

Architecture  
and the  
Built environment

#15  
2014



## Between Flexibility and Reliability

Changing Planning Culture in China

Chiu-Yuan, Wang



# Between Flexibility and Reliability

**Changing Planning Culture in China**

Chiu-Yuan, Wang

*Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment,  
Department of Urbanism*



# Between Flexibility and Reliability

Changing Planning Culture in China

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor  
aan de Technische Universiteit Delft,  
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. ir. K.C.A.M. Luyben,  
voorzitter van het College van Promoties,  
in het openbaar te verdedigen  
op woensdag 6 november 2013 om 12:30 uur  
door Chiu-Yuan WANG  
Master of Science in Architecture - The Netherlands  
geboren te Taipei, R.O.C. (Taiwan)

Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotoren:  
Prof. ir. H.C. Bekkering en  
Prof. dr. Chu-joe HSIA

**Samenstelling promotiecommissie:**

---

Rector Magnificus, Voorzitter  
Prof. ir. H.C. Bekkering, Technische Universiteit Delft, promotor  
Prof. dr. C. J. Hsia, National University of Taiwan, tweede promotor  
Prof. dr. W.M. de Jong, Technische Universiteit Delft  
Prof. dr. ir. V.J Meyer, Technische Universiteit Delft  
Prof. V. Nadin, Technische Universiteit Delft  
Dr. D.A. Sepulveda Carmona, Technische Universiteit Delft  
Prof. J. S. Sabaté Bel, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya



[abe.tudelft.nl](http://abe.tudelft.nl)

---

**Design:** [Sirene Ontwerpers, Rotterdam](#)

ISBN 978-94-6186-375-1

ISSN 2212-3202

© 2013 Chiu-Yuan, Wang



## To my parents

*May the world become a ground of peace; the recognition of cultural differences becomes the power of understanding like Buddha cast his glance at a flower, the flower and Buddha smile for the moment of apprehension.*





# Preface

The aim of this research is to provide an outline to address questions with regard to the transformation of planning in China that has occurred after the 1980s. The research is using “planning evolution” as the main research skeleton. The starting point is to investigate to what extent Chinese urban planning has developed after the opening up and other reforms under the state-led and market-driven modes of Chinese reformation, and to investigate how the different modes and various actors have influenced urban planning, based on the investigation of the respective political and economic changes within the initial reformation in general, and planning in particular.

In recent years, China has undeniably undergone a dramatic process of urban growth and transformation. Apart from its speed and scope, it is less recognized that these processes are confronting the Chinese planning institutions with new and unexpected demands almost on a daily basis. In reference to the increasing importance of private investments and developments within the Chinese urbanization process, a new balance between public planning and private developments, and between top-down and bottom-up approaches is required to be able to generate both a reliable and responsible framework for long-term urban development and a flexible system of implementation that meets the needs of changing conditions and new demands. Flexibility and reliability become the new demands for planning practice.

Based on the theory of planning culture, planning traditions, concepts, systems and decision-making processes are always related to the cultural context and cultural background of the people and societies involved. Investigating the contemporary urban transformation and urban development processes in China can allow us to outline the new planning culture of contemporary China in relation to its historical roots and traditional characteristics in a long term framework. I argue that the changing role of urban planning is strongly embedded in the political, economic, and social domains and is a part of cultural innovation.

The research opens a general debate on the circumstances of the contemporary Chinese transformation after the 1980s. After introducing the idea of planning culture and elaborating to what extent the idea of planning culture is applied in this research, I argue that the “soft” characteristics of planning emphasized by the idea of planning culture are crucial to understand Chinese planning evolution. The idea of planning culture is applied to build up the theoretical framework needed in order to approach the research subject: the contemporary Chinese transformation, based on a systematic structure.

Overall, this research states the following. 1). The reversal of Chinese policies in 1978 and the opening up of the country to foreign investments and technology were taking

up the job that had been left unfinished in 1949. The momentum is regarded as a part of the long-term evolution of Chinese modernization, for which the term of “critical-modernization” is introduced, situating the changes within the broader context of the globalization. It cannot be disconnected from the roots of Chinese history and tradition and as such is an alternative to Western paradigms. 2). The dissection of the specific Chinese historical evolution results in a sequence of layered modes of hybrid development. 3) Situating the political-economic momentum of the 80s in a longer time span and exploring it beyond the political status of the time by making the contextual linkage to the cultural and traditional consensus of Chinese history, it is seen as a “cultural turn” of Chinese society. 4). This study applies the idea of “planning culture”—to compare different periods in one country and to analyze the changes that have taken place with regard to both the planning system and the cultural context; and to approach urban planning transitions from political, social, and economic aspects by investigating the conditions, approaches, and results of current spatial planning in China.

According to the application of the idea of planning culture as a systematic framework, the research comprises three major research themes: the transformation of society, the transformation of the planning system and the implementation of planning in practice.

*The Transformation of the Society* comprises two parts. The first reviews the philosophical roots of the Chinese norm and value system and the second part introduces the contextual background of the emerged evolution of Chinese modernization. The purpose is on the one hand to anchor the contemporary Chinese transformation within the Chinese context, and on the other hand to argue that the transformation of contemporary China in the 1980s is a new turn that is part of the evolution of modernization.

*The Transformation of the Planning System* offers the specific information about the transformation that took place in the 1980s, in particular in relation to the reforms initiated by the central government. The focus is in on the re-modification of the urban planning system after 1978; special attention is given to the political structure, planning organization, and plan forms. It is the analysis of the top-down system.

*The Implementation of Planning System in Practice* zooms further in on the micro-scale of planning evolution by analyzing the planning implementation in practice in one of the fastest growing cities of the country: Shenzhen, located in the Pearl River Delta, which can be regarded as an almost newly constructed city with approximately 300.000 inhabitants in 1980 and reaching 10.47 million in 2011. During a relatively short period of development the degree of acceleration and the scope of an entirely unexpected growth forced local planning authorities to constantly readapt to changing conditions and new demands. In this framework, different planning documents and the process of decision-making are analyzed, with special attention to the coordination and fine-tuning between planning intervention and planning implementation.

These three clusters of research themes serve to answer a series of research questions respectively. The main research question is: How does urban planning in contemporary China face the challenges of the emergent urban evolution within the current world society? This research argues that planning strategies have to be developed, on the one hand under the circumstances of inevitably increasing uncertainties in China society generating the flexibility for new and unexpected developments, and on the other hand to confront the unpredictability and uncertainty of initiatives from diverse public and private actors by generating and building up a reliable framework for sustainable long-term developments. Planning embodiment (ideology, aim, system etc.) must be understood and used not only for political-economical interventions but, furthermore, as a spatial agent in order to mediate the changing confrontations of socio-spatial demands embedded in the cultural domain, instead of being used only as a top-down dominating intervention tool.

China enters a critical era of modernity, a society in which to retrieve the socio-spatial meaning for people is a much more powerful force than only focusing on economic success and political stability. This reflection shall be based on the revival of Chinese traditions and values and the re-evaluation of those values in a systematical manner.

However, in comparison with drawing a concrete conclusion, this study's intention is to inspire reflection, to provoke further debate and to disclose and dissect the context of Chinese planning culture. It is by the same consideration that I found the idea of planning culture a useful and valuable framework to access urban development and planning evolution in non-Occidental countries. The "soft" core of planning culture has the same essential cultural value everywhere, and for countries like China who share the similar hybridity of evolutionary history, the processes of industrialization, urbanization, decolonization, Westernization, post-industrialization and globalization are affecting the country not in a linear-subsequent manner, but on different layers simultaneously and sometimes with contradicting demands.

Being embedded in this unique Chinese political-socio-economic environment, urban planning is used by the state as a powerful instrument providing a vision for the country's future in the transitional process between the rules of both extreme modes of top-down and bottom-up approaches, balanced by involving the governmental and public sectors simultaneously.

I am convinced that the idea of planning culture can trigger a new wave of discourse leading to a completely new insight in and understanding of cultural differences, not only in an abstract sense for Chinese culture but also in general for everybody whose live is strongly influenced by planning decisions and whose daily activities are interactively incorporated in the socio-spatial domain.

# Voorwoord

Het doel van dit onderzoek is een kader te verschaffen voor vragen die betrekking hebben op de Chinese transformatie sinds de jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw. Het begrip “planning evolution” levert hierbij het belangrijkste onderzoekskader. Het uitgangspunt is om te onderzoeken in hoeverre de stedelijke ontwikkeling is geëvolueerd sinds China zich heeft opengesteld voor de rest van de wereld en sinds de hervormingen die hebben plaatsgevonden, met zowel de door de staat geleide als de door de markt gedreven aspecten daarvan: hoe de verschillende modi en de verschillende actoren de stedelijke ontwikkeling hebben beïnvloed. Het onderzoek richt zich daarbij op de politieke en economische veranderingen in het algemeen, als op planning in het bijzonder.

In het recente verleden heeft China onmiskenbaar een dramatisch proces van stedelijke groei en verandering doorgemaakt. Hoewel de snelheid waarmee die verandering plaatsvond en de omvang ervan algemeen worden erkend, realiseert men zich niet altijd dat deze processen de Chinese instellingen die belast zijn met planning bijna dagelijks voor nieuwe en onverwachte vragen stellen. In relatie tot het toenemende belang van private investeringen en projecten voor de Chinese stedelijke ontwikkeling, is er een nieuwe balans nodig tussen planning van overheidswege en private projecten, en tussen ‘top-down’ en ‘bottom-up’ benaderingen om een betrouwbaar en verantwoord kader voor lange-termijn stedelijke ontwikkeling te creëren, en daarnaast een flexibel implementatie-systeem dat kan voldoen aan de eisen van steeds veranderende voorwaarden en vraagstellingen. Flexibiliteit en betrouwbaarheid worden de nieuwe vereisten voor de praktijk van de planning.

Uitgaande van de theorie van “planning culture”, zijn de in de planning gehanteerde tradities, concepten, systemen, en besluitvormingsprocessen onderdeel van de culturele context en de culturele achtergrond van de betrokken mensen en gemeenschappen. Onderzoek van de huidige stedelijke transformaties en van de stedelijke ontwikkelingsprocessen in China stelt ons in staat om een nieuwe planningscultuur voor het hedendaagse China te schetsen, gerelateerd aan haar historische wortels en traditionele kenmerken, gezien op de lange termijn. Ik beargumenteer dat de veranderende rol van de stedelijke ontwikkeling diep is ingebed in de politieke, economische en sociale domeinen, en dat het een onderdeel is van de culturele vernieuwing.

Dit onderzoek opent een algemeen debat over de omstandigheden van de huidige Chinese transformatie die begon in de jaren 80 van de twintigste eeuw. Na de introductie van het idee van een “planning culture” beargumenteren we dat dit idee van cruciaal belang is voor het onderzoek. Ik benadruk dat de ‘zachte’ karakteristieken

van planning, die in het idee van 'planning culture' besloten liggen, essentieel zijn om de ontwikkeling van de planning in China te begrijpen. Het idee van een "planning culture" wordt gebruikt om het theoretisch kader voor het onderzoek op te bouwen.

Samenvattend stelt dit onderzoek het volgende. 1) De ommekeer in de Chinese politiek in 1978 en het openstellen van het land voor buitenlandse investeringen en technologie moeten worden gezien als het afmaken van wat in 1949 onaf was gebleven. De veranderingen worden gezien als deel van de evolutie van de Chinese modernisering op de lange-termijn. Het momentum wordt gezien als een onderdeel van de evolutie van de modernisering van China op de lange termijn. Hiervoor wordt de term "critical modernization" geïntroduceerd, en worden de veranderingen gesitueerd in de bredere context van de globalisering. Het kan niet los worden gezien van de wortels van de Chinese geschiedenis en traditie en is als zodanig een alternatief voor de Westerse paradigma's. 2) De ontleding van de specifiek Chinese historische ontwikkelingen toont de gelaagdheid van een hybride ontwikkeling. 3) Het politiek-economisch momentum van de jaren 80 wordt beschouwd in een langere tijdspanne en in een ruimer kader dan de politieke situatie van die tijd, door het verband te leggen met de culturele en traditionele consensus uit de Chinese geschiedenis. Ten opzichte daarvan is er sprake van een culturele verschuiving ("cultural turn"). 4) Deze studie past het begrip "planning culture" toe door verschillende historische perioden binnen 1 land te vergelijken en de veranderingen te analyseren die hebben plaatsgevonden in het planningssysteem en in de culturele context; en door de transities in de stedelijke planning te benaderen vanuit politiek, sociaal, en economisch perspectief. Zo worden de voorwaarden, benaderingen en resultaten van de huidige ruimtelijke ordening in China onderzocht.

Met het idee van de "planning culture" als systematisch kader, richt dit onderzoek zich op drie belangrijke thema's: de transformatie van de maatschappij, de transformatie van het planningssysteem, en de implementatie van de planning in de praktijk.

*The Transformation of the Society* omvat twee onderdelen. Het eerste onderzoekt de filosofische wortels van het Chinese systeem van normen en waarden en het tweede introduceert de context waarbinnen de Chinese modernisering zich voordeed. Het doel daarvan is aan de ene kant om de huidige Chinese transformatie te verankeren binnen de specifiek Chinese context, en aan de andere kant om de transformatie van het hedendaagse China als een nieuwe ontwikkeling te tonen, onderdeel van de evolutie van de modernisering.

*The Transformation of the Planning System* geeft de specifieke informatie over de omwenteling die plaats vond in de jaren tachtig, in het bijzonder met betrekking tot de hervormingen die in gang zijn gezet door de centrale regering. De focus ligt op de verandering van het systeem van de stedelijke ontwikkeling na 1978, met speciale aandacht voor de politieke structuur, de organisatie van de planning, en de verschillende planvormen. Dit is de analyse van het top-down systeem.

*The Implementation of Planning System in Practice* zoomt nog verder in op het micro-niveau van de veranderingen in de planning door de implementatie van de planning in een van de snelst groeiende steden te analyseren: Shenzhen in de Pearl River Delta, dat beschouwd kan worden als een bijna geheel nieuw gebouwde stad met ongeveer 300.000 inwoners in 1980 en bijna 10,47 miljoen in 2011. In relatief korte tijd hebben de mate van versnelling en de omvang van de totaal onverwachte groei de lokale met de planning belaste autoriteiten gedwongen om zich continu aan te passen aan de veranderende omstandigheden en nieuwe vragen. Binnen dit kader worden verschillende planningsdocumenten en ook het besluitvormingsproces zelf geanalyseerd, met speciale aandacht voor de coördinatie en afstemming tussen geplande interventies en de implementatie daarvan.

Deze drie groepen van onderzoeksthema's zijn bedoeld om een reeks van onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. De hoofd-onderzoeksvraag luidt: "Hoe biedt de stedelijke planning in het hedendaagse China het hoofd aan de uitdagingen van de stedelijke evolutie zoals die zich voordoet binnen de huidige wereldgemeenschap?" Dit onderzoek beargumenteert dat er nieuwe strategieën voor planning moeten worden ontwikkeld. Deze moeten enerzijds in reactie op de onvermijdelijk toenemende onzekerheden in de Chinese maatschappij de flexibiliteit genereren die nodig is om om te kunnen gaan met nieuwe en onverwachte initiatieven van publieke en private actoren, en anderzijds een betrouwbaar kader bieden voor duurzame ontwikkelingen op de lange termijn. De verwezenlijking van de planning in termen van ideologie, doelstellingen en systemen moet begrepen en ingezet worden niet alleen voor politiek-economische ingrepen, maar ook als ruimtelijk instrument dat bemiddelt in de voortdurend veranderende confrontaties van sociaal-ruimtelijke eisen in het culturele domein, in plaats van het top-down opleggen van interventies.

China gaat een kritiek tijdperk van moderniteit binnen, een gemeenschap waarin het vinden van sociaal-ruimtelijke betekenissen voor mensen een veel belangrijker kracht is dan de beperkte focus op economisch succes en politieke stabiliteit. Dit besef is gebaseerd op de herleving van Chinese tradities en op een systematische her-evaluatie van de daarin besloten normen en waarden.

In plaats van een concrete conclusie te trekken, heeft deze studie tot doel om aan te zetten tot reflectie, om verder debat uit te lokken, en de context van de Chinese planningscultuur te ontsluiten en te ontleden. Het is op basis van dezelfde afweging dat ik het idee van de "planning culture" een waardevol en nuttig kader vind om de stedelijke ontwikkeling in niet-Westerse landen te benaderen en te evalueren. De "zachte" kern van de planning-cultuur heeft overal dezelfde culture waarde. In landen met een vergelijkbare hybride geschiedenis als China zijn de invloeden van de processen van industrialisatie, verstedelijking, dekolonisatie, verwestlijking, post-industrialisatie en globalisering niet opeenvolgend, maar simultaan en op meerdere niveaus tegelijk werkzaam en stellen deze soms tegenstrijdige eisen.

Hoewel ingebed in de unieke Chinese politieke, sociale, en economische context, wordt stedelijke planning door de staat vanuit een visie op de toekomst gebruikt als een krachtig instrument in de processen van transitie tussen de regels van beide extreme benaderingen top-down en bottom-up, in evenwicht gebracht door zowel de overheid als de particuliere sector bij de ontwikkelingen te betrekken.

Ik ben er van overtuigd dat het idee van “planning culture” een nieuw discours op gang kan brengen dat leidt tot een totaal nieuw inzicht en begrip van culturele verschillen, niet alleen met betrekking tot de Chinese cultuur maar ook in het algemeen, maar ook voor iedereen van wie het leven wordt beïnvloed door planningsbeslissingen en wiens dagelijkse activiteiten deel uitmaken van het sociaal-ruimtelijke domein.





