the teachers' technicum, which trains for elementary schools, and the teachers' institute, which trains for secondary schools, have far more applicants than they can accept—but it drew back into the profession twenty-six thousand teachers who had left it for other occupations during the years of low salaries.

There are, as with us, different trainings and different salary scales for elementary and for secondary schools; where these schools are combined, as in the incomplete secondary (eight to fifteen plus) and in the ten year school (eight to eighteen), the elementary trained teachers teach the first four classes, and specialists teach the different subjects from the fifth class onward.

Elementary Teachers

The training at a teachers' technicum begins at fifteen plus, and lasts for three years. The curriculum, which covers all the ordinary subjects with the addition of the constitution of the U.S.S.R., is the same for every one. There is no choice of subjects. Narkompros settles the curriculum, syllabus, and methods of teaching. All the students receive maintenance allowances of amounts varying between eighty and one hundred and thirty roubles a month, according to their means and to their progress. Books are free.

Secondary Teachers

There are four institutes in Moscow for training secondary school teachers; the one I visited trains only for schools in the U.S.S.R. and not for schools in Moscow. It is the largest, with two thousand five hundred students, and there is much competition to enter. Students are drawn from all over the Union, and although their individual preferences

are considered if possible, they must be prepared, after training, to go to any part to which they are sent. "We send our best teachers to the most remote and most backward parts," said the head of the teaching staff to me. This is another example of the determination to give all children an equal chance. Too often, under our system, the best teachers are drawn to the big cities.

There are seven faculties in this institute—history, literature, physics and mathematics, biology, chemistry, geography, pedagogy. The courses last four years. Unlike our university diploma courses, the practical side of the training is not confined to the last year. During the second and third years, the students attend classes in schools, but only in their fourth year do they practice teaching themselves, and then only for one month.

The number in training is so great that each institute is a unit. Even all those training to be teachers cannot learn together in Moscow. It is interesting to note that, even with complete equality for men and women, women are beginning to predominate in the teaching profession. Three-quarters of the students in the technicum, and two-thirds in the institute this year, are women.

After a period of experimenting with all modern educational theories, as described by Mrs. King, the schools have settled down to what seemed to me to be ordinary methods of teaching. Emphasis is laid on good grounding and hard work, and membership of circles, or even of the body of young pioneers, is dependent upon good work in school. Although I visited only a few schools, I should be inclined to hazard the opinion that there is far less experiment in teaching going on in Moscow schools than there is in the Manchester schools. There is certainly nothing to equal the experiments, both with the curriculum and with the methods of dealing with the different subjects, that is to be found in the English Senior schools. Narkompros keeps a rigid hold over the schools and teachers. It issues to the head teachers a curriculum for each class with the syllabus worked out, lists of books to be used, and methods to be employed. It settles what school-books are to be printed. These are standardized for the whole of the Union, and translated into eighty languages. In the last three years, three hundred million books have been printed for schools.

In addition, Narkompros settles what story-books shall be published. In carrying out this gigantic task, it consults teachers and professors, but the final word rests with it, and no book can be printed without its consent.

The Commissar of Education is at the head of Narkompros. He is a member of the Council of People's Commissars.[1] Until a year ago there was no machinery by which this all-powerful government department could keep in touch with the people it controlled—teachers, directors of schools, directors of education in the various local soviets. There is now a body of two hundred educationists selected by it, which it summons about twice a year to discuss various educational problems, purely in a consultative capacity. Educational policy in the U.S.S.R. is settled by decrees, issued jointly by the Council of People's Commissars and by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Such was the decree revising the salaries of teachers, and such also, was the decree, issued last July, settling the conditions of entry to the universities. But decrees can also be issued on the sole authority of the Communist Party, as was the decree against "pedology," which was published on July 4th 1936. I will give an account of this curious incident because it illustrates better than anything else the fundamental difference between our system of educational administration and that of the U.S.S.R.

Control by the Communist Party

Centralization of control is common to many administrations, and, where a single system is to be enforced over a vast area, and where thoroughly skilled and experienced teachers are scarce, the local autonomy that characterizes our system would be impossible. But this decree was an order about a technical matter, by a body that cannot claim to be an authority on the subject.

"Pedology" is a word that is unknown here, although apparently it is commonly used in America. It means the study of mental tests, intelligence tests (Binet-Simon, Terman, etc.), and of children's reactions to their environment. In the first flush of enthusiastic experimentation which seized the Soviet schools ten years ago, "pedologists"

[1] See Glossary, p. vii.

were appointed to all the city schools. These were men and women who had gone through a special course of training in pedology, although few, if any of them, had had a teacher's training or experience. They "tested" the children on entry to school, classified them into A, B, C, and D, and continued this testing at intervals throughout the school career. They supplemented these tests with questionnaires, school records, and investigations into home conditions. The pedologists attached to the Central House of Children's Art, for instance, carried out tests to discover the reaction of children to different films and plays. From what I was told, I gather that a good many of these pedologists were insufficiently trained; the tests they made up themselves were not as carefully worked out as such tests should be; and the fact that the teachers, who knew their children, were allowed no part in the classification, led to considerable dissatisfaction. Numbers of children classed as "retarded" and "difficult" were removed from the schools, and put in special schools, where it was hoped to counteract the effect of a bad home environment and of a rigid school discipline. To allow such methods to be used except in co-operation and close contact with the teachers was of course, asking for trouble, and doubtless many mistakes were made. The pedologists, however, were probably trying to mitigate the uniformity of the school system, by removing for special attention children who, for one reason or another, did not fit into the prescribed groove. But what brought the matter into the realm of politics was the discovery that, numerically, most of the children who were classed as "backward" were the children of proletarian origin, and that many of those classed as abnormally able and therefore in need of special attention, were those of *bourgeois* origin. The following decree signed on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and having the force of law, was issued.

Decree

On the Pedological Aberrations in the Systems of the People's Commissariats for Education

Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

The Central Committee of the Communist Party states that the People's Commissariat for Education in the

R.S.F.S.R. and the People's Commissariats for Education of other allied republics have permitted mismanagement in the schools in so far as they have placed a lot of so-called "pedologists" there, and confided to them the most important functions in the direction of the school and in the education of pupils.

By orders of the People's Commissariats the pedologists were required to control the admission to classes, to organize the school régime, to direct the whole course of work "from the point of view of pedologizing the school and the pedagogue," to find out the cause of the pupil's bad progress, to control his political views, to determine the profession for the pupils leaving school, and to turn out from the school backward students.

There exists in the school, in addition to the pedagogical personnel, an organization of pedologists, which is independent of the pedagogues, which possesses its own guiding centres such as pedological seminars, provincial laboratories, and research institutes; and the work of teaching and education is split between the pedagogues and the pedologists, so that the pedagogues are controlled by the pedalogical cell. All this has, in fact, lowered the responsibility of the pedagogue for the educational work, and has caused absence of control in the management of the schools. This could not but damage the whole Soviet school-work.

This damage was increased by the character and the method of the pedological work in the school. The practice of the pedologists, who remained separate from the pedagogues and school-work, was chiefly concerned with quasi-scientific experiments, and with numberless inquiries among pupils and their parents in the form of foolish and harmful lists of questionnaires, tests, etc., long since condemned by the party. These so-called scientific "investigations," carried out among many pupils and their parents, were concerned especially with backward scholars who did not fit in with the ordinary school régime. They aimed at demonstrating from a pretended "scientific biosociological" point of view of modern pedology that the slow progress of the pupil or the defects of his conduct were conditioned by heredity and his social standing. They aimed at showing the bad influences on the pupil, of

his family, relatives, and ancestors, and thus to find a motive for removing him from the ordinary school.

For this purpose a detailed inquiry into the intellectual development and talents of the pupils was carried out. This system of investigation was uncritically transplanted into Soviet ground from the *bourgeois* class pedology and is, being a real fraud on the pupils, directly opposed to the aims of the Soviet school and to common sense. Standard catch questions were put to a six- or seven-year-old child, and thereafter his so-called "pedological" age and the grade of his intellectual talents were determined.

All this led to the classification of an increasing number of children in the category of the intellectually unsuccessful, defective, and "difficult" children.

According to the classification of the pupils, as the result of this "investigation," the pedologists selected the children who were to leave the normal school for "special" schools or for classes for "difficult" or backward or neurotic children.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party states that, in consequence of the injurious activity of the pedologists, the enrolment of pupils in the "special" schools has been much too large. In spite of the direct advice of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. that two or three schools for defective and for difficult pupils should be opened, the People's Commissariat of Education has established a great number of "special" schools with various names, where the large majority of pupils are quite normal children, who ought to be transferred back to the normal schools. Studying in these schools, besides defective children, are gifted and talented children who were, according to quasi-scientific theories, registered as "difficult" by a wholesale decision of pedologists. As to the system of work of these "special" schools, the Central Committee of the Party considers the state of their educational work to be absolutely unbearable and on the border of a criminal irresponsibility. The "special" schools are in reality uncontrolled; the system of teaching and of school régime in these schools is handed over to the least-qualified pedagogues. No attempt at discipline is made in these schools. In consequence a great number of

children, who in the surroundings of a normal school are easily corrected and become active, conscientious, and disciplined pupils—in the conditions of a "special" school fall into bad habits and inclinations and become *more and more difficult to control.*

The Central Committee of the Communist Party believes that such aberrations of the educational policy of the party as have been permitted by the People's Commissariat of Education must mean that it is out of contact with the fundamental and vital work of education and of the development of Soviet pedagogical science.

Only the crying neglect of the tasks of a correct organization of the growing generation's education by the People's Commissariats for Education, and the ignorance of a number of their leading officials, can explain the fact that, in the system of the People's Commissariats for Education, the pedagogy was disdainfully declared an "empiric" and pseudo-scientific discipline; while the so-called pedology, still unbalanced, wavering, lacking an established object and method and full of injurious, anti-Marxian tendencies, was proclaimed a universal science, authorized to direct all sides of teaching and educational work including pedagogy and the pedagogues.

Only by almost imbecile negligence of the work of developing the Soviet pedagogical science can the fact be explained, that the rich and varied experience of the numerous army of school-workers is not co-ordinated, and that Soviet pedagogy is a Cinderella of the People's Commissariat of Education, while the representatives of the contemporary so-called pedology enjoy ample opportunity to propagate harmful quasi-scientific views and to carry out wholesale more than doubtful experiments on children.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party condemns both the theory and the practice of the contemporary so-called pedology. It believes that both the theory and the practice of the so-called pedology are based on quasi-scientific, anti-Marxian theses. To such theses belongs above all, the chief "law" of the contemporary pedology—the "law" that the destiny of children is fatally conditioned by biological and social factors, by

the influence of inheritance and by an assumed unchangeable environment. This deeply reactionary "law" is in crying conflict with Marxism and with the whole practice of the socialistic construction, which successfully re-educates the people in the spirit of socialism and liquidates the survivals of capitalism in economics and in the people's mind.

The Central Committee of the Party states that such a theory can result only from an uncritical transfer to Soviet pedagogy of views and principles of an anti-scientific *bourgeois* pedology, which, for the purpose of conserving the power of the exploiting classes, tries to prove a particular ability and a particular right to exist both of the exploiting classes and of the "higher races," and, on the other hand, the physical and psychical damnation of the toiling classes and of the "lower races." Such a transfer of the anti-scientific principles of the *bourgeois* pedology to the Soviet science is all the more injurious as it is disguised by a "Marxist" ideology.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party holds that the establishment of a Marxian science about children is only possible on the basis of overcoming the above-mentioned anti-scientific principles of the contemporary so-called pedology and by severely criticizing its ideologists and practitioners in order to rehabilitate pedagogy as a science and the pedagogues as its practitioners.

The Central Committee of the Party orders:

1. The complete restoration of the rights of pedagogy and of pedagogues.
2. The liquidation of the pedological cell in the schools, and the withdrawal of pedological text-books.
3. The revision by Narkompros and by the Commissariats of Education of the other allied republics, of the special schools, and the transference of the bulk of the children to normal schools.
4. The repudiation of the decree of Narkompros on the organization of pedalogical work and of the decree of the Council of the People's Commissars of U.S.S.R. of March 7th 1931 "on the organization of pedological work in the republic."

5. The abolition of the teaching of pedology as a separate science in the pedagogical institutes and colleges.

6. Severe criticism in the Press of all hitherto published theoretical books by contemporary pedologists.

7. The transference of the practising pedologists, if they desire it, to the category of pedagogues.

8. The submission of a report by the People's Commissariat of Education to the Central Committee of the Communist Party within a month, as to the fulfilment of this decree.

Signed on behalf of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party.

July 4th 1936

So pedology was turned out of the schools, lock, stock, and barrel, and almost inevitably a great deal of good work must have gone too.

Before the decree, there were fifteen thousand Moscow children in special schools of one sort or another. After the decree there were six thousand. These were the mental deficients, whom not even the decrees of the Communist Party could turn into normal children.

But what is so extraordinary to us is the method by which a reversal of policy is brought about. If these abuses were going on, why did not the teachers take action, either through their professional organization or by approaching Narkompros? Why had Narkompros itself, with its strict control of the schools and all that went on in them, not realized if things were going wrong? Why, finally, did not the parents, who as I explained, are supposed to be in constant touch with the schools through the rayon and city sections of education, do anything about it? Even if, as seems possible, there were rival factions within Narkompros, and the anti-pedologists won, that does not explain the breakdown of the machinery for keeping the schools in touch with the public. The public censure of a department which, under our system of cabinet responsibility, would inevitably have involved the resignation of the minister, is, apparently, quite usual, so far as Narkompros is concerned. Bubnov, the Commissar, is continually being attacked, I was told, but resignation is not open to him. So long as the party wants him there, so long must he stay.

The sequel to this decree took place whilst we were in Moscow. The conference of educationists had met a few months before, but nothing had been said about pedology. Another meeting was held in September, the chief business of which was to discuss the decree, which had, however, come into force as soon as it was issued in July. Bubnov presided at the conference, and several speakers expressed gratitude to the party for having saved the situation. The party decision of July 4th in condemnation of pedology, said a teacher, "came to most of us quite suddenly, whereas we should ourselves have arrived at the same conclusion long before." The following extract from the *Moscow News*[1] says:

"The former pedologists were in attendance at the council and several of them spoke. Most significant was the speech of Professor G. P. Blonsky, acknowledged leader of the pedologists. 'I personally feel the full weight of responsibility for the offences of pedology,' he said. 'I knew all along that *bourgeois* pedology does not accept the Marxian basis, but I continued using tests and measurements, which are a means of bolstering up the exploiting class. I was educated before the Revolution in the methods of Binet and others, and in the American school of theory and practice. As a result, I and all our pedologists looked upon the child as a machine rather than a living being. We explained "difficult" children as due to heredity rather than to environment. The fate of children was for us biologically established. This anti-Marxian conception lowered the energy and thought of the teacher in her work. The *bourgeois* conception of the child closed our eyes to the Soviet Child.'"

As for the pedologists themselves the same paper says:

"Pedological methods were largely confined to the cities, especially Moscow and Leningrad. Only about fifteen advanced students were doing post-graduate work in pedology, and perhaps five hundred undergraduates were specializing in the subject. The majority of them have changed their specialities from pedology to psychology or to methods of teaching, and will continue

[1] September 23rd 1936.

their studies with but slight loss of time. About fifty have transferred to the study of medicine, and will become children's physicians. The four hundred and fifty professional practitioners of pedology must requalify for teaching by from six to ten months of additional study."

Conclusion

It will be clear to the reader that the Soviet system of education differs widely from ours.

The administration is centralized in Narkompros, the Mossoviet department of education being an executive branch of Narkompros, and there is neither public nor local control as we understand the terms. Vital decisions of policy, the length of the compulsory school life, the kind of education to be provided before and after the compulsory age, the amount of money to be spent on education, even the date by which the two-shift system is to be abolished, are not the result of public discussion, either national or local. The elected members of Mossoviet who serve on the education section help to keep the administration in touch with popular feeling, but they have no power to question, or to decide, important matters such as those that I have enumerated. These are settled by Sovnarkom and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and once a decree is issued no discussion is possible.

There is no local autonomy as with us, which means that one authority can spend more and another spend less on its children, nor can one town choose to admit children of preschool age and another to exclude them altogether. There is strict equality of expenditure between town and town, village and village.

One wonders how much freedom the teachers have in their own schools or how much influence in moulding educational policy through their professional organizations. On the questions of discipline, methods of teaching, or, as we have seen of classification of children, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issues decrees. In similar cases our Board of Education would make "Suggestions".

As their education administration differs from ours, so does their conception of education. In *I Write as I Please* Walter Duranty quotes a foreign correspondent in Moscow

who once remarked, "To know about the Soviet Union properly, you must stay here ten days or ten years."[1]

I stayed four weeks, and with a full sense of my inadequacy for the task, I propose to try to assess what education means to the builders of the Soviet state and how their ideal differs from ours.

They have set out to build, and are succeeding in building, a new form of society, a society in which exploitation of the individual for individual profit is abolished, and where the energies of all are united in an immense co-operative effort for the good of all. If communism has not yet arrived, if there are great and increasing divergencies of income, at any rate all the money is earned, and there is no individual ownership of land or of the means of production.

This fundamental change, brought about by a violent revolution, and maintained by a severely repressive system of government, necessitates a changed outlook among the citizens. Through its educational system the state implants the new outlook; through its control of all the sources of information and propaganda, it maintains it.

An adviser of the late Tsar once said, "Give the people the barest minimum of education, just so much that they shall not look for any way out from the position they are in; give them as little education as possible, for education may be harmful both for them and for the whole system."[2] This used to be the accepted attitude towards popular education, not only in Russia, but in other countries, where the rulers feared the effect of education more than they valued its advantages. To allow people to eat of the apple of knowledge has always been considered, and rightly, as a dangerous proceeding. Experience in the past has shown that once access to knowledge has been put into people's hands, the consequences cannot be foreseen or controlled. Education, which enables people to read, to reason, and to propagate ideas, is the most potent force for altering the *status quo*.

But that was before the technique of modern dictatorship, with its control over all the sources of propaganda, had been evolved, and before the invention of wireless had given the state a weapon that is even more powerful than ability

[1] Page 96.

[2] Quoted in *Science and Education in the U.S.S.R.*, by A. Pinkevich, p. 134.

to read. To read and to reason involves considerable effort; to listen and to absorb is an almost subconscious process.

In the past, governments had to choose between the advantages and the risks of having an educated people. To-day, thanks to the enormous power that the state can, if it wishes, exercise over all sources of information and knowledge, it almost seems as if they can escape from the horns of the dilemma. The rulers of the U.S.S.R. want its citizens to be educated, so that they can be efficient, skilled, happy human beings, and at the same time, devoted, unquestioning followers of the leaders of the Communist Party. Every faculty is to be developed, every activity encouraged except the desire and the capacity to question fundamental principles of religion, philosophy, law, economics, and politics. That is forbidden fruit, of which citizens eat only on pain of imprisonment, and even of death. By control of the whole educational system and of all the machinery of propaganda, printed matter, the wireless, all publicly expressed opinion, and by prohibition of all travel outside the Union, education is shorn of its dangers, and is transformed from a two-edged sword to a weapon that cuts only with one side of its blade.

Our conception of education is fundamentally different from that of Soviet Russia.

We believe that education is only worthy of the name when we regard the children as individuals, to be given the chance of developing themselves to the limits of their capacities, capacities which differ with almost every child. That we are far from this ideal hardly needs stating, especially when we still send the majority of our children out to work at the tender age of fourteen. We are, in fact, probably much farther from our goal, after sixty years of public education, than Russia is from hers, after twenty years.

Those who are responsible for directing and practising education in England, do not concern themselves with the next stage in the evolution of our society, still less do they profess to know what the ultimate form of civilization will be; but they all have a profound inward conviction that a satisfactory state of society will only be reached as the result of the full and free development of individuals.

Modifications of the existing order of society have come about in this way, and even more fundamental changes may result in the future. As Mr. Oliver Stanley said in a recent speech:[1]

> "The symptom of this change as far as education is concerned was a new outlook on the relation of the individual to the democratic society of which he is part. It was, in short, the recognition that society and the individual have, each of them, a twofold nature.
>
> "Society is, on the one hand, a system of government, which imposes on its citizens definite burdens and responsibilities, for which they must be prepared and which they must be taught to undertake. But society is, on the other hand, a 'mode of associated living,' which may be influenced and modified by the very individuals whom, as a system of government, it controls.
>
> "The individual is, on the one hand, a potential citizen, trained for his place in society, his work, his leisure, and his social contacts. But he is, on the other hand, an individual—growing, changing, with instincts and peculiarities emerging at every stage, none of which can be ignored or crushed or put in a social strait-jacket without damage to the individual.
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> "In few states of society since history began has this been recognized. Generally speaking, there has been in most societies a primary stage, during which the state governs the individual, and the individual finds his real development in conforming to the state. Seldom does a nation emerge into the second stage until it attains a wider conception, and, by grasping the importance of conserving and pursuing individual freedom, realizes once and for all the difference between training and education. The ancient Greeks passed from the primary to the second stage when the City State declined. The ancient Jewish race passed from the primary to the second stage at the Dispersion. Most modern nations have given up the effort in despair, and have relapsed into the most primary of the primary stage, into the narrowest, most rigid form of state control."

[1] At the Annual Meeting of the Union of Lancashire and Cheshire Institutes, Chester, October 2nd 1936.

EDUCATION

The rulers of the U.S.S.R. regard the children as instruments to be used in the furtherance of their clearly defined object. They know exactly what product they want to emerge from the schools—hard-working boys and girls who have acquired a body of knowledge, largely technical or scientific, as a basis for technical work; skilled in different ways; with their artistic and literary tastes also developed; but similar in fundamentals, that is, with the same unwavering belief in socialism, and the same acceptance of whatever may be the party line at any given moment.

Molotov, chief of the Council of People's Commissars, speaking to a group of young pioneers who were returning from some weeks in a summer camp, exhorted them "to work hard and acquire knowledge, so that you can take your part in building socialism." This is an echo of Lenin's words, "without books there can be no knowledge; without knowledge there can be no communism"—not knowledge or learning for its own sake, nor for the pleasure or profit of the learner, but strictly subordinated to a determined, common end. There is no mention of the free development of the individual, which it is a commonplace for us to consider the object of education. True, Lenin believed that once communism was achieved and was universally accepted the individual would be able to enjoy political as well as economic freedom, and that without the latter, the former was of no value. We, on the other hand, believe that it is only possible to achieve a satisfactory society—including economic freedom—by means of political freedom.

Education in the U.S.S.R. is avowedly biased. Accounts of the "capitalist" countries in the children's school-books contain false information, as, for instance, that children in England work in the mines at the age of nine years, and that at fourteen they have to work for several years without wages. As all the sources of information—the Press, books, theatres and cinemas—are controlled perhaps more completely than in any other country, children are not only protected from an anti-socialist influence, but are increasingly subjected in all their activities to positive socialist ideas.

It is sometimes said that teaching in our schools is also biased—in favour of the *status quo*, capitalism, the royal family, etc. Although there is undoubtedly some truth in this contention, there is, it seems to me, a real difference

between an unconscious bias on the part of many teachers, and deliberate, dogmatic, teaching imposed upon them from without. By common consent, party political teaching, whether by a Conservative, a Liberal, a Socialist, a Communist or a Fascist, is excluded from our schools. Teachers and education authorities are equally concerned to observe this unwritten law.

In England, we believe that the teacher's work is different from, and more fundamental than, that of the politician, and that is why, I think, there is a general feeling that teachers should not take an active part in politics. Their task is to turn out each generation so that it will be fit later on to decide the questions which it will then be the duty of the politicians to put before it.

The exhilaration of being in a society where children really count, where their physical and mental welfare is a matter of the utmost importance, and not merely an occasion for the payment of lip-service at the time of a general election, is so great; the courage and imagination needed to carry out the educational programme over the vast expanse of country are so immense, that one is almost swept off one's feet by a wave of admiration. But when an English observer reflects upon the real purpose for which schools and teachers exist, he is assailed by doubt.

It is magnificent—but is it, after all, education?

CHAPTER IV

HOUSING

By SIR E. D. SIMON

PRELIMINARY NOTE—STANDARD OF ACCOMMODATIO N

Housing accommodation in the Soviet Union is always measured in terms of the number of square metres of housing accommodation per head. *Statistics based on this method of measurement are so universal and so vital to any proper understanding of the housing problem in Russia that it is necessary to make it clear at the outset. The Russians include in their measurement the floor area of the living- and sleeping-rooms only. The kitchen, passage, lavatory, bath, and staircases are excluded. "Person" in these statistics means any human being, a child being counted as a whole person, not, as is usual in England, as half a person.*

The Mossoviet is aiming at a standard of 12[1] *square metres per person. For a family of four this would mean 48 square metres (480 square feet).*[2] *This happens to be almost exactly the same as the area of the living- and sleeping-rooms in the ordinary English three-bedroom, non-parlour cottage, the standard house now being built by local authorities all over the country. If and when Moscow achieves its aim of providing 12 square metres per head, it will have reached about the same standard of housing as is attained in the new English municipal cottages.*

PRE-REVOLUTION HOUSING UNITS[3]

There are two principal types of housing in the central parts of Moscow—the new houses built since the Revolution, and the pre-Revolution houses, the latter consisting mainly of large middle-class flats of eight or ten rooms each, which

[1] *The first aim is 9 square metres: the ultimate aim, as shown on a map giving the distribution of population when Moscow is fully developed with a population of five millions, seems to be 15 square metres per head. But the leading members of the Mossoviet accept 12 square metres as the minimum objective at which they are aiming before they can consider the housing problem to be solved on satisfactory lines.*

[2] *It is fortunate that a square metre is almost exactly 10 square feet—so the conversion is easy.*

[3] For management purposes one or more blocks of flats constitute a housing unit. The unit may vary from a few flats up to a thousand or more, and may contain a population of several thousand persons.

in pre-Revolution days housed one family and which now house roughly one family to each room. There are also large numbers of wooden houses, mainly of two stories, which will ultimately be replaced by modern buildings.

Let me begin by describing my first visit, officially arranged by the Mossoviet, to one of these pre-Revolution houses belonging to the Mossoviet. On arrival I was taken down a steep and narrow stone stair to a cellar which had been converted into a pleasant and well-lit club room, containing the usual equipment of a Lenin corner: a bust of Lenin, large portraits of Stalin and other leaders, quantities of red cloth inscribed with the latest Bolshevik slogans. The housing unit was co-operatively managed by a committee appointed by the tenants, and I was received by the management committee, the chairman of which was the director of a factory, clearly a man of position and high quality. Members of the committee showed me round the building, which consisted of an old three-story house, with two floors recently added on the top to increase the accommodation. The flats were all of one type; about eight rooms of fair size, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a lavatory, all arranged along the two sides of a long corridor. They insisted on my seeing most of the flats, and a considerable proportion of the rooms; they had just been having a "socialist competition" as to which of the flats was cleanest, best decorated and best kept. Each flat had a Lenin corner in the broadest part of the passage, with a small table, two or three chairs, pictures of the leaders, of socialist triumphs, etc., decorated with the usual scarlet cloth. Each flat of eight rooms had in pre-war days housed a single family; now each room was in most cases occupied by a family. In one case we saw a room of 20 square metres occupied by a single woman; in other cases a smaller room was occupied by four or five people; sometimes a family had two rooms. It was hard to judge how many people slept in each room, as they use collapsible beds, which are hidden away during the day, and sleep in all sorts of unexpected places. Considering the tremendous shortage of space, the rooms were wonderfully well arranged; great ingenuity had been used to make it possible to live, work, and eat in such confined quarters. The fact that many meals are taken outside, either in the factory or in a restaurant, of course helps to make life practicable.

The kitchen of about 20 square metres was shared by eight families. Each family has an unventilated cupboard, the only place for the storage of food. The top of the cupboard is used as a table, and there are two gas cookers with eight rings, one for each family.[1]

There is one bathroom and one lavatory which have to be shared by all the occupants of the flat, in this house generally from twenty to twenty-five persons.

The way in which these people managed to live a clean and self-respecting life, under what would appear to us quite impossible conditions of overcrowding, was most impressive. We have, unfortunately, in Manchester even to-day some old middle-class houses containing eight rooms, occupied by eight families. These are the worst slums in Manchester, and one quite understands the failure of the women to keep the house clean, or to bring up children under decent conditions. It must be borne in mind that these houses in England are only occupied by the very poor, generally with a considerable number of children. The house I am describing in Moscow was occupied by what we should call middle-class people; their success in living self-respecting lives under such conditions was astonishing.

I saw another pre-war house which had been converted in the same way, and had also had two new stories built on the top; in this case owned by a factory, which was using the house for some of its leading workers. This housing unit was not co-operatively managed; it was directly managed by a man appointed by the factory. Conditions were slightly better than in the house previously described; along each corridor are twelve flats with two bathrooms and six lavatories. But the overcrowding was about the same: each room was occupied by a single family.

In one long, narrow room we found the parents and two schoolchildren. In order to give the children a chance of doing some quiet work, the first six feet of the room from the corridor had been boarded off, and the two children were working there at a small desk, with an electric lamp. The room so provided for the children was unventilated and pitch dark, but it gave them an opportunity of being alone; the main room left for the parents and for the general family

[1] Gas is laid on in comparatively few houses. Normally all cooking is done on primus stoves.

life was exceedingly small. It was a touching example of the tremendous keenness of the parents to give their children the best chance of a good education.

Most of the tenants seemed to be fairly well off, and some of the rooms were so overcrowded with furniture that there was hardly room to move in them. They were clean and well kept.

Post-Revolution Houses

The new houses are quite different; they consist invariably of large blocks of flats generally five or six stories high. Balconies are very rare, lifts almost non-existent. There are stone staircases of easy gradient, with flats opening off on both sides; rarely any corridors. The Mossoviet took us officially to see a housing unit of this sort consisting of thirteen tenement blocks built by them in 1928. That was a bad period for the building industry. They were built of red brick, quite roughly finished, with the intention that they should be plastered; owing to the excessive pressure of work this had never been done. The thirteen blocks were rectangular in shape, as simple as possible, with no effort at architectural design. The spaces between them were rough gardens divided between broad, sandy and dusty paths, used as playgrounds by the children, and areas of grass, uncut and pretty weedy. The whole effect, both of the houses and gardens, was drab and dreary to a degree. There was a small crèche, and in one of the basements a washhouse with no facilities for drying. The gardens were full of washing at the time of our visit.

While the houses are generally built by the Mossoviet, or alternatively by some other government department such as a commissariat, an industry, a factory, or the Red army, there is also another method of building: by a group of people who join together to build houses for themselves, a so-called Owners' Co-operative House.

I visited one of these owners' co-operatives; seven blocks of houses built in 1928, housing about 4,000 persons. The tenement blocks and the flats were very similar to those built by the Mossoviet. The gardens were equally untidy, the communal services on about the same standard.

As regards the flats themselves in the new housing units,

these generally consist of two, three, or four rooms, a kitchen and bath. Electric light is universal; gas is being introduced into the more recent houses.

In the whole of my visits I found at least 90 per cent of the rooms occupied by a single family of from one to about five persons. I must have visited over fifty flats; though there were often three or four adults living together in a room, never once did we find more than two children. Where the large families live remained a mystery.

The standard of building has steadily improved. I was shown by the Mossoviet the latest and best houses which they are now building, a block ten stories high with lift. The flats were large and well equipped: central heating, hot and cold water laid on, gas cooker in the kitchen, a parquet floor, and, of course, a bath and electric light. I was shown two of these flats of about 75 square metres area, well built, with all the services of the latest London County Council flats and half as big again. Each of these flats was occupied by a single family; the Mossoviet officials informed me that they have abandoned the old policy of building three-roomed flats and letting them to three families; they are now building good-sized flats and letting each to a single family.

Communal Services

As regards communal services for the housing units, comparatively little is being done. There is generally a club-room, which is so small that it can only be used by a quite limited proportion of the tenants; some sort of wash-house; playgrounds, sand-pits, and a crèche for the children; and often a cheap open-air theatre. But on the whole it all seems rather half-hearted and not very well done. The surprising thing is that communal dining-rooms are not provided; I was told by several authorities that they had definitely been a failure. This is difficult to understand when one has regard to the overcrowded conditions of the living-rooms.

I noticed in one second-floor room of about 20 square metres, housing father, mother, and son, a bicycle and motor bicycle crowded in behind the bed. Perambulators do not

exist; no provision seems to have been made for any such means of transport; still less for the day when every Soviet family will own a motor car!

Management

I have explained that there are two kinds of management: some housing units are managed by a staff appointed by the owners (the Mossoviet or perhaps a factory); some are managed by a committee appointed co-operatively by the tenants.

The house management department gave me the following figures as regards the ten million square metres which come under their control:

Managed by	Square metres	Persons	Square metres per head
Mossoviet . . .	1,047,000	185,000	5·6
District Soviet . .	1,732,000	318,000	5·4
Tenants' Co-operative .	7,565,000	1,637,000	4·7

On the whole the Mossoviet and the districts tend to keep in their own hands the management of the newer houses and to hand over the older ones to co-operatives. It will be seen that the overcrowding in the co-operative houses is substantially greater than in the Mossoviet houses.

As regards owner management, I found nothing particularly striking. In one of the larger units I visited there was a staff of fifty persons under the manager, looking after rent-collection, repairs, cleaning, heating, etc. I was not particularly impressed by the salaried management staff; there was nothing even distantly approaching the skill and knowledge of Octavia Hill management. Some of the managers seemed extraordinarily incompetent as regards figures; when we cross-examined them as to how the income was spent they struggled endlessly with an abacus but were never able to add up the details to the correct total.

The co-operative management was much more interesting; it will be noted from the table above that three-quarters of the houses controlled by the Mossoviet are co-operatively

managed. I went pretty fully into the management with the committee of a housing unit in which 490 people were living, which I was told was fairly typical.

The tenants elect a committee of management of five persons which has general responsibility for the whole house. The secretary, who is a resident, receives a small salary and makes out the rent demand notes for the tenants; the tenants are responsible themselves for paying it into a bank. The management committee is also responsible for sending records of all financial transactions to the district union of tenants, which actually prepares a balance sheet for each housing unit, and so enables the district soviet to keep a close eye on everything that is being done.

The management committee appoints three sub-committees: sanitary, repairs, and culture.

The sanitary sub-committee have the right to go into all the rooms and to insist on the most scrupulous cleanliness. They do this so far as possible by giving advice and help; in cases of recalcitrant tenants they have various means of bringing pressure. In the first place there is the comradely court, which this house shares with two or three other houses. Three tenants are elected as members of this court. They have power to inquire into any case of trouble; their verdict, as representing general public opinion, carries great weight. In the rare cases where they fail, an appeal can be made to the Mossoviet or to the procurator, and ultimately, if necessary, a bad tenant can be got rid of.

The repairs sub-committee is responsible for seeing that everything in the house is kept in good order. It works in close touch with the district union of tenants, which has a staff of workmen for carrying out repairs; it advises the various housing units on repairs and provides the necessary men and materials for carrying out the work.

The "culture" sub-committee receives a certain proportion of the rent and spends it in whatever way seems good to the tenants. In this house there was a pleasant little library in the club-room, and a playground for the children in the courtyard.

The tenants also elect a control committee of three persons who have no executive functions. Their duty is to watch the working of the management committee and of its sub-committees, to make sure that things are being done as

far as possible efficiently and in accordance with the wishes of the tenants; to be ready in case of inefficiency or bureaucracy to report the matter to the general meeting, and to see that it is dealt with.

There is a paid staff, consisting of a manager, a porter, a heating attendant, and the necessary charwomen for cleaning purposes.

The two things that impressed me most in the whole of these housing visits were, on the one hand, the terrific overcrowding; on the other hand, what seemed to us the supremely good management in some of the co-operative houses, which made a decent life possible even under such conditions. Having regard to the extraordinary difficulties, the achievement in living clean and self-respecting lives in some of the old flats was one of the most remarkable things we saw in Russia. It might be well worth while for some enterprising municipality to experiment in copying this Russian system of co-operative management. Even under English conditions tenants of blocks of flats live in very close touch with one another, and it must be important, in order to make life tolerable, to make every effort to ensure that the fullest regard is paid to the wishes and tastes of the tenants.

Overcrowding

The overcrowding in Moscow is appalling. By far the biggest task facing the Mossoviet is the building of the houses necessary to provide reasonable living accommodation for the people. It is difficult for one accustomed to the housing standards of a successful and old-established capitalist country like England to appreciate the conditions which prevail in Moscow.

Although statistics of overcrowding comparable in any way to ours are unobtainable, one vital figure is available, which enables one to get a good general grasp of the whole problem. The population of Moscow is estimated at 3·6 millions, the existing housing accommodation at 16·4 million square metres; this gives living-room accommodation for each citizen of Moscow, man, woman, or child, of an average area of 4·5 square metres (or 45 square feet).

In order to try to form some concrete idea of what this

means to individuals living in Moscow, I have attempted to analyse the overcrowding under different grades.

Grade I. Houses where there is more than 12 square metres (120 square feet) per head. These may be called luxury flats on Moscow standards. I have described the new flats we were shown by the Mossoviet; in two cases flats of about 75 square metres are occupied by families of four, or nearly 20 square metres per head. I was told by authorities, both in the Mossoviet and in the government, that the present policy is to build large flats and let them to single families. I believe that the number of people occupying these luxury flats is at present insignificant; it will increase substantially if the Mossoviet perseveres in this policy.

Grade II. Accommodation from about 8 to 12 square metres (80–120 square feet) per head. Mainly occupied by leading workers: architects, scientists, engineers.

There seem to be a considerable number of flats of this sort, partly flats built co-operatively by a group of professional men, partly flats built by factories for their leading workers.

Though the ordinary worker is supposed to have only 9 square metres per head, leading professional workers are allowed an additional 10 square metres, so that a married couple may have 28 square metres, if they can get it! All the people of this class whom I saw had either one or two rooms, mostly in a small flat so that they only had to share their bathroom and lavatory with one other family. If the area they succeed in getting exceeds the permitted amount, they pay three times the rent on the excess area. I met several foreigners who were living under Moscow conditions typical for this class, and although they did not like it, they did not suggest that it was interfering seriously with their efficiency. But it must be remembered that they had an average of perhaps 12 square metres per head as against the general average of Moscow of only 4·5 square metres.

A typical flat of this type was as follows: a living-room of 20 square metres, a bedroom of 16 square metres, a small passage, small lavatory and bathroom, and a kitchen of about 5 square metres. In this were living a married couple with a daughter of three. The cook was sleeping on a folding bed in the kitchen and considered herself lucky to

have such comfortable quarters. There are 9 square metres per head. The owner of the flat is a well-to-do foreigner with two motor-cars and a chauffeur; he considers himself very fortunate to have this flat. There is a likelihood of ejection owing to street widening, and he is much worried as to the possibility of getting anything equally good.

Grade III. Houses with something above the Moscow average area per person, say from 4·5 to 8 square metres (45–80 square feet) each.

These are for the average competent worker. All the houses we were officially shown come under this category, with the exception of the one new house of luxury flats. Under the best conditions in one of the new houses, a single person may have a room of, say, 20 square metres, sharing a kitchen and lavatory with one or two other families.

As regards the worst conditions, the following three cases occur in an old nine-roomed flat with one bath and one lavatory, near the centre of Moscow. Average income of the tenants from 250 to 350 roubles per month. Twenty-three occupants with an average of 6·5 square metres each. The three worst rooms out of the nine were occupied as follows:

Area of room Square metres	Number of adults	Number of children	Square metres per person
11	3	1	2·7
10	2	1	3·3
22	5	2	3·1

Take the first case: a room of 11 square metres or 110 square feet; 3 adults and one child. It would be an interesting occupation to try to arrange four beds in a room of that sort, a table, a modest cupboard, some sort of a sideboard, and four chairs. In fact, it cannot be done. Or rather, it can only be done by using collapsible beds and stowing them out of the way during the day. And it must be remembered that the occupants have to share the kitchen with eight other families and the bath and lavatory with *twenty-two* other individuals.

Grade IV. Grade IV includes the more overcrowded half of the houses of Moscow; all the houses where the average

area is less than 4·5 square metres per person. Unfortunately there are no figures to indicate the number of such houses. But having regard to what I was told and what I saw, I should be inclined to suggest that perhaps half the people in Moscow are living in houses of the first three grades, with an average of say 6 square metres per head; in that case, the other half must be living in grade IV, with an average of 3 square metres per head. This is only a guess, but it seems likely not to be very far wrong.[1]

I did not see any of these grade IV houses; they are not normally shown to visitors, and unfortunately owing to lack of time I did not insist on seeing them.

Walking along the streets in the lower parts of the town in the evening one could see something of the conditions in lighted basements, which were clearly very bad. I saw one barrack for workers, in which about twenty beds completely filled the two sides of the room, leaving only a narrow passage between them: and there seemed to be no ventilation whatever in the room. I heard many stories; of a washerwoman who shared a large room with twenty-eight other people; of a gardener who had to give up his job, which was outside Moscow, because to keep it would have meant giving up his right to a bed in a corner of a medium-sized room shared with six other people, and if he had given up that bed he would have lost his passport giving him the right to live in Moscow.

But it did not seem important to find out particulars of specially bad cases. If half the residents of Moscow are living in an average of 3 square metres[2] per head of space, this means 30 square feet each, which might be filled by a bed 6 feet × 3 feet, having a passage 6 feet × 2 feet. Apart from their small share of a kitchen, corridor, and lavatory,

[1] If less than half live in grade IV houses, then the area available for each person in those houses must be correspondingly less than 3 square metres.

[2] An experienced observer, who is now in England, writes: "The average figure of 3 square metres per head for this category is probably correct, for it agrees with the widespread need for putting *two* families in *one* room. Taking an average family of four persons, they would occupy on this basis an area of 12 square metres, but the rooms in the flats of the old *bourgeoisie* were large, on the average more than 12 square metres. We would find, therefore, about seven members of two families in a room of 20 square metres, which is not at all unusually large for a nineteenth-century building. The fact that such cases of overcrowding—two families per room—are still absolutely normal in Moscow, should, I think, be specially underlined to complete the picture of the present housing situation."

that is the whole space that these unfortunate people have in which to sleep and eat and live. What life must be like under such conditions is difficult to imagine. How it is possible for people to keep their temper and health under the constant irritation of such close quarters, how brain workers can show anything approaching their full efficiency, is an insoluble riddle to the Englishman.

Although I saw none of the grade IV houses, I did see a good many of grades II and III; I began to feel ashamed of living in a comfortable suite in the hotel and to wonder whether one ought not to ask two or three families to share it!

The following quotations from Kaganovich's address to the plenum of the Mossoviet in 1931 are of interest. Kaganovich is explaining how well people are housed in Moscow in 1931 as against pre-war days and gives the two following cases:

> "Bubentzov, who in the old days shifted from basement to basement, now occupies a room of 15 square metres, together with his wife and six-year-old daughter. Two months ago a son was born to him.
>
> "Lesenkov. Before the Revolution the family of eight persons occupied a room with a floor space of 12 square metres. Now he has 24½ square metres for seven members of the family."

In these two cases which Kaganovich quotes with satisfaction there are under the new conditions 3¾ and 3½ square metres per head! The Lesenkov family has seven members living in a room of 245 square feet, comparable to the very worst case of overcrowding in England, which is generally regarded as deeply shocking. And yet so low is the Moscow standard that even a man of Kaganovich's experience and width of outlook is able to quote such a case with pride as an example of Bolshevik achievement.

The worst overcrowding in Moscow may not be much worse than the worst in London or Manchester, but in England this bad overcrowding is confined to 1 or 2 per cent of the population; in Moscow it is nearly universal. In Manchester we are pulling down thousands of "two up and two down" houses, houses with three living-rooms and a kitchen and a separate backyard, with water laid on to

the sink and a separate water closet. There are usually three living-rooms with an area of about 28 square metres. Many of the houses are in bad condition, many of them are verminous; but it is safe to say that 90 per cent of the families in Moscow would improve their housing conditions beyond recognition if they could have to themselves one of these houses which are being pulled down in Manchester as unfit for human habitation.

Rents

The outstanding fact about house rents in Moscow is that no interest or sinking fund is paid on capital. The scale of rents is fixed so as to cover the necessary charges for carrying on the house management: administration, repairs, insurance, cleaning, and cultural activities.