# Contents

Index of tables 21  
Index of figures 22

## PART 1 Introduction, Theories and the Research Outline

---

### 1 Introduction 26

---

#### 1.1 Opening the Debate 26

---

#### 1.2 Specific Conditions 29

---

#### 1.3 General Aims and Concerns 31

---

#### 1.4 Outline of the Study 33

---

### 2 Theoretical Framework, Research Hypotheses and Questions, and Methodological Approach 35

---

#### 2.1 The Idea of Planning Culture 35

---

##### 2.1.1 Globalization and the Emergence of Planning Culture 38

##### 2.1.2 “Soft” Characteristics of Planning 40

##### 2.1.3 Confronting Planning Culture in Transition 43

##### 2.1.4 “Cultural Turn” and the Application of Planning Culture as Analytical Frame 45

#### 2.2 The Transformation of Society 48

---

##### 2.2.1 Phenomena: Urbanization, Globalization and the Information Age 48

##### 2.2.2 Challenges: Competition, Political Accountability and the Risk Society 51

##### 2.2.3 Solutions: Reflexive Modernization and Citizen Participation 53

2.3	The Transformation of the Planning System	55
2.3.1	Phenomena: The Idea of the Functional City and the Concept of Modern Urban Planning	56
2.3.2	Challenges: Inhospitability of the Modern City and Inconsistency of Planning Approaches	58
2.3.3	Solutions: Adaption of the Planning System	62
2.4	Space and Society: The Implementation of the Planning Practice	65
2.4.1	Phenomena: The Idea of Space and its Transformation	66
2.4.2	Challenges: Facing Complexity and Uncertainty	69
2.4.3	Solutions: Generic City versus Citizen's City	70
2.5	Hypotheses and Research Questions.	75
2.5.1	Main Hypothesis and Sub-Hypotheses	75
2.5.2	Main Research Question and Sub Questions:	78
2.6	Methodological Framework and Research Design	79
2.6.1	Setting the Analytical Framework	80
2.6.2	Methodological Approaches and Concerns	82
2.6.3	Review of other Analytical Models of Planning Culture	84
2.6.4	Highlights of the Major Contents of the Research	86

## PART 2 Cultural and Historical Review

### 3 Ancient Roots and Philosophies 92

3.1	Cosmology: Spatial Conception and Environmental Harmony	93
3.1.1	Man and Nature	93
3.1.2	The Recognition of Subjectivity	98
3.1.3	The Integration of Knowledge with Practice	103
3.2	From Moral Ontology to Authentic Spatiality	106
3.2.1	Ritual Principles and Social Orders	107
3.2.2	Feudal Control, Economic Organization, and Spatial Paradigms	110
3.2.3	Principles for Building the Actual City and Human Settlement	114
3.2.3.1	The Integration of Landscape	114
3.2.3.2	The idea of Feng Shui and Orientation	119
3.2.3.3	The Hierarchical and Isomorphic Spatial Mode	121

- 3.3 The Emergence of Chinese Cities and Urban Planning 124
- 3.3.1 The Emergence of Chinese Cities 125
- 3.3.2 The Emergence of a new Urban Culture: the City of Aristocrats and the City of Bureaucrats 127
- 3.3.3 The Transformation of Planning Approaches between Flexibility and Reliability 129

## 4 Modernization and the Contextual Background of Urban Development in China 131

- 4.1 Modernization and the Break of National Identity in Chinese Civilization 131
  - 4.1.1 The Evolution of Modernization Movements 132
  - 4.1.2 The Confusion of National Identity 138
  - 4.1.3 The Fusion of Urban Development 142
- 4.2 The Major Socio-Political Systems and the Emerged Urban Cultures before 1970 151
  - 4.2.1 Decline of Feudalism and the Sprout of Capitalism 151
  - 4.2.2 Colonization and the Emergence of Industrialization 155
  - 4.2.3 Republicans and the Emergence of Nationalism and Modernization of Architecture 156
  - 4.2.4 Communism and the Urban Geo-Spatial Reconstruction 160

## PART 3 Initial Reformations and the Modification of the Planning System

## 5 Contemporary Urban Development: Reformation and New Urban Phenomena 168

- 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform 169
- 5.2 Political Reformation: The Relaxation of State Control 180
- 5.3 Economic Reformation: Crucial Economic Measures and the Reform of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) 187
- 5.4 Social Reformation: Administrative Control of Migration and Urbanization 196
- 5.5 Spatial Reformation: New Urban Paradigms 204

## 6 Transformation of Planning in China 212

---

### 6.1 Planning Formation 212

---

- 6.1.1 The Changing Role of Planning 213
- 6.1.2 Reinventing Government and Civilian Society in Transition 217
- 6.1.3 Hierarchical Structure of Governance 220

### 6.2 Planning System 240

---

- 6.2.1 Authorities Relating to Spatial Policy 240
- 6.2.2 Legal System and Administrative System of Planning 248
- 6.2.3 System of Plans 253

### 6.3 Establishment of Statutory Planning 269

---

- 6.3.1 Preparation and Approval of Urban Planning 269
- 6.3.2 Implementation of Urban Planning 271
- 6.3.3 Evaluation and Monitoring 273

## PART 4 Planning Practice and emerged Socio-spatial Challenges

---

## 7 Planning for the Reality 278

---

### 7.1 The Application of the Chinese Planning System after 1978 278

---

- 7.1.1 The Given Condition: An Accident of Conjuncture and an Iron-hard Fact 278
- 7.1.2 From a Fishermen's Village to An Open Economic Practice Laboratory 286
- 7.1.3 The Evolution of Urban Development 301

### 7.2 Planning Shenzhen in Practice 316

---

- 7.2.1 Administration and Management of Planning 316
- 7.2.2 Establishment of Planning System 327
- 7.2.3 Planning Execution and Key Elements 336

## 8 The Production of Space beyond Planning 347

---

### 8.1 The Criteria of Selection of the three Projects 347

---

8.2	Central District of Futian	349
8.2.1	CBD, Foreign Concept and Local Implementation	350
8.2.2	International Competition for Conceptual Design	356
8.3	OCT-Loft Creative Park	371
8.3.1	OCT: The Overseas Chinese Town	372
8.3.2	Grouping the Urban Fracture for Urban Creation	377
8.4	Urban Villages—Village amidst the City	387
8.4.1	The Emerged Urban Villages: The Push and Pull Effect	388
8.4.2	From Urban Fringe to Urban Indispensability	399
8.5	A few Points for Reflection	411

## PART 5 Outline of the Chinese Planning Culture

### 9 Conclusions 416

9.1	Answering the Research Questions	416
9.1.1	The Transformation of the Society: Critical Modernization	416
9.1.2	The Transformation of the Planning System: Establishing the Law-and-Plan-based System	423
9.1.3	The Implementation of the Planning System in Practice: The Conception of a New Urbanism	429
9.2	The Planning Culture of the Chinese Contemporary Urban Development	434
9.3	Paddling between “Flexibility” and “Reliability”	439

### 10 An Unfinished Project and the Way Forward 442

References	451
Chinese Index	471
Acknowledgements	475
Curriculum Vitae	479



# Index of tables

- [Table 4.1. Semi-feudal and Semi-colonial Cities](#) 143
- [Table 5.1 Number of Chinese cities by sizes and locations, 1949-1998](#) 206
- [Table 5.2 Domestic and foreign investment in Chinese cities, 1990-1998](#) 207
- [Table 6.1 Generations of Chinese leadership](#) 229  
Source: Constructed by author. 229
- [Table 6.2 Structural hierarchy of the administrative division](#) 232
- [Table 6.3 Subnational government in China](#) 233
- [Table 6.4 Three types of Policy Research Institutes in China](#) 236
- [Table 6.5 Top 10 Think Tanks in China \(Compiled by Chinese Authorities at the "First Forum on China's Think Tanks" held in Beijing in 2006.\)](#) 238
- [Table 6.6 Functions of Urban Land Use Planning and control in three main central government sectors](#) 247
- [Table 6.7 Instruments of legislation](#) 249
- [Table 6.8 Vertical system of legal system of urban planning](#) 251
- [Table 6.9 Horizontal system of legal system of urban planning](#) 251
- [Table 6.10 Framework of the urban planning administration](#) 251
- [Table 6.11 Hierarchy of planning authorities and administrations](#)Source: Derived from Urban and Rural Planning Law and constructed by author. 252
- [Table 6.12 Plans and responsible authorities](#) 254
- [Table 6.13 Key features of the Five-Year Plans \(FYPs\)](#) 255
- [Table 6.14 Statutory Plans](#) 266
- [Table 6.15 Statutory Plans and responsible authorities](#) 269
- [Table 6.16 Statutory Plans and approval authorities](#) 270
- [Table 6.17 Instruments of urban planning in China](#) 271
- [Table 7.1 Special roles and innovations in the Special Economic Zones \(SEZs\)](#) 292
- [Table 7.2 Price and rent level of different types of housing in Shenzhen 1994](#) 297
- [Table 7.3 The highlights of the Five-Year Plans \(FYPs\) and the making of Master Plans for Shenzhen Constructed by author](#) 315
- [Table 7.4 Newly established Commissions after Shenzhen administration reform of 2009](#) 326
- [Table 7.5 Statutory Graphic Standard \(Fadingtuze\) of Shenzhen City](#) 334
- [Table 7.6 Shenzhen Planning System](#) 335
- [Table 7.7 Types and features of Planning Committees in China and abroad](#) 341
- [Table 8.2 Mechanisms of Urban Villages](#) 394
- [Table 8.3 2005-2010 Urban Village redevelopment area control \(10,000 m<sup>2</sup>\)](#) 397
- [Table 8.4 The different models for the renewal of Urban Villages](#) 398

# Index of figures

- Figure 2.1* The overall methodological framework and the analytical framework of the research. Constructed by author. 83
- Figure 2.2* Political economy and urban planning: A tentative theoretical framework. 85
- Figure 2.3* Analytical model of Planning Culture of Knieling and Othergrafen 86
- Figure 3.1* Diagram of Wang Cheng (Capital City) in Kao Gong Ji 111
- Figure 3.2* Ancient drawing of ChiCheng Ancient Town and aerial photo around 2008. 116
- Figure 3.3* The Characteristic of the “Shan-Shui-City” pattern in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei North Region. 117
- Figure 3.4* Sketches by Wu Liangyong and the application of Shan-Shui Worship in his design for the Red Chamber Museum in Nanjing 118
- Figure 3.5* The Isomorphic structure existing at various scales and in different historical periods. 123
- Figure 3.6* Archaic and Modern Forms of Yi, the Ancient Word for City. 125
- Figure 3.7* Du, the modern Word for Capital, in its archaic and modern forms. 126
- Figure 3.8* Plan of Chang’an. 128
- Figure 3.9* Schematic Reconstruction of Kaifeng. 128
- Figure 4.1* Growth and locations of Treaty Ports System. 145
- Figure 4.2* Street plan of the English, French and American Settlements in Shanghai. 147
- Figure 4.3* Master Plan of Qingdao under German Colonization 1901. 148
- Figure 4.4* Master Plan of Nanjing 1929 149
- Figure 5.1* China’s Industrial Output, by ownership in 1985 188
- Figure 5.2* Process of rural industrialization. 201
- Figure 5.3* China’s three macro-regions, Open Cities, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs). 205
- Figure 5.4* Growth of the number of cities in China 1978-1998. 206
- Figure 5.5* Gradual open-door policies and emerging metropolitan regions 209
- Figure 6.1* The structure of the Chinese central cadre and organization 221
- Figure 6.2* Legal System of China 248
- Figure 6.3* The framework of the present urban planning administration 252  
Source: Tang Kai (2004: 4). 252
- Figure 6.4* Five levels of Land Use Master Plan 264
- Figure 6.5* Implementation of Urban Planning 273
- Figure 7.1* Regional Setting of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 282
- Figure 7.2.* Coastal Open Cities 283
- Figure 7.3* Number of establishment under different types of ownership in Shenzhen (1984-1999) 300
- Figure 7.4* The Conceptual Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 1980  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010, Figure 1.2).  
Caption here. 303
- Figure 7.5* Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 1986-2000 304
- Figure 7.6* Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 1996-2010 307
- Figure 7.7* Pearl River Delta Regional Plan 308
- Figure 7.8* Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 2010-2020 312
- Figure 8.1* The location of Futian Central Business District (CBD) 352
- Figure 8.2* Topographic map of Futian Central District in 1984 353
- Figure 8.3* Futian District Plan 1988 354
- Figure 8.4* Urban design study of Futian Central District 1995 356
- Figure 8.5* Aerial photo of the Futian Central District in 1996 358
- Figure 8.7* Central axis public space system of Futian Central District 1997 361
- Figure 8.8* Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) (1999) 362
- Figure 8.9* Urban Design for Block No. 22 and 23 363
- Figure 8.10* Obermeyer’s Remodification of Futian Central District 1999 364
- Figure 8.11* The future schema of Futian Central District made in 2002 365



- Figure 8.12** Urban design study for Block 26  
 Source: (a) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 27); (b) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM.  
 Note: (a) Location of Block 26 (26-3 and 26-4), and (b) Site of Phoenix TV. 366
- Figure 8.13** Re-modification of Block 26 367
- Figure 8.14** Illustrated images of Phoenix TV  
 Source: (a) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 131); (b) and (c) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM.  
 Note: (a) Ground floor plan of the winning scheme, by UDS Architects; (b) Central axis of open space and (c) 3D model of the site. 368
- Figure 8.15** Aerial Photo of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) and the location of OCT-Loft 373
- Figure 8.16** Master Plan of Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) 2005-2015. 373
- Figure 8.17** Variations in real estate developments and housing projects in Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). 375
- Figure 8.18** Images of Post-Industrial Warehouses in OCT 377
- Figure 8.19** Images of OCAT 379
- Figure 8.20** Images of warehouses after renovation 380
- Figure 8.21** The concept of the OCT-Loft renovation in the southern zone 382
- Figure 8.22** Design concept of southern and north zone of OCT-Loft 382
- Figure 8.23** Images of exhibition, shops and café 383
- Figure 8.24** Distribution of Urban Villages in Shenzhen 2005 390
- Figure 8.25** Images of Urban Village surrounded by high-rise Buildings 391
- Figure 8.26** The location of Yunong village, Gangxia village and Dafeng village in Shenzhen 401
- Figure 8.27** Demolition of Yunong Village 402
- Figure 8.28** Images of the western section (Heyuan) of Gangxia village before (2009) and after (2011) demolition 405
- Figure 8.29** Images of Dafeng Village 408
- Figure 8.30** Site map of Dafeng Art Museum 410  
 Source: URBANUS 410
- Figure 8.31** Connections between the Dafeng village and the newly developed housing project 410



## PART 1 Introduction, Theories and the Research Outline

The aim of this research is to provide an alternative outline to address questions with regard to the transformation of planning in China that has occurred after the 1980s.

Chapter 1 opens the debate on the circumstances of contemporary Chinese transformation after the 1980s. It argues according to the theory of planning culture, planning traditions, concepts, systems and decision-making processes are always related to the cultural context and cultural background of the people and societies involved. Following this argumentation, the aim of the study is set to decode the contemporary Chinese planning culture. The idea of planning culture is applied to build up the theoretical framework in order to approach the research subject: the contemporary Chinese transformation, based on a systematic structure.

Chapter 2 elaborates further the idea of planning culture and the way that it is applied in the research. Being embedded into the theoretical framework of planning culture, relevant theories are elaborated in order to guide the direction of the research and research hypotheses and research questions are proposed. In the end of Chapter 2, a detail description of the research including methodological framework and approaches are given.

# 1 Introduction

The transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s is a spectacular phenomenon, a miracle one might add. To what extent this miracle is made still remains in constant debate among scholars nationally and internationally. The efforts that have been made from different angles dedicated to dissect this extraordinary transformation have proposed permanently new denominations for interpretation and have competed in redefinitions of the circumstances. In general, researches cover three fields. First, scholars who focus on the political-institutional transformation imply that the political development is facing the crucial dilemma between attempting for economic revival and maintaining political authority. Second, a few are concerned with distinguishing the future direction of ideology, as influenced by the foreseen increase of economic liberalization. Third, others explore the social phenomena by anticipating the degree of democracy that China is heading to. These researches have contributed, within a few decades, to an abundant accumulation at the level of practical fact-finding as well as theoretical mapping.

Based on the benefits from earlier research, this research has set a course from the beginning to decode the Chinese reformation from a single subject matter: the planning evolution of contemporary China.

In this chapter, the introduction opens and links to the central research inquiry: how does urban planning in contemporary China face the challenges of the emergent urban evolution within the current world society? It argues that the changing role of urban planning is strongly embedded into the political, economic, and social domains and is a part of the cultural innovation of society. The main aim of the research is set to outline the planning culture of contemporary China and illustrates how internal and external forces influence it simultaneously. At the end of the chapter, the overall research design and the composition of the parts and chapters is explained.

---

## § 1.1 Opening the Debate

---

Since the late 1970s, China has undergone a dramatic process of transformation and societal change. During the last decennia's the country experienced one of the fastest process of urbanization in human history, generating urban agglomerations of unknown dimensions and unknown dynamics. The radical change from a mainly rural society to a society, whose economy, societal system and lifestyles became more

and more dominated by urban conditions, resulted both in growing welfare and in increasing social contradictions - contradictions within the cities, contradictions between cities and surrounding former rural areas and contradictions between the underdeveloped west of the country and the more developed, more urbanized east.

The radical change has been both enabled and accompanied by a major reversal of Chinese policy that started in 1978 and slowly led to an opening of the country for private entrepreneurship as well as foreign investments and technologies. The existing society, which used to embody the planned-economy, traditional communist ideology, and top-down political organization, was forced to change. It was challenged by newly arising interests in favor of an entrepreneur-oriented society, in combination with the emerging new policy of open-market practices. Consequently, the internal transformation took place at many different levels and in many different aspects.

Firstly, the supposed certainty of the planned-economy has been replaced by the increasing complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability of the recent transformation processes. New parties, such as private investors and developers, have become involved in urban development, while bringing in their own interests and following their own logic. New user groups are demanding spaces for their own initiatives, resulting in an increasing importance of private investments and private developments within Chinese urbanization.

Secondly, the concept of an open society was gradually introduced during this time. A comparatively open society and environment after the Maoist period introduced a new urban paradigm that includes changes in urban governance, urban layout, and urban form—mostly, this involved introduction of the new urban mindset to society. Thus, the city has become less controlled by top-down interventions and more open to public involvement. As a result, the spatial sphere has become a collective arena bringing together the public and private domains, and often both forces confront and contradict each other.

In addition, the emphasis on the overwhelming reformation of the economy, the politics, and society in general has often undermined the ethics and the traditional Chinese norms and values, and therefore has created a break with its historical and cultural context. The growing social contradiction, as a result, is leading to an increasing segregation and, in many cases, to a concentration of poverty in certain parts of cities and regions.

Furthermore, rising environmental problems have become key issues for the development of Chinese cities. For example, the energy consumption of buildings is much too high and must be reduced profoundly. The increasing motorization and, in particular, the fast growing number of private cars not only generates daily traffic jams, but also has become one of the main causes for air pollution in most of the cities in China.

In the domain of planning practices it is less recognized that these processes are confronting the Chinese planning institutions almost on a daily basis with new and unexpected demands, in view of the increasing diversity of actors who are intervening and interacting in the urban development process. Not only the Chinese cities, but the planning approaches and methods are in transition as well. A new balance between public planning and private development, and between top-down and bottom-up approaches is required, a balance that is able to generate both a reliable and responsible framework for long-term urban development and a flexible system of implementation to meet the challenges of changing conditions and new demands. This requires the former blue-print urban planning of the Maoist period to be modified and complemented by an approach that can give space to private initiatives, on the one hand, and give the capacity to public planning to guide private initiatives and to adapt them to the general aims of urban development on the other.

Flexibility and reliability became the new demands for a planning practice that traditionally was used to act within the strict top-down order of the Maoist period, framed by the 5-years planning scheme of the communist system. The planning administrations on different levels had to learn how to integrate private developers and other parties involved into the planning process, how to take into account the mood of the market and the interests of private investors, how to adapt plans to changing conditions and new demands. However, they also had to avoid the new flexibility to end up in unclarity and chaos. The newly demanded type of urban plans not only has to be flexible, it still has to generate too a reliable framework for future development, giving planning security to private investors as well as future users.

To find a balance between the contradictory demands of reliability and flexibility, between top-down and bottom-up, between public planning and private development, is a big challenge for the Chinese planning administration since the political opening up in 1978. It still is an ongoing process, triggering a huge amount of new regulations and an even bigger amount of approaches and experiences. From a certain point of view it can be seen as a catching-up process taken from developments in Western countries, where the traditional blueprint planning has been replaced by more flexible approaches such as negotiation planning, participatory planning and strategic planning. On the other hand we should not expect that the transformation of the Chinese planning system will result in a copy of Western approaches. Considering the political differences, the dimension and dynamics of the urbanization process in China, and last but not least the specific Chinese value systems and social manners, it will be (and has to be) a specific Chinese approach, embedded in the Chinese culture as well as in the specific political conditions of the country, facing urban challenges that are unprecedented in human history.

## § 1.2 Specific Conditions

The dynamics of the globalization and urban transformation processes in Europe and North America have been documented and analyzed extensively. Compared to this body of knowledge, the number of studies on the recent urban transformation processes in China is rather limited. Only a few studies place the current changes in reference to the Chinese history of the last centuries. Hou Youbin (2003) argues that, in comparison to Western industrialized countries, the modernization of China had a delay of 160 to 200 years. In addition, the development was interrupted by political turmoil, civil wars, foreign invasions, and occupations. As a result, China is confronted by a double challenge: to catch up to the delay of the past and to simultaneously deal with the current challenges of globalization and global economic transformation. This situation is generating a special mode of development: the processes of industrialization, urbanization, decolonization, Westernization, post-industrialization and globalization are affecting the country not in a linear-subsequent manner, but on different layers simultaneously and sometimes with contradicting demands. The discourse between the effects of this layered development on the systems and on the approaches of spatial planning in China requires a better understanding of its particular cultural context.

In a sociological sense, China is a special case, particularly at this moment in history (Logan 2002). The weight of transition and the promise of changes combine to make this remarkable moment. Many transformation processes that are interactively taking place in China are not unique to China—globalization, urbanization, and a market economy are not country-specific phenomena—however, it appears to be distinctive in the Chinese case, because of the long history of self-imposed isolation and the evidence that it has propelled itself so quickly within the past four decades from a third world country toward becoming a first rank world power, while making a transition from a centrally planned to a market economy.