The rent of each tenant is based on the number of square metres of living room (which has the advantage for an inquirer that every tenant knows exactly how many square metres he has!) There is a basic rental dependent on the location of the building, the location of the apartment in the building, the quality of the premises, etc.; and a personal rate depending on the income of the head of the family, with reductions (not exceeding a total of 10 per cent) for dependent children. The whole thing is very complicated; it does not seem to be of much importance from the standpoint of the foreigner, as in practice the rent seems to work out as a rule not far from one rouble per square metre per month. By law, the rent cannot exceed 10 per cent of the income of the chief wage-earner, nor can it exceed 1·65 roubles per square metre in a new house, or 1·33 roubles in an old house.

The house management department of the Mossoviet gave me a table showing the average rents for houses managed by the Mossoviet and managed by tenants' co-operatives respectively. The total area of house-room covered by this table was 10 million square metres, or 60 per cent of all the housing area in Moscow; of this area 75 per cent is managed by co-operatives, 25 per cent by the Mossoviet house management department.

The table relates to total sums expended during the financial year 1935.

	Kopeks per square metre per month	
	Managed by Mossoviet	Managed by Co-operatives
Administration .	33	33
Repairs . .	43	30
Sundry . .	30	30
TOTAL . .	106	93

I was informed that the rental averaged 4·7 per cent of the income of the highest wage-earner in the family. Generally speaking, it seemed to vary between 2 and 7 per cent; in the case of an architect with 28 square metres for himself and his wife, the rent amounted to 2 per cent of his income.

In the case of the building co-operatives the rent is calculated quite differently. In the first place, a low interest on capital has to be paid, as well as a sinking fund; in the second place, the whole of the outgoings are worked out and divided by the total square metres in the housing unit; the charge per square metre is uniform for all tenants without allowances of any kind. In spite of the small capital charge, the rent in the only building co-operative house that I visited was only slightly over the normal figure of one rouble per square metre.

One other interesting point about rents is the following. In spite of the desperate shortage of houses rents do not go up as they would certainly do in a capitalist society. Subletting and profiteering by individuals is strictly prohibited. There are indeed rumours that something in the nature of key money is common and that flats can be got by bribery; in view of the desperate shortage it would be surprising if there were not some underhand dealings of this sort. But, broadly speaking, there is no doubt whatever that in spite of the fact that thousands of people in Moscow would be only too glad to pay higher rents for better accommodation, the level of rents is kept rigidly at the point which is necessary to pay for the outgoings.

HOUSING

Allocation

The letting of houses is controlled by three types of organization: the employer, the tenants' co-operative, and the Mossoviet.

According to figures given to me by the head of the house management department of the Mossoviet, the proportion of tenants controlled by these different organizations is about as follows:

Employers	40 per cent.
Tenants' co-operatives . . .	45 per cent.
Mossoviet	15 per cent.

In England our post-war housing effort has one chief fault. While it has provided good accommodation for those who can afford to pay for it, it has done very little for those whose need is greatest and who are most overcrowded, the poor large family. It is estimated that there were about two million children living in slum conditions at the time of the armistice, and that in spite of the immensity of the housing effort only a relatively small proportion of them have as yet been moved to better conditions. It is interesting to consider the question as to whether a "classless" society in Russia is likely to do better.

In the first place, it should be pointed out that the range of salaries in Moscow to-day is not very different from that in the public services in England. The lowest annual wage paid to an adult worker under the London County Council is probably about £100, the highest about £3,000. In the Mossoviet the lowest wage is about 100 roubles per month and the highest about 3,000 roubles per month. As it happens, the range of salaries is almost identical in the two countries.

If we omit those families in England with more than £3,000 per annum (however important they may be in other ways, they are numerically negligible from the point of view of housing), the range of incomes of those for whom houses must be provided seems to be remarkably similar.

It is difficult to find out exactly what has been done in Russia, but the general trend seems to be clear. The factories are, of course, mainly interested in housing their

most important workers. Their first object is to see that their managers, engineers, architects, and foremen have conditions at least sufficiently comfortable to enable them to do their work with reasonable efficiency. This means that they must in any case have well above the present Moscow average of $4\frac{1}{2}$ square metres per head: in fact, so far as my inquiries went, the more important workers (engineers, architects, etc.), housed by their employers, have probably on an average something like 10 or 12 square metres per head. It is pretty clear that in Russia, just as elsewhere, the scale of salaries bears a close relation to the value of the worker to the factory; it seems inevitable that the factories will provide houses for their poorer workers only when they have satisfied the needs of the more important workers; in most cases it will be many years before this is achieved.

Coming now to the tenants' co-operatives, here we have in each housing unit a management committee elected by the tenants. The duty of this committee is, of course, to see that the house is run as well as possible from the point of view of the tenants. Let us consider their position in the selection of tenants when they have a vacant room. If they choose a married couple with no children and a good income, they receive a high rent; the tenants are likely to cause no nuisance or damage, and to make little demand on the communal services. If, on the other hand, they choose a poor couple with a large family, on the one hand the rent is reduced and the total available income for running the house correspondingly reduced. On the other hand, the children will tend to be noisy and dirty, and to cause damages which will increase the repair bill. They also make a heavy demand on the welfare fund: the really heavy burdens on this fund are the provision of playgrounds, crèches, and other amenities for children. If the house happens to be an old converted *bourgeois* flat, with ten rooms along one corridor, then the noise of normally healthy children living under such conditions must make life for the other tenants almost impossible.

Under these conditions how can the management committee give preference to the poor large family? Angels might do so, but not ordinary human beings—even Russians!

Finally, we come to the Mossoviet. It seems that, just as

in England, if the poor large families are to get decent houses it will have to be done through the local authority. I was informed that the Mossoviet houses are allotted as follows:

1. To factory workers near their factories;
2. To scientists, doctors, and other professional men;
3. To occupants of houses demolished for slum clearance purposes;
4. To overcrowded families according to lists supplied by the district soviets of the worst cases in their areas.

I have already explained that until recently the Mossoviet was building two- and three-roomed flats and putting a family into each room, giving them about 5–6 square metres each. The policy, however, seems to have been altered: each flat of two or three rooms is now being given as a rule to a single family. The rents of these large flats are, of course, heavy; if this new policy is adhered to, the poor large family is excluded.[1] In view of the claim that Russia is a classless society, this might perhaps be regarded in the nature of a test case. It will be interesting to watch developments, to see whether the housing space, which will certainly be much overcrowded for the next twenty years, will be allocated so as to give each family approximately equal accommodation, or whether the privileged classes will get the benefit of new building, leaving the children of the poorer families almost indefinitely in the present state of appalling overcrowding.

Flats or Cottages?

In England we are almost unanimous in preferring a cottage with a garden to a flat, except, of course, near the centre of the larger cities. In Moscow the preference is all the other way; I naturally tried to find out the reason. The answer I got most commonly was, "We have always lived in flats and see no reason to change." And it was generally pointed out that communists like and encourage collective life. They hold that the habits of living together, of sharing communal services, of discussion, of co-operation and mutual

[1] Of the fifty flats I inspected personally, I do not remember seeing a *single one* in which there were more than two children.

service, encourage a socialist spirit and outlook. On the other hand, they think that life in a separate house with its own garden tends to strengthen an individual and selfish habit of life.

As regards the central parts of the city, everybody I spoke to was most emphatic that the old two-story houses must go, that Moscow must be a real city with buildings worthy of the capital of the greatest country in the world. The houses in the ordinary streets must have at least five stories, and on the more important streets ten and fifteen stories, to give opportunity for architectural effects and to correspond with the real importance of Moscow.

The climate, of course, plays an important part; a garden can only be worked and enjoyed for about five months in the year. And the long and very cold winter means that a cottage cannot be built, as in England, two bricks thick: it would be impossible to keep such a cottage warm. But the cost of heating a cottage, even when suitably built, is greater than that of an individual flat, which is kept warm by the surrounding flats; and the necessary thickening of the walls substantially increases the cost of the cottage. The Mossoviet authorities informed me that they had carefully estimated the cost of housing people in cottages in satellite towns, allowing, of course, for all the necessary development costs and services as well as the cost of heating, and had come to the conclusion that it was definitely cheaper to house the population in large tenement blocks in the city rather than in cottages situated in satellite towns or villages outside.

Another important factor seems to be the position of women in Moscow. A large proportion of women are workers in factories or offices and have little time or energy for housework. Servants are obtainable only with the greatest difficulty, and the general opinion seems to be that this difficulty will steadily increase. The men with whom I discussed this matter generally took the view that it did not much matter to them whether they lived in a flat or a cottage, but that they were not interested in having a garden. What they wanted was a wife who was doing an outside job, who had intellectual interests and who was a companion and not a mere housekeeper. Incidentally, one of these men said that nobody in Russia would mind if his wife got

a higher salary than he did, and wondered what view an Englishman would take on this matter!

A young Englishwoman, with a daughter six months old, whose husband is an important engineer in Moscow and who is fortunate to have two small rooms, said that she immensely preferred life in a flat. She could go out in the evening and ask a neighbour to keep an eye on the baby; there was a mechanic ready at any time to repair anything that went wrong; the flat was cleaned cheaply and effectively. Even if she had a garden there would be no time to look after it, and in any case it would only be useful during the few months of summer.

The Mossoviet authorities pointed out that the policy of keeping the area of Moscow down to 60,000 hectares and of having a ten-kilometre forest belt round it, combined with the electrification of all the railways and the building of great main roads radiating from the centre of the city, meant that it would in future be exceedingly easy to get out to rest-homes and country clubs, situated in beautiful country just outside the city. Such rest-homes are already being built, and a very large proportion of the population will in future be able to get out, not only on rest-days but on fine evenings, and to enjoy country air and sunshine under the pleasantest possible conditions.

Such is the case for tenements; undoubtedly it is a very strong one under the conditions of Moscow. I did find a few unofficial Russians who said they would prefer a separate house. There are a large number of cottages and houses called "dachas" round Moscow; the great majority of them are used for the summer months only. We went out along one of the main roads on a rest-day in September and found a continual stream of lorries, carrying a family and its furniture back from the summer dacha to Moscow. The question is being discussed whether it would not be possible to make these houses fit for use in winter, or to build new dachas suitable for habitation all the year round. As communications improve, this will become easily practicable from the transport point of view. Although I found very little sympathy for this idea in Mossoviet circles, I was interested to hear from the chief constructional engineer of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, whom I met just before leaving Moscow, that he had on the instructions of

his Commissar collected plans for various types of winter dacha, and that it was the intention of the Commissariat to build several thousand all-the-year dachas outside Moscow next year. This seems to me interesting evidence of what the Webbs call "the multiformity of soviet socialism." The Mossoviet, looking at the matter largely from the point of view of building a fine city, is concentrating all its energy on blocks of flats; the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, thinking mainly of housing its workers conveniently in relation to its numerous important factories in Moscow, is turning its mind to dachas on the outskirts of the city.

Administration

The work of building and managing houses is entrusted to two departments of the Mossoviet: a building department under the chief engineer, and a management department under the housing manager. Each of these departments consists of a group of officials and is responsible to the presidium of the Mossoviet. I met several of the leading officials in these two groups and was impressed, not only with their competence, but with their uniform keenness and even enthusiasm for their work.

The elected members of the Mossoviet have no executive functions in relation to housing. The housing section consists of 172 elected members of the Mossoviet, of whom forty are women, and meets every two months. Its routine business is delegated to a bureau of seven, which includes the official manager of the housing department.

The secretary of the bureau is a whole-time paid man; the other members are workers, who are expected to spend two or three hours every other day on the work of the section.

This work consists in keeping in touch with public opinion, dealing with complaints, and preventing bureaucracy; in seeing that the management of the Mossoviet houses is carried out efficiently and with due regard to the wishes of the tenants.

As is explained in Chapter I, all complaints and suggestions made at the time of the four-yearly election to the Mossoviet are collected and printed in a book. About 25 per cent of these complaints deal with housing and are referred

to the housing section. The main job of the housing section is to see that due attention is given to these complaints and that they are properly dealt with. Every three months a *Quarterly Bulletin of Fulfilment* is printed and circulated to all the members of the Mossoviet, who are expected to communicate the results to their electors.

Another aspect of the work of the housing sections of the Moscow and district soviets is as follows. All housing units are allocated to individual members of the Moscow or district soviet housing sections, the larger ones to the Mossoviet. Each member of the section has two or three housing units under his care. It is his business to be in close touch with the management of the houses and with the tenants' representatives, and to see that everything is being properly done. At the time of my visit they were busy with their winter programme, to ensure that the houses were put into a proper state as regards repairs, heating, supply of wood, etc., to face the hard Moscow winter.

The members of the section can call on the officials of the housing department for help on technical matters. If they find a housing manager unreasonable or incompetent, they first of all try to put things right by persuasion; if they fail they make a report to the housing section and through them to the trust who appointed him, and may get him warned or, if absolutely necessary, discharged. In case the managers are not carrying out the law, the section may report the matter to the proper authorities for prosecution.

The members of the section clearly take their responsibilities seriously. In fact, if a member is not in close touch with his houses the bureau may reprimand him; if that is not sufficient, they may report him to his electors, who can at any time recall him. There seems to be no difficulty in getting willing workers to take on the responsibilities involved in membership of the section.

It is, of course, clear that the section has functions totally different from the housing committee of an English city council. It has no executive responsibility; this is left entirely to the presidium and the management department. Its sole *raison d'être* is to keep in the closest possible touch with public opinion, to find out what the people want, what grievances they have, whether inefficiency is occurring, and to bring their observations to the notice of the officials and to ensure

that they are properly dealt with. This is an exceedingly interesting constitutional device. On the one hand, it is a training for a large number of Moscow residents in the duties and responsibilities of citizenship; on the other hand, it would seem to provide more efficient machinery for keeping the executive authority in the closest possible touch with the wishes of the people and for avoiding red tape and bureaucracy than is provided by any other constitution that I know.

Nobody can pretend that the housing section has the powers of the housing committee in a democratic town like Manchester: but it may be a good half-way house. The work of the section should do much to prevent bureaucracy and inefficiency, and at the same time to train the members in public responsibility and gradually to fit them for real democratic powers.

The Building of New Houses

The history of the Moscow post-war housing effort is summarized in Tables I and II. It will be seen that at the time of the Revolution there were 12 million square metres of housing area and that this has been increased by just over 4 millions to a total of 16 millions, the great bulk of the increase having taken place in the last ten years. The population has fluctuated rather violently. First of all a heavy drop to a million, then a rapid increase in thirteen years up to 3·6 millions. Since then, owing to drastic action taken by the government the population has remained constant.[1]

There have been corresponding variations in the area of housing available per head of the population. Starting at 7 square metres, it rose with a falling population up to no less a figure than 12 square metres per head in 1920, the very figure at which the Mossoviet is aiming, which at the very best it cannot hope to attain for another twenty years. From that point the building of new houses failed entirely to keep up with the very rapid increase of population, with the result that the area per head fell from 12 square metres

[1] The figures have been collected from various sources, partly printed, partly verbal. The sources vary a good deal as to the exact figures; but not enough to affect the general argument.

in 1920 to 4·3 square metres in 1933. In spite of the stabilization of the population at that date, all the efforts in the building of new houses have only raised it to 4·5 square metres at the present time.

It is only fair to point out one important thing which has been done by the Bolshevik government to improve conditions, as Kaganovich stated in an address to the Moscow plenum in 1931: "We have transferred half a million people from cellars, doss-houses, and barrack houses into the apartments of the former *bourgeoisie*." It is stated that although there was a reasonable average accommodation per head of the population in Tsarist days, this meant in practice that the well-to-do had large houses and that the average worker had perhaps not more than 2½ square metres per head. Although there are, as we have shown, still big inequalities in the distribution of house-room, there can be no doubt that the present government are distributing the available area far more equally than was done in the old days.

During the last three years the actual building has only reached about half of what was planned. It is stated that this is the only serious planning failure in Moscow, and that it was due to various causes. During the first five year plan the whole energies of the nation were concentrated on heavy industry. During the second five year plan there were still substantial factory extensions going on in Moscow, and a great deal of labour was diverted to the underground railway and to the Moscow-Volga canal; in 1936 there was the big school-building programme. Everybody I asked about the reason for this planning failure as regards the last year or two answered instantly with one word, "Hitler"; an immense amount of money was being spent not only on engineering and chemical armaments, but also on fortifications and barracks which were to-day employing a substantial proportion of the whole force of the building trade.

The Russian Housing Effort

It has been alleged that Russia has already done great things in housing. For instance, at the seventeenth party congress, Stalin said:

"The very appearance of our large towns and industrial centres has changed. The inevitable hall-marks of the big towns in *bourgeois* countries are the slums, the so-called working-class districts on the outskirts of the town, which represent a heap of dark, damp, in the majority of cases, cellar dwellings, in a semi-dilapidated condition, where usually the poor live in filth and curse their fate. The Revolution in the U.S.S.R. has swept away the slums in our country. Their place has been taken by well-built and bright workers' districts and in many cases the working-class districts of our towns are better built than the central districts."

And in 1931 Kaganovich spoke as follows:

"During the first five years 30 million square metres of new housing space have been built in the U.S.S.R. . . . Let the *bourgeois* slanderers point to one country in Europe where such extensive housing construction has been undertaken during the past five years."

Komorov, People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., said in January 1935,[1] after referring to the achievements in housing in the U.S.S.R., "No *bourgeois* country has ever known housing construction on such a scale."

In fact, the rate of building in the U.S.S.R. has been incomparably slower than in the United Kingdom. The U.S.S.R. has only once built more than 6 million square metres of new housing space in a single year. The United Kingdom in 1935 added to its housing space over 15 million square metres, a rate of building per thousand of the population over ten times greater than that in the Soviet Union!

Moscow's record is much better than that of the U.S.S.R. as a whole. Moscow has been building something under half a million square metres of housing area per annum, which gives accommodation equivalent to about 10,000 of our standard three-bedroom non-parlour municipal houses. If in the United Kingdom we built at the same rate as Moscow per thousand of the population, we should be building 125,000 such houses each year; in fact, we are now

[1] *Moscow Daily News*, January 20th 1935.

building over 300,000 houses, which on the average are of a substantially larger size. The rate of building in Moscow is well under half the rate of building in the United Kingdom per thousand of the population.

It is clear, therefore, that Moscow has not yet begun to make any serious effort to overtake the terrific shortage of houses which exists.

Future Needs

The Moscow ten year plan lays down the following rate of building for the first three years:

1936	. . . .	800,000	square metres
1937	. . . .	1,000,000	,, ,,
1938	. . . .	1,200,000	,, ,,

In the whole ten years 15 million are to be completed, so that the rate of building towards the end of the period would have to rise to say 2 million square metres per annum.

It is estimated that in the building of these 15 million at least 2·4 million square metres of existing house space will have to be destroyed as slums or obstructive buildings. In order to get 12 square metres per head of a population of five million, 60 million square metres are needed. We have, therefore, the following calculation:

	Million square metres	Million square metres
Existing houses . . .	16·4	
To be destroyed	2·4	
Permanent housing existing . .		14·0
Houses required		60·0
Remaining to build . . .		46·0

At the present time the cost per square metre is 490 roubles, so that the total cost of completing the housing of Moscow will amount to about 22 billion roubles. This is a gigantic task. The annual budget of Moscow is only 1·2 billion roubles.

A Gigantic Task

In ten years Moscow has built 4 million square metres of housing space. It needs 46 million to solve the housing problem; at the average rate of building over the last ten years this would take more than a century. What are the prospects of doing it in a more reasonable period? A leading authority put his personal view of the position to me as follows:

This year, owing to preparations for war, the housing plan will again be a relative failure. Next year he hopes that their energies will not again be diverted to war; in that case he is confident that next year will be an easy record, and that a million metres will be built. Owing to the shortage in Russia of every kind of capital equipment, they have been forced to concentrate on the most vital things first. He hopes, however, that the government will soon be able to turn its full energy to housing, and that we shall then see what real Bolshevik *tempo* means. Much work has been done on the building trade, which is already improving rapidly and will continue to improve even more rapidly. He believes the ten year plan will be completely fulfilled; this will mean that in the later years they will have to be building at the rate of 2 million square metres a year. He hopes the next ten year plan will be double the present one, and will clear off the remaining 30 million metres, so that by 1956 there will be an average of 12 metres of housing space for every citizen of Moscow. In that case he believed that Moscow would be the best-housed city in the world so far as the average worker was concerned.

Russia is a land of strange contradictions. A study of the housing problem in Moscow has brought two of them vividly home to me. In the first place, never was a country more desperately in need of capital goods, never was a government so resolutely determined to produce the maximum possible amount of them, and yet that same government chooses not only to lead the world by adopting an eight-hour day, but actually a maximum day of seven hours. And then one finds leading members of the Communist Party working an average day of twelve or fourteen hours! This year, the new anti-abortion law has been passed, which is expected to lead to a flood of new babies. Orders

have already been given for a great extension of crèches and kindergartens, and in a few years more schools will be needed. The whole education equipment, in spite of great efforts, is still utterly inadequate for the present number of children. And yet the government chooses this moment to introduce the anti-abortion law, and so to ensure that a large amount of labour will be diverted from housing and other urgent needs to the building of more crèches, schools, kindergartens, rest-homes, hospitals, etc., and to the provision of more teachers, doctors, and nurses.

The solution of the Moscow housing problem is a gigantic task; they are endeavouring in one generation to raise an Asiatic standard of housing to the latest and best European standard; and that at a time when the population of the U.S.S.R. is increasing by about three and a half million persons per annum. Fortunately for the Mossoviet, their problem is simplified by the fact that the population of Moscow is not to be allowed to increase beyond a maximum of five million.

In order to judge of the size of this task let us consider the position in England. In England we need a total of about ten million houses; we are building at present something over 300,000 each year, or say 3 per cent of our total ultimate need. As we already have a large proportion of good houses and as the number of families is not likely to increase substantially, it may reasonably be estimated that another three million houses would put things right; that is to say, another ten years' building at the present rate would provide a decent house for every family. But in fact, everybody knows that this will not happen. In the first place, there are a large number of families in the country who cannot afford to pay the rent of a decent new house. In the second place, it is safe to say that the present rate of building will not be maintained for ten years; the present building boom will collapse in a year or two; thereafter the rate of building will be very much less. I do not wish to underrate our post-war housing effort, which in many ways has been a fine one; but there is still a long way to go before we shall have housed our poorer families satisfactorily, and our purpose is insecure; there is a conflict between those who want decent houses for the lower-paid workers at all costs, and those who believe that we cannot afford them.