China's economic trajectory since the beginning of the reform has been profoundly different from developments in Central Europe and in the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, including Russia. In contrast with the sudden demise of the entire system, China engaged in much more gradual economic reform while clinging to its political framework of Communist one-party rule. As a matter of fact, a Communist leadership that is successfully, to a certain degree, controlling the speed and scope of market reform, is turning into a new capitalist oligarchy: a leadership that maintains political supremacy during this process "while still maintaining a critical level of stability and, presumably, generating sufficient legitimacy for its regime through good economic performance, national zeal, and a good deal of tolerance, with respect to political decentralization and local voice". (Heberer and Schubert 2006: 10)

The challenges lying ahead for China are certainly manifold—despite the influence of globalization, in general, and urbanization, in particular, China still is one of the most state-controlled countries in the world. The core problem for the Chinese Communist Party, since the beginning of the reform era, has always been how to keep the balance between steady market transformations on the one hand, and persistent authoritarianism without endangering one-party rule on the other. Such an integrationist (or state-hegemonic) tendency, as Michael Leaf (2005) defined, is in fact deeply rooted in Chinese ancient history, instead of just deriving from the history of Communist China.

Among further issues, the crucial lesson that the Chinese have to learn is that the market can do little to transform an economy without a parallel shift in its class relationships, private property, and all other institutional structures that typically ground a thriving capitalist economy (Harvey 2005). It indicates that planning is and has to be more than a mere instrument to serve certain demands, in reference to the functioning of society and the intention to alter the existing course of events.

In recent years, abundant research regarding the Chinese urban transformation after the open-door policy era has been accumulated. In fact, the debate on where China is headed—and how fast—is the core question for most scholars. The issue of market reform arises in China in a unique way, as the concrete choices made at every step of the way are marked by the state's continuing intervention. However, it is important to understand the new perspectives that the Republican era introduced, and that, as Marie-Claire Bergère (2000: 55) emphasized, "was more and more perceived as the starting point of a forceful modernization drive, as a time of economic and cultural innovation and creativity to which contemporaries should turn for inspiration." A rigid challenge lies right in front of Chinese transformation, as the need for a modernization theory, postulated by Lowell Dittmer (2003: 904):

That a political regime must open up in the long run in order to master the rising complexities of economic and social development by establishing responsive political institutions, feedback channels of communication between the state and its citizens, and inclusive modes of participation. At a minimum, a non-democratic state must foster continued and equitable economic growth by ensuring sufficient degrees of (extractive, regulative and redistributive) state capacity; and liberalize the political system for the institution of at least some participation considered meaningful by the people.

Being embedded in this unique Chinese political–socio–economic context, urban planning is used by the state as a powerful instrument and political–economic mechanism in the transitional process, keeping the rules of both extreme modes in balance by involving the governmental and public sectors simultaneously and providing a vision for the country's future. It may, however, be accompanied by new faults and



mistakes within its own political and societal limits. One may argue, based on the historical development of Western democratic societies, that spatial interventions in China still serve mainly political and economic goals, without giving enough space to all types of civil organizations. However, it is debatable if this is also an occidental value, as it ignores the cultural evolution of China.

---

### § 1.3 General Aims and Concerns

---

To investigate the “cultural turn” in recent urban planning approaches in China is the major aim of this study. In which way (and to what extent) the traditional top-down approach of the Maoist period has been changed and adapted to the plurality of a more open society? How have the demands of flexibility and reliability been solved? To what extent was public planning in practice able to integrate private initiatives, investments and developments into the planning process? In which way have the planning regulations and its legal framework have been adapted to the new challenges?

Of course these questions cannot be answered completely for China as a whole. The recent transformation processes in China are characterized by diversity, dissimilarity, and inequality and are by no means simultaneous. For that reason the research is focusing on the changing conditions and regulations for urban planning on the national level, and—with regard to the planning practice—on the case of Shenzhen as one of the fastest developing cities in China and in the same time as one of the most experimental cases for new planning approaches. In this way the research does not reflect the average planning practice in China, but focuses on more advanced approaches, indicating the direction in which China is moving.

Decoding the urban planning transition in China helps to outline a possible interpretation of the special mode of Chinese contemporary urban development. However, planning evolution is not just a technical mechanism. It is by nature part of the political, economic, and social decisions that are made interactively and of which new values and cultures for civil society are evolving simultaneously. I argue it is a part of the unfinished modernization that China is still undergoing, a continuing process in which external and internal forces are inevitably interacting. All these aspects are associated with the idea of Planning Culture.

The idea of Planning Culture has been developed in Europe in the 1990's as an analytical framework to compare the planning systems in different European countries.<sup>51</sup> It became clear that the analyses of differences and similarities of planning systems cannot be reduced to the comparison of technical and procedural regulations.

The concept of Planning Culture is based on the idea that planning approaches and related decision-making processes are always embedded in and defined by the cultural context and the cultural background of the people and societies involved. Only within this context planning systems become understandable and comparable.

This study makes use of the idea of Planning Culture in a different and until now unusual way. The aim is not to compare planning systems and their cultural context in different countries, but to compare different periods in one country and to analyse the changes that have been taking place with regard to both the planning system and the cultural context. The research wants to elaborate further interpretations of the evolution of Chinese urban planning in contemporary China by anchoring it into the Chinese social and historical context, and in addition, to build up first a systematic accumulation of the relevant material, which is regarded as an important research in itself. The main aim is to provide a cultural-contextual foundation for a broader international debate and a better understanding of the current and future Chinese transformation.

It is impossible to achieve such observations completely within a limited timeframe; neither is it possible to build up entirely comprehensive results that allow for a finite interpretation of the overall aspects. With this constraint in mind, the research skeleton focuses on the evolution of urban planning and its development in relation to the political, economic, and social momentum, and at the same time it is underpinned by studying the relevant stages of Chinese society that are related to its modernization over a longer time span. I agree with John Friedmann (2005a: 187) that China's current system of physical planning is still "under construction". However, one could also argue that it represents one of the most extreme cases of "pre"-modernization, rather than "post"-modernization within contemporary urban development, where everything is changing in front of our eyes through strong socio-political interventions. Many presumptions about Chinese economic and political reform still remain unknown. One can see that Chinese contemporary urban development demonstrates one of the most dynamic frontier conditions in the evolution of urban planning, permanently shifting between modes of flexibility and reliability. Studying Chinese urban development and its planning evolution provides new evidence for urban development debates; thus, building a discourse on the evolution of Chinese urban development and urban planning is very much needed.

## § 1.4 Outline of the Study

The study is divided into five parts, each of them including two chapters. The following text gives an overview of these parts and their main contents.

Part I Introduction, Theories and the Research Outline contains the Chapter 1 Introduction and Chapter 2 dedicated to the theoretical framework, the research hypotheses, questions and the methodology of the study. In this framework the idea of planning culture and the application of planning culture in this research are further elaborated, based on which, relevant theories are reviewed and converted into a thematic framework of investigation in three aspects: the transformation of the society, the transformation of the planning system, and the implementation of the planning system in practice.

Part II Cultural and Historical Review starts with providing the general contextual background. The major relevant aspects dwell in two parts: reviewing the philosophical roots of the Chinese norm and value system as well as the contextual background of the emerged Chinese modernization. The purpose is on the one hand to anchor the contemporary Chinese transformation within the Chinese context, and on the other hand to argue that the transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s is a new turn as part of Chinese modernization.

Part III Initial Reformations and the Modification of the Planning System offers the specific information about the transformation of the turn in the 1980s, in particular relating to the planning formation. The focus is in on the transformation of contemporary China after 1987 in the four initial aspects of political, economic, social, and spatial reformations. Special attention is given to the political structure, planning organization, and planning system.

Part IV Planning Practice and the Emerged Socio-Spatial Challenges zooms further in on the micro-scale of planning execution by analyzing the planning implementation and this is done by a case study: Shenzhen, one of the fastest growing cities in China. It investigates the recent planning history of Shenzhen and provides a comparison between the planning interventions and the process of realization that the local planning administration is encountering. In this framework, different planning documents and the process of decision-making are analyzed, with special attention to the coordination and fine-tuning between the planning intervention and planning implementation. Three projects on three scales and of three different planning modes are chosen to demonstrate the interactions between the state-led and market-driven planning modes in local practice.

Part V Outline of the Chinese Planning Culture is dedicated to drawing a conclusion and reflections. It responds to the research questions, extracted from the research investigation and analyses, and demonstrates how the new urban development in China is finding a dynamical balance between flexibility and reliability. At the end, suggestions are given for further research.

## 2 Theoretical Framework, Research Hypotheses and Questions, and Methodological Approach

In this chapter, relevant theories are framed based on the idea of Planning Culture.

The idea of Planning Culture lays the foundation of a thematic framework, following which relevant theories are further elaborated and composed following three research entrances: the transformation of the society, the transformation of the planning system, and the implementation of the planning system in practice. Each research entrance comprises three parts of review on phenomena, challenges and solutions.

Each research entrance guides the research and leads to research hypotheses and questions that are proposed in accordance with the same line of inquiry, reflecting on the transformation of China. The hypotheses and questions cover aspects from the macro-scale of the historical context to the micro-scale of planning adoption on the execution level, and interrelations between the planning vision and the planning outcome.

The idea of planning culture is transferred from a thematic framework into an analytical structure, based on which the methodological structure of the research is framed and explained.

At the end of the chapter, the contents of the analytical aspects, viewpoints of observation, and the selection of case studies are composed into the overall research design.

---

### § 2.1 The Idea of Planning Culture

---

The relationship between planning and society was a major issue in the work of the Hungarian-German sociologist Karl Mannheim already in the 1930's. For Mannheim planning is a necessary and inevitable condition for a democratic society to control irrationality. In his book *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus* (Mannheim 1935), published 1940 in the English language under the title *Man and Society in an*

Age of Reconstruction, he distinguished four types of societies resulting from variations in the participation and centralization of the societal decision-making processes<sup>51</sup>:

- Dictatorship is the result of low levels of participation and high levels of centralization.
- Anarchy results from high levels of participation and low levels of centralization.
- Anomie results from low levels of both participation and centralization.
- The “democratically planned society” is a result of high levels of both participation and centralization.

Mannheim’s book was a fundamental attack against both the top–down approach of the fascist dictatorship and the laissez-faire attitude of the liberal capitalism. Seeing the upcoming totalitarian societies in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union he strongly argued for a shift from a liberal order to a planned and planning democracy, based on rational decision-making processes.

After World War II, Mannheim’s argumentation played an important role in the political debates about the future of democracy in different Western countries. It triggered what became known as the Great Debate on planning and society that deeply affected both the USA and post-war Europe. While first focusing on the desirability and feasibility of public planning in general, the debate shifted from the 1950’s on to more concrete questions concerning particular planning techniques and alternative institutional structures: who are the actors of planning, which (democratic) institutions should be involved in planning decisions, and what are the rights of citizens in planning processes. The debate had a strong influence on planning practices and on planning legislation in almost all Western countries, resulting in highly formalized procedures for public planning, including the obligation for citizen participation, or at least information.

In the 1990s, the debate on planning and society arose anew, particularly in Europe. An important reason for this revival was the process of European unification with its growing demand to harmonize planning procedures and planning legislations and to understand the divergences and dynamics of planning approaches in different European countries. In addition, the rapid and fundamental changes of planning approaches and planning paradigms—caused by political changes in Europe and by newly arising actors, constellations, attitudes, modes of action, and planning instruments—induced the recognition of the high relevance of “soft” and culturally driven orientations by planning researchers.

Within this framework, a new term was introduced, subsuming all perceived and interrelated differences and changes of style and notion of spatial planning: the idea of “Planning Culture” (Planungskultur) (Brech 1993). Based on the idea of planning culture, a research project, regarding the comparative studies on different planning approaches, was undertaken by three European experts: Donald A. Keller, the Director of the Zurich Regional Planning Association, Michael Koch of the Department of the School of Orts-, Regional- und Landesplanung at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule in Zürich, and Klaus Selle, a social planner at the University of Hannover (Keller et al. 1993). The project was titled: “Journey into the planning cultures of four countries: Switzerland, Germany, Italy and France”. There was an urgency to initiate this project, as exchanges on planning across Europe were steadily increasing, while the European Union was posing more and more new challenges for cities. It had become inevitable for European countries and cities to reposition themselves from an exclusively national to a Europe-wide context of projects, priorities, administrative regulations, and legislations.

During this period, while not necessarily categorized under the term planning culture, comparative researches focusing on planning approaches in different political and economic contexts were becoming increasingly important issues to study (Newman and Thornely 1996). Despite the growing volume of international communication within the profession, while the notion of planning practice is more or less the same regardless of where it is practiced, the researches have proven that the major differences in planning exist in the ways that planning is conceived, institutionalized, and carried out within the contexts of different cultures. Planning gains its power through its embodiment in legislation and regulations that are part of the legal apparatuses of a particular country.

More precisely, according to John Friedmann (2005b: 30), “a universal planning discourse must proceed by way of an acknowledgement of local, regional, and national differences in planning institutions and practices; I shall call them cultures.”

## § 2.1.1 Globalization and the Emergence of Planning Culture

---

The term planning culture has received a broad response, in particular within the context of globalization. This is not just coincidental. Globalization is bringing major changes in institutional structures, procedures and scale and scope of planning at all levels of governance, as well as economic, social, and environmental issues. Even though much has been written about the homogenizing effects on culture, resulting from the increasing global connectivity, it is not necessarily a negative perspective. On the contrary, the push-back effect between global homogenization and national/local cultural resistance provides us an opportunity to link the effects of the global economy to the daily lives of common people and localities, in which the local planning ideas and spatial appropriations are simultaneously fertilized and interwoven.

Saskia Sassen (2006) has forced scholars of globalization to take seriously the ways in which global influences are constructed through multiple institutions, technologies, and infrastructures, rather than existing as an independent, singular process. She has argued that the national scale is far more important in globalization than many have realized. In this perspective, “globalization is actually a process of denationalization, in which the apparatuses constructed to support the role of the national-state in the past are reconstructed to support global institutions and frameworks in the present” (Hubbard and Kitchin 2011: 349).

On the other hand, the urban impacts of globalization may be most obvious in those cities that have been “successful”—those cities that have captured the high-level functions of the global economy. In order to mediate global economic forces, different countries have different traditions and practices in the organization and financing of property markets. This means that globalization has penetrated, to a certain degree, from the national level down to urban governance and planning (Newman 1996). Thus, from the socio-spatial point of view, as Manuel Castells (1989) emphasized in his idea of “space of places”, the avoidance of meaningless spaces and the flattening towards identical cultural environments, in the process of shaping spatial forms, is critical in our time.

The abovementioned statements have underlined the changing roles of planning in its relation to politics, social exchange, and spatial production in the emerged global-local dialectic context. Planning is becoming part of the cultural activities.

Earlier, Friedmann (1988) advocated a preference for the cultural autonomy of regions over their functional integration for market expansion. The “Life Space,” as he argued, would be defended by civil society as the resistance from below to efforts at economic integration from the top, and he coined the term “radical planning” to legitimize this form of resistance that is mobilized to preserve cultural autonomy and self-governance as another type of planning aimed, ultimately, at the empowerment of civil society.



Which means, “the slate of history cannot be wiped clean and the diversity of national and even local planning cultures will continue to flourish” (Friedmann 2005b: 43)<sup>1</sup>.

One could argue that studying the interrelation between planning practices in certain political, societal, and cultural contexts is not new. However, in comparison with mainstream planning theorists, who tend to debate as if planning is a universal concept, the idea of planning culture challenges Western-centered conventions (Shibata 2008).

On the one hand, throughout different planning approaches, and within different contextual backgrounds, what makes the application of planning culture significant is the increased interest in using the idea of “culture” as an important criterion in the planning domain. It enhances understanding of different planning traditions by defining their own planning characteristics that are rooted in individual historical contexts. On the other hand, as Bishwapriya Sanyal (2005) argues, planning styles and concerns in each context have been shaped by not only endogenous, but also exogenous factors. Planning cultures appear to be complex responses to important social changes, both within and outside the national states. It proves that the related issues of a changing planning culture require us to explore the specific context of an individual case before ideas, norms, and philosophies of certain planning modes can be extracted and integrated into spatial construction through the process of planning intervention.

Following a growing interest in planning culture, an international symposium—held in Hamburg in 2007 with the title “Planning Cultures in Europe—Exploring Cultural Differences as Resources and Restrictions for Interregional Cooperation”—focused particularly on cultural variety and cultural differences regarding specific occurrences within the development of urban and regional planning. The aim of the symposium was to encourage the analysis of the relations between different perceptions and meanings of space, specific planning traditions, and philosophies, as well as societal rules and values (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009).

One step further than the project of Donald A. Keller c.s., this symposium invited broader audiences to participate in the debates on broader themes. It focused on all aspects of urban, regional, and community planning and development, while requiring the paper submissions of the symposium to be from an international or a comparative

---

1 Friedmann emphasizes that even as the economy becomes ever more global, it would be wrong to conclude that, the reach of the American empire notwithstanding, the world is about to become a mirror of the United States or that a universal planning discourse based on the American model is about to emerge.

perspective. The symposium tackled issues in planning practices, with regard to the planning system, organization, judicial, and administrative structures, as well as tasks and objects of planning, respective of their individual perceptions. Special attention was given to the importance and influences of fundamental beliefs, values, and orientations. Since the symposium was conducted in English, it gave the advantage and opportunity for non-European audiences to access and to participate in the debates, even though the main theme was still limited to the European context.

### § 2.1.2 “Soft” Characteristics of Planning

---

In 2002, Bishwapriya Sanyal invited a group of distinguished scholars with knowledge of planning from nations on four different continents to participate in a semester-long symposium on “Comparative Planning Cultures” at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Sanyal underpinned the “soft” characteristics of planning as a broader set of social activities not limited to traditional city planning efforts.

This broader concept of planning was summarized in several strong statements that are necessary to highlight here. According to Sanyal (2005: 15), planning culture is declared as the ways, both formal and informal, that spatial planning in a given multi-national region, country, or city is conceived, institutionalized, and enacted. “It evolves with social, political, and economic influences, both internal and external, creating hybrid cultures and spatial outcomes whose complexity can only be understood through deep historical analyses”. Friedmann (2005a: 184) elaborated that the link between planning, political culture, and history is important, because planning “continues to be primarily a responsibility of the state, even as it draws upon the contributions of other societal actors. It is deeply embedded in the political culture of the country and/or individual cities and, as such, is always historically grounded.”

Several questions were posed to the participants during the symposium. Firstly, emphasis was laid upon the linkage between the formation of society, including its distinctive social attitudes, geographical features, historical conjunctures, and religious beliefs, and public policy influences. Secondly, the participants discussed to what extent the state, market, and civil society can claim their roles in the planning domains and to what extent the formation of society is able to reinforce the giving portion of participation between the state, market, and civil society within the planning constitution. In addition, they were asked to what extent the response of certain planning cultures is able to deal with the intensification of global interconnection in trade and new developments of dominant technologies.

In retrospect the initial emphases of the symposium were apparently stemming from Sanyal's intention to access the planning discourse by accumulating inquiries of circumstanced debates from the invited scholars who actually shared a common ground of understanding on the issue of planning culture and, at the same time, tried to provoke divergences through significant cases. Especially from the obvious shift of interests of the symposium, one conclusion can be drawn: from the very beginning, the idea of planning culture has the advantage of being developed as a cultural phenomenon that is related to specific historical, political, and social environments of countries, regions, and cities. It proves to be an interesting inquiry into the other side of planning, which is described as the core "cultural nucleus" by Paul Ricoeur (1965: 319). He further elaborated (1965: 278):

The only way to reach the nucleus of a culture is to go deep down into its soul. The ethic-mythical nucleus shapes a people's cultural background. (...) The structure of this subconscious or unconscious shelters the very mystery of human diversity. Cultural identity and diversity need to be preserved because culture structures and orders everyday life (...) imbues personal experience with meaning and significance.

By culture is meant the complex of values and evaluations emerging in a people's concrete attitude towards everyday life: e.g. towards tradition, change, fellow-citizens, foreigners, and technology. It is that something specific to a culture that does not repeat itself, but always re-invents itself, thereby perpetuating the culture it defines (Popenici and Tat 2008).

In addition, this dimension of understanding the soft and cultural-driven orientation of planning makes the idea of planning culture valuable and gives a refreshing insight into the term of planning in the globalization era. An important aspect to emphasize is that cultural identity is often viewed as comprising core cultural traits that are indigenous, inherited, and immutable. Planning practices must be characterized by unique socio-political formations and institutional arrangements by which the planning culture can be shaped, and have to acknowledge this fundamental criterion in which people formulate their own identities. Conclusion is that planning culture "like the large social culture in which it is embedded, is in constant flux." (Sanyal 2005: 22)

Dominic Stead and Vincent Nadin (2009a: 283) have elaborated that the link between the "models of society" and the "models of planning" can prove that the characteristics of spatial planning systems are embedded in wider models of society. The notion of planning cultures sits between the two. According to them, "the form or 'model' of spatial planning and the prevailing planning culture is likely to be interconnected with the model of society." With regard to the close links between the models of society and the models of planning, Stead and Nadin (2009b: 71) pointed out in their research of European Spatial Planning and Welfare Systems, that:

Models of welfare systems help to generalize about the diverse values and practices that shape relationships between the state, the market and citizens in particular places. Models of planning systems tend to follow a similar typology because they are rooted in the same “model of society”.

This reveals another crucial epistemological question of debate: Even within the European Union there is no common meaning or interpretation of terms like “urban planning”, “urban design”, and “urbanism” that allows a smooth translation from one language into the other.<sup>53</sup> This issue often arises in the field when determining how the planning disciplines and the mode of the planning are taught in different planning educations, and under which circumstances of political, social, and spatial consensus the body of knowledge in the planning domain has been interpreted and transferred by planners into the practical skills or tools for spatial interventions. Thus, diverse notions, definitions, interpretations, and realizations of planning applications in different countries can produce varied findings from debates on urban planning practices. This stresses the idea that planning is part of a culture.

Another caveat is that the discipline of planning has inherently a modernist genealogy in the Western liberal tradition. Theories of planning seek more often to reconcile the differences between three basic sectors of a liberal, democratic policy—state, market, and civil society. However, the planning practices and planning concepts in China are embedded in a different ground. Under the state hegemony, the basic practices of governance do not derive from an acknowledged separation between state and society. Such a state hegemonic tendency is deeply rooted in the older Confucian conception of statecraft. Further elaboration on this theme is given later in the Chapters 3 and 6.

Therefore, importantly as Michael Leaf (2005: 95) argues, “the lack of a culturally embedded body of planning theory (...), thus presents challenges to the adoption and local adaptation of planning practice, which all too often is still presented to the world as a modern, and thus universalistic, undertaking”.

To bare this in mind, the idea of planning culture is used—as a term similar to urbanism indicating the “unity of the urbanistic work” —in our attempt to understand and interpret how the political, economic, social and cultural characteristics of place are interacting with each other, and simultaneously influencing the urban form and social life, which is also the concern of urban design.

### § 2.1.3 Confronting Planning Culture in Transition

---

Overall, the idea of planning culture assembles interpretations of understanding in the new aspects of the planning discourse. To what extent can these interpretations make contributions to planners while they have to deal with the trouble of losing manageable skills in planning practice, confronted with the ever more complex planning context? “Planning Cultures in Transition”, posed by Friedmann (2005b) gives us some hints. Fundamentally, Friedmann argues that, within any given setting, planning must continuously reinvent itself as circumstances change. In the professional field, without a doubt, urban planning is an institutionally embedded practice. It is also a practice that is inevitably interwoven with the politics and on-going conflicts over the allocation and use of public and private resources. In the information age, on the one hand, the tasks of planners are considered similar globally, with regard to the new emergence of unexpected meta-metropolitan regions, new cross-border collaborations in politics and economy, and hybrid models of urbanization. Nevertheless, daily planning procedures are still very much embedded in the specific local contexts.

Not only is the planning system in transition, planners must adapt their mindsets to the ability to take challenging positions in the dynamic overall planning conditions. Never in human history have we had such comprehensive and advanced technologies available; consequently, we have never had such good opportunities to initiate collaborative exchanges of knowledge. It is a privilege of the discipline in our time that, in fact, any individual planning of significance can impact others beyond its geographic boundary.

A convincing example is the climate and environmental issue. Worldwide planning can do very little to deal with this crisis, not to mention the failure of planning on the issue of social justice, e.g. shelter provision and bridging the enormous gap between richness and poverty in those areas where public resources are distributed unjustly. It is not the era of globalization that we are entering that should be blamed, nor a lack of knowledge of the relevant matters; on the contrary, to a certain degree it is the failure of planning mechanisms that are not able to respond dynamically and collaboratively to these critical issues as they emerge. “Planning mechanisms” as referred to here include governments and their governances, planning institutes, private actors, and the civil society that are involved in human-built and natural environments, as well as ordinary individuals who appropriate and participate, whether in the private or public spatial domains of their daily lives. It is our collective responsibility to address what eventually will happen in our surroundings.

The urgent issue that confronts scholars, like Donald A. Keller and many others who share the same concerns, is reaching out to broader audiences. In general, both industrialized countries and industrializing countries are confronted with a planning

culture in transition. In most industrialized countries, such as in North America and Western Europe, the interactive planning and bottom-up planning processes gained a lot of attention after the 1980's, which led to the responsibilities being handed over to lower policy levels and to the citizens themselves. Friedmann states "cities are encouraged to become entrepreneurial, to market themselves, and to compete against each other for inbound capital" (Friedmann 2005b: 33). On the other hand, in industrializing countries, the understanding of the planning discourse is still in the stage of exploration, in the awareness of the necessity to manage themselves to be inserted into the competitive world market. Despite the fact that the cause-and-effect structures of planning transitions in both industrialized countries and industrializing countries are diverse, what they now have in common is an understanding of the planning discourse as becoming a mechanism of local diversification and production.

Especially in countries where the establishment of a planning system is still "under construction", learning from the Western mode of planning is not yet a proper way to face the new phenomena of globalization, urbanization, and rapid societal transformation that appeared simultaneously and that are conflicting with each other. During a long period planning systems in Western liberal economies have been evolved in response to the ill effects of industrialization and urbanization (Cherry 1972; Hall 1996; Sutcliffe 1980; Shibata 2007). In other words: Planning policies in the Western countries have been developed over time to solve upcoming urban problems, such as the concentration of poverty, housing shortage, and environmental degradation. This process made Western planning mitigate the externalities of the market economy, and eventually serve the needs of the urban working class.

Compared to the long-term development of planning systems in Western countries, planning systems in non-Western, mostly developing countries emerged and transformed in a much shorter time. In many cases the establishment of a system for spatial planning was needed in the process of national-state building to defy Western hegemony and promote national independency through industrialization (Chatterjee 1993; Madanipour 2006). The origin of this contextual background inevitably affected the development of planning culture in the non-Western world and led to planning priorities different from the Western approaches, in many cases being associated with building the national state and assembling the national economy (Shibata 2008).

The need for a debate about specific planning demands and approaches in non-Western domains is underpinned by Kuniko Shibata (2008). In her research "The Origin of Japanese Planning Culture" she emphasizes that applying the idea of planning culture is a good start to become aware of the divergence of planning traditions and origins far beyond the dominant Western-centered ones.

## § 2.1.4 “Cultural Turn” and the Application of Planning Culture as Analytical Frame

---

The original idea of planning culture, as developed in the European context, aimed to make planning approaches, planning institutions and planning systems of different countries comparable by interpreting them within the specific social, economic and political “cultures” of these countries. However, in this research planning culture is used as analytical frame in a different way. In stead of comparing planning systems and their cultural environment in different countries, in this study the idea of planning culture is used as analytical frame to investigate the dramatic changes within one country and within one cultural environment - the changes of system and approaches of urban planning in China, caused by the political opening of the country for private entrepreneurship and foreign investment that started around 1980, accompanied by a fast process of urbanization and a radical transformation of a mostly rural into a mostly urbanized society. These changes I will call a “cultural turn”, because they are related to fundamental changes of the political culture, societal system, and the living conditions and lifestyles of the people. They are not rootless; they are grounded in the social-spatial tradition of China, and in this way are specific for the Chinese society and distinctive from the development in other (Asian) countries.

The idea of the cultural turn as a means of investigation of changing planning cultures has been stimulated by the research of Heng Chye Kiang (1999), who analyzed the differences in the development and lay-out of two capital cities in Chinese history as a result of changing conditions and demands of the society: the city of Chan ‘an, capital of the Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.), and the (later developed) city of Kaifeng, capital of the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1125 A.D.). Heng illustrates that more than a thousand years ago, the planning system of the city of Kaifeng already realized an optimal balance between a top-down and bottom-up approach by integrating a reliable, long-term framework for urban development (general zoning, transportation network, locations for public institutions) with a flexible (open) system “for initiatives of the common people” (residential buildings, commercial activities, non-hazardous industries, and open space). His research indicated how planning culture could be used analytically to interpret consistently the interrelations between all factors within the planning context when a “cultural turn” is taking place in one specific context. Therefore, it is relevant to review Chinese historical and philosophical elements in relation to socio-spatial experiences before entering the debate of contemporary urban development. Further elaborations are given in Chapter 3.

In other words, the idea of planning culture can be applied in a new dimension, although the extent of contemporary urbanization and transformation is a unique phenomenon within the history of China. Historically, it is not the first time that Chinese society has undergone a vast urban transformation. A relatively comparable and adaptive planning approach was once already introduced within ancient

Chinese urban practices. The character of this ancient urban transformation allows one to understand contemporary demands better, as it shows that the adaptive planning approach is generally based on Chinese tradition. The assumption is that the understanding of planning culture can help to retrieve the balance within the conditions of current urban development in China, in a society that is again in transition.

This research uses the idea of planning culture to build up a thematic analytical framework to approach the research subject. There are two major reasons to do so: firstly, it allows us to approach the recent changes of urban development in China in a more cultural-orientated framework; secondly, it helps us to decode in a systematic structure the on-going changes in Chinese society and the changing planning modes within the last 30 years of transformation after the reform policy had been launched. Based on the essential value of using planning culture as a common conceptual framework for discussion, the divergences between different forms of planning in their cultural context do not necessarily require a tightly defined parameter in order to interpret the divergent characteristics comparatively. Nevertheless, it is the “soft” element, added into the contextual embedding of planning that provides us a new analytical framework in the planning culture approach that becomes more creative and innovative in establishing new planning discourses.

It is also the dimension of the “soft” and culture-driven orientation dwelling within the divergent planning domains that stimulates our interests and studies on diverse planning modes. In other words, it is the dynamic transformation of society evidenced by its specific values, norms, traditions, philosophies, and ways of living in specific political embodiments that creates a dynamic planning transition. This allows the concept of planning culture to be applied to any individual case, in relation to its own causes of transformation in time.

The driving forces behind the development of planning concepts, theories and practices are societal change, in its turn caused by social, political and economic developments. Furthermore, a philosophical approach to understanding social, political and economic changes provides us with a basic tool at the abstract level by emphasizing on context and history in analyzing social issues, including planning, rather than imposing a simple “universal” solution. In other words, the importance of changing formations of certain societies requires a better understanding and interpretation of the transformation of the society, economy, and culture, as well as the consensus of people in their norms and traditions. Especially in the case of a society with an overwhelmingly rapid transformation, the discourse between the changing space, society, economy, and politics needs to be elaborated.



Within this research the multiple aspects of planning culture will be divided into three interrelated research entrances.

- The transformation of the society

This entrance is focusing on the societal context of changing planning cultures. It deals with the major social, economic and political changes, the spatial transformation as well as the historical cultural roots that are related to the planning culture.

- The transformation of the planning system

The second entrance is zooming in on the changes of the planning system itself. In this framework the changing conditions and demands for urban planning will be analyzed as well as the transformation of the legal and institutional framework.

- Space and Society: The implementation of the planning system in practice

The third entrance is focusing on the implementation and the outcomes of the changing planning system. It deals with new planning approaches and procedures, the involvement of new participants, and the generation of new urban spaces and structures.

In the following three sub-chapters the above-mentioned research entrances will be elaborated as far as they are reflected in the mainly Western centered urbanism debate. Each sub-chapter deals with the following issues: 1) a description of the main phenomena and ideas, 2) a description of the main challenges, 3) a description of the main solutions. At the end of the theoretical review, research hypotheses and questions are proposed with regard to the situation in China. These questions are used to guide the research.

## § 2.2 The Transformation of Society

A technology revolution of historic proportions is transforming the fundamental dimensions of human life: time and space. (Castells 1989: 1)

From the perspective of a macro-scale and a bigger scope of transformation, we are situated at a local-global conjunction. Since the opening-up of Chinese society in the late 1970s, many researches have been enthusiastically carried out to interpret the significant transformation of contemporary Chinese society. Without a doubt, no matter what internal forces have triggered the rigid transformation of Chinese society, one of the most influential external forces that have massive impact in our time is “globality.” Ulrich Beck (2000: 10) pointed out that “globality” means, “that we have been living for a long time in a world society, in the sense that the notion of closed spaces has become illusory.” Beck inferred that no country or group could shut itself off from others. Various economic, cultural, and political forms, therefore, collide with one another. Beck elaborates “world” in the combination “world society” thus means difference or multiplicity, and society means non-integration. “World society” then, denotes the totality of social relationships as multiplicity without unity. This notion of world society that Beck regarded as the external context, is further elaborated below.

### § 2.2.1 Phenomena: Urbanization, Globalization and the Information Age

Without a doubt, internally, urbanization is one of the most important and most influencing societal changes in China and in most of the other Asian countries (and in Africa as well). Asia at the moment is experiencing the fastest urbanization process in the history of mankind. Half of the world’s urban population now lives in Asia. Since the beginning of the 21st century this region has accounted for about 65 % of the demographic expansion of all urban areas across the world (UN-Habitat 2012: 28). Today 7 out of 10 most populous cities in the world are located in Asia. In the recent past, Delhi and Shanghai have joined the league of “meta-cities” with more than 20 million people. It is expected that by 2020, another three Asian cities—Beijing, Dhaka and Mumbai—will have reached this mark. According to the “State of the World’s Cities 2012/13” report of UN-Habitat the 21st century undoubtedly is the “Asian Urban Century”.

All over the world most of the new super-agglomerations are situated in so-called developing countries, in particular in Asia, but also in Africa and in Latin-America. “The process of urbanization in these countries is accompanied by fundamental economical, cultural and social changes; impoverished farmers and land workers try to find a new

livelihood in the fast developing economy, and a growing number of refugees seek to escape from the escalating conflicts worldwide. As a result the new mega-cities are faced with an unprecedented stream of mostly poor and unschooled rural migrants that threatens to undermine the conditions of economical development as well as social life.” (Rosemann 2005:1)

The process of urbanization is strongly connected with a new mode of globality, when sovereign states are crisscrossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities, and networks—this dynamic process is called globalization, the most widely used—and misused—keyword in disputes of recent years. It is also, as Beck (2000:19) emphasized, “one of the most rarely defined, the most nebulous and misunderstood, and the most politically effective terms.”

Globalization, as a process of economic transformation, has been defined by Giddens (1990: 64) as “an increase in the geographical range of locally consequential social interactions, especially when the increase stretches a significant proportion of all interactions across international or intercontinental limits.” Beck (2000: 11) further concluded that globality means that “from now on nothing that happens on our planet is only a limited local event—all inventions, victories, and catastrophes affect the whole world, and we must reorient and reorganize our lives and actions, our organizations, and our institutions along a local–global axis.”

Raymond Dezzani (2010) emphasized that these processes involve the movement of capital, goods, labor, information, and services across country borders, usually by transnational or multinational corporations. However, it is also a social process that transforms current social conditions into a situation where international connections of economy, production, capital flows, and perspective are commonplace. A comparable notion has been given by Castells (1996; 1997; 1998). He states that we are entering the phenomenon of a new age: The Information Age. The information age creates the network society that, through the technology revolution, triggers enormous socio-economic changes.

The most obvious impacts of these changes are on the physical form of our cities. As Peter Hall (1991) remarks, the traditional pattern of urban land use, in which residential activities are clustered around nodes of employment that maximize accessibility, is increasingly replaced, in combination with more rapid and cheaper forms of telecommunications, by patterns that depend on economies that transcend the nation-state, thus enabling—and necessitating—local-to-global communications that had hitherto been unimagined.

In his much earlier work *The Informational City* Castells (1989) revealed his concern about the change of societal formations, in combination with a technological revolution of historic proportions that is transforming the fundamental dimensions of human life in terms of “space” and “time”. Castells advocates a new theory of urbanism with regard to the study of new relationships between time and space in the Information Age. Castells (2005: 57) proposes the following hypothesis: “In the network society, space structures time, in contrast to the time-dominated constitution of the industrial society (...) In our society-the network society-where you live determines your time frame of reference.”

To Castells (2005), despite the emerged electronic networks that provide a new notion of communication protocol, public space, as the site of spontaneous social interaction is the communicative device of our society. Therefore, in the practice of the city, its public spaces, including the social exchanges or communication nodes of its transportation networks, become the communicative devices of city life. Further he emphasized (2005: 60) that, “the establishment of meaning in the physical notion of communication is a crucial social practice, which requires a socio-spatial treatment of urban forms, a process we know as urban design”—it must be an urban design able of connecting local life, individuals, communes, and instrumental global flow through the sharing of public spaces.

If the warnings for a “Risk Society” from Beck are an alert to the darker dimension of such development in modernity, then Castells sees our time of the Information Age as situated within a longer time span. Optimistically, he sees the unfolding promise of information technology of opening up unlimited horizons of creativity and communication, inviting us to the exploration of new domains of experience from our inner selves to the outer universe, challenging our societies to engage in a process of structural change (Castells 2005). Hall (1991) shared the same vision—he also saw that not only do these technologies enable existing processes and practices to be executed more efficiently and often at lower cost, they also generate new opportunities.

The emergence of the information society has heralded new ways of communicating, which allow a much wider section of the urban population to interact purposefully over unlimited distances. In this sense, both Beck and Castells suggest that the massive transformation of our time requires the understanding that the transformation of society is a long and dynamic process. Therefore, the process of social change is a learning process as well. This understanding can be applied perfectly to the extreme transformation of contemporary Chinese urban society. It suggests that the debate shall examine carefully the extent to which the revolutionary global context will impact Chinese political domains and to what extent it will trigger the evolution of the internal opening-up. Can global impacts be a threat to local autonomy or vice versa? Firstly, we shall review what impacts can be recognized within the local–global context.

## § 2.2.2 Challenges: Competition, Political Accountability and the Risk Society

---

One of the most recognizable impacts of globalization in the political domain is the reducing power of national governments over transnational actors (corporations), especially in terms of global economic force. Due to the fact that flows of information and power are global, the major players of the global economy are limited to those who have the power to control, access, and sometimes, even to manipulate the information flows. These global economic powers are accumulated inside their own logic of shelters, where the most low-cost-effective productions can be realized efficiently in optimally chosen locations. Consequently, as notions that are closely linked to transnational networks as strategic nodes in the dynamic inter-city flows that are generated by financial transactions and trade, migration and information are becoming significantly more important than any other factors. A new category of cities rises: the “world cities” or “global cities” (Sassen 1991; 2001; Taylor et al. 2002).

The main characteristic of a global city, as defined by Sassen (1991), is its significant role as a new system of “coordination”, which focuses on the development of specific geographic control sites in the international economic order, and sites that can provide production with specialized services, such as complex organizations for running a spatially dispersed network of factories, offices, and service outlets. It has to be able to perform at a high level of specialized services and financial goods. Therefore, a global city is a city deemed to be an important node in the global economic system, whereby the linkages between the global cities have a direct and tangible effect on global affairs through socio-economic means.

If industrialization gives birth to megacities, it is the revolution of technology that redefines the position of global cities in the process of globalization because of the progressive shift of advanced economies from goods production to information handling, whereby the great majority of the workforce no longer deals with material outputs (Hall 1996).

While politicians are embracing the power of globalization and cities are competing to (re-)gain a dominant position worldwide, there is to a certain degree a delayed political response to the negative side effects of globalization, such as the warning of Beck (2000: 3): “Politicians from various parties do not realize that the very substance of politics and the state, as well as of the trade unions, is at stake in the globalization campaign.”

Due to the computer-generation of worldwide, transnational actors, globally active corporations can play a key role in shaping not only the economy but also society as a whole, because they have it in their power to withdraw the material resources (capital, taxes, jobs) from society and to decide for themselves their optimal sites for

investment, production, taxes, and even residence. They can simply punish particular countries that appear too “investment-unfriendly,” and easily break down and disperse goods and services. The battle of confrontation seems to easily turn sour and become a one-side winning story (Beck 2000). Beck warns that an attack has been launched upon the material lifelines of modern national societies. The call for free markets, without policy makers even noticing, threatens a society’s very own lifeblood and the very source of its money and power.