When we turn to Moscow we find a different situation. Need is far greater; houses exist for perhaps 25 per cent of the total ultimate population; no less than 75 per cent have to be built. If Moscow succeeded in building houses for 3 per cent of the population each year as England is doing (at the height of the biggest building boom ever known), it would take twenty-five years to solve the problem. If Moscow succeeded in increasing this rate of output to 4 per cent, the job could be finished in twenty years. It is, as I have said, a gigantic task; but the Mossoviet has the advantage, I believe, that there is no visible conflict of interests and that they are likely to hold firmly to their purpose. They can solve the problem in twenty-five years only by maintaining a steady output proportionate to what is being done in England to-day at the height of our building boom. If they accomplish the task within twenty, or even twenty-five, years, it will certainly be the finest housing achievement in history.

One other contrast between Russia and England deserves notice. In England we are at present building a very large number of houses by private enterprise because, for some combination of reasons which the economists are endeavouring to explain, the building of houses for sale has happened, for the last few years, to yield a good profit to builders. The result has been a building boom, and the drawing of a large number of men into the building trade. This has occurred on so large a scale that it is generally held to have been the major cause of Britain's economic recovery during the last five years. The boom will inevitably come to an end, and be followed at most within two or three years by the usual slump, which is likely to be all the more severe owing to the height of the boom. The matter has on several occasions been brought to the attention of the government. The government has shown no sign of interest in it, still less any sign that they have serious thought of endeavouring to take action to try to even out these excessive booms and slumps which are the major cause of unemployment in our building industry.

In Moscow the building industry is to-day even more busily engaged than ours. I was assured on all hands that any competent person in the building industry could always be sure of a job, winter or summer, the very day his last one

came to an end. The Russians are sure that by their planning system they have permanently abolished unemployment. This is much too big a question to examine here, but it would be exceedingly interesting to follow the course of the building industry in the U.S.S.R. during the next twenty years. It is at once clear that booms and slumps such as we are now experiencing in the building trade owing to the peculiar economic conditions of capitalism, should never occur under a planned economy such as the Russian. It should be not only possible, but reasonably easy, for them to plan their building operations ten years ahead, and to ensure that when it is necessary to change the size of the building trade this should be done so gradually and steadily that with the help of proper arrangements no unemployment whatever should result.

TABLE I

MOSCOW: POPULATION AND HOUSING

		Population in millions	Houses built during year (thousands of square metres)	
	1918	1·7	—	
	1920	1.0	—	
	1923	1·5	29	
	1924	1·7	58	
	1925	—	113	
	1926	—	223	
	1927	—	404	
1st 5-Year Plan	1928	2·2	432	
	1929	2·3	496	
	1930	2·5	516	
	1931	2·7	455	
	1932	3·1	592	
			Built	*Plan*
2nd 5-Year Plan	1933	3·6	300	650
	1934	3·6	300	650
	1935	3·6	455	750
	1936	3·6	—	800
	1937	—	—	1,000
	1938	—	—	1,200

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TABLE II

MOSCOW POPULATION AND HOUSING AREA PER HEAD

	Population In millions	Total Area. In millions of square metres	Square metres per head
1918	1·7	12	7
1920	1·0	12	12
1928	2·2	13	5·9
1933	3·6	15·7	4·3
1936	3·6	16·4	4·5

CHAPTER V

THE BUILDING TRADE

By SIR E. D. SIMON

THE solution of the housing problem depends almost entirely on the building trade. Can it be made efficient? Can it be expanded sufficiently? We therefore endeavoured to find out something about its position and prospects.

There are two separate divisions of the building trade: firstly, the manufacture of building materials, and, secondly, the actual construction of buildings. The really weak spot is the former; by universal consent that side of the building trade is among the weakest of all the major industries of Russia. One architect called it "grässlich"; so far back as 1931 Kaganovich said:[1] "There is not a single branch of our economic life where the production of equipment is so backward."

A good deal of attention has been given to the industry from that time onwards. The government has issued several decrees with the aim of making it more efficient, but the position is still bad. Authorities whom we met variously estimated that it would take from three to five years before the necessary factories could be built and could be got into full and effective production.

I had no opportunity to make any investigation into this side of the building trade.

Turning now to the construction of buildings, we interviewed the Moscow Building Trust, to which the Mossoviet gives all the contracts which it lets for house-building. I was informed that it was the largest house-building organization in the U.S.S.R.

In accordance with the general Soviet principle of decentralizing executive work, the Moscow Building Trust has been encouraged to take an active part in producing some of the materials it needs; in particular, it has developed quarries and transport. Three years ago it was employing 10,000 men on the production of building materials, largely on capital development; the number is being cut down

[1] *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow*, p. 72.

steadily as the quarries and other factories are getting into full development and are becoming efficient. But the Moscow Building Trust still purchases the bulk of the materials it needs from specialized trusts, manufacturing bricks, baths, windows, doors, etc. They told me that their chief difficulty in increasing output is almost invariably due to late delivery from these various sub-contractors, and that this late delivery is almost always on account of shortage of labour. On many occasions, in order to accelerate deliveries, the Moscow Building Trust has lent squads of workers to their sub-contractor. When the proper deliveries have been achieved the squad goes back, and at a later date a squad of corresponding size is lent by the sub-contractor to the Moscow Building Trust. This was a surprising proof of the almost complete absence of anything resembling demarcation disputes, and of the readiness of the workers, and of the trade unions, to help production in whatever way they can.

As regards the work done by the Moscow Building Trust on the construction of houses, I was given the following figures:[1]

	Value of buildings in millions of roubles	Workers employed :		No. of square metres built at 450 roubles per square metre	No. of sq. metres built per man on construction per annum
		on construction	on preparation of materials		
1935	50	7,500	10,000	110,000	15
1936	98	11,500	8,000	220,000	20
1937	175	16,000	6,000	390,000	25

The figures for 1935 are actual: 1936 and 1937 are estimates.

The head of the Moscow Building Trust informed me that the Stakhanovite movement had during the last year added greatly to the efficiency of their work. The essence of the movement was that every man was urged to study and to think out for himself methods by which the conditions of his own work could be improved and maintained at the highest possible pitch of efficiency. He asked about the number of

[1] These figures were given verbally.

bricks laid per day by English bricklayers and offered to show me what could be done by a Russian Stakhanovite. Perhaps the most interesting afternoon I spent in Russia was visiting a block of houses where an outstanding Stakhanovite bricklayer was at work.

The first thing I noticed was that the building was surrounded by barbed wire, and that an old man with an even older rifle with a fixed bayonet was on duty at the gate. However, having got safely past that obstacle, I was shown round the building, which had reached the first-floor level. The general lay-out for the mixing of the mortar and for the transport of the bricks and mortar seemed to me efficient, probably just about on a par with an average contracting firm in England, both as regards mechanization and organization of labour. The mortar was transported in specially designed hand-trucks with large wheels; as regards the bricks, they were 25 × 12 × 6 cm. (10 × 5 × 2½ in.) and weighed about 8½ pounds each, and there were ten of them on a wooden frame convenient for handling; about ten of these frames were arranged on a specially designed wheelbarrow. Portable conveyors were used for carrying the materials up to a height of about ten metres.

Having had a general look round we adjourned to see the Stakhanovite bricklayer. He was working on a wooden platform about 25 ft. × 10 ft., building a 25-in. solid wall (two and a half bricks thick) round three sides of the platform. Two girls whom he had himself trained were working for him. The duty of one was to place each brick on the wall, not more than about a foot from the point where it was to be laid. The duty of the other was to shovel mortar from a receptacle on to the actual spot where the next bricks were to be laid. She took a spadeful of mortar and spread it over a length of from two to three feet with one movement of the spade, not stopping to smooth it down or adjust it in any way.

The bricklayer smoothed the mortar and splashed it against the next brick with his left hand, while placing the brick with his right; when all was going smoothly at a rate approaching one brick a second. There was no time to spread the mortar with any nice accuracy; for instance, it was generally an inch or two back from the outside surface of the outer wall, but they said that this was simply a wall

to carry weight, the only thing that mattered was that there should be enough mortar to carry the weight and that the wall should be accurately vertical, which it seemed to be. The engineers were confident that the much greater accuracy of work insisted on in foreign countries was unnecessary and useless. The Stakhanovite first laid the outer row of bricks, then the inner row; then the girls in their spare time actually laid the centre row themselves: these bricks, amounting to about one-third of the whole, were never touched by the Stakhanovite.

I have never seen three people move so fast and so accurately. It was heavy work and must have been very tiring. Their movements were always thought out in advance: the girls anticipated and fitted in admirably. It was a most impressive piece of well-organized high speed work.

One interesting point was this: after I had been watching for ten minutes or so I was asked through the interpreter why I had not timed the work; they all seemed quite disappointed that I had not taken out a stop watch. I asked what the trade union thought about it. The trade union representative on the job was immediately brought forward, and like everybody else expressed the greatest pleasure and pride in the achievement of the Stakhanovite. He was absolutely convinced that the greatest possible output was to the benefit, not only of the individual worker, but of the community as a whole. Rather a contrast to the English worker's view—I wonder what Sir Walter Citrine would have thought of it?

I was told that on the previous day the Stakhanovite had laid 8,000 bricks in six hours (an average of under three seconds per brick), and one of the engineers, who had made chalk marks when we arrived, said he had done 570 bricks in ten minutes: if he was right, they were working at the rate of 3,400 bricks an hour, or well over 20,000 bricks in a seven-hour day!!

I insisted that they could not keep up the rate they were doing while I watched; the manager in reply asked me to stop all day and to see it done.

The Stakhanovite was a young man of 27, finely and strongly built: the girls were younger and equally tough. I asked the three whether they spent the rest-day in bed. "Not a bit of it," said the girls. "We thoroughly enjoy our

work. We get well paid and have a good time on rest-day." The bricklayer himself was said to be studying hard like most people in Russia and hoped before long to rise to managerial work.

On the other hand, he could not hope to rise to better pay. The standard pay for a skilled bricklayer is 13 roubles per day; the piecework system is so arranged that a given increase in output means an actually greater increase in pay; for instance, a double output means treble pay. The manager of the Moscow Building Trust told me that this bricklayer was getting 2,000 roubles a month, more than he, the head of the Trust, was getting himself, and seemed very pleased and proud about it all. A match was being arranged between him and the champion bricklayer of the U.S.S.R.

The number of bricks laid per day cannot be compared with English practice—the whole conditions are totally different; the quality of work would never be accepted. An English bricklayer, a member of a trade union delegation, had been there a fortnight earlier. His comment was "That is not brick laying—it's brick murder!"[1]

I have no doubt that as an example, as an effective piece of propaganda for the importance of output, a Stakhanovite demonstration such as I have described must be valuable. Whether it is industrially efficient it would be impossible to say without an elaborate investigation. Bringing up to the working-place of a single man enough bricks and mortar to lay over 1,000 bricks an hour is a big task. The platform on which he was working had to be big and therefore expensive. There were twelve men bringing up bricks and mortar from the ground-level to the level of this platform—about 15 feet; the gangway and the platform were congested and there was a good deal of waiting. It seemed at least possible that two

[1] As it happened, the first bricklayer I saw at work after my return to England was working at a new house on the outskirts of a small town. It was a perfect autumn day. He was enjoying the sunshine, he was enjoying his pipe, and clearly had a craftsman's joy in his unhurried work; judging by his jolly red face, he was enjoying the prospect of his glass of ale when the day's work was done. As I arrived, he took up a brick. After looking at it critically he laid some mortar on it and carefully spread it as evenly as possible, smoothed down the edges, added a little more mortar at one corner, smoothed the whole thing over again. He then examined it, laid it in its place, adjusted it accurately and pointed the joint with more mortar. The whole thing was done with loving care; the brick must have been perfectly laid. It took about a minute; meantime the Stakhanovite would have laid 50. Which method belongs to the better civilization?

or three bricklayers working at a slower rate, without the elaborate arrangements that render such high speeds possible, might perhaps have produced a better job at a lower total cost in labour.

But I believe that the Stakhanovite movement is proving an important step towards increased efficiency at the present stage of Russian industry. Previously those who secured the greatest output were known as "shock" workers; the whole point was sheer energy and persistent hard work. The distinguishing mark of the Stakhanovite movement is that the worker is held to be responsible for making sure that the conditions of work—the actual methods of work, the movements made, the tools used, the regular supply of suitable materials—shall be as good as possible. So far as the work of the Stakhanovite and his two girl assistants was concerned, this aim was achieved in the case I have described, and I was assured that he had personally thought out several small but important ways of improving these conditions.

I said to a trade union secretary that the Stakhanovite movement seemed to be similar to the Taylor system. He leapt indignantly to his feet and asserted it was exactly the opposite: Taylor wanted all the thinking to be done from above, the men only had to carry out their instructions obediently "like oxen." The Stakhanovite movement was based on hard thinking as well as hard work by the individual manual worker; it inspired the workers to feel responsible for efficiency; Taylor's system did just the reverse. The Taylor system might be suitable for capitalist countries; the Stakhanovite system implied an educated working class, all consciously co-operating for greater output, and would, in his opinion, be a potent force leading to a better standard of living and a higher civilization.

It is of course very hard for a foreigner as a result of a short visit to Russia to form any reliable judgment on a matter of this sort. But it seems to me that the Stakhanovite movement is convincing evidence of the fact that there is very little, if any, tendency to limit output. In Moscow to-day there is a shortage of labour of every kind; the worker therefore feels no danger of doing anybody else out of a job by increasing output, and there is no individual employer to profit by the man's work; he feels that the advantage of it goes to himself and his fellows. These facts, combined

with the low standard of life and the constant propaganda of an energetic government, seem to result in a passion for increased output, and a contempt for anything in the nature of laziness or ca' canny in work. It would seem that Russia has important advantages over us in this matter, and it will be deeply interesting to watch developments. Will the Stakhanovite movement ultimately lead to an efficiency equal or superior to that of England or America?

Another method adopted to secure quick and efficient work is the effort to complete buildings in record time.

The head of the Moscow Building Trust told us that they had built six of the 152 new schools which had been put up in Moscow that year. There had been keen competition between the different builders as to who could do these schools in the shortest time. Mostly they had been built in 90, 80, or 70 days. He showed me with pride a certificate from the committee of inspection as to one of his schools which had been built in the record time of 65 days. Perhaps the most interesting thing about the certificate was that it began by mentioning by name a dozen individual workers, bricklayers, plasterers, and even labourers, as having done specially good work, and then went on to praise the management afterwards. There are to be a large number of schools built again next year, and we were told that one or two of the leading firms were determined by increased mechanization to complete a school in not more than 35 days! A German architect, practising in Moscow, told me that the normal time in Germany for such a school would be 12 months. The German schools would, of course, be far better equipped and built; there is clearly no advantage in rushed jobs of this sort except in an emergency—as a stimulus to a traditionally lethargic people to work with supreme vigour and energy.

Efficiency

It is difficult to compare the efficiency of the Moscow building trade with that of England. We came to the conclusion that the relations between the rouble and the pound were so involved and uncertain that no reliable comparison could be drawn. But it does seem to be possible to compare the amount of labour taken for a given amount of building.

The Moscow Building Trust informed me that in 1935 the

work of one man for a year produced 15 square metres of their normal five-story tenement blocks. In England, the flats which are now being built by the councils of the larger cities take about 1½ man/years per flat, which, measured on the Russian system, includes about 40 square metres of living space: in other words, a man's work for a year produces 26½ square metres. As the quality of the English work is substantially higher than that in Russia, it would seem that the English worker produces about twice the volume of building that a Russian does in the same time. A leading member of the State Planning Commission indicated that in his opinion this was probably about correct. In fairness it should be pointed out that the output per man of the Moscow Building Trust has been increasing rapidly during the last few years, and that they are full of confidence that it will continue to do so; in fact, I received various estimates that the output per man would be doubled in anything from three to five years; if the table on page 174 proves to be accurate, their efficiency would be approaching ours in 1937.

Having regard to the accusation of megalomania often brought against the Russians, it is interesting to note that the Moscow Building Trust is only entrusted with 25 per cent of the house-building required in Moscow. Both the head of the Trust and one of the heads of the national planning commission agreed that the Trust is at present as large as it should be, having regard to the available experience and managerial ability. The result is that the plan for building houses in Moscow is divided between eight different departments; for instance, the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, for the present year, is to do just a little less than the Mossoviet. I asked a member of the national planning commission how they managed to induce each of these eight bodies to agree to undertake just the right amount of housing to fulfil the plan. "Without the smallest difficulty," he replied. "We get them all together and we settle the amount each is to do in half an hour." So easy apparently is planning when no questions of private interests or profits arise!

Employment

I had been told before arriving at Moscow that there was no unemployment, and was anxious to inquire in particular

how they managed to employ bricklayers in winter, with a temperature of 30–40 degrees of frost. I found invariably that any question implying that unemployment might exist in the building trade was greeted with amused laughter. There is no doubt whatever that at the present time there is a tremendous shortage of every kind of building trade labour. Moscow is full of large unfinished buildings with hardly anybody working on them.

I have already said something of the flexibility of labour in connection with the supply of materials. I was told that the Moscow Building Trust was teaching its bricklayers also to act as masons, and in many cases as plasterers. While they wish to train people to the highest degree of skill, they believe it is perfectly practicable that a competent man should learn two or three of these crafts, more especially as the work becomes more and more mechanized.

As regards bricklaying in winter, they told me that for the last four years they had paid no attention to frost. They mix and lay the mortar warm and go right ahead with bricklaying whatever the temperature may be, except when there is snow or a cold wind. Building costs about 5 per cent more in winter because there are more blank days to pay for, because the bricklayer has at intervals to go and warm his hands, because the mortar has to be heated, and because foundation work has to be enclosed and heated. But seasonal unemployment does not now occur in the building trade.

Another important factor relating to unemployment is that a firm like the Moscow Building Trust never diminishes its total number of workers. It always has more work to do than it can manage; it is always steadily increasing its output. There is no question of losing contracts to competitors and having to get rid of staff. Any competent man can have a permanent job with them.

Their chief complaint is that of the 17,000 workers they employ, only 10,000 are permanent whole-time workers; the other 7,000 are farm workers who come and work at building for a portion of the year. A certain rural area is allotted to the Moscow Building Trust; they send their agents out to this area, and by agreement with the collective farms bring in seasonal workers. They work at the farms when they are needed, especially in sowing time and harvest, and put in

the rest of the year building in Moscow. This is, of course, an inefficient system from the point of view of the building trade: one engineer referred to it as a "calamity"; the Moscow Building Trust hope that they will gradually increase their 60 per cent of permanent workers to 80 or 90 per cent. But it would seem to be an effective piece of "dove-tailing" from the national point of view. It is an interesting and surprising fact that the labour exchanges were abolished several years ago, and that the present system of allocating rural areas to individual firms seems to be regarded as more satisfactory.

It should be added that the Moscow Building Trust has its own school for educating young persons from the ages of 17 to 19. The students work for six hours a day; two hours' general education, four hours' practical work, much of it going out with an instructor on an actual building job.

Incentive to Work

Although our information came mainly from the Moscow Building Trust, it was confirmed and amplified by visits to buildings, and by conversations with trade union officials, and with different engineers and architects and members of the Mossoviet. The following view of conditions of labour in the building trade in Russia emerged from what we heard.

There are two radical differences in this matter between Moscow and England. In Moscow the employer is always the state in some form: the whole of the output goes to increase the wealth of the country. The greater the output, the more there is to divide in wages and services between himself and his fellows. A man is never working for a profit-making employer—there is no "enemy" to take a share of the product of his labour.

Secondly, there is no unemployment. There is no fear that if he works harder he will do some of his mates out of a job. He and his fellows are perfectly certain that they can always get work at full trade union wages.

Both these points are constantly hammered in by insistent propaganda and by the firmest repression of any criticism or counter-propaganda: "Increased output is the only way to save the country from attack by its predatory capitalist

neighbours; the only way to build socialism, to produce better education, better houses, shorter hours, a better life for all."

So far as we could judge this seems to be universally accepted as obvious, and every possible effort is made to secure increased output. Piecework is universal; monetary rewards are scattered freely round to those who do good work. The slacker is held up to contempt in the wall newspaper. In fact, there is a drive for output incomparably stronger than anything which the trade unions would tolerate for a moment in England. So much so that Sir Walter Citrine, in his recent book, *I Seek the Truth in Russia*, constantly deplores their methods as inhuman and unfair. I find his views difficult to understand. The working day in Russia for the manual worker is limited to seven hours, or six hours in case of specially heavy work, and it is difficult to believe that hard work during that time can do anybody any harm. On the other hand, they can only build up all the capital equipment they need if they succeed in developing what they call a real Bolshevik tempo during working hours. The leading party members, so far as I could judge, work hard for a day of ten or twelve hours or more: under present conditions in Russia it seems legitimate that they should endeavour to persuade the mass of the people to work as hard as reasonably possible during their relatively short working day. It seems to me quite clear that Citrine is wrong, and the Russians right in their methods.

The engineers and builders I met were full of the usual enthusiasm and confidence. As one of them put it, "What we are doing now is baby talk! Come back in two years, come back in one year, and we shall have something to show you." Others more cautious believe that although the actual construction of buildings should become efficient pretty quickly, the creation of an efficient building material industry must take at least five years. But optimism was universal. Is it the way that Russians talk? Or is it the kind of faith that moves mountains? Only time will show.

CHAPTER VI

THE TEN YEAR PLAN[1]

Moscow, which for many centuries had developed in chaotic fashion, reflected, even in the best years of its development, the barbaric character of Russian capitalism. The narrow and crooked streets, the districts intersected by a multitude of lanes and blind alleys, the uneven distribution of buildings between the centre and the outskirts of the city, the centre encumbered with warehouses and small enterprises, the low, decrepit houses huddled together, the haphazard distribution of the industrial enterprises, railroads, and other branches of economy and public service hinder the normal life of the rapidly developing city, particularly in respect of traffic, and make imperative a radical and planned reconstruction.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars place on record the fact that on the basis of the decisions of the June 1931 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party extensive work is being done in connection with the reconstruction of the municipal economy of the city of Moscow, thanks to which the living conditions of the toilers of the city have been considerably improved: the building of the underground railway and the Volga-Moscow canal, the widening of the most important central streets and squares, the facing of the Moscow river banks with granite and the construction of improved roadways, public buildings, houses and schools, factory kitchens and public dining-rooms, mechanized bakeries and cold-storage plants, the development of central heating, regularity in the supply of fuel to the population, increase in the water supply, improvement in scavenging and drainage, etc.