This is to say that, once the competition between cities begins to evolve in the global economic system to only focus on attracting transnational actors who are able to export jobs to parts of the world by following the global logic; the arising competition in global city rankings could weaken the mechanism of political accountability. The ongoing globalization is in many dimensions undermining the importance of the national state.

The weaknesses of the national state and the lack of accountability are accompanied by a global threat that Ulrich Beck already in 1986 expressed in the idea of the risk society. In his book *Risikogesellschaft* (Risk Society) he not only warned against the destruction of the environment and the exploitation of natural resources. He, in particular, emphasized the dependency of a world society that is mutually connected by global risks that no longer can be shifted onto nature, other continents, or future generations.

In essence, Beck referred to a three-stage periodization of social changes: first pre-modernity, then simple modernity, and finally reflexive modernity. In his view, “modernity is still very much coextensive with the industrial society and the new reflexive modernity with the risk society” (Beck 1992: 2). He argued that both forms are distinctly related to social aspects, as the principle of the industrial society is the distribution of goods, and that of the risk society is the distribution of “bads” or dangers. “Risk”, as he emphasized, becomes an intellectual and political web across which many discourses relating to the slow crisis of modernity and industrial society are thread. From his point of view, “in advanced modernity, the social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks.” (Beck 1992: 3)

Even though the contextual background that stimulates Beck’s work dwells in his observation of Germany and other advanced industrialized countries, impacts and crises are worldwide. If the industrial revolution was taking advantage of efficiency in manufacturing production, then globalization has the features to take advantage of the on-going revolutions in information and communication technology, resulting in the geographical expansion and ever greater density of international trade, as well as simultaneous increases in the global networks of financial markets and the growing power of transnational corporations.

### § 2.2.3 Solutions: Reflexive Modernization and Citizen Participation

---

The dynamic articulation between metropolitan planning, architecture, and urban design is still in the domain of urban policy. Castells (2005) reminds us that urban policy, which starts with a strategic vision of the desirable evolution of metropolitan spaces, in its double relationship to the global space of flows and to the local space of places has to be transferred into a guiding tool. Furthermore, he concludes that innovative urban policy does not result from great urbanists (although they are indeed needed), but from courageous urban politicians who are able to mobilize citizens around the meaning of their environments.

At the first glance, cities seem to embody all threats of modern civilization. They are using more energy, producing more environmental pollution and generate more social contradictions than all the rest of the world together. However, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) already in 2007 pointed out, that “the protection of rural ecosystems ultimately requires that population be concentrated in non-primary sector activities and in densely populated areas” (UNFPA 2007). Moreover, further urbanization not only is inevitable, it also “(...) offers significant opportunities to reduce poverty and gender inequality, as well as to promote sustainable development.” Under these conditions the questions about further urbanization become reduced to how to shape and how to plan the cities in a more sustainable way. A proactive planning for the urban growth is necessary.

In this framework the global risks have to be faced as a new phenomenon of our time. Beck underpins the necessity to conquer these risks on the global level; otherwise, the world society as a whole will not survive. For its survival—in the words of Beck—a reflexive modernization is necessary, i.e. a self-transformation of the modern society that continuously reflects on its own conditions. In this framework a special obligation is allocated to planning: planning must become “reflexive”—it must reflect all possible impacts in the most circumspect manner (Beck 1992).

The transformation of society in the Information Age has to lead to a new stage of reflexive modernization and reflexive civil society. The process of societal transformation has to re-fertilize the soil in which the changing culture can be transformed anew. The new culture of the city is not that of the end of history. As Castells (2005) emphasizes, to restore communication may open the way to restoring the meaning of conflicts. What he refers to is the existence of cities as communication artifacts; thus the new culture of the city is not only the culture of assimilation into the values of a single dominant culture, but also the culture of communication between diverse local societies connected to global flows of wealth, power and information. In his opinion, a dominant culture no longer exists, because in the Information Age, only the global media have the power to send dominant messages.

In order to combat the global cultural dominance, the crucial factor of dynamic societal transformation is to revitalize and regain the meaning of shared identity, both collectively and consistently. Valuable historical continuity, as mentioned by Bekkering (2007) as the choice to design with attention for the context, can only be derived from the specific local characteristics and forces of the context.

The collective meaning of individuals and their shared identity is simultaneously formulated by collective norms of “individualization” and “communalism”. Castells (2005: 62) encourages planners, architects and urban designers to find inspiration from social theory and to be concerned citizens of their societies—“they must do their jobs as providers of meaning by the cultural shaping of spatial forms, even though their traditional functions in society are more critical than ever in the Information Age”.

We, by all means, need the support of innovative urban policy and democratic politics. Castells states that cities are made by citizens and should be governed on their own behalves. In his words (Castells 2005: 58):

Only when democracy is lost can technology and the economy determine the way we live. Only when the market overwhelms culture and when bureaucracies ignore citizens can spatial conurbations supersede cities as living systems of multidimensional communication.

In our time social relationships are characterized simultaneously by “individualization” and “communalism”, while virtual communities and physical communities are developed in close interaction, and both processes of aggregation are challenged by the increasing individualization of work, social relationships, and residential habits (Braham and Hale 2006: 420). Therefore, even a developed democratic society needs to become reflexive—finding the balance and collaboration of “individuation” on the one hand, and “communalism,” on the other.

There is a shared insight in Beck’s ideal of socio-politics, Castells’ citizen society, and that of Karl Mannheim. In Beck’s idea of reflexive modernization, the process of individualization is conceptualized theoretically as a reflexive product. Mannheim, who as mentioned before distinguished four types of societies resulting from variations in participation and centralization of the societal decision making processes, defined the “democratically planned society” as a result of high levels of both participation and centralization<sup>2</sup>. Without a doubt, to deal with the challenges of the confrontation



between “individuation” and “communalism” of our time requires the development of a reflexive mechanism within the modernization process of both cultural and political domains. In order to fulfill the demands of societal balance dynamically, both the reflexive society and political accountability of reflexive network-governance are indispensable.

---

## § 2.3 The Transformation of the Planning System

---

Making (and building) a city goes beyond the understanding of spatial characteristics. Without a doubt, the formation of society, with its different political, economic, and cultural developments, redefines the discourse of planning through time. The common birth of modern planning theories goes back to the first days of our profession. Planning theories are tools for professional practitioners to apply in spatial development. Therefore, planning theories are highly related to the demands of the profession in urban management both economically and politically in the beginning, and later are also extended to social and ecological concerns. Because of the characteristics of being used as a tool and instrument in the domain of urban management, it has been devoted to the idea that twentieth-century city planning, as an intellectual and professional movement, essentially represents a reaction to the evils of the nineteenth-century city. From this origin, urban planning develops a split into two trails: of those who define it according to its object (land use pattern) and of those who do so by its method (planning process of decision making).

However, the domain of planning is to transform visions into actions. The concerns of the planning movement are different from conceptualized ideas—it has to attempt to realize the building of a city, in reality. Therefore, the practical demands of a city’s functions are to assure that the basic demands of urban living are sustained: that is, to enhance a healthy civil life as well as to facilitate the city’s regularity, such as street layout, urban sanitation, and other services of civil convenience. Deliberately planned and managed cities have to deal with urban form and spatial configuration by providing a regulatory urban structure and a reliable system of urban management.

### § 2.3.1 Phenomena: The Idea of the Functional City and the Concept of Modern Urban Planning

---

In his book *Cities of Tomorrow*, Peter Hall (1988) provides us with a synthesis of the process of realization of the planning practice during the modern epoch. His exploration focused on the development of the planning movement from its roots in the anarchist movement. He argued that many of the early visions of the planning movement stemmed from the anarchist movement, which flourished in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth. This research does not at all attempt to follow this standpoint, but rather, to use his elaborative work to understand our history, especially the history of the planning movement, and his ideas echo Mannheim's debate on the discourse between urban planning and the changing formation of society. Simultaneously, besides extracting from the abundant insights of Hall, additional shifting ideas of planning theories in relation to the planning instruments that had been invented and practiced in different periods are highlighted below.

In fact, the planning movement does not represent a coherent, identifiable unity but covers a wide variety of trends with different approaches, depending on individual opinions, political climate, social and cultural context, and time. Yet the various individual approaches do have a common purpose of exploration, to try and understand the chaotic complexity of urban constitution by the possible logics that can be grasped and transformed into useful tools. In the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, most big cities in the industrialized countries had comparable destinies, and cities became unpleasant living environments. The many problems were manifest in every corner of the city. In this period, urban utopias became desirable concepts in the modern movement, regarding the consensus of many people dreaming of a better world.

What would be the ideal city for the twentieth century? Three notable visionaries took initiatives between 1890 and 1930, tried to answer this question, and went a step further to envision one: Ebenezer Howard in England, Frank Lloyd Wright in the United States, and Le Corbusier in France. Each began his work by himself, preparing hundreds of models and drawings specifying every aspect of the new city: the ideal city that best expresses the power and beauty of modern technology and the most enlightened ideas of social justice. As Robert Fishman (1977) emphasized, the very completeness of their ideal cities expresses their convictions that the moment had come for comprehensive programs. They consistently rejected the idea that a planner's imagination must work within the system. Instead, they regarded the physical structure of the cities in which they lived, and the economic structure of the society in which they worked, as temporary aberrations that mankind would soon overcome. In the three ideal cities, the physical environment of their ideal type represented a world in which their political

and economic goals had already been achieved, not in reality, but in the reality of their own ideals. In the three ideal cities the transformation of the physical environment is the outward sign of an inner transformation in the social structure; therefore, they were both architectural and social.

As an interesting insight, as Fishman (1977) concluded, the three planners worked beyond their own troubled times to a new age that each believed was imminent, a new age each labored to define and to build. Their plans, when compared, offer us not a single blueprint for the future but three sets of choices—moderate decentralization, extreme decentralization or the great metropolis—each with its corresponding political and social implications analogous to the classical political triad of monarchy–aristocracy–democracy.

Howard, Wright, and Le Corbusier proposed three ideal cities in a unique scope and fervor, but this uniqueness had its dangers. They had created plans that were based on their single point of view. As Fishman (2003: 29) phrased the question: “How can an individual, even a man of genius, hope to comprehend the interwoven city structure, which is the product of thousands of minds and thousands of individual decisions?” This question is perhaps the most perplexing question for any planner. Is there any ideal city? Can we impose one by planning one? However, we have to acknowledge that their influences are enormous in the development of the idea of modernism in building cities and in urbanism, even though their ideal cities remained utopias.

Among them, the Radiant City (Ville Radieuse) envisioned by Le Corbusier put forward the most important principle of the contemporary city: the juxtaposition of a collective realm of order and administration and an individualistic realm of family life, which became the key to Le Corbusier’s attempt to resolve the syndicalist dilemma of authority and participation. The concept of the Radiant City strongly influenced the Athens Charter (Charte d’Athènes, 1933) of CIAM, which had a huge impact on urban planning all over the world after World War II.

CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne) was the name of a series of international conferences about modern architecture and urbanism that have been organized on different locations between 1928 and 1959. CIAM became a place of debate for leading architects and urban planners from all over the world to discuss (and promote) the idea of modern architecture and the modern city. Already the first meeting in the castle of La Sarraz in Switzerland resulted in a manifest that emphasized the functionality of architecture and defined it as a social and economic intervention—not an esthetic one. The following meetings in Frankfurt and Brussels were dedicated to the housing problem: how to overcome the serious housing shortage that appeared in the cities as the legacy of the 19th century and World War I? In this framework the mass production and standardization in housing as well as design principles for new (social) housing settlements have been discussed.

The meeting in 1933, that took place on the steamship Patris sailing from Marseille to Athens, had as its theme “The Functional City”. This meeting became the most influential and most important session of CIAM. Based on preliminary research on 34 cities the basic principles of the functional, the modern city were defined and published in the Athens Charter:

The Athens Charter was a strong rejection of the city of industrialization with its unhealthy and overcrowded housing conditions, the absence of unusable green spaces and the neglected maintenance of buildings. “The advent of the machine age has caused immense disturbances to man’s habit, place of dwelling and type of work; an uncontrolled concentration in cities, caused by mechanical transportation, has resulted in brutal and universal changes without precedent in history. Chaos has entered the cities.” (The Athens Charter 1943). To overcome this chaos, the Athens Charter recommended a strict separation of the urban functions in different zones, where residential areas should occupy the best places in the city and should be separated from the industrial zones by areas of open green spaces. On the other hand distances between work places and dwelling places should be reduced to a minimum; industrial zones should be contiguous with railroads, canals and highways.

The principles of the Athens Charter as a model of the functional city and at the same time a concept for modern urban planning strongly influenced the redevelopment and extension of cities after World War II and still is influencing urban planning in many developing countries, particularly in Asia. The simplicity of the monofunctional zoning seems to be easy to understand and easy to apply, in particular in fast growing cities.

On the other hand, very soon the principles of the Charter became criticized as too limiting and too technocratic. The critics organized themselves in Team X, operating within CIAM, but distancing themselves from the principles of the charter. They demanded the reflection on new values and new approaches for modern town planning matching better the requirements of complexity and livability of the modern city. The conflict within CIAM increased in severity and finally resulted in abolishing the organization in the 1959 meeting in Otterloo. A new chapter in the debate about the modern city and adequate approaches for urban planning was opened.

### § 2.3.2 Challenges: Inhospitability of the Modern City and Inconsistency of Planning Approaches

---

The end of CIAM in the 1959 meeting in Otterloo only was one indicator of the growing critique of the functional, rational city, based on the top-down zoning planning that was recommended by the Athens Charter. From 1960 on a whole range of publications

appeared that denounced the inhumanity of the new cities and the failure of modern planning approaches. The striking book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* by Jane Jacobs (1961), was a real eye-opener. It is the author's reflection on the urban crisis of the United States in the 1960s. She shared her view of cities as organisms that are sustained optimally through organic interventions, rather than master planning and social engineering. In this framework, the best way to learn from a place is by observing and participating in its processes. Also Lewis Mumford (1962) argues that urban planning should emphasize an organic relationship between people and their living spaces and strongly criticizes the urban sprawl of the modern city of his time. The German psychologist Alexander Mitscherlich (1965) blamed in his book *Die Unwirtlichkeit unserer Städte* (*The Inhospitability of our Cities*) that the modern city makes its inhabitants ill by generating estrangement and isolation.

In his book *The City is not a Tree* Christopher Alexander attacked the structure of the new cities as not matching with the conditions of society. "Too many designers today seem to be yearning for the physical characteristics of the past, instead of searching for the abstract ordering principle which the towns of the past happened to have, and which our modern conceptions of the city have not yet found" (Alexander 1965: 30). He showed that most of the modern planned cities have a tree structure, while historically grown cities in general have a semi-lattice structure which fits much more the networks generated by human behavior and relationships.

For the human mind, the tree is the easiest vehicle for complex thoughts. But the city is not, cannot and must not be a tree. The city is a receptacle for life. If the receptacle severs the overlap of the strands of life within it, (...) it will be like a bowl full of razor blades on edge, ready to cut whatever is entrusted to it. In such a receptacle life will be cut to pieces. If we make cities, which are trees they will cut our life within to pieces. (Alexander 1965)

Beside these critiques on the functional city and the results of top-down master planning, a second line of critique arose, focusing on the role of the urban planner in society and his position in the decision-making process. Already by the late 1950s, Charles Lindblom (1959) argued that political leaders could not agree on goals in advance, as the rational model of planning requires. They prefer to choose policies and goals at the same time. He suggested, under these conditions, that the relationship between planners and the community changed dramatically, as citizen participation became more important and a new pluralism of values was taken into account in a more multi-cultural society. He proposed the term "incrementalism". The theory claimed that public policy is actually accomplished through decentralized bargaining in a free market and a democratic political economy.

However, other critics argued that incremental planning only addresses a small range of alternatives and with its limited consideration of variables it offers nothing to guide the accumulation of small steps that could lead to significant change. In his critique on how useful models of urban development are, Tomas Sieverts (2008) stated that the city of today has, by its nature, become basically intangible; thus, how can models or images serve as guides?

He points out that the true characteristic of today is, in his view, a loss of visibility. Cities have, for a long time, been too big for even the most basic characteristics and circumstances to be perceived through direct observation or personal contact. The dividing line between city and countryside has become blurred. Residents and workers enter into different spatial and social relationships and experience the city only partially, in bits. As a result, in comparison to the early stage before the nineteenth century, urban planning models in any direct sense, i.e. as visual images capable of providing guidance with regard to the city, become impossible. However, unless we develop a common goal for urban planning and urban space, the domination of the market will lead to the decline and decay of the city. It is inevitable that, in an age in which the communal and political aspects are being suppressed in favor of the market, an urban planning model is a utopia—but without such a utopia, urban policy has no foundation.

The reality is that no single tradition of planning can do everything. Each of these theories and ideas actually describe only parts of the planning picture—some create an ideal model, and others provide a realistic insight into a part or aspect of the real world. In practice, planners make repetitive attempts to solve problems, starting from the outside inward or vice versa, as well as from an incremental approach toward a more comprehensive solution. The shortcomings of planning practice, whether building an ideal utopia or modeling were becoming recognized among planners. By the late 1970s, planners recognized that the completeness with which they had embraced notions of science in their work had exacerbated their isolation from political decision-makers. The critical position of planners was that, if planners want to influence decisions, they have to make arguments in a manner that the dominant regimes will understand and be responsive to. A series of new planning theories emerged that directed focus on planners' facilitative roles in shaping decisions (Lauria 1997).

The crisis began with the planners' lack of representation in the planning process. Paul Davidoff's article in 1965, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", resonated with the frustration of many planners in their inability to meaningfully address the social and economic issues tearing at the fabric of American cities. Davidoff called for the distribution of planning services into low-income, minority neighborhoods through a cadre of advocacy planners who would be physically located in those neighborhoods and would represent the interests of neighborhood residents in city-level planning processes. In his own words (Davidoff 1965: 545):

Moreover, planners should be able to engage in the political process as advocates of the interest both of government and of such other groups, organizations, or individuals who are concerned with proposing policies for the future development of the community.

Furthermore, according to Davidoff's point of view, appropriate policy in a democracy is determined through a process of political debate, in which the right course of action is always a matter of choice, never of fact.

It was to be the duty of the city government to appoint advocates to represent the neighborhood. Following the experiences with advocacy planning, planning theorists began diverging in many directions—one of the major reasons was that the diverging subjects in societal development became impossible to address comprehensively. As a result, the tendency in planning by the early 1970s was to distinguish theories on planning processes from theories on the growth and development of cities (Faludi 1973). In this framework, a series of new directions emerged, such as social learning theories and communicative planning, which emphasized the planners' roles in bringing stakeholders together, gathering and sharing information, and helping social structures to learn from their exchange experiences. A separate movement, called the "The New Urbanism" emerged in the 1970s and 80s<sup>3</sup>, promoting a revitalized vision of high-density, transit- and pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods as an antidote to faceless suburban sprawl, which has influenced planning practice toward the more direct engagement with land use, design, real estate development, and environmentalism (Fainstein and Campbell 2001). The progressive planning movement, on the other hand, promoted incremental changes within the planning structural system and encouraged leveraging of public resources through partnerships with private organizations that would agree to serve public purposes (Friedmann 1987).

Planning approaches were becoming more incoherent and fragmented, and the direction that planning approaches headed depended upon which aspects of the societal constraints they were attempting to solve. Old problems emerged anew, and aspects of planning were defined by a wide range of diverse issues: urban aesthetics, urban decay and slums, urban reconstruction and urban renewal, regional

---

3

Although The New Urbanism as an organized movement would only arise later, a number of activists and thinkers soon began to criticize the modernist planning techniques being put into practice. Social philosopher and historian Lewis Mumford criticized the "anti-urban" development of post-war America. The *Death and Life of Great American Cities*, written by Jane Jacobs in the early 1960s, called for planners to reconsider the single-use housing projects, large car-dependent thoroughfares, and segregated commercial centers that had become the "norm."

development and the urban mobility question, and suburbanization and the shrinking of the city, as well as environmental aspects, in terms of sustainability and other factors.

The classic modes of the urban spatial model can no longer be implemented easily into a blueprint plan, while new spatial claims and social demands require new urban shelters, to accommodate the new socio-spatial constitution and structure. The (new) urban questions are diverse and un-answerable, if we are not able to recognize and explicitly acknowledge change as a fundamental condition of our time. As far as designers and planners are concerned today, the lesson may be one of understanding the problems in terms of a less superficial, less pictorial, perhaps less object-oriented, and certainly more process-oriented understanding of the condition of the urban space. The other concern is that spatial transformation often focuses on the interaction between the local and the global. To an extreme, one may argue as Stephen Read did (2005: 9), “there is hardly a place—certainly no urban place—in our world that is not touched by the global.”

However, these concerns evoke new questions: How to generate planning security in the framework of changing conditions, contradictory demands, fragmentation and incoherency? How to find a new balance between the demand of flexibility that is needed to adapt urban plans to changing conditions and unexpected events, and the demand of reliability that is needed to generate consensus between different parties involved and to produce accountability with regard to long term developments? Which theoretical concepts and practical approaches have been developed to solve these problems?

### § 2.3.3 Solutions: Adaption of the Planning System

---

Reviewing the evolution of planning theories, approaches and practices in the Western context, planning is essentially an institutional arrangement between the government, the market and the society in response to social and economic changes in a particular society and a particular period of time. Therefore, it explains the multiple directions and non-linear nature of the evolution of the planning discourse.

It is to argue, and it is the approach of this research, that the modification of the planning mechanism requires responding—in reality or in ideology—to the analytical-structural level, rather than a fixed method of arriving at a prescription. The tension between the actual parameters and the complementary narratives creates a dynamic looping system that enables us to define and redefine the emerged urban issues. In this framework, the distinguished division between the courses devoted to either the



process of planning (planning theory, planning method, instruments, and approach) or to the context (structure of cities and regions, development of city history, and philosophical perspective) and the objects of planning (e.g. policy, and aspects of a diversity of issues) have to be redefined.

In other words, as the idea of planning culture suggests, planning mechanisms are the way that approaches are used to access urban questions, urban phenomena, and urban explorations by providing analytical interpretations that are able to guide us through the maze of complexity—at least partially. Often, questions of planning theory are posed in relation to two clusters of debates: “parameters” are built to provoke debates starting with questions of “how”, and narratives provoke questions directed towards “what”. For example, to compare questions like, “How do planners do their job?” to “What do planners do?” the concern of the former question is in the level of operation of planning (realization, method, approach, etc.), while the later one dwells in the domain of planning justification, such as to what extent planning, as an intention to alter the existing course of events, should intervene. Therefore, the timing and legitimacy of planned interventions become central questions to planning theory. However, we cannot build one parameter without consulting these narratives contextually. This is the reason that both criteria contribute to the dynamically looping normative system. It is not the individual components of question and answer; it is the mechanism that leads to synthesis, in which the interaction between impulse and cause can be formulated.

We recall the aforementioned argumentation: planning in practice as a procedural force employs, on the one hand, a philosophical orientation toward laying out the correct way to plan in an ethical sense, as well as in an ideal sense; on the other hand, a scientific orientation towards the possible implications of undertaking various planning aspects in which a narrative can be confined. Both the philosophical and the scientific aspects coexist within planning mechanisms. This dualistic characteristic of planning mechanisms also allows for diversification of the research directions; often, written literature on planning theory is structuralized either to one cluster or the other.

For example, Campbell’s and Fainstein’s (1996: 5-9) approach to planning debates explores two major questions: “What is planning theory?” and “Why do planning theory?” They posed five clusters of questions, which they found to be the most important usable to define the debate of planning theory. The five questions are: What are the historical roots of planning? What is the justification for planning? What values are incorporated within planning? What ethical dilemmas do planners face? How can planning be effective within a mixed economy? And what do planners do? Their intentional works provide the evidence that to build planning theory is a collective work of continual evolution. Similar evidence can be found in other, earlier works, such as Hall (1988) and Sennett (1969). Therefore, I agree with Friedmann (1993) that planning is a professional practice that specifically seeks to connect forms of knowledge

with forms of action in the public domain. In this sense, planning mechanisms shall be able to respond both to the formation of knowledge as well as action.

In addition, as the evolutionary process is continually taking place, planning has to be able to absorb the changing consensus of the public sphere that it is responding to and perform its responsibility simultaneously. Friedmann (1993) finds five criteria to result in a clear and sharp underpinning of what planning mechanisms should possess within their systems. First, planning should be normative—this can reflect what was mentioned above, in relation to the parameters and the narrative. Second, planning should be innovative—this refers to the dynamic looping system that planning mechanisms should create. Third, planning should be political, due to its original function of origin—it is defined to serve the public domain, where policies often have to be addressed in advance. The fourth criterion is that planning should be transactive, that is, it should be a situation-specific mechanism in which planning seeks to find a diversity of solutions at different levels of scale. Last but not least, as I think this is the most important criterion: planning should be based on social learning.

Friedmann argues for the social learning model of planning as an open process with two main characteristics: critical feedback and a strong institutional memory. The openness requires democratic procedures, recalling Mannheim's favored outcome: the "democratically planned society", which is a result of high levels of participation and centralization. Consciousness of and admitting to mistakes is what an accountable, confident government leadership should possess. Such accountability of governance does not rely on a mandate of intervention to satisfy fixed-ideal and one-sided expectations, but on establishing an open and reliable institutional structure that can be accessed democratically. Planning mechanisms have to be built to replace Euclidian planning, which Friedmann (1993) defined as either dead or impaired. On the other hand, planners have to take proactive roles as responsible professionals as well. In this entrepreneurial role, planners must be publicly accountable, as they preside over processes that are radically open to public inquiry.

However, we cannot neglect the fact that to modify the planning mechanism is as tricky as attempting to compile a reader in planning theory. Campbell and Fainstein (2003) argued, first, many of the fundamental questions concerning planning belong to a much broader inquiry concerning the role of the state in social and spatial transformation. Consequently, planning theory appears to overlap with theories in all social science disciplines, and it has become hard to limit its scope or to stake out a turf specific to planning. Second, the boundaries between planners and related professionals (such as real estate developers, urbanists and architects) are not mutually exclusive: planners don't just plan, and non-planners also plan. These argumentations from Campbell and Fainstein tackled the simplest dilemma of planning but failed to distinguish adequately the specific task of planning in the broader forces of urbanization—this makes it harder to recognize what planners can actually do. As a

result, planning as a practical endeavor claims, to a certain degree, to be able to predict the consequences of its actions by providing reliable framework, and this endeavor of reliability is still appreciated and necessary to be made.

As a consequence, planners need to recognize the constraints of what they cannot do before they do what they think they can, and this must be done consciously, prior to practicing their day-to-day work. Theories help us to allow for both professional and intellectual self-reflection. No single paradigm defines the foundation of planning theory. How dangerous can misguided theories be? It is a real situation—much of what planners do today reflects their understanding of practices and their aspirations, melding the planning theories they have read or heard about, or the ideas of others, which in turn were melded theories (Beauregard 1995; Sandercock 1998). The danger of this convenience that we take for granted can be found in practice, in educational textbooks, or even in planning theory—cities that were built are, more or less, clones of one another. This phenomenon is especially recognized in most developing countries. I argue that the core of planning is context-defined instead of fixed—cultural development in different contexts requires planners to define their core work differently. This colonized duplication of planning is the first area that this research will attack.

Furthermore, planning mechanisms cannot be guaranteed only by their political mandate. They also rely on justice and the morals of public consensus. These are fundamental values that a society shares collectively—what planning should do to us and our environment and why, especially in the epoch where we finally realize and accept that we all share a delicate sphere in which everything either seems possible to achieve in a short term or to fail in the next minute. The collective consensus of awareness of our own existence, at this very special moment in human history, cannot be written into a statute of law, regulations, or policy, if our total spiritual level is not yet promoted. Then, there is no longer any meaningful reason for us to continue our task and to claim that we have ideas to make our man-made environment sustainable. Individual awareness of collective consensus is the key to establish the wellbeing for all in our time. Without a doubt, the same spirit should be applied to the domain of planning.

---

## § 2.4 Space and Society: The Implementation of the Planning Practice

---

New social relationships call for new spaces and vice versa. The word “space” has had different meanings through time in the domains of philosophy, mathematics, and science. Not so many years ago, as Henri Lefebvre (1991) pointed out, the word “space” had a strictly geometrical meaning: the idea it evoked was simply that of an

empty area. However, from a philosophical point of view, the modern field of inquiry known as epistemology has adopted the notion that the status of space is that of a “mental thing” or “mental place”. (Social) space is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, while space also continually reproduces society. Such interaction implies that spatial and social conditions influence and evolve together. In addition, being embedded into the abovementioned global-local context, socio-spatial interaction is manifold and its constitution is becoming more complex. Understanding the socio-spatial dialectic interactions is one of the crucial criteria for spatial planning.

### § 2.4.1 Phenomena: The Idea of Space and its Transformation

---

Edward Soja (1996), with his contribution to spatial theory and the field of cultural geography, has updated Lefebvre’s concept of the spatial triad with his own concept of spatial trialectics. Soja clarified the fugue of Lefebvre’s writing of *The Production of Space* by observing that there are three different kinds of spaces: the perceived space of materialized spatial practice; the conceived space which is defined as representations of space; and the lived spaces of representation<sup>4</sup> (Lefebvre 1991: 32-33). Soja saw, in the late 1960s, a more general spatial crisis spreading all over the world and another form of spatial awareness that began to emerge. In comparison with Lefebvre’s notion of spaces, Soja defines a Firstspace as fixed on the concrete materiality of spatial forms, on things that can be empirically mapped; and a Secondspace as conceived in ideas about space in thoughtful re-presentations of human spatiality in mental or cognitive forms (these coincide, more or less, with Lefebvre’s perceived and conceived spaces, with the first often thought of as “real” and the second as “imagined”). Soja then defines a Thirdspace as another way of understanding and acting to change the spatiality of human life, a distinct mode of critical spatial awareness that is appropriate to the new scope and significance being brought about in the re-balanced trialectics of spatiality–historicality–sociality, as well as of spatiality, of spatial thinking, and of the spatial imagination that echoes from Lefebvre’s lived space—a “real-and-imagined” place. Soja challenges us to explore the spaces that such a difference makes and to

---

4 The materialized spatial practices refer to physical and material factors, transfers and interactions that occur in and through space in the way they provide production and social reproduction. Representations of space include all the signs and significations, codes and meanings that allow such material factors and deeds to be spoken of and understood by the discursive terminology of academic spatial disciplines. Finally, spaces of representation are understood as: codes, signs, “spatial discourses”, utopian plans, imaginary landscapes or even material constructions like symbolic spaces, specially designed environments, or places of culture that conceive new meanings and possibilities for spatial disciplines.

avoid falling into the traditional dualism of Firstspace-Secondspace. However, spaces of representation contain all other real and imagined spaces simultaneously. Hence, the notion of “space” here is referring to that which is defined within the domain of the recreation of social production: both “real” and “imagined” social spaces.

The recognition of humanity, with its consciousness, in Lefebvre’s (1991) point of view, has properties that can be adequately summed up by three terms: energy, space, and time, which can be neither conflated nor separated from one another. In order to understand the original argumentation and to elaborate the interrelations between the three terms, herewith I quote Lefebvre.

When we evoke “energy”, we must immediately note that energy has to be deployed within a space. When we evoke “space”, we must immediately indicate what occupies that space and how it does so: the deployment of energy in relation to “points” and within a time frame. When we evoke “time”, we must immediately say what it is that moves or changes therein. Space considered in isolation is an empty abstraction; likewise energy and time. (Lefebvre 1991: 12)

(Social) space is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations; therefore, in the view of Lefebvre, social spaces cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object, because social spaces are the outcome of past actions; they subsume things that are produced and encompass their interrelationships in their coexistences and, simultaneously, order and/or disorder. The major contribution, among others, of Lefebvre is that he claims “space” is the production of society; it is the result of social production. He emphasized that “space” is never produced in the sense that a kilogram of sugar or a yard of cloth is produced. “Space” is a social relationship, and it includes both the formal and the material reality. This means that space as social production, produced as such, cannot be separated from either the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, from the social division of labor which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society.

Therefore, while “space” is produced, the society and the space begin to influence each other. In other words, space also continually reproduces society. The link between space and society, which has been highlighted by Lefebvre (1991), leads us to the understanding that “space” is the product of any activities that involve the economic and technical realms of the society, while at the same time also dwelling in the realm of politics. Thus, it is never a dead end; it is more akin to a dynamic producing and re-producing process.

The dialectic socio-spatiality is consistently developing within its own constitution of the time-space framework. As long as human evolution continues, the socio-spatial dialectic will continue to evolve as well. Therefore, (social) “space”, as the (physical and virtual) body of society is asked to respond permanently, within its own system, to the requirements of societal changes.

In the present Information Age, and with the consequences of globalization, the socio-spatial question arises in cities in a significant new dimension. If social relationships are characterized simultaneously by individualization and communalism, can we conclude in the socio-spatial discourse that (social) space is appropriated simultaneously by both the forces of individualization and of communalism? What socio-spatial characteristics of this interrelationship can be found while both forces interactively claim their roles in the process of spatial transformation? Two notions of space that have been distinguished by Castells (2005) provide us with a constructive interpretation on how the above-mentioned interrelations of spatial transformation can be characterized.

According to Castells (2005: 50), it is necessary to distinguish “space” using two notions: “space of flows” and “space of places.” In order to take the advantage of his original idea, herewith I give his definitions.

The space of flows links up electronically separate locations in an interactive network that connects activities and people in distinct geographical contexts. The space of places organizes experience and activity around the confines of locality.

He underpins that cities are simultaneously structured and unstructured by the competing logics of the space of flows and the space of places. He emphasizes that cities do not disappear into virtual networks, but they are transformed by the interface between electronic communication and physical interaction by the combination of networks and places. Therefore, the spatial transformation evokes the transformation made up within the notion of flows and places and of their relationships.

Let us straighten out the parameters that make up the key elements of socio-spatial changes at a more analytical level. If one parameter is made up of the social integration between individualization and communalism, the second parameter shall be made up of the spatial encounter in our urban experiences of places and flows in both physical and virtual ways. This is to say that spatial transformation has a specific, introverted mode of changing processes that involves both the interaction and participation of participants/actors (individualization and communalism) and their related recreation of space (of places and flows), simultaneously and dynamically.

It is these multiple layers of responding and the interactive process that generate unexpected new socio-spatial constitutions of spatial form and spatial transformation. This new dimension of spatial transformation has unprecedented spatial and social representations in the actual forms and the virtual networks that force us to redefine our behaviors, as well as the ways in which we interact with others.

## § 2.4.2 Challenges: Facing Complexity and Uncertainty

---

While in the arena of our time, it is the dilemma of our discipline that urbanists can easily fall into the narrative of our own, one-sided view; at the same time, unavoidably, we are forced to integrate the insights of other disciplines, especially when the complexity of present spatial issues requires more integration of multi-disciplinary knowledge. However, we should be aware that by integrating other knowledge, we might also lose our main focus. Therefore, it is the priority of this research to focus on the actual appearance of spatial transformation in the real, rather than in the “imagined” world. But this does not mean that to understand and to investigate the driving forces behind the actual spatial performance is less important. On the contrary, it is crucial to investigate and to outline socio-spatial constitutions, in combination with new spatial claims and social demands, as well as the possible tentative and flexible terms that allow us to understand not only the meanings and rapid changes in all dimensions. It is also important, as Soja (1996) emphasizes, to be able to capture what is actually and constantly shifting and changing in the milieu of ideas, events, appearances, and meanings.

This research argues that new social transformations are producing new spatial structures; unexpected, surprising, and illogical spatial formations are emerging on an unprecedented scale. Those unexpected urban formations are constituted within their own mega structures by a livable, self-operational mechanism that is constantly producing new social confrontations and social challenges that are beyond what human logic can follow and urban planning interventions can fully control.

The search for an alternative to overrule the controlling system of master planning, which, ironically, tends to generate fragmented cities without soul or character, is becoming tangible. Another cluster of urban parlances inherits their applications from science and physics, even though they can barely be measured by using traditional urban spatial instruments and be included as one of the indexes in the system of master planning.

For example, Nan Ellin (2006) demonstrated five qualities in her approach of integral urbanism: hybridity, connectivity, porosity, authenticity, and vulnerability. Her intension is to overrule the rational mechanistic approach of the master-planned functionally zoned city and instead, to heal the wounds by expressing and allowing for the soft elements of urbanism.

The idea of “complexity” has been employed to describe the uncertainty characteristics of social spatiality. Even though ideas of complexity have been expressed elsewhere in other ways, a general definition given by Edmonds (1999) is fairly sufficient to summarize “complexity” as “that property of a language expression which makes it difficult to formulate its overall behavior even when given almost complete information

about its atomic components and their inter-relations. Complexity is posited as a mid-point between order and disorder.” (Edmonds 1999: 1) The related but extended insights of “complexity” are called “chaos theory”, which for the last 20 years has been rippling through different scientific disciplines. Later, in the form of so-called “emergence”, they impact radical political theory as well. Comparative theory is also applied through the terms “networks” and “fluid”—these terms have been used as metaphors or as states in which things exist or as processes through which things are transformed (Edmonds 1999; Boudourides 2001).

At the same time, derived from the abovementioned parlances, new urban forms of social spatiality are named and analyzed. Castells (1996; 2009) emphasizes the power of the network society, a society whose social structure is made around networks activated by digitally processed information and communication technologies. Sassen (2002) also indicates how global cities enhance their involvement in globalization by embedding themselves into global networks. Based on the information networks, a comparative approach of analysis can be found by examining the influences in our daily lives. Mitchell (1995) elaborates that we are entering an era of electronically extended bodies living at the intersection points of the physical and virtual world: Cyberspace. Another term that reflects the characteristics of complexity is that of “self-organizing cities”. Such cities are characterized by unpredictable and chaotic behavior, which poses dilemmas to planning, often referring to the confrontation of urban agents and actors involved in the planning process.

Based on the idea of the emerged dynamic forms of socio-spatiality, Juval Portugali (2000) questions whether, in the absence of predictability and control, there can be a meaning to planning. I assume that the answer is still positive. Even though planning is not able to accommodate the demands of the diverse forms of socio-spatiality all at once, yet it is an important criterion to establish an evolutionary planning mechanism that is able to respond to the attempts of understanding unknown social spatiality.

### § 2.4.3 Solutions: Generic City versus Citizen’s City

---

Are we able to outline a critical, but practical urban discourse that provides, as Sennett (1970: 99) suggests, “for the fact of history, for the understanding, for the contradictory, for the unknown” ?

Indeed, new contemporary urban parlances are employed and invented in our discipline to express, understand, and interpret the unknown emergent urban characteristics of social spatiality of our time. These have triggered the development of possible scientific perspectives in order to apply them in design and planning practices.



Christine Boyer's critique in her study of three "big" books of architecture by Rem Koolhaas (S.M.L.XL. 1995), Winny Maas and Jacob Van Rijs (FARMAX 1998), and Ben Van Berkel and Caroline Bos (Move: Liquid Politic 1999) demonstrates that the return of architects to the urban field, after decades of absence, implies a major restructuring of architectural thinking—shifting away from philosophical inquiry towards questions of performance and reception, the design process, and experimentation (Boyer 2005).

Among them, with the use of statistics and equations the leading figure is Koolhaas. He establishes an alternative argument of urbanism. Explanations of the architectural projects of his Office for Metropolitan Architecture are seldom given; instead, the reader is taught to visually explore a wide array of imaginations and texts in an open-ended, questioning manner. Boyer (2005: 158) emphasized that:

With the use of these statistics and equations, in spite of the random and ironical manner in which they are presented, Koolhaas begins to outline an approach for an alternative urbanism of data, graphs and hidden logics. Hoping to understand how information is a form (an in-formation) he therein returns architecture to an intricate play between graphic elements and thinking, symbol manipulation and imagination. The concern is not the reproduction of an exact record of reality, (...) it is a question about the visibility of the argument, how to represent the data according to the rules of graphic specification and how to transform sets of data into planar mappings.

As the privilege of advanced techniques that these advocates of datascares support, planning with information is a form of abstract thinking. Maas and Van Rijs (1998:123) explained they are looking within the chaos of events for the hidden logic that allow gravities to emerge.