The great work now being carried out on the reconstruction of the municipal economy of Moscow and the still

[1] This chapter is an almost full translation of the decree of July 10th 1935, leaving out only lists of names which would be meaningless to those who do not know Moscow. It is taken from *Moscow: General Plan for the Reconstruction of the City*, published by the Union of Soviet Architects, 1935, and may therefore be regarded as an officially approved translation.

greater scope of the work to be carried out in the near future make it particularly important to have a set plan for the building of the city, since the extensive development of construction in Moscow without a unified plan may extremely complicate the life and reorganization of the city in the future.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars reject the projects of preserving the present city intact as a museum-city and of creating a new city outside the limits of the present one. The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of the People's Commissars also reject the proposals to demolish the existing city and to build a new city in its place according to a totally different plan. The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars consider that in drawing up the plan of Moscow it is necessary to retain the historical outlines of the city, but radically to replan it by co-ordinating the network of its streets and squares. The most important conditions for this replanning are: the proper disposition of dwelling-houses, industries, railway transport and warehouses, the deepening of the Moscow river and the introduction of new ponds, canals, etc., the elimination of congested areas, the proper organization of residential districts and the creation of normal and healthy living conditions for the population.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars consider that in the entire work of replanning the city, uniformity in the architectural treatment of the squares, thoroughfares, embankments, and parks must be achieved and that the best examples of classical and modern architecture, as well as all achievements in the technique of building construction, must be utilized in the erection of dwelling-houses and public buildings. The hilly contours of the city, the Moscow river and the Yauza river, which intersect the city in different directions, the fine parks of Moscow—all these individual sections of the city in all their variety taken as a whole make it possible to create a truly socialist city.

In consideration of the above the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars resolve:

To approve the following general plan for the reconstruction of the city of Moscow in the course of ten years and in

the next three years, as submitted by the Moscow organizations.

I. Plan for the City of Moscow

1. In determining the size and in planning the lay-out of the city of Moscow, the decision of the June 1931 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, concerning the inexpediency of creating huge cities with an agglomeration of a great number of enterprises in the existing urban centres and concerning the inadmissibility of building new industrial enterprises in the city of Moscow, shall be taken as a basis.

In accordance with this decision the extent of the growth of the city of Moscow shall be restricted, and the increase of its area shall be calculated on the basis of an urban population of approximately five million. This population shall be provided with complete municipal and cultural facilities (dwellings, city transport, water supply and sewerage, schools, hospitals, a network of stores, dining-rooms, etc.).

2. Inasmuch as some districts within the present territorial limits of the city (28,500 hectares) are overcrowded with buildings and inasmuch as the city as a whole is overpopulated and its area does not permit of the normal housing of the growing population, it is deemed necessary gradually to extend the territory of the city to cover an area of 60,000 hectares.

The extension of the area of the city of Moscow shall be effected primarily by including 16,000 hectares of land adjoining the city in the south-west and located along the Moscow river beyond the Lenin hills, an elevated and conveniently situated suburban area, which is most healthful residential territory.

The gradual development of a new south-western district provided with water mains, sewerage, and other municipal services for the convenience of the population shall be undertaken. By the end of the ten year period, new dwelling-houses having one million square metres of floor space shall be built in this district.

3. All suburban territories indicated in the general plan of urban development shall be placed at the disposal of the city of Moscow as reserve city land to be included within the

city limits as construction progresses in them. All populated sections within the above-mentioned territory shall be placed under the administrative jurisdiction of the Moscow Soviet, and the latter shall immediately introduce into these sections the same rules concerning allotment of plots for construction purposes as have been established for the city of Moscow and shall also take all practical measures for the protection of lawns, trees and shrubs and for sanitary inspection in these localities.

A protective belt of forests and parks up to ten kilometres in width shall be created beyond the limits of this territory. This belt shall consist of evenly distributed large forest areas adjoining the woods surrounding the city and shall serve as a reservoir of fresh air for the city and a place of recreation for its inhabitants. These wooded areas shall be linked up with the centre of the city by parkways.

4. The water from the Volga river which will be available as a result of the construction of the Volga-Moscow canal shall be utilized to the fullest extent to provide waterways for the city, for which purpose two new water circuits shall be created.

5. The embankments along the Moscow river shall become the main thoroughfare of the city; the banks of the river shall be faced with granite, and broad avenues shall be constructed, permitting the passage of through traffic along the embankments over their entire length.

The facing of the banks along the Moscow river with granite, within the city limits, from Shelepikha to Kozhukhovo (a distance of 46 km., in addition to the 18 km. already constructed or in process of construction in 1935) shall be completed by the end of 1938. Asphalted thoroughfares, 40–50 metres wide, shall be constructed along these embankments.

Within three years the banks of the backwater canal shall be faced with granite over a distance of 8 km. (including the embankments under construction in 1935) and asphalted thoroughfares, 25–30 metres wide, shall be constructed along these embankments.

Embankments 20 km. long shall be constructed in the course of three years along the banks of the Yauza river, and asphalted thoroughfares, 25–30 metres wide, shall be constructed along these embankments.

During the next three years houses shall be built on the Krasnaya-Presnya, Smolensk, Dorogomilovo, Berezhkovskaya, Prichalnaya, Kotelnicheskaya, Novo-Spasskaya, and Rostov embankments, which shall be architecturally treated, and during the course of the remaining years of the ten year period similar work shall be carried out on the other embankments of the Moscow river, the backwater canal and parts of the embankments of the Yauza river from its mouth to the Sadovoya circle.

In view of the fact that after the water-level of the Moscow and the Yauza rivers has been raised, the river banks faced with granite and asphalted thoroughfares built along them, the embankments will become the most favourable part of the city for residential quarters, they shall be reserved exclusively for the construction of dwelling-houses and public buildings.

6. Taking the historical radial and circular system of streets as a basis for planning the city, this system shall be supplemented by a system of new streets which will serve to relieve traffic in the centre and afford the city districts direct communication with each other without necessarily passing through the centre of the city.

Accordingly, a new avenue shall be laid out parallel to the embankments running from Dzerzhinsky Square to the Palace of Soviets, Luzhniky and thence, along a specially constructed bridge with an elevated roadway approach, across the Moscow river and over the Lenin hills to the new south-western district.

In order to continue the work that has already been done in the construction of an avenue in the direction of the Palace of Soviets, Volkhonka Street, between Frunze Street and Antipyevsky Pereulok, shall be widened in 1936, and by 1937, when the construction of the new Moscow Soviet Hotel will be completed, the block of dwelling-houses facing this hotel shall be pulled down. All buildings between Mokhovaya and Manezhnaya Streets as well as between Volkhonka and Bolshoy Kamenny bridge shall be pulled down by the time the Palace of Soviets is erected. The avenue shall be reserved for government buildings as well as for public and scientific institutions.

7. Within a period of three years the width of the Red Square shall be doubled and the centrally located Nogin,

Dzerzhinsky, Sverdlov, and Revolution Squares shall be reconstructed and architecturally treated.

The territory of Kitay-gorod shall be cleared of its present buildings with the exception of individual large structures, and in their place several large government buildings shall be erected.

The high, hilly bank (at Zaryadye) shall be cleared of small buildings, and a great structure—the House of Industry—shall be built on the plot, with architecturally treated approaches to the river.

8. In order to facilitate pedestrian and vehicular traffic, the existing main radial and circular thoroughfares shall be straightened and their width shall be not less than 30–40 metres. The widening of the streets shall be effected by demolishing certain structures and by immediately clearing away the shrubbery and lawns from the streets and removing trees planted along some streets, which reduce the width of the streets and obstruct traffic.

All structures at the intersection of the circles and the radial avenues which block the outlets of the boulevards shall be demolished and in their place architecturally treated squares shall be laid out.

During the ten-year period three broad avenues intersecting the whole city shall be created by connecting, straightening, and widening several streets and small avenues in the following directions:

[*Names follow.*]

9. In addition to the central squares the following squares in the city shall be reconstructed: the squares in front of the railway stations and their approaches:

[*Names follow.*]

Architecturally well-treated houses shall be built on them. In planning and designing these squares broad passages for traffic shall be provided and parking space for automobiles shall be reserved over which no traffic shall be permitted.

10. To approve in the main the outlines for the main thoroughfares submitted by the Moscow Committee of the Party and the Moscow Soviet.

11. To open the following new arterial circles:

[*Four new circles specified.*]

12. With the object of relieving the centre of the city of through traffic, provision shall be made prescribing the laying out of the following streets connecting the nodal points and districts of the city with each other by direct routes: [*Four new roads specified.*]

Within a period of one year, the Moscow Soviet shall, on the basis of the approved outlines, draw up and adopt detailed plans for the erection of buildings on the city streets and squares, to be completed within the next ten years.

13. In order that the five million population of the city may be normally distributed and the residential districts properly organized, the following basic principles of construction and housing in the city shall be laid down:

(*a*) In planning and building new blocks and in re-planning the present city blocks, large blocks of from 9 to 15 hectares shall be laid out in place of the present small blocks of from 1·5 to 2 hectares, crowded with buildings which are from 50 to 60 per cent small houses, and intersected by a multitude of lanes crossing the main streets.

(*b*) Each of the blocks shall be occupied by a small number of large houses, with intervals between them so as to provide a maximum of light and air;

(*c*) The city development shall be carried out in such a way as gradually to reduce the density of the population, which, although it is on the average 350 persons per hectare of residential block, at present exceeds *1,000* persons per hectare of residential block within the Sadovoya circle. Eventually the density of the population shall average *400* persons per hectare of residential block, evenly distributed throughout the entire city. In certain districts which are most convenient and favourable for residential quarters (as, for example, along the embankments), 500 persons may be allowed per hectare of residential block, in which case the number of stories in the house shall be increased accordingly;

(*d*) Dwelling-houses of not less than 6 stories shall be constructed in Moscow, while on the main thoroughfares and at such points of the city as call for the most effective and imposing architecture (embankments, squares, and broad streets), dwelling-houses of 7, 10, and 14 stories shall be built.

14. To improve public service in respect of cultural and general welfare institutions, the construction of a network of schools, out-patient hospitals, dining-rooms, kindergartens, nurseries, stores, sports grounds, etc., shall be developed. The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars consider the tendency to install all such institutions in every large apartment house, reserving them for the exclusive use of the residents of that house, to be incorrect. The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars maintain that schools, out-patient hospitals, dining-rooms, kindergartens, nurseries, theatres, cinemas, clubs, hospitals, stadiums, and other cultural and general welfare institutions must be located in the centre of a number of blocks so as to serve the needs of the residents not of one but of tens of apartment houses.

15. In order properly to utilize the area of the city of Moscow and to ensure healthy living conditions for its population, all enterprises which are fire hazards or which are injurious from the point of view of sanitation and hygiene, as well as individual, for the most part small, enterprises, located so as to hinder the planning of the streets and squares of the city, shall be gradually removed beyond the limits of the city.

16. Freight-sorting stations and railway depots as well as inner-city warehouses near the railway lines shall be gradually removed beyond the limits of the city.

Railway lines converging on Moscow shall be connected by tunnels, starting with the construction of a tunnel connecting the Kursk railway line with the October railway line.

Some of the lines of the circuit railway shall be transferred to the south-west and south-east of their present route, and provision shall be made for the construction of a second circuit railway beyond the city limits to relieve the city of all through freight traffic.

All the lines of the Moscow railway junction shall be electrified, starting with the electrification of the suburban lines.

In accordance with this, the People's Commissariat of Railways shall be instructed to draw up a plan for the reconstruction of the Moscow railway system.

II. The Construction and Reconstruction of the Municipal Services of the City of Moscow

The realization of the adopted plan of widening, replanning, and architecturally treating the city of Moscow requires a tremendous amount of work in building and reconstructing its municipal services, which will radically improve the cultural and living conditions of the population.

The following programme of construction and reconstruction of the municipal services of the city of Moscow in the course of ten years (1936–45) and in the course of the next three years (1936–38) submitted by the Moscow Committee of the Party and the Moscow Soviet is hereby approved:

1. Within the ten-year period houses totalling 15,000,000 square metres of floor space (approximately 2,500 buildings) shall be built in the city of Moscow, of which 3,000,000 square metres (approximately 500 buildings) shall be built within the next three years, including:

800,000	square	metres in	1936
1,000,000	,,	,,	1937
1,200,000	,,	,,	1938

Not less than 25 per cent of this house-building programme shall be carried out with the forces and means of the Moscow Soviet.

2. Six new hotels containing 4,000 rooms shall be built and, in addition, in the course of the next three years the new Moscow Soviet Hotel on Okhotny Ryad as well as the superstructure on the Grand Hotel shall be completed, and the second section of the hotel on the square facing the Kiev railway station shall be built.

3. Simultaneously with the further extension of the underground railway, the passenger service within the city of Moscow is to be increased so that by the end of 1938 there shall be:

2,650 street cars
1,000 trolly-buses
1,500 motor-buses
2,500 taxicabs.

New tramway lines totalling 400 km. in length shall be laid in the course of the ten-year period; of these 100 km. shall be laid within the next three years.

In connection with the development of underground, motor-bus, and trolly-bus traffic in the centre of the city, it is deemed necessary to remove street car lines from the most congested streets, transferring them to the outlying streets of the city.

4. The diversity in the kind of paving material used on arterial streets and between the car tracks shall be eliminated, and asphalt shall be used as paving material throughout, with the exception of inclines where paving with small stone blocks or paving brick shall be permitted. All street car tracks within the city limits shall be placed on firm foundations of concrete and gravel. In the course of the ten-year period ten million square metres of city streets and squares shall be covered with asphalt, thus accomplishing the asphalting of all the streets and squares of the city. Within the next three years 2,500,000 square metres of Moscow streets and squares shall be covered with asphalt.

It shall be laid down that the construction of drains shall, as a rule, precede the covering of the city streets with asphalt.

5. Within the ten-year period 11 new bridges shall be built at an elevation corresponding to that of the Borodinsky bridge (up to 8·6 metres above the water-level at 120 metres above sea-level) and 3 bridges shall be reconstructed by raising them to the same elevation, in order to improve communication between the districts of the city lying on either bank of the Moscow river and to provide a through passage along the river for large Volga boats.

The following bridges shall be built in new localities:

[*Three bridges specified.*]

6. In order to increase the water supply of the Yauza river and other water areas of the city, the following work shall be carried out:

(*a*) By 1939, a canal shall be built in the northern section of the city to connect the Khimky reservoir with the Yauza river, which together will form an inner-city water ring;

(*b*) The bed of the Yauza shall be widened to 20–25 metres;

(*c*) All ponds on the territory of the city shall be cleaned and amply filled with water.

7. In order duly to prepare the Moscow water supply system to receive water from the Volga river and to supply it to the population, the construction of the Stalin Waterworks using Volga water shall be begun immediately. The capacity of these works shall reach 25,000,000 vedros[1] of water a day in 1937 and 50,000,000 vedros a day in 1938. During the ensuing years, the Northern Waterworks using Volga water, with a capacity of 50,000,000 vedros a day, and the Proletarsky Waterworks in the south-eastern section of the city, with a capacity of 25,000,000 vedros a day, shall be built. The total capacity of the Moscow water supply system shall be increased to 106,000,000 vedros a day by 1939 and to 180,000,000 vedros a day by 1945.

8. In order to raise the efficiency of the inadequate Moscow sewage system to the level of efficiency attained by the water supply system and in order to develop the sewage system in keeping with the development of the water supply system as herein provided for, the following work shall be carried out:

(*a*) The capacity of the sewers which drain water into the sewage farms shall be increased to 90,000,000 vedros a day by 1939 and to 120,000,000 vedros a day by 1945;

(*b*) The total capacity of the sewage farms shall be raised to 62,000,000 vedros a day during the next three years and to 100,000,000 vedros a day by 1945.

9. The most important task in the reconstruction of the municipal services of the city of Moscow is the development of its central heating system (using the steam from the turbines at the steam-electric power plants)—a principal means of freeing the city from long-distance hauling of fuel, of rationalizing its heat supply, and of further increasing the supply of current to the city.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars deem it necessary to increase the aggregate capacity of the central heat and power stations, which at present reaches 89,000 kw., to 675,000 kw. by 1945.

By the beginning of 1939 the capacity of the Moscow central heat and power stations shall be increased to 275,000 kw. This is to be effected by the construction of the Stalin

[1] 1 vedro = 1·7 gallons.

central heat and power station with a capacity of 100,000 kw. the Frunze central heat and power station with a capacity up to 50,000 kw., and the central heat and power station of the Stalin automobile plant, with a capacity up to 25,000 kw. —all to be completed by the beginning of 1939. The central heat and power station of the all-union heating institute, with a capacity up to 64,000 kw., shall be completed in 1936, and that of the first Moscow electric power station, with a capacity up to 24,000 kw., shall be completed in 1937.

10. In view of the fact that the capacity of the Moscow gas-works is inadequate to satisfy the most pressing needs of the city, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry shall by 1945 ensure Moscow with a supply of 600,000,000 cubic metres of gas per annum by developing the supply of gas to Moscow from out of town. Until the problem of the gas supply for Moscow has been fully solved, it shall be deemed necessary, along with increasing the capacity of the present gas-works, to build a new coke and gas plant, with a total capacity of not less than 200,000,000 cubic metres of gas per annum, in the vicinity of Moscow. This new plant shall be opened by the beginning of 1938 and shall also produce coke for the requirements of the industries of Moscow and of the Moscow region.

11. To proceed in 1936 with the reconstruction of the underground pipe and cable system of the city of Moscow by placing the telephone, telegraph, light and power cables, and gas and water mains into one collector, which shall permit the control, regulation, and repair of these conduits without tearing up the pavements.

12. During the ten-year period, 530 new school buildings shall be constructed in the city of Moscow, of which 390 buildings shall be constructed during the next three years.

Not less than 17 hospitals and 27 dispensaries shall be built during the ten-year period. Of this number, 6 hospitals and 3 dispensaries shall be built during the next three years.

13. In order to serve the cultural requirements of the population the following shall be built in the city of Moscow during the ten-year period:

(*a*) Fifty cinemas, of which five shall be built during the next three years;

(*b*) Three houses of culture, a children's house of culture, and seven clubs.

14. Bearing in mind the continued increase in Soviet trade, public catering, and the material well-being of the toilers, it is deemed necessary to build:

(*a*) Nine big department stores, of which two shall be built within the next three years;

(*b*) Five cold-storage plants with a total capacity of 50,000 tons, of which two shall be built within the next three years;

(*c*) Large underground storehouses with a capacity of 600,000 tons for the storing of potatoes and other vegetables, of which, storehouses with a capacity of 150,000 tons shall be built within the next three years;

(*d*) Three grain elevators with a capacity of 175,000 tons, of which one elevator shall be built in 1937;

(*e*) Six bread factories, of which one shall be built by 1937;

(*f*) Five large factories for supplying public dining-rooms with semi-prepared products; three such factories shall be built within the next three years.

15. In order to relieve the centre of the city of freight traffic, all warehouses serving as supply bases shall be removed from the territory of Kitay-gorod and the Boulevard circle.

16. In order to ensure the fulfilment of that part of the adopted programme for the reconstruction of Moscow which requires the demolition of houses and the removal of their residents, the Moscow Soviet shall reserve a special number of dwelling-houses totalling 100,000 square metres of floor space for the temporary accommodation of the persons affected.

17. In order to ensure firm discipline in the building and planning of the city of Moscow and in order that construction on its territory shall fully conform to the approved general plan for the city, it shall be laid down:

(*a*) That, irrespective of departmental jurisdiction, all construction work on the territory of the city of Moscow and the areas reserved outside the city limits shall take place only with the approval of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet and under its control, and the injunctions of the Moscow Soviet shall be strictly complied with.

(*b*) Construction shall be permitted on the territory of the city of Moscow only on condition that the plans for building and the architectural designs of such construction are approved or agreed upon by the Moscow Soviet.

18. The draft decision on the rules and regulations of Moscow city development submitted by the Moscow Committee of the Party and the Moscow Soviet shall be approved in the main, and the Council of Labour and Defence shall be instructed to work out the details and to introduce the corresponding changes into the legislation which is now in force and which governs these questions.

19. All reconstruction work provided for in the general plan for the reconstruction of the city of Moscow in the period of ten years (1936–45) and in the next three years (1936–8) shall be incorporated in the respective annual plans and the five year plan.

20. The State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., jointly with the Moscow Committee of the Party and the Moscow Soviet, shall determine the amounts, the time limits, and the consecutive order of appropriation of funds and material means which will be necessary in order to ensure the realization of the plan of work as provided in the present decision, and shall submit same to the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars for approval.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Party emphasize the fact that the task of the Party and the Soviet organs of Moscow consists not only in formally executing the plan of reconstruction of the city of Moscow, but first and foremost in building and creating high quality structures for the toilers, of ensuring that construction in the capital of the U.S.S.R. as well as the architectural design of the capital as a whole shall fully reflect the grandeur and beauty of the socialist epoch.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are fully convinced that the Moscow Bolsheviks, Soviet organizations, engineers, architects, and building workers who have already shown many examples of high quality work will be able to discharge with honour the tasks entrusted to them.

V. MOLOTOV
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

J. STALIN
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party

July 10th 1935

CHAPTER VII

THE TEN YEAR PLAN: COMMENTS

By SIR E. D. SIMON

POPULATION

Two fundamental factors on which all good planning must be based are population and area; effective planning of a city as a whole is only possible when the planners know what the ultimate area and population of the city are to be. This is, of course, recognized by all professional town planners; for instance, these factors were settled in advance in Letchworth and Welwyn; but to the best of my knowledge none of the great cities of the world have hitherto made any serious attempt to regulate their population.

The classical case is London; Queen Elizabeth's famous attempt to prevent expansion, followed by Cromwell's, were both defeated by the power of private enterprise. Growth has gone on continuously, till to-day Greater London has a population approaching ten millions, with the result that land values in the centre have reached fantastic heights and the time taken in transport to and from work grows ever greater. Everybody agrees that London is far too big, that its sheer size produces all sorts of grave results.

And yet to-day the government has abandoned all attempt to control it. Two or three years ago the Lancashire Industrial Development Committee wrote to the Prime Minister to urge that the government should prevent new factories going to London when they were so badly needed in Lancashire and other areas. After four months' delay he replied quite simply that nothing could be done; the government was not prepared even to consider taking any action to regulate the distribution of factories, which in their turn regulate the distribution of population.[1]

[1] The Commissioner for Special Areas in his third report (*Stationery Office Cmd. 5303*, p. 7) writes: "The colossal post-war growth of London . . . has become a national menace. . . . The missed opportunity of preplanning Greater London's post-war housing and industrial development in conjunction with the construction of new highways is only second to that lost when Wren's replanning of London was rejected after the great fire." After the publication of their report, and under great pressure from private Members of Parliament, the government has at long last announced its willingness to consider taking some action!

Moscow looks at the matter differently. In 1931 the population had been increasing rapidly, housing conditions were becoming intolerable; the Central Committee of the Party took the first important step by issuing a decree that no new factories were to be built in Moscow. In the following year the passport system was introduced, under which nobody was allowed to live in the city unless they were granted a Moscow passport by the G.P.U. In 1935 the decree of the government quoted in the last chapter took the vital decision by fixing the ultimate population of Moscow at five million. The city architect showed us a large-scale map giving the ultimate distribution of these five million people in the Moscow of the future, on the assumption that each resident would by that date have fifteen square metres of housing area. The map was divided up into districts; in each district was shown how many new houses would be needed; in the overcrowded areas how many of the present population would have to be removed to other areas. The daily movements of population in a fully developed Moscow, to and from its work, were also indicated. This map shows the state of affairs which it is hoped may be achieved in perhaps thirty years.

The population is to be controlled by three main methods: firstly, the control of factories. The intention is that no new factories are to be built in Moscow except those which are necessary for the production of goods for the population of Moscow, and which for reasons of transport could not economically be made elsewhere.

Existing factories may, if necessary, be extended; we saw three large factories contiguous to one another, all in course of extension during our visit. On the other hand, it is thought that the output of many of the factories is sufficient, and that by improved methods and with increasing skill it may be possible to maintain, or even increase, the present output while reducing the number of workers. Then again, it has been decided that insanitary factories already existing in Moscow, factories which create any sort of a nuisance, are gradually to be moved out to a distance of 50 or 100 kilometres, residences for the workers being built at such a distance that the nuisance will inconvenience nobody.

An official of Gosplan told us that everybody was agreed that the factories in Moscow must be kept down at all costs.

"Even," he said, "the directors of the factories themselves agree when they are here." But he said there was immense pressure for all kinds of reasons to increase Moscow factories, and he seemed a little uncertain how far they would be able to resist it.

The second method of keeping down the population of Moscow is by the passport system, which was introduced in 1932. Nobody can live in Moscow without a special passport authorizing them to do so. The control of passports is in the hands of the G.P.U. We did not succeed in getting hold of any regulations as to the conditions on which passports are issued; the stories we heard about it were most conflicting. Some people said that if a man had work and a dwelling-place in Moscow, he automatically got a passport; others put it that unless a man had both work and a dwelling-place in Moscow he could not get a passport, which would seem to make it very difficult for any outsider to get one! Others again said that the G.P.U. did not hesitate to take passports away if they disapproved of anybody's actions; in fact, we were given instances where this had happened.

The third method of controlling the population of Moscow is by means of evictions for slum clearance. Until recently alternative accommodation had to be offered. In July 1936 a decree was issued by the Central Committee of the Party and Sovnarkom[1] under which in the case of evictions for slum clearance or other purposes alternative accommodation need not be offered. Instead of that a payment would be made for each individual removed of 2,500 roubles; two months' notice to be given.

This decree was issued for the purpose of facilitating slum clearance. According to the official view there would be little hardship; the cash compensation was generous. When there were four members of the family it would be possible to build an all-the-year dacha for the 10,000 roubles received.

Critics pointed out that nobody could hope to build a dacha in two months; that only where there were four or more members of a family and where ample time was allowed, would it be possible to build a dacha; that it was quite impossible to get even a temporary bed in a corner of

[1] *Moscow Daily News*, July 22nd 1936.

a room in Moscow; eviction, therefore, meant the loss of the Moscow passport and very great hardship.

One point which was emphasized was that even in the case of evictions involving hardship, no active signs of sympathy are shown by the neighbours. The decree was issued without any warning, without any public discussion. But any protest meeting, either against the decree or against individual cases of hardship, was unthinkable.

Such are the steps which the government has taken to regulate the population of Moscow. It is a task of the utmost difficulty; the experience of the whole modern world shows how great is the attractive power of capital cities, and the prestige of Moscow in the Soviet Union is immense; it is said that there are three classes of people in Russia, those living in Moscow, those on the way there and those hoping to go there later on. Again, the natural increase of the population of the Soviet Union is about 20 per 1,000; we did not succeed in getting any figures in Moscow, but it is said to be much less than in the Union as a whole. If there is any substantial natural increase, it will, of course, greatly add to the difficulty of stabilizing the population.

We were informed that according to the official estimates the city population had not increased since 1932; if this is correct it is most remarkable evidence of the power of the government.

Area

Having settled the maximum population at five million, the next problem was to decide in what area it should be housed.

There was much discussion on this matter between the years 1931–5, and many people were consulted, including the distinguished French and German architects Corbusier and May. Corbusier suggested leaving old Moscow as a museum city and building a new city of great towers on a new site. This was, not unnaturally, rejected as impracticable. May proposed a series of satellite towns on the general lines which are so popular with town planners in England; this also was rejected.

It was decided to rebuild and extend the city on the existing site, the area to be enlarged just enough to provide

for the necessary houses, open spaces, etc. It has already been explained that there are to be no cottages, that all the houses are to be of not less than six stories, and "at such points of the city as call for the most effective and imposing architecture of seven, ten, and fourteen stories," so that a limited city area will be compatible both with a considerable density of population and with ample open spaces. In this way it is expected that the population of five million can be housed in a city with a radius of about eight miles, so that with good transport there will be easy and rapid access for all the citizens to the open country. There is to be a forest belt, from three to six miles deep, right round the city; this to be kept free from new buildings, with a very limited number of exceptions.

The old area of Moscow was 70,000 acres; it is to be extended to 150,000 acres. It is interesting to note that when Moscow is fully developed according to plan and the population has arrived at five million, the average population will be 33 per acre, which happens to be exactly the same as the density of Manchester to-day. Wythenshawe, laid out by the city of Manchester, has a density of only 20 per acre, but it must be remembered that the houses in Wythenshawe are all of the two-story cottage type. Oxford has only 11 people per acre.

It is intended that in residential areas the buildings shall cover from 20 to 22 per cent of the land, in works areas from 30 to 40 per cent. There should therefore be plenty of green everywhere: the courts of the houses and the children's playgrounds, the boulevards and parkways, the smaller parks in the centre with larger parks on the outskirts, and finally the forest belt right round the city.

About half the extension of the city area will be to the south-west of the city in the area known as the Lenin hills. These rise to a height of about 300 feet above the present city, and will be the chief residential area, inhabited ultimately by over a million people.

No special factory areas are to be reserved, as almost the whole of the factories already exist. On the whole they are concentrated in the east and south-east, but they have developed haphazard, and are distributed irregularly over the whole town. There is no regular prevailing wind, though a slight preponderance of south-west winds, which

fit in well with the proposed Lenin hills residential area in the south-west and with the existing factories.

The following table may be of interest:

	Population Millions.	Approximate radius miles
London County Council . .	4·2	6
Metropolitan Police Area . .	8·3	15
New Moscow	5·0	8·5
Moscow (including forest belt) .	5·0	14

The Metro

In 1931 a great public debate was begun as to the advisability of building an underground railway. On this matter Perchik[1] writes in 1936 as follows:

> "A considerable number of the so-called 'theoreticians' on municipal enterprises were opposed to the construction of a subway 'on principle.' They wrote in all seriousness that under socialism the population will not move about more rapidly, but more slowly than under capitalism. In other words, according to their theory, in the future people were to become self-sufficient stick-in-the-muds.
>
> "In essence, these people preached not proletarian, but *petty-bourgeois*, socialism.
>
> "It is now clear to every one in the Soviet Union that these people were preaching outright *bourgeois* views, that they were propagandists of the most reactionary anti-proletarian ideas in the sphere of developing socialist cities."

This seems to be evidence that discussion on matters of importance is not always welcomed! In any case, the government were successful in working up a high degree of enthusiasm. So much so that many thousands of citizens went and did a substantial amount of voluntary work in their spare time on the building of the Metro (though the economic value of this irregular and unskilled work may be doubtful).

[1] *The Reconstruction of Moscow*, p. 55.

It was an immense task for Moscow to undertake; there was no experience of similar work in Russia, there was an inadequate supply of trained workers and an almost complete absence of equipment. We were told that there were actually no wheelbarrows till the foreign workers insisted on them. A competent foreign observer states that he had seen certain statistics showing the number of man/hours spent upon the work. "They were prodigious, but this was partly due, I imagine, to the necessity to use crude labour for want of the necessary specialized plant and equipment."

The same observer adds that with the experience that has been gained from the building of the first line, he expects their second to be "a more efficient piece of work altogether."

In spite of being expensive, the work was carried through quickly, if we can accept the figures given by Kaganovich, who states that the 12 kilometres of subway in Moscow were finished in three and a half years, whereas in Berlin the first subway of 11 kilometres took six years; he quotes other instances, none of which approach the Moscow record in speed.

There is no doubt that they have succeeded in building a good railway. Without necessarily agreeing with Perchik's view that "the subway of the Revolution is a revolution in subways," or that "in quality, the Moscow subway is far in advance of all subways abroad," yet it is undoubtedly true that the Metro gives a rapid and reliable service at reasonable fares. It is claimed that it carried 76,000,000 passengers in the first year without an accident.

It is also true that the architects have succeeded in making the stations look bright and cheerful. The good lighting, the free use of varied types of marble, and the absence of advertisements, no doubt account for the frequency with which visitors are said to describe the halls of the stations as "palaces."

Not only has the government done a good job in building the Metro, but there is no doubt that the whole of Russia feels proud of it. In medieval days the whole people of a town joined together to build a cathedral. So in Moscow the people joined to build the Metro; and regard it to-day with the same pride as a thing of beauty, their common

achievement, their common possession. It is constantly referred to as "the most beautiful underground in the world." I was told that in the early days people were seen affectionately caressing the marble walls! And I was told by an Englishwoman that a peasant in Tiflis had asked her whether she had seen "our" Metro? She said that she thought the only Metro was in Moscow. "Yes," said the peasant, "our Moscow Metro!" Surely the high-water mark of successful propaganda!

The Moscow-Volga Canal

Next let us consider shortly the Moscow-Volga canal. We had an interview with the chairman of the waterworks committee of the Mossoviet,[1] who gave us the following information.

The canal is being built with two main objects: to increase the water supply of Moscow and to improve transport facilities by water.

As regards the water supply, the present supply is quite inadequate; the Moscow-Volga canal will increase it five times. Large reservoirs are being made about 30 kilometres away from Moscow, holding a year's supply. In fact, the water supply for a population of five million in Moscow will, when the Moscow-Volga canal is complete, be ample for all time.

The canal, in its course from the Volga river in the north to Moscow, rises, at its highest point, no less than 40 metres. Five large pumping stations are being installed to raise the water needed by the people of Moscow up to this point from the Volga. Five hydro-electric stations will use the power in this water as it falls again to Moscow.

The second object is to link up Moscow for water transport with the four seas: the White Sea and the Baltic Sea

[1] The interview with the chairman of the waterworks committee, at which the above information was given to us, was fixed at ten o'clock at night. He had been good enough to promise to make certain appointments for us with some of his colleagues. We suggested at ten o'clock that he should do this, but he preferred to have the interview first. When the interview was over at 12.30 a.m. he rang up five of his colleagues on the Mossoviet, and on the spot fixed up interviews with four of them! When we suggested that it would be difficult to find officials of the London County Council in their offices at midnight, he said that they found that the quietest time to work; when he had got rid of us he was going to have a conference with the acting chairman of the Mossoviet.

in the north, the Caspian and the Black Sea in the south. Of these, the Baltic and White Seas are already connected by a new canal; the Moscow-Volga canal will complete Moscow's connection with these two and with the Caspian Sea. In order to complete the connection to the Black Sea, a further canal is required in the south of Russia connecting the Volga with the Don.

The canal will have a minimum depth of 5½ metres, and will take specially built barges of 20,000 tons, as well as the standard Volga passenger ship, 120 metres long. There will be two ports in Moscow: one in the north, mainly for passengers, and one in the south near the main factory area, chiefly for goods.

The level of the Moscow river will be raised by 3 metres, and it will be necessary to build 11 new bridges with a clearance of 8·6 metres.

The task is an enormous one. The length of the canal is 135 kilometres, the weight of soil excavated will be 148 million tons. The job is only slightly smaller than the Panama canal, which is 160 kilometres long and where the excavation amounted to 160 million tons. For our special benefit it was also compared with the Manchester Ship Canal, length 47 kilometres, excavation 35 million tons; the Moscow canal is nearly three times as long, and the excavation nearly five times as large![1] We were informed that 124 villages were going to be flooded in a few months' time and were now being built elsewhere. When one remembers the immense excitement and the amount of discussion and protest caused by the destruction of the one small village of Mardale for Manchester's new waterworks at Haweswater, one is impressed by the ease with which, under Russian conditions, 124 villages can be displaced apparently without any public discussion whatever.

Transport

Transport in Moscow is a difficult problem; it was never good, and the rapid increase in population made the position exceedingly bad. At present all forms of public transport

[1] The great bulk of the work on the canal itself is already done; it is hoped that the canal will be opened early in 1937.

are being increased as rapidly as possible:[1] trains, buses, trolly-buses, taxis, and underground railway. Bicycles and private cars are rare, so that public transport is almost universally used. It may perhaps be interesting to quote the following from Perchik.[2]

> "In the cities of the land of socialism the worker works only seven hours a day. Unemployment has been abolished. The adult working population has been drawn into active productive, political, and cultural activity. The working-class women have also been drawn into production, lead an active public life, and are not disfranchised domestic slaves, fettered to their kitchens.
>
> "Science and art, theatres and clubs, cinemas and parks—all these are accessible to the broad masses. After work, the worker and his family still have enough time to go to the theatre, to the club, to a lecture, on an excursion, to the park, to the stadium, or to pay visits to comrades."

The principle of decentralization has therefore been adopted as far as possible. Housing must be as close as practicable to the place of work, and in every area the normal amenities, theatres, cinemas, open spaces, playgrounds and clubs, must be provided.

But everybody will want to visit the centre of the city occasionally, if only to see the Palace of Soviets or to attend a demonstration in the Red Square, and everybody should have easy access to the open country.

As an illustration of the probable demand for transport (also, no doubt, of the scarcity of available amusements), there was a football match while we were in Moscow; the leading local team against Turkey. The stadium holds 90,000 spectators. I happened to be in the city architect's office next day; I was told that so great was the interest in the match that every one of the hundred people in the office had applied for tickets; only two had received them. In all, no less than two million citizens of Moscow had applied!

In the centre of the city buses and trolly-buses are to

[1] Except trams, which are being reduced in the centre of the city.
[2] *The Reconstruction of Moscow.*

replace trams; an attempt is already being made to discourage the use of trams in the central parts by charging higher fares.

We have already dealt with the biggest transport job that has as yet been finished, the building of the first section of the Metro. At present the line is short and the area served is small, but it already makes it possible to reach two of the principal parks in a few minutes from the centre of the city. As other lines are built, the Metro should do a good deal to relieve street transport. In particular, the residential area in the Lenin hills is to be connected to the central portions of the city by three Metro lines.

Most of the suburban railway lines have been electrified, and it is intended that they shall all be dealt with in the next two years.

As regards roads, an immense amount of widening is being done at the present time. Trees and grass in the boulevards and in the squares have been, and are being, replaced by asphalt; obstructive houses are being pulled down; it is not too much to say that the work of widening is proceeding at a furious pace. In fact, there is a good deal of criticism. Many of the roads seem to be too wide for the amount of traffic: people say with some justice that they are both ugly and dangerous. There are no roundabouts, and traffic control does not seem to have been worked out, with the result that although the traffic is very small for so large a city, road crossing in many places is exceedingly dangerous for pedestrians.

The centre of Moscow is laid out on a spider's web plan, with two ring roads (the *A* ring and the *B* ring) on the sites of old fortifications. This plan is being maintained in its general lines, with two additional ring roads farther from the centre and three great diagonal boulevards. A large part of the widening is at present going on in the *A* and *B* rings, and already the crossings with the main radial roads are causing serious congestion.

But this can be overcome; more study of traffic problems is needed; and, in fact, Moscow traffic experts were visiting England and Paris at the time we were in Moscow. A great deal has already been done to improve transport, although the trams are still often abominably overcrowded. The whole transport system seems, so far as one could judge

from a hurried investigation, to have been well worked out, and if steadily and wisely developed should in time prove to be effective.

The Local Authority

One difficulty of town planning in England is the existence of old-established local authorities with conflicting views and interests. No such troubles exist in Moscow: the decree of 1935 gives the Mossoviet full authority over the whole area of Moscow and the forest belt. How admirable! How sensible! How simple! And, alas, how utterly impossible to copy in a country of rigid traditions and tough individualism like England!

The power of the central government in Moscow is so great, the habit of innovation so strong, that at the present stage any such question simply does not arise. It was recently decided that the existing ten rayons were too large to get effective detailed local government. It was decided to convert them into twenty-three; and the whole thing was discussed and settled without the smallest difficulty; with none of the long-continued protests and opposition which would have been inevitable here, if indeed such a change could have been carried through at all!

Queries

There are three main questions as regards the fundamental bases of the Moscow plan which might be questioned. Firstly, is five million the right figure for the population?

Clearly there is no scientific test possible in a question of this sort. All sorts of factors have to be borne in mind. Moscow must be a worthy capital for a country with a population of 170 million people: it must be conveniently arranged for its inhabitants. It would be impossible to prove that five million is the right population rather than four or six; but on the whole my impression is that the decision is a wise one.

Secondly, should Moscow have chosen a larger area?

This is, of course, a difficult question to answer. Having regard to the fact that Moscow is a capital city, having regard to the severity of the climate, it seems to me that the

arguments in favour of the main decisions that have been taken with regard to population, area, and height of building, are of considerable weight. Although I discussed the matter with a large number of architects, engineers, and ordinary citizens, both Russian and foreign, I did not find anybody who had serious criticisms to make of these fundamental decisions. The only point on which I feel any serious doubt is whether they would not be wise to build a series of either satellite or dormitory towns outside the forest belt and to keep the night population of Moscow perhaps rather lower than the proposed total of five million. However, this is a point which can be dealt with later on if desired.

The third question is that of prestige building. The only serious criticism we came across was that in view of the desperate need for more houses, the Mossoviet ought not to have gone in for prestige building so much as it has done. If the labour on the Metro and on the Moscow-Volga canal had been switched over to housing, a great deal more could have been done. Above all, some people felt that the proposal to build the Palace of Soviets ought to be postponed till the housing was better. The Palace of Soviets is planned to be the largest and most expensive building in the world. The foundations are bad and will be enormously costly; there is to be a tremendous hall to hold 20,000 people, completely free from columns, and the walls of this immense hall are to carry the tallest and heaviest building in the world. It is suggested that the materials and labour required to build the Palace of Soviets would house a very large number of families, and that such housing would contribute much more to human welfare than a gigantic palace. There may be some truth in this; but it must be remembered that Moscow is the capital of a nation of 170 million people, that delegates from all over the U.S.S.R. constantly meet in Moscow, and that it seems not unreasonable to spend a good deal of time and money and to make a good many sacrifices to prove to the whole of the U.S.S.R. that a socialist republic can build a capital rivalling in magnificence the greatest capitals of the world.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MOSSOVIET: ITS ADVANTAGES FOR TOWN PLANNING

By SIR E. D. SIMON

THE Mossoviet has an opportunity unrivalled in the history of the world to reconstruct Moscow on the best town-planning lines. It has two overwhelming advantages compared with a capitalist democracy. The first advantage is socialism: the government owns the whole of the land and buildings; there are no interests of private owners to oppose or thwart its decisions. The second advantage is the one-party system, which makes the Mossoviet notable for its ability to concentrate the whole energies of the government in whatever direction its wishes, and its power to secure not only the acquiescence of the public to its plan, not only immunity from adverse criticism, but the active, and even enthusiastic, co-operation of the public.

SOCIALISM

The most important advantage of socialism to a municipality is undoubtedly the public ownership of the land. It is hardly necessary to stress the difficulties of planning the central areas of a city when the land belongs to individuals. Only in the last few years has the power to plan built-on areas been given to the city councils in England; already the impossibility of any drastic reconstruction has become clear. Two examples will suffice: the first was given to me by the city architect of Moscow, who said that he had recently been in Regent Street in London when there had been a bad traffic block. He had walked three times the length of the street while a bus got from one end to the other. Regent Street, as he pointed out, had recently been rebuilt; "owing to the terrific land values it had inevitably been rebuilt the same width as before, instead of being made three times as wide, as it would have been under socialism."

Our second instance is taken from Manchester. The

Town Planning Committee of Manchester recently recommended a modest civic centre. Unfortunately an insurance company came along and purchased for £40,000 a small piece of land required as part of the civic centre. The Town Planning Committee informed the City Council that the erection of an expensive building on this site would ruin their proposed plan, and recommended its repurchase at the same price by the City Council. The City Council refused on the grounds that Manchester could not afford the cost, and so killed the civic centre scheme. Manchester is a much richer city than Moscow; yet such a thing is almost inconceivable in Moscow, which itself owns the whole of the land within the city boundaries and allocates it regardless of cost to whatever purpose seems best in the public interest.

We interviewed the land department of the Mossoviet. They informed us that the land of Moscow is not even valued. They have a complete list of all the land with full particulars of its geological and economic aspects; it is their business to have the fullest possible knowledge as to the whole of the land of the city, and to allocate each site to whatever use is likely to be best in the interests of the population as a whole. When a site is allocated to a particular trust, factory, or government department, an agreement is entered into as to the type of building to be put up, so as to make sure that it fits in with the economic and aesthetic life of Moscow. The agreement gives the Mossoviet full control of the building to be erected.