Cities can no longer be described as if they are divided into zones, the center or the periphery (...) They have become polynucleated, and built containers of density can erupt at any point in their extended field. Processes shape cities, and cities should be seen as indeterminate soft bodies whose form changes, depending on the gravitational field they occupy and the information they receive.

Their experiences in studying non-Western cities can indicate, to a certain degree analytically, the phenomena that are happening in reality. As Koolhaas (1995: 1016) argued, contrary to William Gibson's<sup>5</sup> remark about Singapore that Singapore stands

---

5

William Gibson, a cyber-fiction author who referred to Singapore as "Disneyland with the Death Penalty".

for something that Westerners can neither imagine nor interpret: it is an effect of the “operational”, of the ability “to make city”—something Western architects have long forgotten.

If there is to be a ‘new urbanism’ it will not be based on the twin fantasies of order and omnipotence; it will be the staging of uncertainty; it will no longer be concerned with the arrangement of the more or less permanent objects but with the irrigation of territories with potential; it will no longer aim for stable configurations but for the creation of enabling fields that accommodate processes that refuse to be crystallized into definitive form. (Koolhaas 1995:969)

The model for the new urbanism according to Koolhaas is the generic city, the city of sprawl, sameness and repetition, the city without history, in every case as much as possible stripped by the decaying historical artifacts. In place of history, continuity and stability generic city emphasizes potentiality, uncertainty and permanent change. Historic places are transformed into ‘enabling fields’, open for changing demands and new appropriation.

The skyscraper looks as if it will be the final, definitive typology. It has swallowed everything else. It can exist everywhere: in a rice field, or downtown – it makes no difference any more. The towers no longer stand together; they are spaced so that they don’t interact. Density in isolation is the ideal. (Koolhaas 1995:970)

A main argument for generic city is according to Koolhaas its success all over the world. “Generic city, the general urban condition, is happening everywhere, and just the fact that it occurs in such enormous quantities must mean that it’s habitable (...) Maybe their very characterlessness provides the best context for living” (Wired 1996:7).

The question is, to what extent habitability is a sufficient condition to provide the best context for living. The attractiveness of generic city at least seems to be contradictory, as Rosemann emphasized:

Generic city may be characterless, but in most cases it shows the strong characteristics of a highly segregated urban society.... Of course it is attractive for the ‘happy few’, the new rich who can afford any luxury and who find in generic city the optimal conditions to live it up. It is habitable, but less and less affordable for the huge army of employees in the offices, shopping malls and other services, who have to extend their working time to the limits to be able to pay their small and bad equipped apartments. It became the ‘only hope’ for those who no longer can survive in the impoverished rural areas, where they come from. For them generic city offers the opportunity to participate at least

on the lowest level in the economic development and to feed their families. For that aim they accept even the most miserable living (and working) conditions. (Rosemann 2012:18)

Considering the rapid changes of our urban society, there is the fundamental value of human interrelationships that cannot be replaced by the digital bits of computer intelligence: the collective sense of memory. Christine Boyer defined this as a sense of tangible face-to-face daily contacts and the city of collective memory should focus on creating meaning and imaginative public space to serve that purpose—“including places for public assemblage and public debates, as well as private memory walks and personal retreats” (Boyer 1994: 9). Also Bekkering (2007:44) argued that memories result in a social and culturally meaningful feeling of belonging:

(...) belonging to a place and a community that shares its surroundings and that feeling. If all goes well, with this comes a shared feeling of responsibility for the state of those surroundings. Neglecting this and breaking down essential parts of the urban environment at some moment will lead to social unrest.

According to Castells the lack of shared meaning and cultural communication is—beside social inequality—the most important reason for disintegration of the city. His argumentation looks like a basic attack on the idea of generic city, although he does not mention it (2005:57).

The great urban paradox of the twenty-first century is that we could be living in a predominantly urban world without cities - that is, without spatially based systems of cultural communication and sharing of meaning, even conflictive sharing. Signs of the social, symbolic, and functional disintegration of the urban fabric multiply around the world as do the warnings from analysts and observers from a variety of perspectives.

To overcome this paradox Castells allocates major tasks both to urban planners and to architects. On the one hand planning in his view has to deal with the ability of the region to operate in the space of flows, to ensure the connectivity both on intra- and on intermetropolitan level. On the other hand it has “to structure the space of places as living space and to ensure the connection and the complementarity between the economy of the metropolitan region and the quality of life of its dwellers” (Castells 2005:59).

Architects (and urban designers) in this framework have the task to generate meaningful places.

Restoring symbolic meaning is a fundamental task in a metropolitan world in a crisis of communication. This is the role that architecture has traditionally assumed. It is more important than ever. Architecture of all kinds must be called to rescue in order to recreate symbolic meaning in the metropolitan region, marking places in the space of flows. (...) architecture per se cannot change the function, or even the meaning, of a whole metropolitan area. Symbolic meaning has to be inserted in the whole fabric of the city, and this is, as I will argue shortly, the key role of urban design. (Castells 2005: 59)

In an article about the formation of the West Coast Metropolitan Region of Taiwan also Hsia emphasizes the importance of local cultures and meaningful places. Against the idea of generic city as the urban condition of a globalized economy, giving space to almost unlimited flexibility, he developed the idea of citizen's city, the city of the democratic society. "In the trend of political democratization, the birth of a citizen's city has advanced the time for a dependent city in a developing country. One could argue that any significant urban reform must react based on the initiative of citizen participation through policy and institutional responses." (Hsia 2009: 76)

Like Castells Hsia (2009:76) underpins the necessity to connect the local conditions with the global demands.

There is an opportunity to match the contesting urban meanings between the "use value" pursuit of a citizen's city and the "innovative value" pursuit of the technological upgrade as an innovative node in a learning region. (...) The use value of urban space and urban fascination of space would support the function of a node for the milieu of innovation. This is one of the conditions of a competitive home base.

However, according to Hsia the home base still is a place of permanency and sustainability, providing the fascination of the space of places, and empowered citizens and cities are the major attractions to reconstitute the urbanity.

I would like to make a tentative conclusion. Although notions and discussions elaborated in this chapter partly are related to the new urban conditions in China (and Taiwan), they are mainly originated from the Western context. The debate about the practice of urban planning and design ends up in two contradictory concepts: the idea of generic city as the expression of the globalized economy, offering seamless flexibility and adaptability, and the idea of citizen's city, where the demands of global flows are bridged with local conditions, where symbolic meaning becomes recreated, based on local identity and citizen participation. We have to investigate to what extent these two concepts are reflected in the recent planning culture in China.

## § 2.5 Hypotheses and Research Questions.

In the previous chapter, the idea of planning culture and the relevant theories are elaborated, which defines the major content of the themes that planning culture comprises, namely 1) the transformation of the society, 2) the transformation of the planning system and 3) the implementation of the planning system in practice. In the following chapter this trinity of research entrances is used to develop the hypothesis and research questions with regard to the investigation of the changes in the planning culture in China.

### § 2.5.1 Main Hypothesis and Sub-Hypotheses

Main hypothesis:

*The recent changes in Chinese society are demonstrating a fundamental change in planning culture, integrating the specific perceptions and meanings of space in China, as well as the Chinese planning traditions and philosophies. The new planning culture re-defines the role of the state, the market, and civil society in the planning process in order to generate a new balance between centralization and participation (Mannheim, 1935) and between flexibility and reliability.*

In replacing the top-down approach of the Maoist period, the new planning culture has to fulfill contradictory demands:

- to generate a reliable framework for sustainable long-term development;
- to guide the initiatives of different public and private actors;
- to generate flexibility for new and unexpected developments;
- to allow for influence of private initiatives and civil participation.

In this framework, planning strategies have to be developed, on the one hand under the circumstances of inevitably increasing uncertainties in society, to generate the flexibility for new and unexpected developments in order to cope with the emerging complexity; on the other hand, to confront the unpredictability and uncertainty of initiatives from diverse public and private actors by generating and building up a reliable framework for sustainable long-term developments.

Further, this research argues, with respect to the transformation of the society in countries like contemporary China, that planning embodiments (method, ideology, aim, instruments, etc.) must be understood and used as not only political-economic intervention instruments for intervention, but also as spatial agents in order to mediate the changing confrontations of socio-spatial demands embedded in the cultural domain, instead of being used only as a top-down dominating intervention tool in the political-economical domain.

In order to understand the rapid transformation of the contemporary urban development in China, the research is reaching in two main directions.

- To outline the new planning culture within the embodiment of Chinese political, societal and cultural context.
- To explore to what extent the new Chinese transformation is adapting to fulfill the demand of planning between reliability and flexibility in contemporary spatial intervention processes.

The main hypothesis leads to the following sub-hypotheses.

*Sub-hypothesis 1:* The transformation of the Chinese society under the conditions of urbanization and globalization triggers the emergence of a new societal culture. This transformation cannot break off the evolution of modernization in relation to the historical roots, traditional norms and value systems of Chinese society.

The interactions between the emergence of global forces and local cultural roots are dynamically influencing and transforming Chinese society. This involute involvement is defined in the research as the “cultural turn” of the society. The specific characteristics of the cultural turn of Chinese society result in a more layered and hybrid mode of urban development in comparison to Western countries. In its modern history China experienced in rather short time a number of fundamental changes of the political system: from the ancient empire via colonial occupation, the development of the Republic, the civil war and the People’s republic in 1949. However, the societal system, the living conditions and lifestyles of the majority of the people, although heavily affected by the political changes, are much more characterized by continuity with the cultural roots and traditions of Chinese society. The cultural turn of the last decennia is a fast catching-up of social, economic and political developments on diverse levels, generating simultaneous changes in different layers in place of consecutive developments over time.

*Sub-hypothesis 2:* The transformation of the Chinese society—defined as the “cultural turn”—is an on-going process that is leading the country towards a society in which urban development and spatial planning are confronted with the increasing tension between the public and private claims.

The planning formation, including planning system, structure and procedures, has to be adjusted. The demands for change are not limited to a technical adaption of the planning system, its legal status and the related regulations. They include the redefinition of the role of the public and private realm in urban development, and the involvement of the different participants as well. In this way, Chinese urban planning will change its role from a top-down regulation system to an arena of negotiation.

*Sub-hypothesis 3:* The implementation of planning in practice in China now is facing the challenge to keep a balance between political and societal demands in relation to the planning outcome.

Space as a social product is becoming the embodiment of the collective ethos of actions from both “individuation” and “communalism” in the society. Both actors take initiatives to (re-)shape the spatial environment, sometimes in a contradictory way. Planning intervention, where policies are taking in consideration how the aims, concerns, methods, and enactment are enforced from top down, is asked to mediate the spatial demands of the collective actions of the “individuation” and “communalism” from bottom up. Both agents interact within the transformation of Chinese society and influence the planning outcome. The tension of the interaction creates the Chinese planning culture in transition, in which a new type of urbanism is emerging.

*Sub-hypothesis 4:* In order to combat the uncertainty of the transitional stage, planning between flexibility and reliability may sound like an ambiguous concept but is instead a tangible approach for China to pursue further development. In particular, it originates from the state-of-the-art of Chinese philosophical thinking, the wisdom that already existed for thousands of years in Chinese culture.

Due to the fact that the Chinese society is still under construction, faults and risks can only be attempted to overcome by collective participations between the diverse actors involved in a more transparent, reflexive-democratic planning process. The ideas like generic city and citizen’s city are practiced in Chinese urban development like a socio-political project, which is still strongly embedded into the specific political formation of China. To what extent social interaction and integration can be managed in balance by the political supervision (and planning intervention) is the most critical challenge awaiting Chinese modernity. At this stage, the tailor-made reflexive modernity of Chinese urban development necessarily remains undefined.

## § 2.5.2 Main Research Question and Sub Questions:

---

Following the hypotheses, this study's main research question is:

*How does urban planning in contemporary China face the challenges of the emergent urban evolution within the current world society?*

Additional sub questions related to the main questions are:

*The transformation of the society:*

1. What is the characteristic of the recent "cultural turn" in contemporary China?
2. How is it related to the historical development of China?

*The transformation of the planning system:*

3. Which changes and challenges have the "cultural turn" generated for Chinese urban development and planning?
4. How has the planning system been adapted to the new situation?
  - What kinds of planning institution have been installed?
  - What are the responsibilities and tasks?
  - What kinds of plan have been developed?

*The implementation of the planning system in practice:*

5. Which new challenges have the implementation of the planning system confronted on the level of local execution?
6. How does the planning intervention contribute to the reshaping of the social-spatial urban development between different spatial demands of actors?
  - What kind of constraints and shortcomings can be recognized?
  - To what extent should the planning intervention allow for changing circumstances?



## § 2.6 Methodological Framework and Research Design

Extracting from the thematic framework and the understanding of the planning culture, corresponding to the research questions and relative hypotheses that are elaborated, hereby the analytical framework of the research structure is built. By using the idea of “planning culture” as central to building up the analytical framework, this structure is used to guide the research and to avoid distraction. Within the analytical framework of the research, the main research object focuses on the Chinese planning evolution. It concerns in relation to the idea of planning culture three research clusters: 1) the transformation of the society. 2) The transformation of the planning system. 3) The implementation of the planning system in practice. These three clusters of research entrance are defined as three parameters: societal context, the planning formation, and the planning outcome. These parameters are placed within the methodological framework sequentially and interactively. They are used to guide the research directions and define the composition of the following chapters.

The first parameter the societal context includes two components: the first is the elaboration of ancient roots and philosophies in China. The purpose is to shed light upon the political and societal disputation of the current situation, based on Chinese tradition from the angle of norms and values of thoughts (Chapter 3). The second component is embedded in the evolution of the Chinese modernization movement. Given how, throughout the evolution of Chinese modernization, the cultural turn is triggered by the momentum of political–economic interests (in a short-term time span) and accommodated by the evolution of the society (in a long-term time span), the importance is to link the interaction between these two forces in Chinese history to the extension of the contemporary development (Chapter 4).

The second parameter the planning formation explores the formation of the planning of contemporary China. It includes two components as well: the first component gives the context of transformation after the 1980s, with the initial political-economic-social and spatial aspects (Chapter 5). Then we zoom in on the planning formation (Chapter 6). It includes, firstly, the planning structure: the aims and concerns of planning in its ideological and visionary aspects. Secondly, the planning system includes legal system and spatial policy that are used to realize the abovementioned aims and concerns. Thirdly, the establishment of statutory planning includes the illustration of the execution of the planning procedure and the implementation.

Based on the third parameter the planning outcome, the focus is on planning practice for reality and comes down to the execution level. The purpose is to explore following the contextual background elaborated in parameter one: societal context and the top–down new planning formation elaborated in parameter two; how the emerged spatial appropriation of users, with respect to their new spatial claims and demands,

are transforming in reality. Chapter 7 sheds light on how the planning implementation in Shenzhen has to respond in parallel to the national scope and at the same time can contribute to adapting the emerging local demands. To achieve the analysis on the micro-execution level, three cases studies are selected with the criteria that they tackle the interaction between the planned the emergent attitudes. In the three case studies, the mode of planning intervention, the participation of citizens and stakeholders, between agents and actors who are involved in the planning process, their interactions within the planning system, and their roles within the decision making of planning are explored (Chapter 8).

### § 2.6.1 Setting the Analytical Framework

---

Even though the abovementioned three parameters, in correspondence with the respective research questions, define the major analytical framework of this research, they are inevitably interacting with each other, regarding the unalienable relationship between them. They do not provide an enclosed and linear structure.

The three major parameters together create the connection that shapes the conceptual outline of the Chinese planning culture. In addition, there are constraints to be overcome. For example, when the transformation of a society begins, according to the statistic data it is easy to define the new role of the actors through their various involvements in the planning process and the process of transformation of society; however, the idea of how their identifies evolve and establish themselves in spatial domains is much more hidden and blurred.

Another example: once a farmer becomes a citizen, his social status can be clearly defined, including his right of citizenship, his occupation, his status in his living environment, etc. However, it is much more difficult to draw a clear picture of how and in which way his urban spatial behavior is different from his non-urban spatial behavior because human behavior is a more complex process of evolution than changes of identity on official documents. It is a learning process that involves a complex and emotional self-reflection. The same process of reflection can also be applied in the case of planners. The reason is very often that they separate themselves from the plans they made as well as their participation in the planning process and planning realization. However, these subjects are not the main concerns of this research, even though they are also important in the urban transformation processes.

In order to provide a consistent contextual background, a chronological order is used to make connections between the evolution of the Chinese modernization movement and the transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5),

and between the initial reformations of contemporary China after the 1980s and the birth of Shenzhen as an base for experiments (Chapter 5 and Chapter 7)<sup>6</sup>.

At the same time, it is important to mention that, between the context and the outcome in treatment of each parameter, a looping and clustering system is applied. This means, content-wise, that different components based on the three parameters also re-modify new clusters within the analytical framework. Therefore, processing the setting of the overall analytical framework of the research based on the idea of planning culture, from the very beginning, is used to provide linkage and sequential and interactive relations between the individual components of the parameters. The analytical framework zooms in from the broader scope and scale to the case under study.

In order to set up the analytical framework of planning culture, the three parameters are integrated into the looping and cluster system within the overall analytical framework. The description of their interactions is highlighted below:

As mentioned in the conceptual characteristics of the content of the analytical framework, the three parameters interact with each other sequentially in a loop, and the relationship within each parameter is composed by a different cluster system.

Looping system: The first parameter: the societal context (the forces that trigger a cultural turn) and the second parameter: the new planning formation (the changing planning system) are continually interactive in a loop. The same is the case with the second parameter: the planning formation (the changing planning system) and the third parameter: the planning outcome (the socio-spatial outcome of planning).

Joint-cluster: The first parameter, the societal context (the forces that trigger cultural turn), is embedded in a broader cluster of Chinese traditional and historical values, norms, and philosophies that defines the embodiment of "cultural turn." The second parameter, the new planning formation (the changing planning system), is embedded in a broader scope of the overall initial reformation in socio-political and economic aspects. The third parameter, the planning outcome (the socio-spatial outcome of planning) evolves within the local planning execution. Each parameter is dealt with in two chapters: one is giving a broader contextual disclosure (Chapter 3, 5 and 7) while a paired chapter reflects on a specific subject (Chapter 4, 6 and 8).

---

6

These contextual backgrounds provide framework of narratives, as mentioned in Chapter 2.3.3.

## § 2.6.2 Methodological Approaches and Concerns

---

In accordance with the analytical framework of planning culture, the overall research design comprises five components: next to Part I Introduction and Part V Conclusion, Part II, Part III and Part IV apply methodological approaches.

*Part II: Cultural and Historical Review* is focused on the spatial themes that are related to the Chinese traditions and the historical momentum of Chinese modernization. In this framework, the following topics are elaborated:

- Historical spatial discourse in China, its traditions and philosophies;
- The evolution of modernization in China;
- Societal changes and urban developments in historical Chinese evolution.

*Part III: Initial Reforms and the Re-modification of the Planning Formation* is focused on the planning transformation of contemporary China after the 1980s. In this framework, we are concerned with the following topics:

- Initial reforms in multi-dimensional aspects after the transformation of the 1980s;
- The planning transformation of China including the changing role of planning, the mode of governance and the planning formation;
- Planning mechanism and planning system.

*Part IV Planning Practice and the emerged Socio-Spatial Challenges* is given to the case study of the city of Shenzhen city in the Pearl River Delta. The following topics are elaborated:

- The history of Shenzhen and its establishment related to the opening-up of China;
- The planning procedures and planning documents in a time-line;
- Comparison between intended and realized development, related to urban development and public participation;

Based on the outcomes of the general research of the Shenzhen development, three projects are selected for in-depth analyses of the planning realization, the different actors involved, the fine-tuning between different public planning institutions and between public and private planning, the intended and realized spatial qualities, and the weaknesses, constraints, and contradictions of the planning process.

The scheme of the methodological approach and the composition of the assembling chapters are illustrated in the diagram below (Figure 2.1)




Figure 2.1 The overall methodological framework and the analytical framework of the research. Constructed by author.

### § 2.6.3 Review of other Analytical Models of Planning Culture

---

The analytical framework of this research is based on the specific research questions in the specific case of China and structured by the idea of planning culture. Inspiration has come from the input of the other two diagrammatic schemes that were proposed by Ng Mee Kam (1999) and by Joerg Knieling and Frank Othengrafen (2007). Herewith, it is necessary to review their original analytical schemes that help give the research its specific approach.