Not only the land, but all the buildings are owned by the community. Although they belong in the first instance to different commissariats, factories, trusts, etc., they are all ultimately in national ownership and can be dealt with as desired. When a building has to be removed the only consideration is the cost of pulling it down and rebuilding it. The capitalist bugbear of excessive compensation does not arise.

An amusing instance had occurred just before we were in Moscow: the level of the Moscow river is to be raised by three metres early in 1937. In the middle of 1936 the British Embassy received a note informing them of this fact and pointing out that as a result the basement of the Embassy would be flooded to a depth of 1½ metres. The British

Embassy is a large building housing a considerable community; there are three separate kitchens in the basement. They were much perturbed about this when we were there and did not know how they could manage. That, however, was not the affair of the Mossoviet, who courteously but firmly pointed out the facts and suggested that the Embassy should deal with them. No question of compensation arises: I am not even sure whether there will be a reduction of rent! The Embassy must manage as best it can. This is an undoubted hardship; one can imagine what would happen if the level of the Thames were to be raised and to flood large numbers of kitchens. The compensation demanded and awarded by the courts would almost certainly be enough to prevent any such scheme being carried through. The excessive compensation so frequently awarded in England is disastrous to town planning; on the other hand any costs forced on individuals by a town plan are in fact part of the total cost to the community of that plan, and as a matter of principle fair though not excessive compensation should be paid. And yet there can be no doubt of the immediate advantages of the Moscow method for town-planning purposes; in the Russian view it is far better that the general advantage should be followed, even though a limited number of individuals suffer.

Another advantage of socialism is that the Mossoviet has full architectural control over new buildings to be put up. Careful consideration has been given to this matter. Nine ateliers of architects, each under the leadership of a distinguished Russian architect, have been made responsible for the general design of the principal quays and main roads. Under capitalism unified control of this sort has only been possible when a single landlord has owned large areas of a city, as in Bath and Buxton. Even when a city council buys the land and so acquires the powers of ownership, as the Manchester City Council has in its new satellite garden-town of Wythenshawe, the council as a whole feels that the private owners of houses must be allowed to settle the design of their own houses. Though the city council gives its architect some control, their "ownership mentality" means unfortunately that the architectural control is much less than it is likely to be in Moscow.

Not only will these ateliers of architects control the broad

design of the buildings on the main roads; in addition a "decorations department" of the Mossoviet has recently been appointed, employing a number of artists to co-operate with the architects in seeing that the details of the decorations of the streets, advertisements, lettering, minor buildings, such as kiosks and lavatories, are effectively harmonized with the architectural design of the whole street. We were interested to learn from the head of the decorations department that advertising is only just beginning in Moscow; till recently there have been no surplus goods to advertise. New kinds of goods are now beginning to be produced in large quantities, many of them such as some kinds of jam and cheese totally unknown to the bulk of the population. We were told that whereas under capitalism advertisers push shoddy or harmful goods for profit, socialist advertising would only push goods of approved quality, would inform the population of good new products available for consumption, how these products are best cooked or used, and what their advantages are. And all advertising would be under the control of the artists of the decorations department, and instead of rendering Moscow hideous would add to its beauty.[1]

Clearly there will be difficulties; however good the economic possibilities may be, it is easy to make a mess of things. For instance, Kaganovich said in 1934:

> "Comrade Stalin sharply raised the question of a decisive struggle against haphazard building. Individual builders, organizations, and institutions build planlessly, spontaneously, and thus harm the city as a whole. We abolished private property in land long ago. However, even until to-day we can observe the private property approach of individual builders towards the sections which have been placed at their disposal. We must fight decisively against such anti-state tendencies in the building of the city."

But there can be no denying the enormous advantages of socialism for town planning. Any city government, however efficient and honest, however incompetent and corrupt,

[1] We saw advertisements of toothpaste on some of the trams, covering a board right along the top, and quite equal to the worst type of capitalist advertisement in unpleasantness. How will all this work out in practice?

would almost inevitably make a better job of the town planning of a city where there were no private ownership of land or buildings. To any one who has experience of the slow progress and of the difficulties of town planning in England, the constant preoccupation with the damage done to certain private interests when any scheme is proposed, however advantageous the scheme may be to the community as a whole, the constant bugbear of compensation and excessive costs, it seems almost the realization of a dream to find a city where these problems do not arise.

One-Party Government

Dr. Robson has described the constitution and powers of the Mossoviet in detail. Let us consider them again shortly in order to try to understand their power to concentrate a great mass of energy on to a single job and to secure the enthusiastic co-operation of the mass of the people, as they did in the case of the building of the Metro:[1] and more broadly their relative advantages compared with party government of the British type.

The first words to us of the acting chairman of the Mossoviet were: "The Mossoviet is an organ of the national government." And there is no doubt that this is true. The executive power of the Mossoviet is vested in the presidium, a body of about fifteen elected members, most of whom devote the whole of their time to the work of the Mossoviet and receive appropriate salaries. So far as I could judge, they appeared to be persons (there is one woman) of high efficiency, integrity, enthusiasm, and devotion. Within the presidium there is an inner group of five, who are the day-to-day government of Moscow. It is interesting to note that a small governing committee of this sort, of from three to five persons, is the form which has been more and more adopted by the big corporations in this country (L.M.S., I.C.I., Unilever, etc.). Below the presidium is a hierarchy of officials responsible to the presidium, planning, advising, carrying out orders. At the other end the presidium is in close touch with the commissariats of the national government. The whole thing is a civil service efficiently organized to carry out the orders of the government.

[1] See p. 203.

But we were also told a very different story; that the presidium is the executive organ of the plenum of the Mossoviet; it is elected by the plenum, the plenum takes all the main decisions, is the law-making body, approves the budget; it is the duty of the presidium to carry out the instructions of the plenum; in fact, that the Mossoviet is as democratic a body as the London County Council. Every official we met talked with deference of the plenum and constantly stressed its importance. In fact, we were asked to believe that the presidium was simultaneously responsible to two different bodies, to Sovnarkom (the Council of Commissars) and to the plenum of the Mossoviet! A highly novel constitutional device.[1]

During the first week or two of our stay in Moscow we spent much time trying to solve this enigma: how can an executive body be responsible to two totally separate authorities? Gradually the answer became clear: the Communist Party dominates everything. Moscow is governed by the Party; the Party makes the decisions on all matters of importance. Both Sovnarkom and the plenum of the Mossoviet invariably accept these decisions; in form they actually take the decisions themselves. The presidium is, in fact, responsible through the plenum and through Sovnarkom to the party.

The Communist Party is an epoch-making invention.[2] As regards the government of Moscow, it means that the Mossoviet policy (decided, in fact, by the party) is constantly helped and supported by thousands of eager and loyal party members.[3] They permeate every section of the life of Moscow; they control the action of every group. Every newspaper, even every wall newspaper, is thus under the control of a party member. With their fanatical conviction of the righteousness of the government, their loyalty, their

[1] Compare the following which is article 101 in the new Constitution: "The executive organs of the soviets of toilers' deputies are directly accountable both to the soviets of toilers' deputies which elected them and to the executive organ of the higher soviet of toilers' deputies."

[2] The best description is in *Soviet Communism*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

[3] Illustrating the close touch between the leading members of the party, a member of the presidium told us that one of his four telephones was directly connected through the exchange to similar telephones on the desks of all the leading members of the party in Moscow. It was a private direct line, not passing through secretaries. He could, he said, at any moment ring up Stalin himself, but, he added, with a smile, he would think two or three times before doing so.

integrity and ability, their ruthlessness in the suppression of opposition, they constitute for the Mossoviet an organ of incomparable power, both to keep the presidium in touch with the feelings of the people and to expound to the people the policy of the Mossoviet, and to persuade them to accept it and support it.

But the Mossoviet has another, and almost equally original, method of keeping in touch with public opinion. There are literally thousands of members of the Mossoviet and of the district soviets, largely non-party members, who are in close personal touch with every group in Moscow, whose main duty it is to see that delays in justice and in efficiency do not occur in the work of the Mossoviet, and that complaints are properly considered; as it was often put to us, "to prevent bureaucracy." They also act as propagandists among the people for the Mossoviet; they interpret the Mossoviet to the people and the people to Mossoviet.

In short, the Mossoviet has an original and tremendously powerful dual organization for contact with the populace and for propaganda.

The Mossoviet has further advantages; Professor Jewkes has dealt with their advantages in the matter of finance, particularly the ready acceptance by the people of the heavy burden of indirect taxation, and the non-existence of charges for interest on capital.

But all the power of the Mossoviet would be of little importance unless it had a definite purpose, a spirit of enterprise and determination. Here again, there is no doubt of their dual purpose, the determination to "build socialism," and to make Moscow the finest capital in the world. This purpose permeates the whole of the members and officials of the Mossoviet; their chief characteristic is perhaps constructive energy. They have no lawyer town clerk, whose whole training is calculated to make him approach every question from the point of view, "Is this legal? Is this within our powers?" A lawyer's is the very worst possible training for constructive drive and energy; to make the head official a lawyer is a sure sign of a conservative civilization. The whole attitude and outlook of the leading officials of the Mossoviet is one of energy and action.

This spirit of the Moscow civil service seems to me to be of outstanding importance. By way of contrast, let us

consider the British civil service under a democratic party system.[1] In the early days, the civil service supported the party in power and went in and out of office with the government. In England this "spoils" system is discredited and has been abolished. The civil servant to-day, both national and local, is a whole-time expert in the permanent service of the government who must render his services impartially and with equal zeal to either party. The result is, as we know, that the British civil servant is a man of the highest qualities of ability and integrity, but that his zeal must be reserved for the efficient service of whatever party may for the time being be in power rather than for the main objects of policy. It may fairly be said that he has every virtue except enterprise and initiative; the successful official is usually the man who plays for safety. Men of vision and driving force are (with a few outstanding exceptions) not likely to be either welcome or happy in the civil service.

In Moscow the position is totally different: the policy of the one and only party at any given time is clear and definite. So far from the civil servants keeping out of politics, just the opposite is expected of them. They must be enthusiastic and whole-hearted supporters of the political aims of the party. The effective governing organ of Moscow, the presidium, consists at present entirely of party members; of the elected members of the plenum, nearly half are not party members, and may therefore be taken to be less politically interested than the party members who constitute the presidium.

It should be pointed out that while this is true at any given time, the policy of the party may change, and in fact does change. When it changes, things may be unpleasant for the people who are carrying out the previous policy: for example, the pedologists[2] would hardly be likely to maintain their enthusiasm undimmed. Time alone will show how far this difficulty is likely to be serious; it must depend on the wisdom and consistency of the leaders.

While our civil service tradition is good and has admirable results where the task is a regulative one, the result is by no means so satisfactory when it comes to constructive work.

[1] See *The British Civil Servant*, edited by W. A. Robson. (Allen & Unwin.)
[2] See p. 129.

Indeed, how is it possible for any great task to be accomplished when the officials are expected to be interested in doing their particular section of the work well, but not really to care whether the task as a whole is successfully accomplished or not? Any competitive business run on these lines would inevitably go bankrupt in a few years.

I have described the two main differences between the Mossoviet and a capitalist city council—socialism and the one-party system—and have indicated their special importance for town planning. As regards the other services, their importance varies.

Socialism already exists in most English cities as regards many of the services: the public utilities, police, paving, cleansing, drainage, etc. Moscow has no advantages over Manchester in the matter of public ownership so far as these services are concerned, in fact, apart from the services which may be considered as coming under the head of town planning (including transport), the only service where Moscow would seem to have an important advantage over Manchester through public ownership is in public health. The Mossoviet or some other public body owns the whole of the hospitals, sanatoria, clinics, etc., and employs all doctors, dentists, and nurses. The opportunities of effective planning, and of concentrating the attention of the whole public health service on an organized system of prevention should be of immense importance.

Coming to the one-party system, here again the advantages of a single purpose permeating the whole city council are shared with Moscow by the English cities in many services. In the public utilities, electricity, gas, water, the object is efficient production at low prices. No differences of opinion owing to the party system in England are likely substantially to reduce the efficiency of such services. It is undoubtedly true, at least at the present stage of Russian civilization, that there is more drive and energy, a more restless spirit seeking change and improvement, in Moscow than in Manchester. So long as this drive is in the right direction it is all to the good. But as soon as it is turned in the wrong direction it is full of danger. The fanatical enthusiasm which regards any criticism or obstruction of the "party line" as sheer wickedness, must tend to intolerance in all matters. There is one field in local government where

this spirit of intolerance is particularly dangerous—education. In the view of democrats the main object of education is to produce the free, independent citizen, thinking for himself, whose highest aim is the search for truth, without fear or favour. In Russia, the party has produced a fine passion for education, but, as Lady Simon shows,[1] it is the party's education, the party's text-books; they teach the scientific method everywhere except where it conflicts with the party line; in that field independent thought becomes the greatest crime which a man can commit.

In fact, there are many objections to the one-party system, as will be further shown in the next chapter; but nobody will deny that for town planning, for the special task of reconstructing Moscow in ten years, the one-party system, unifying all the energy both of elected members and of officials in one effective fighting force, should (subject always to wise and efficient leadership) be incomparably more efficient than the English two-party system.

[1] See p. 124.

CHAPTER IX

THE MOSSOVIET: IS IT DEMOCRATIC?

By SIR E. D. SIMON

How far can the government of Moscow be regarded as having those characteristics which we attempt to define by the word "democracy?"

It seems to me that the reality behind the government of Moscow may be summed up as follows:

1. That all important decisions are made by the Central Committee of the Party. (Whether they are made personally by Stalin or by some group within the Central Committee is unimportant for our purpose.)

2. Before deciding any important matter the party generally makes considerable efforts to consult the relevant sections of public opinion and to obtain the best possible expert advice. It has admirable machinery for this purpose.

3. Once a decision is made all opposition or criticism is ruthlessly suppressed.

4. Every effort is made to make the whole process appear as democratic as possible.

Let us consider by means of some examples what responsibility and power the individual citizen has, how far he is free, free to suggest, criticize, or protest against the party line, in speech or writing. Dr. Robson has explained how the very large number of "instructions" are given by the voter at the elections, and how they are afterwards dealt with.[1] It was suggested to me early in our stay in Moscow that the following could be taken as typical of the method in which the suggestions were made, whether brought up at election time or at other times; and after discussing it with as many people as possible I believe this to be a fairly correct picture:

Supposing a group in a certain district decided to agitate for a new public bath. They would first approach some influential group of workers, probably in a factory, and get them interested. The matter would thus automatically come

[1] See p. 4.

before a party member, who would consult the party authorities. If they said the bath could not be built, the whole matter would be dropped and nothing more heard of it. If, on the other hand, the party said they were prepared to consider it, then things would move. There would be widespread propaganda; meetings would be arranged which members of the rayon and Mossoviet would attend. The proposal would be advertised in wall newspapers. Ultimately it would be brought up in the rayon soviet and finally approved by the Mossoviet. The whole thing would be advertised as a triumph of democracy and as proving the wisdom and far-sightedness of the people!

It is remarkable that of the 100,000 "instructions" given by the electors in 1934, *not a single one* complained of extravagance or demanded a reduction in taxation. In Manchester there was a bitter fight extending over several years as to whether the city could afford a much-needed extension to the Town Hall; in Moscow the Palace of Soviets, which will be the most expensive building ever erected in Europe, is being built (so far as we could find out) without one protest against such extravagance: without one suggestion that its erection should be deferred till enough houses have been built to do away with the appalling overcrowding in cellar dwellings. Is it not abundantly clear that the so-called "instructions" are limited to such as are approved by the party?

Let us now consider how a really big thing is dealt with.

The ten year plan for the reconstruction of Moscow was discussed for four years from 1931 to 1935. It was discussed in hundreds of public meetings held largely in factories and in offices, it was discussed in special meetings of party members, and in the plenum of the Mossoviet. It was discussed at meetings of architects and other experts. Two officials of the Mossoviet told me that they had addressed respectively about fifty and a hundred public meetings on the subject, and they assured me that any suggestions made at those meetings were taken note of and carefully considered. What does all this discussion amount to? From the point of view of democracy, the important discussion should have been at the plenum of the Mossoviet, where the minority who disagreed with any part of the plan should have made their view heard. Unfortunately, we were not able to get

any particulars of the discussions at the plenum,[1] but I believe that there was never an amendment moved to any substantial point in the plan at any meeting of the plenum; that, in fact, the meetings were meetings of exposition and persuasion and for the stirring up of enthusiasm rather than meetings of a deliberative assembly taking a responsible decision. For instance, the official English translation of the speech delivered by Kaganovich at the plenum of the Mossoviet in July 1934 dealing with the progress of the work on the Metro and outlining the plan for the reconstruction of Moscow ends with the following peroration:

> "To-day, in discussing the question of the subway and the reconstruction of Moscow, we activists—the leaders of the city of Moscow—will say to the party, to our central committee and the government, we will say to Comrade Stalin: we will be worthy of that confidence and that support which you have shown us, we will work unceasingly under your leadership, Comrade Stalin, so as to make Moscow the model socialist city of our proletarian state.
>
> "*Long live the new Moscow—the capital of the great Soviet Union of Socialist Republics!* (Stormy applause.)
>
> "*Long live the working class of Moscow and of all the Union; long live the great army of shock brigadiers, among them the shock brigade builders of the subway!* (Stormy applause.)
>
> "*Long live our great, mighty party, our great and mighty friend, leader and organizer—Comrade Stalin!* (Thunderous applause, cries of 'Hurrah,' all stand cheering.)"

Kaganovich's speech as a whole was a wise and statesmanlike speech; it was certainly admirable propaganda; but hardly our idea of a debating speech before a deliberative assembly which had the final power of amendment or decision.

In the examples I have so far considered there has been much public discussion; but this does not by any means always happen. I have already described the eviction decree which was passed[2] in July 1936. While this was no doubt discussed in the presidium and in the appropriate

[1] Although we tried very hard, we did not succeed in getting any copies of agenda or minutes of the meetings of the plenum.

[2] See p. 200.

committee of the party, there was no public discussion of any sort before the decree appeared; from that moment it became the party line, and of course no discussion was permitted afterwards. When one remembers from English experience what strong feelings are stirred up not only among the neighbours of families evicted, but among the public at large, where families are evicted without alternative accommodation being provided, one realizes the profound difference in the treatment of inconvenient individuals in Russia and England.

There is to an Englishman an extraordinary atmosphere of suspicion about Moscow. I was walking alone one day in the Red Square near the entrance to the Kremlin and stopped to make a note. I was at once tackled by a militiaman, who was most suspicious and carried on a five minutes' conversation with me. However, we neither of us understood a word that the other said, and he then let me go in peace and keep the note-book. I had rather been hoping to get a view of the jealously guarded inside of the Kremlin; as it happened, the note was one of admiration for some action of the Mossoviet, so my conscience was clear!

I visited two works in Moscow, a flour-mill and a large house in course of erection. Both these works were surrounded by barbed wire, and militiamen with rifle and fixed bayonet demanded passes at the gate.

These were minor matters; much more perturbing was the question of the labour on the Moscow-Volga canal. I was informed that some impressive work was being done on the canal within a few miles of Moscow, and asked permission to see this. Intourist said that such arrangements were never made. I applied higher up and was promised by two different authorities that arrangements would be made; however, nothing happened. Twice when motoring outside Moscow I passed places where work on a large scale was being done, in connection with the Moscow-Volga canal. There was great activity; armed guards with fixed bayonets were in charge of the work. The first time I saw this I asked the chauffeur to stop so as to have a look from the public high road. He shook his head and informed me through the interpreter that cars were not allowed to stop in proximity to these works!

The work is, I understand, in the charge of the G.P.U.

and is said to be carried out mainly by prison labour. But the whole thing is shrouded in mystery, with the result that the usual crop of rumours and stories circulate among some of the foreigners living in Moscow. It is said, for instance, that any "deviant," anybody who in any way obstructs, anybody who protests, say, against an eviction decree, is found within a few days working as a prisoner on the Moscow-Volga canal; that the number of prisoners depends on the number of people required to carry out the public works which are at any time under the charge of the G.P.U.; that if a man at his trade union meeting gets tired of the constant praise of the government and says that things are getting worse, he is found in a few days working on the Moscow-Volga canal; that there are hundreds of thousands of prisoners working on the canal; that there are concentration camps outside every village; and so on.

It would not be necessary to publish rumours of this sort if the facts were available; but secrecy is so strictly enforced that there is no way of finding the truth. All that one can say with confidence is that the government flatly refuses to tolerate opposition or criticism,[1] and that any overt protest means immediate arrest.

The account given by Lady Simon of the recent decrees by the party against the pedologists affords striking evidence, first of all, of the sledge-hammer methods by which the party intervenes in matters which in England are left to the educational world to settle by free discussion, and, secondly, of the painful, and to us shocking, confessions of error, similar to those of Zinoviev and Kamenev, which those unfortunates who offend the party feel compelled to make.

The conclusion that I draw from these examples and from my general experience in Russia is that the one-party system is a new form of dictatorship, like all dictatorships intolerant of criticism and opposition, but with the advantage over the old dictatorships of a large band of devoted disciples, who serve the double purpose of keeping the leaders well informed as to public opinion and of guiding public opinion into the party line. In this latter task they are immensely helped by their full control of the ubiquitous and all-powerful police and of all the means of propaganda—the Press,

[1] The *Manchester Guardian* arrived only three times out of the twenty-eight days we were in Moscow.

the radio, the theatre, the cinema, and public speech. Their powers, both of repression and of constantly dinning into the ears of the people the party view, are out of all proportion more effective than anything that was possible in the past.

It seems to be broadly true that hardship and even injustice to individuals are not seriously considered in Moscow if they are held to be necessary for the general plan. The result of such a powerful and all-permeating dictatorship by a party which is fanatically convinced of its own righteousness is that Russia is a land of the most violent political contrasts. The tremendous co-operative drive towards the building of a better city, towards giving the best opportunity for the health and education of children, is magnificent and exhilarating. The ruthless suppression of all criticism and protest, the callous treatment of those who get in the way, is intolerable to those who believe in the fundamental importance of individual liberty, who believe that the best single test of a civilization is the way in which it would treat a modern Christ or Socrates who appeared in its midst.

Does the good outweigh the evil?

In Russia one must remember the conditions of 1917; an illiterate people with no experience of self-government, an insignificant industrial development, an immense sprawling country almost without communications. Remembering the time and energy that have gone into war against foreign countries, against internal capitalists, against the Kulaks, it seems quite possible that a Tsarist or a republican government, run on capitalist lines, if it had been free from these wars, might have given the people a higher standard of living than they have to-day; but it is highly improbable that any alternative government could have given the mass of people the same hope and confidence[1] in the future as has been given by the Bolshevik methods of revolution, socialism, and the one-party system. If we are justified in regarding it as a transitory stage towards a new, just, and free social order, the Bolshevik régime as a whole may well

[1] It should be added that through the party membership, through the numerous elected soviets, through all kinds of committees in houses, factories, etc., it seems certain that a considerably larger proportion of the citizens of Moscow are getting training for democracy through experience of responsible public work than in London.

have been the quickest available method of arriving at what democrats would regard as a high standard of civilization.

But when we consider Russian methods from the point of view of England, the position is very different. We have by democratic methods gradually built up a civilization which, while in many ways full of injustice and imperfection, does give to the mass of people an opportunity of leading a full and free life indubitably better than anything Russia has yet achieved. There is in my opinion much in the powerful drive and leadership of their one-party system, and in some aspects of their socialism, that we must wholeheartedly admire and from which we must endeavour to learn. But I cannot conceive of any British democrat who, in order to obtain these undoubted advantages, would be willing for one moment to consider abandoning our traditional British methods of freedom, of toleration, of kindliness, and of consideration for the rights of every individual.

Can we achieve something of the leadership and enthusiasm of Moscow while maintaining the freedom of minorities and the kindly tolerance of England? That is the problem on the solution of which the future of British democracy depends.

CHAPTER X

THE MOSSOVIET: IS IT EFFICIENT?

By SIR E. D. SIMON

Is Moscow well governed? Are the people getting the services they want? How do they compare with the equivalent services in London?

Before attempting to answer these questions the difficulties which have faced the Mossoviet must be pointed out. Conditions in 1920, after six years of war and revolution, must have been exceedingly bad. During the next ten years the population increased rapidly and little was done. It is only in the last few years that effective work has begun in order, on the one hand, to extend to the whole area and population of Moscow, to bring up to date, and to improve, the services which existed in Tsarist days, and, on the other hand, to provide for the additional two million people who are now living in Moscow. The task has been an enormous one, and the Mossoviet has had to try to undertake it at a time when the country was short of every kind of capital asset and skilled labour, and almost inevitably concentrated its available energies mainly on heavy industry and agriculture.

The Mossoviet has no achievements to offer on a scale comparable with the achievements of Russian heavy industry, but it has carried out and is carrying out a very big task; so far as we could find out it is employing about 350,000 workers, if each worker has one dependent, this means that 20 per cent of the whole population of Moscow is directly dependent on the Mossoviet. It is interesting to compare this with Manchester, where not 20 per cent but only 10 per cent of the population is dependent on the City Council for employment.

It must further be remembered that we made no serious attempt to investigate any of the services of the Mossoviet except housing and education. But it is perhaps worth attempting a very rough estimate.

To begin with the public utilities, we have already dealt with transport; the Mossoviet can look back in this matter on some considerable achievements: the completion of the

first section of the Metro, and much preliminary work on the Moscow river. Boulevards of from 40 to 50 metres in width are being made right along both banks of the river; a good deal of work has already been done on them. About 15 kilometres of the river bank have already been faced with granite: work has already begun on six new bridges which will have a clearance of 30 feet above the new water-level and so allow the large Volga ships to pass through Moscow. When we think of the difficulty of widening one bridge over the Thames and of the long-continued failure to deal with the south bank of the river, the record of what the Mossoviet has already done, and still more, what it is planning to do during the next few years, with the banks and bridges of the Moscow river is most impressive.

We have also dealt with the water supply; before the end of 1937 Moscow should have a supply of good water ample for a population of five million for all time. That is perhaps the first of the big municipal services which will have been put on a permanently good basis.

The production of electricity is not undertaken by the Mossoviet; gas supply is still on a small scale; big extensions are contemplated.

So much for the trading services of the types which are carried out by English municipalities. In addition to these, the Mossoviet runs a large number of industries to manufacture goods mainly for local consumption. These are described by Professor Jewkes;[1] the scale on which this work is carried out is shown by the fact that they employ no less than 100,000 persons.

Another trading activity of the Mossoviet is the owning and management of retail shops. At the time of our visit there were plenty of goods in the shops in the central parts of Moscow and some of them were immensely crowded; but neither the range of goods nor the service given could in any way be compared with what is customary in England, with the exception of the book-shops, which were numerous and filled with a large assortment of cheap books.

About 90,000 persons are employed in retail trade in Moscow; of these about 36,000 are under the Mossoviet. We had an interview with the member of the presidium in charge of it; he told us that whereas in large capitalist cities

[1] See p. 73.

10 per cent of the population were normally engaged in retail sales, the figure in Moscow was at that time not more than 2½ per cent. In his opinion the economies rendered possible by central control were so great that they would ultimately be able to give the same services as in a capitalist city without employing more than 3 per cent or, at the maximum, 3½ per cent of the population. He made this assertion with great confidence; we were, of course, unable to form any judgment as to its probable accuracy.

Coming now to the social services, we did not seriously investigate public health and sanitation. We were informed that the public health department own and control all hospitals, and many of the clinics and sanatoria. They employ no less than 40,000 men and women. We have no reliable information as to the quality or extent of the work, though there is no doubt that great attention has been paid to it and some aspects of it are well done. We understand that there have been no serious epidemics for the last few years.

The Mossoviet makes no charge for any of the health services; one interesting example was given to us by a young Englishman who a few months ago had been given a job in a government department. On the second day he was taken seriously ill; he was sent to a hospital for a month, and was then sent to a rest home for another month. He could not speak too highly of the admirable treatment he received throughout the whole of the two months. He was not allowed to pay for anything.

But the biggest achievement among the social services is what has been done for children; immense efforts are being made to give them every opportunity of growing up strong, healthy and well educated. Schools, kindergartens, crèches, and playgrounds seem to be appearing everywhere. While in England only elementary education is free to all, in Moscow the whole system of education from the elementary school to the university is free and equally open to all. A great deal has already been achieved, though there is still such a shortage that it is impossible at the present time to make the quality of the services as high as might be desired. But it seems fair to say that they are making a more strenuous effort to improve their educational system and to make it equally accessible to every child throughout the U.S.S.R. than has been made in any other great country.

Housing is the outstanding failure. It has certainly not been deliberately neglected, but, owing to the enormous increase in population, overcrowding is to-day substantially worse in Moscow than it was in 1928; housing plans have been consistently fulfilled to the extent of only about 50 per cent.

The Mossoviet officials we met were, as we have pointed out, all of them full of enthusiasm and confidence. Such other Russians as we met seemed inclined to accept the Mossoviet much in the same way as they accept the government of the U.S.S.R.; we heard no real criticism from them. What is more important is that we got very little criticism from foreigners resident in Moscow; they mostly knew very little about the Mossoviet and had certainly not more grumbles ready than the ordinary citizen of an English town.

Power and responsibility are concentrated in the presidium, which is the key to the government of Moscow. Below it is a well-arranged hierarchy of officials with executive responsibility effectively decentralized. They have already built up a new civil service tradition, combining loyalty and obedience to the government with strong political convictions, and with the passionate desire to get on with the great and inspiring task of rebuilding Moscow.

The personnel may be inadequate at the bottom; there is no doubt that it steadily improves as one gets nearer the top; my impression was that the higher officials were not only keen, but competent. Taken as a whole, I believe that the organization will prove to be highly efficient for its purpose.

There are, of course, great obstacles to be overcome. There is a grave lack of experienced administrators and technicians. The building trade and its subsidiaries are in particular unequal to the task which is expected of them. There seems to be a tendency to lay undue stress on prestige building, to make everything the largest in the world. But all these disadvantages are of a temporary nature and should be overcome in time.

On the other hand, the advantages of Moscow for town planning are likely to be permanent: no land values, no obstructive private property, and a powerful government, planning and thinking ahead, with the single unwavering

purpose of building the best capital in the world and giving the best opportunities of life to the whole body of citizens.

A group of London citizens, writing recently to *The Times* (October 28th 1936) pointed out:

> "Though, from time to time, articles appear in the Press on such problems as traffic, bridges, the river, housing, playing fields, or markets, very rarely is effective action taken. Part of the cause of this failure lies in the division of responsibility. In the administrative County of London the City Corporation and twenty-eight borough councils share responsibility with the London County Council, and there is inevitable overlapping. Outside the London County boundary (and London proper extends many miles beyond it) three county councils—Middlesex, Essex, and Surrey—divide the work of local government with numerous authorities of varying status, from municipal corporations to rural councils. It is thus almost impossible for the public to fix responsibility."

They go on to say:

> "As for traffic, there has not been a single new thoroughfare constructed in central London since 1906, though wheeled traffic, both in numbers and speed, has multiplied beyond measure. In the post-war suburbs of outer London miles of new streets are springing up on no ordered plan, and with inadequate provision for parks and playing fields. Factories are built where no houses are available for the people that work therein, while in other areas housing estates are developed by local authorities where there are few opportunities for employment."

Mr. Herbert Morrison, looking at the matter from an even wider point of view, wrote an article during 1936 in the *Evening Standard*, setting forth what he would like to do with London.

> "Not only would I wish the solid, urban sprawl of London to be checked—for London is unhealthily large—but I would like to see 'continuous' London cover a much smaller area than it does at present.
>
> "I would create a green belt for London very much

nearer than the green belt courageously envisaged by the London County Council can possibly be to our great city.

"I would give it a coherent and homogeneous local government, removing every public authority that had no good reason for its continued existence and concentrating power, so far as practicable and administratively convenient, in a great Municipal Corporation of London elected by the citizens.

"I would make a town plan to which the future development of that new London should conform."

These are the main things Mr. Morrison said he would like to do. But he concludes by saying:

"These things I should like to do—but, alas, they cannot constitute a practical programme for either of the political parties at the next London County Council election, for then we shall not be able to ignore financial and other practical considerations, nor the legal limits on our area and local government powers."

Now it happens that all the things that Mr. Morrison wants to do are also the things that the Mossoviet wants to do. But the difference is that the Mossoviet is actually doing them. In fact, as regards the four main things for which Mr. Morrison sighs—the limitation of the area of the city, a great green belt, a coherent and homogeneous local government, and a town plan, the whole of these were actually included in the decree of 1935 printed in Chapter VI. Mr. Morrison says: "This is not practical politics for to-day; it is a vision of the London of my dreams." In Moscow it is not only practical politics; much of it is already done. The contrast is, for an Englishman, pitiful and depressing. Mr. Morrison, a man of first-class energy and ability, is struggling nobly against insuperable obstacles in London. Mr. Bulganin, who is in Mr. Morrison's position in Moscow, has one of the most exhilarating and even exciting jobs in the world: to rebuild Moscow during the next ten years with no interests opposing him, with the full force of the government of the U.S.S.R. and of popular opinion behind him.

What will the Mossoviet achieve? I believe that they have the best constitution yet devised for effective city

government, that their leaders are men of integrity, enthusiasm, and ability, that the advantages of socialism and of the one-party system for town planning purposes are of overwhelming importance. If there should be no great war, if the population of Moscow does not exceed five million, if the government maintains its present integrity and strength of purpose, I believe that at the end of the ten year plan Moscow will be well on the way to being, as regards health, convenience, and amenities of life for the whole body of citizens, the best planned great city the world has ever known.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

(*See p. 37*)

THE FUNDAMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CITY SOVIETS[1]

9. In the sphere of planning and statistics
   (*a*) they prepare plans of the economic and social-cultural construction of their cities and control their execution; they discuss the plans of other institutions on their territory, which are not subordinate to them, and give their opinion on them.
   (*b*) They carry on all statistical work.

10. In the sphere of the technical reconstruction of the socialized industry
   (*a*) They guarantee the execution of the *promfinplans* by industrial concerns subordinate to them and control their efficiency; they assist also, in carrying out the plans, all industrial concerns situated on their territory.
   (*b*) They encourage mass-production from local raw materials and explore the local resources of raw materials and fuel.
   (*c*) They take the necessary steps to develop industrial co-operation, mass-production, and production of building materials necessary for the socialized industry.

11. In the sphere of the socialist reconstruction of the cities
   (*a*) They control the communal economy and housing of the cities.
   (*b*) They deal with the distribution of living accommodation, see to the repairs of houses and supervise all technical and sanitary aspects of living conditions.
   (*c*) They supervise the town planning and see to the location of industries, transport, housing, and social-cultural institutions in the cities.
   (*d*) They take the necessary steps to develop the housing co-operatives and to control their activities.
   (*e*) They deal with the construction of all communal and social enterprises and institutions of the cities.
   (*f*) They take necessary steps to develop electrification and fuel supply.
   (*g*) They deal with the city transport and traffic.

[1] From the Decree of the VTZIK. of January 20th 1933. Published in the *Collection of Laws and Regulations*, Pt. I, No. 29. Moscow, May 18th 1933.

(*h*) They see to the water supply, main drainage, and sewage.
(*i*) They take the necessary steps to develop the exploitation of urban land, forests, and the planning of green belts.
(*l*) They see to the utilization of local building materials and develop local industries.
(*m*) They deal with the protection of the cities against fires.

12. In the sphere of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture
(*a*) They take necessary steps to develop collectivization in the villages attached to the cities, to render assistance to *sovkhoses* and to the motor tractor stations and to liquidate the *kulaks*.
(*b*) They assist *sovkhoses*, *kolkhoses* and individual peasants' households in increasing the yield, and guarantee that all of them will fulfil their obligations towards the state.
(*c*) They assist the villages attached to them in the organization of social-cultural institutions.
(*d*) They open peasants' houses and supervise their activities.

13. In the sphere of labour and *cadres* (i.e. specialists)
(*a*) They assist the enterprises in getting the necessary labour force.
(*b*) They take necessary steps to organize the *cadres* of workers.
(*c*) They endeavour to provide industrial occupations for women.
(*d*) They take necessary steps in increasing productivity of labour, and control the conditions of work in the enterprises and institutions.
(*e*) They assist in rationalization of work and utilizing inventions.
(*f*) They see to the protection of labour and organize technical and sanitary control.

14. In the sphere of supply, consumers' co-operation and trade
(*a*) They control the local trade and prices.
(*b*) They take all necessary steps in encouraging the development of all kinds of farming and allotments, and the improvement of state, co-operative, and public trading organizations.
(*c*) They assist the enterprises in organizing the food-supply for the workers.

(*d*) They open dining-rooms, factory kitchens, bakeries, and control all public feeding institutions.
(*e*) They supervise local affairs, city bazaars, stalls and markets, and fight the private traders and speculators.
(*f*) They build and supervise warehouses for storing food and other commodities.

15. In the sphere of transport and communication
(*a*) They assist in improving the local communications and transport.
(*b*) They take necessary steps to improve goods traffic.
(*c*) They assist in improving the radio and telephone service.
(*d*) They render assistance to civil aviation.

16. In the sphere of finance and budget
(*a*) They draft the city budget and control its expenditure.
(*b*) They prepare control figures and approve the district budgets.
(*c*) They collect local and state taxes and rates; and see to the non-tax revenue.
(*d*) They take necessary steps in the floating of state loans, improvements of the saving system and voluntary insurance.
(*e*) They supervise the credit system.
(*f*) They issue local loans.
(*g*) They prepare all financial plans connected with national economy and social-cultural construction.

17. In the sphere of Lenin's national policy
(*a*) They take necessary steps to the fulfilment of the social-cultural needs of the national minorities.
(*b*) They take all measures in attracting national minorities to the national work and forming *cadres* amongst them.

18. In the sphere of social-cultural construction
(*a*) They liquidate illiteracy and open all kinds of educational and mass-political institutions.
(*b*) They encourage polytechnical education.
(*c*) They take all necessary steps in pre-school education, care for homeless waifs, etc.
(*d*) They deal with personal hygiene and physical culture.
(*e*) They deal with assistance to the incapacitated, their pensions and social insurance.
(*f*) They take all necessary steps in encouraging education, protection of health, and social insurance.
(*g*) They keep the register of civil acts (deeds).

19. In the sphere of revolutionary activities
    (*a*) They organize the defence of socialized property and the maintenance of revolutionary order.
    (*b*) They see to the strict fulfilment of Soviet laws, issue obligatory regulations and control the collection of administrative fines.
    (*c*) They supervise the police and the system of *permis de séjour*.
    (*d*) They form city judicial courts and supervise their activities; they organize legal aid to the toilers.
    (*e*) They supervise all corrective institutions for prisoners.

20. In the sphere of the Red Army
    (*a*) They render every assistance to the military authorities in recruiting, etc.
    (*b*) They take care of the families of persons serving in the Red Army.
    (*c*) They promote military education.

21. In the sphere of Soviet construction
    (*a*) They organize the election commission and control the entire election campaign.
    (*b*) They attract the mass organizations of toilers to assist the public administration, fight against bureaucracy, and improve the personnel of the public offices.

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER II

APPENDIX I

MOSCOW FINANCIAL PLAN, 1936

Income (in thousand roubles)

I.	Income transferred from Budgets of Local Industries		85,457
II.	Income from Agriculture		155
III.	Rents of Houses, Shops, Warehouses, etc.		62,497
IV.	Income transferred from Budgets of Public Utilities including Income transferred from Budget of Tramways Trust	59,478	84,942
V.	Income from other Public Services		19,400
VI.	Income from Retail Trading		6,915
VII.	Miscellaneous Income		22,023
VIII.	Local Taxation		70,241
IX.	State Taxation allocated to Mossoviet		377,931
	(i) Industrial Turnover Tax	258,373	
	(ii) Tax on Services	54,970	
	(iii) Cultural Tax	27,680	
	(iv) State Loans	36,238	
X.	State Taxes on Incomes allocated to Mossoviet		213,303
	(i) Income Tax on State Enterprises	37,000	
	(ii) Individual Income Tax	149,243	
XI.	Voluntary Contributions by Trade Unions for Social Services		6,410
XII.	Allocations from Social Insurance Fund		174,324
	(i) For Education	21,824	
	(ii) For Health Services	152,500	
XIII.	TOTAL		1,123,597

MOSCOW FINANCIAL PLAN, 1936

Expenditure (in thousand roubles)

I.	Allocations to Local Industries		27,621
	Capital Expenditure	7,484	
II.	Agriculture		1,148
III.	Municipal Building		41,410
	Capital Expenditure	35,890	
IV.	Allocations to Public Utilities		76,967
	Capital Expenditure	56,242	
V.	Other Public Services		206,915
	Wages	16,750	
	Capital Expenditure	122,860	
VI.	Retail Trade		52,050
	Capital Investment	9,650	
VII.	Communications		3,670
VIII.	Education		342,669
	Wages	111,537	
	Capital Investment	111,734	
IX.	Health		299,457
	Wages	158,449	
X.	Social Relief (Invalids, Pensioners, etc.)		6,536
XI.	Physical Culture		1,000
XII.	Administration		38,823
	Wages	25,956	
XIII.	Payment of Debts and Loans		14,210
XIV.	TOTAL (including others)		1,123,597

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER II

APPENDIX II

FINANCIAL PLAN OF TRAMWAY TRUST, 1936

Expenditure (in thousand roubles)

Capital Expenditure	41,805
Increase of Circulating Fund	1,000
Expenditure on Workers Training	2,700
Payment to Social Insurance Fund	10,826
Payment of Loans	10,064
Payment to Mossoviet Budget	59,458
TOTAL	125,873

Income (in thousand roubles)

Profits	98,163
Depreciation	13,710
Bank Credit	10,000
Other	4,000
TOTAL	125,873
Total Operating Revenue	239,326
Total Operating Expenditure	141,163

APPENDIX III

CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLAN OF MOSSOVIET, 1936

	From own resources	Special funds	Credit	Budget	Total
Local Industry	16,719	46,614	—	7,484	70,817
Housing	—	13,600	31,500	35,890	80,990
Public Services	61,032	16,886	63,380	179,102	320,400
Including :					
(*a*) Public Utilities	58,577	7,986	63,380	161,441	291,384
(*b*) Construction Trusts	2,455	8,900	—	16,243	27,598
Culture					
Including:					
(*a*) Schools	—	—	—	110,837	110,837
(*b*) Theatres	—	—	—	378	378
Health	—	—	—	22,000	22,000
TOTAL	81,851	105,760	94,880	347,533	630,024

Appendix IV

IMPORTANT FORMS OF CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION IN MOSCOW, 1936[1]

(In million roubles)

1. Industry		661
2. Housing Construction		482
Mossoviet and Co-operatives	117	
Other	365	
3. Municipal Public Services		350
4. Metro		350
5. Railways		33
6. Water Transport		6
7. Communications		59
8. Trade		53
9. Public Feeding		26
10. Culture		313
School Building	148	
Academy of Science	27	
11. Health		42
12. Administration Buildings		69
Palace of Soviets	30	
Offices of Commissariat for Heavy Industries	20	
TOTAL		2,456
In addition: Volga-Moscow Canal		*665*

[1] These figures relate to all the activities in Moscow; not merely those for which Mossoviet is responsible.

APPENDIX V

FINANCIAL PLAN OF A MOSCOW RAYON,[1] 1936

(*Thousand roubles*)

Income			*Expenditure*	
I. Local Industry		433	I. Local Industry	—
II. Agriculture		—	II. Agriculture	69
III. Houses, Shops, etc.		1,739	III. Municipal Building	—
IV. Public Utilities		1,466	IV. Public Utilities	—
V. Other Public Services		2,716	V. Other Public Services	2,891
VI. Retail Trade		178	VI. Education	22,741
VII. Miscellaneous		1,155	VII. Health	19,704
VIII. Local Taxation		7,254	VIII. Physical Culture	29
IX. State Taxation		8,470	IX. Social Insurance	359
Tax on Services	2,485		X. Administration	1,673
Cultural Tax	2,510		XI. Miscellaneous	393
State Loans	3,445			
X. State Income Tax		11,158		
Income Tax on State Enterprises	1,220			
Individual Income Tax	9,933			
XI. Social Insurance Fund		13,046		
Education	3,054			
Health	9,991			
		48,475		48,475

[1] Moscow city has recently been divided into 23 rayons, but the budgets of 1936 were based upon the original 11 rayons.

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
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
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