Firstly, in a comparative study of the political economies and urban planning systems of Hong Kong, Taipei, and Singapore, Ng (1999) argues that legacies of world history, globalization, and technological development interact with domestic histories and culture to shape the local socio-economic and spatial development. She translates the idea of planning culture into a tentative theoretical framework, which is useful to make comparative studies between the different urban regions under an analytical structure of planning (Figure 2.2). In her tentative theoretical framework, she underlines the fact that changing planning formations have to deal with the different social formations, in which the powers and resources within and among the different agents/actors are accumulated.

In comparison to her analytical scheme, in this research, in order to outline the planning culture of China, the analytical framework is organized by the parameters of investigation that associate with the research questions. In addition, as a new application of the idea of planning culture, this analytical framework focuses on the consistency of building up the overall interpretation more than to provide a methodology for comparison. Therefore, the research has to go through each step of planning scale—not only on the level of interaction between the political–social environment and the planning mechanism, but also to focus on a specific region and elaborated cases. To explore how the shift of the preferable governmental planning has given its impact comes down to the spatial performance of planning in reality. This is also the reason why the research is concerned, beside the individual research questions, with the three mentioned parameters, to outline the planning culture by using one case in one region and in a specific, limited time span.




Figure 2.2 Political economy and urban planning: A tentative theoretical framework.  
 Source: Modified from NG (1999), Figure 1.

Secondly, Knieling and Othergrafen (2007) have built an analytical model in order to translate the idea of planning culture into a scheme of what concerns planning achievement in relation to their different focuses (Figure 2.3). In their model, three layers of planning concerns were distinguished as to their scale, with different focuses. Different issues and concerns are clustered into three scales, from the micro- to macro-planning environments. The concerns of actors, instruments and mandating are situated in the micro scale together with concerned issues of more specific focus on project-oriented. At the other extreme contrary, the issues about the significance of society such as basic values and norms are situated in the macro-scales of societal environment and with more concerns of context-oriented achievement. Their model shares coherent insights with the previously mentioned debates in the division between planning process and planning context and other aspects. However, their proposed model remains on a conceptual level. Instead of a model that leads to a methodological approach they emphasize the sequence of issues that emerge in the domain of planning culture.




Figure 2.3 Analytical model of Planning Culture of Knieling and Othergrafen  
 Source: Knieling and Othergrafen (2007).

These two analytical models both evaluate the contextual characteristics and describe the themes chosen to be related. The essential idea of planning culture is to unfold the contextual consequences, and to place a planning discourse into a broader contextual picture. The contextual revelation is the state-of-the-art of the idea of planning culture. It is not used to measure any quantity, but the measure of capacity to disclose—particularly—the cultural perspective. In this research, this clarification is a crucial explanation to regard why the nit-picking contextual materials in different chapters are tenaciously presented.

## § 2.6.4 Highlights of the Major Contents of the Research

Before we proceed further into the main research body, in each chapter, some important accents need to be underlined in advance.

*The societal context: The transformation of China*

In Part II, the general contextual background of the Chinese modern movement reflects on how Chinese urban development was affected by the emergence of modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and (post)-colonization. This layered development is



my primary standpoint to regard the period of transformation after the opening-door in 1978, which I defined as a “cultural turn”—a transitional momentum in Chinese modern history. The reason to include Chinese ancient roots and philosophies is to lay out the ground for understanding the ethos of Chinese tradition, which has been undermined due to a variety of historical matters during the last two centuries. The result is that much valuable wisdom and thought, in particular linked to the authentic spatiality, had no opportunities to develop under the constraints of these historical matters into modern use as systematic knowledge. In order that society can be modernized. It explains why those ideas are barely applied in the spatial interventions of the cases that are elaborated later. However, this does not mean they have been completely forgotten, on the contrary, they are hidden in the veins of society and the people. Further, we can find many current political-societal characteristics are strongly rooted in Chinese tradition.

These cultural and historical backgrounds are crucial clues in this research because the hybrid characteristic of Chinese historical evolution—although they come from different aspects of the past, to access and to dissect the dynamic contemporary transformation. No matter how we try to interpret this transformation by following a logic structure and wish to grope for evidence and proof, I suggest the readers to put away the anxiety of fact-finding, and instead to maneuver through materials that are provided, without any kind of prejudices, to recognize a non-occidental evolution of Chinese planning culture.

### *The Planning Formation: The Planning System in China*

In Part III, the intention is to provide a portrait of the initial reformations in a comprehensive scope. The focus is on the essential consequence of the contemporary spatial development. Initial political, economic, social and spatial reformations give the clues as to how the role of the planning system in China has been (re-) defined and (re-) modified.

Following the general contextual background, the second part of the analysis is devoted to exploring the Chinese planning system in transition. This part of research emphasizes the planning formation, including the planning systems, planning approaches, planning mechanisms, planning methods, and so on. Special focus is given to the illustration of how the re-modification of planning formation took place after the Maoist period. What planning mechanisms were built? What planning institutes were installed? What planning methods were applied? What had the new planning mode introduced between the decision-making, participation of actors, and planning implementation?

This part of study reveals the reformation from the top-down initiatives, and explores what kind of planning ideology the government applies. The content is used in this

research for two purposes: to relate the transformation after 1980s to the broader historical evolution, and to lay out the ground for the later discussion of case studies in Shenzhen, in both contextual and planning implementation aspects.

*The Planning Outcome: The Application of Chinese Planning Systems in Shenzhen Project Analyses*

I chose to use the city of Shenzhen as a case study. By no means is Shenzhen a standard example for the recent processes of urban transformation in China. On the contrary, in fact, the city is a rather extreme example of Chinese urbanization. Below I will explain the reason for this choice.

Shenzhen was built up following the market-liberation policies of the early 1980s. It represents an experiment to implement and test the effects of market-economy principles that, till that time, had been barely recognized and never applied during the planned-economy era of the communist regime. In the context of these special circumstances, many new strategies and approaches for urban development were introduced that were driven by the dynamics of a free market. The result was that new institutions for spatial planning had to be established in order to meet the new demands of urban development, as well as to adapt the older existing planning system during the transitional phase. Shenzhen's experience demonstrates that the role of spatial planners and planning institutions, as well as the approaches and methodologies in spatial planning, have been transformed.

It is crucial to understand that without the societal changes from planned to market-economy Shenzhen would not have been built. Recently, for various reasons, many other Chinese cities have been appointed as experimental bases for new principles in spatial planning, following the Shenzhen model. So the case of Shenzhen to a certain level shows the rise of a new Chinese society in general. A society in which, on the one hand, the traditional top-down structure is crumbling, and, on the other hand, a more open society is demanded. Spatial planning must reflect the changes within a society, and therefore it must promote the continuous redefinition of itself. In this sense, Shenzhen can be described as a highly relevant case for tackling the question of transforming the spatial planning culture in China. The major purpose is to analyze under which conditions the Shenzhen experience has demonstrated a new planning culture for China on the implementation level.

Three thematic projects were chosen to show the range from the top-down to the bottom-up initiatives with regard to their effects on planning (design control) and design outcome. They represent the different relations between the planned approach and emergent approach and, furthermore, to demonstrate how the planned approach is confronting the emergent approach in the spatial dimension, what result is reflected in the spatial performance, and what is the interaction between the spatial

performance and the social status. They demonstrate a common characteristic of how the top-down planning ideology is asked to adjust, coordinate, and compromise on the execution level in accordance with emerging bottom-up conditions.



## PART 2 Cultural and Historical Review

The culture and the historical evolution interactively shape the thinking of a society and from this derive the socio-political formation, of which planning culture is a part.

What constitutes a socio-political formation? Culture, which contains elements of persistence and changes in various relations, lays the ground for a society to evolve. With regard to the Chinese civilization, historically, but not too long ago, the country has suffered many vicissitudes, yet, associated cultural evolution continued.

This part reveals that Chinese philosophies are basically intended to draw the consonance between the moral order and the political order. Thus the way that Chinese civilization evolves in its modernization is different from that of the Western, liberal countries. As spatial development is strongly influenced by the cultural determinants of the specific Chinese socio-political formation, this legitimizes the state-society integration as its essential socio-cultural system.

The crucial notion in this part following the setting of the first parameter societal context is to access and to dissect the roots of Chinese socio-political sector through the philosophical and historical contextual investigations in its culture.

### 3 Ancient Roots and Philosophies

Each country has its own special historical background, cultural heritage, political system, and level of economic development, in which the cities are built. Together, these lead people to different realizations and different standards, as conditions differ greatly between developed and developing countries and the people's understanding, needs, and attitudes. Therefore, the embodiment of ancient roots and philosophies should not be underestimated.

Even though for many the pursuit of modernization may emphasize the significance of economic development and take modernization as industrialization with a high level of science and technology, others attach more importance to changes in socio-political systems and connect modernization with their reform. Compared with economics, sociology, law and other humanities, as well as natural sciences and technology, philosophy may at first seem far from the realities of people's practical social life, and therefore far from the real movement of modernization. But on the contrary, this heritage of a value system does not fade out with time.

This chapter reveals the ancient Chinese philosophies, embedded between the two extreme poles of the value system: on the one hand, the ritual principle—based on moral ontology, and on the other, the state hegemony—based on the routinization of charisma, which is supported by emphasizing on social orders and regulations.

The evolution of Chinese civilization is derived both from the Chinese ancient spiritual and ethical values, and from the emphasis on the political and social orders. Interactively these values also were used to steer the spatial norms for building cities.

Further, the chapter underlines a profound difference of cultural evolution in Chinese history in comparison to Western-democratic countries, also in the spatial domain. This Chinese ancient specialty of spatial paradigm can still be recognized in Chinese society now, however, due to the break of historical matters, they have never been established into a systematic discourse for modern use.

## § 3.1 Cosmology: Spatial Conception and Environmental Harmony

人法地, 地法天, 天法道, 道法自然.

Man follows the Earth, the Earth follows Heaven, Heaven follows *Dao*, and *Dao* follows Nature<sup>7</sup> (Lao Tzu 600 B.C.).

In Chinese civilization, like in many other great civilizations, the birth of the city heralds the might of the states and empires, marks the boundary between history and pre-history, and announces the arrival of higher religion. Indeed, the great divide between civilization and savagery is in the constitution of urban settlements, in which most human inventions are born.

As a centuries-old civilization, China has accumulated abundant ideas and philosophies to interpret, define, and evolve the way in which humans perceive their surroundings. Not only have these comprehensions been applied to define the spiritual and ethical values of the society, they have also been used to steer the spatial norms to build cities.

### § 3.1.1 Man and Nature

Cosmology starts with the question of how people perceive the world around them. In every culture the people must first of all deal with their natural environment. Their daily basic confrontation is between “Man and Nature”. That people should form a community or a society arises from the primary need of man to cope with nature, so as to protect and develop them. Man has to find the specific meaning of his very own existence, in order to develop his being in the vast cosmological environment. Therefore, social ethics are derived from the relation between “Man and Nature”. The diverse behavioral responses to the essential definition of “Man and Nature” influence the features of particular cultures, especially their modes of thinking, basic philosophical hypotheses, and value systems.

7

Lao Tzu (Chinese: 老子) (ca. 600 B.C.) was a philosopher of ancient China, best known as the author of the *Tao Te Ching* (simplified Chinese: 道德经; Traditional Chinese: 道德經). His association with the *Tao Te Ching* has led him to be traditionally considered the founder of philosophical Taoism (pronounced as “Daoism”).

According to Chen Kuide (1989: 131), referring to ancient Greek civilization, the basic hypotheses, values systems, and modes of thinking that dominated the various cultures were approximately established during the so-called “classical times”<sup>8</sup> (about 500 B.C.). He pointed out that a correlation between the natural environment and culture seems undeniable and that ancient Greek civilization, one of the sources of Western culture, supports this point of view. His theory is that the human awareness of the relationship between “Man and Nature” is among the essential elements that form early civilization. Even though one cannot simply imply the same logic to other cultures, his emphasis on the hostility of natural circumstances nevertheless seems, to a certain degree, to reflect also the natural circumstances in which Chinese civilization came into being.

Chinese ancient philosophies flourished for the first time from 770 to 221 B.C. after the decline of royal power, the disintegration of slavery, and the aristocratic culture of monopoly was broken in the Western Zhou Dynasty (1100–771 B.C.) while a large numbers of newly established powers came into being. This is an era of great cultural and intellectual expansion in China. Even though this period—known in its earlier part as the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period<sup>9</sup>—in its latter part was fraught with chaotic and bloody battles between the divided kingdoms, it is also known as the Golden Age of Chinese philosophy, because a broad range of thoughts and ideas were developed and discussed liberally. The fundamental philosophies that influence Chinese culture from the past to the present mostly emerged in this period.

This was an era of harsh contention between the divided kingdoms and it was full of great social changes. These social changes spread culture among the people. The intellectual society of this era was characterized by itinerant scholars, who were often employed by various state rulers as advisers on the methods of government, war, and diplomacy. Intellectuals of this period had to face the reality of social problems, life issues, and proposed solutions developing new ideas. With a result unconventional theories and ideas emerged. Numerous thinkers constantly provided their own strategies for governing the state. Those ambitious enough took the salvation of the world as their responsibility and offered their political propositions, one after another. Some of them set of journeys among different states to offer advice to the rulers;

---

8 Chen Kuide referred to ancient Greek civilization, for the Greeks attached great importance to the natural environment and its influence.

9 The Eastern Zhou (770 up to 256 B.C.) period, characterized by a breakup of Zhou territory into states that were essentially independent, is further divided into two sub-periods. The first, from 770 to 476 B.C., is called the Spring and Autumn Period; the second is known as the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.).



some opened private schools and devoted themselves to writing books; some were unconventional and unrestrained and showed their concerns for worldly life in the form of criticism; some assisted the rulers in governing the states.

In this way, the term of “contention of a hundred schools of thought”<sup>10</sup> (*Paichiachengming* or “hundred schools contend”) has emerged. This period of history is called the “Pre-Qin” period<sup>11</sup>—the hundred schools of thought (Chu Tzu Pai Chia, literally “all philosophers hundred schools”). Important scholars were Lao Tzu, Confucius, Chuang Tzu, Mo Tzu, Mencius, Xun Tzu, and others; different academic schools were formed, including Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, and Legalism. The Spring and Autumn–Warring States Period was a time of great liberation of mind and people of talent emerged in rapid succession. The thoughts and ideas discussed and refined during this period have profoundly influenced lifestyles and social consciousness in China up to the present day.

During this period, different schools of thought had built up their hypotheses regarding the issue of the relationship between “Man and Nature.” The relationship between “Heaven and Man” has been explained by different theories in traditional Chinese philosophy. Most ancient Chinese thinkers believed that the little cosmos of man and the great cosmos of *Tian-Di* share the same natural feature: the two are correlative, as is expressed by the term: Unity of Man with Nature. *Tian* in Chinese means Nature, Heaven, and laws of Nature, and *Di* refers to Earth.

What is called “Heaven” (*Tian*) in ancient China had various implications, but after the middle period of the Warring States (453–221 B.C.), most thinkers meant mainly Nature by Heaven. In general, what most thinkers refer to as “Heaven” is the vast objective world and its vast nature; “Man” refers to mankind or human society. The best principle for man to follow is nothing other than Nature, or *Tian-Di*. Doctrines that concern the relationship between “Heaven and Man” in Chinese philosophy can be divided into two types—one type comparatively stresses the unity of “Heaven and Man,” while the other stresses the separation of the two.

Among these, the idea of Lao Tzu’s basic hypothesis has strongly influenced Chinese ideas on how human beings should regard their positions in relation to the cosmological environment. Lao Tzu founded his philological system centering on *Tao* (Way)—an absolute, overriding spirit transcending time and space and encompassing the whole universe. He advocated “*Wu Wei*,” literally “non-action” or “not acting”—

---

10 *Paichiachengming* (simplifies Chinese: 百家争鸣; Traditional Chinese: 百家爭鳴).

11 This period ended with the rise of the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C.–206 B.C.) and the subsequent purge of dissent.

letting things take their own course—and suggested defeating the strong with suavity, conquering the firm with gentleness. He phrased “the highest excellence is like (that of) water”<sup>12</sup>. These are central concepts of the Tao. The concept of *Wu Wei* is very complex and reflected in the words’ multiple meanings. Even in English translation, it can mean “not doing anything”, “not forcing”, “not acting” in the theatrical sense, “creating nothingness”, “acting spontaneously”, and “flowing with the moment”.

Chuang Tzu (369–286 B.C.), as the most recognized successor of Lao Tzu, advocated that nature was originally harmonious and perfect, but after man acquired knowledge and invented their techniques, nature’s harmonious and perfect state of being was destroyed. Hence, the basic principle of life is to follow the course of nature, instead of adding anything to it artificially. His skeptical philosophy and advocacy of what we now might call “anarchism” may extremely underestimate the meaning of man’s initiative. Nevertheless, the Taoist demand that no damage be made blindly to nature and that no destruction be inflicted upon things is a significant warning to civilized society (Zhang Dainian 1989).

Confucianism presents a watershed of philosophical thinking on how man perceives the world surrounding him/her and the attitude towards Nature, different from that of Taoism. According to Mencius (ca. 372–289 B.C.), another Chinese philosopher, and arguably the most famous Confucian after Confucius himself, human nature is given by Heaven. “The union of Heaven and Earth gives birth to all things” comes from Mencius, who put forward the proposition that “to know (human) nature is to know Heaven.” Heaven, in Mencius’ sense, has a double meaning: both the supreme ruler and the supreme law of necessity.

In opposition to, and critical of, Chuang Tzu, Hsun Tzu (ca. 312–235 B.C.) stressed the importance of transforming Nature, and believed the meaning of man’s initiative to be the ability to comprehend the transformation of Nature. It is his belief that the idea of human life should be “to form an overview of both Heaven and Earth and make full use of all things there”; “to utilize to the fullest all things covered by Heaven and carried by Earth”, in order to transform Nature and make use of everything in order to improve human life (Zhang Dainian 1989). Hsun Tzu distinguishes what is born in Man and what must be learned through rigorous education. He rejects Mencius’ notion that Heaven has a moral will. Instead, he asserts that Heaven is simply the natural world; thus, people should focus on the human social realm, rather than dealing with heavenly ideas. He also emphasizes the discussion of Ritual Propriety (*Li*)<sup>13</sup> and enumerates the rules of individual and social conduct (decorum).

---

12 *Tao Te Ching* (simplified Chinese: 道德经; Traditional Chinese: 道德經), chapter 8.

13 *Li*, Ritual Propriety (simplified Chinese: 礼; traditional Chinese: 禮)

In general, different thinkers share quite a few basic elements: Man is born of Heaven and Earth and enjoys an outstanding position between Heaven and Earth. For example, *Yi Zhuan*<sup>14</sup>, a theoretical work of the Confucian school, also illustrated that the *Tao* of Man, by means of the *Tao* of *Tian*, regarded Heaven, Earth, and Man as “the three gifts”, clearly affirming man’s significant position between Heaven and Earth. *Xiao Jing*<sup>15</sup> thus recorded the remarks of Confucius: “Man is the most valuable according to the nature of Heaven and Earth.” Hsun Tzu illustrated man’s value: Fire and water have energy but no life; grass and trees have life but no sense; birds and beasts have sense but no righteousness. Man however, has all of them: energy, life, sense and also righteousness. On the basis of the theory of *Yi Jing Ba Gua*<sup>16</sup>, Chang Tsia (1020–1077 A.D.), a Chinese Neo-Confucian moral philosopher and cosmologist, emphasized “*Qian* (Heaven) is father while *Kun* (Earth) is mother. People are born of the same parents as mine; and things are my companions.”<sup>17</sup>

The idea that Man has his outstanding position between Heaven and Earth (Tian-Di) also brings up the idea of what attitude Man should take towards Nature. Zhang Dainian (1989) emphasized that, in the primitive society, people did not possess self-consciousness and perceived no distinction or opposition between Man and Nature. Only after the dawn of civilization was Man distinguished from Nature, and only then was the distinction and opposition between the two fully realized. This is the important watershed in the development of human civilization, resulting in what is called human self-consciousness. How does this development of self-consciousness enhance human value in the entire cosmos—between Heaven and Earth (Tian-Di)—and generate the special mode of ancient Chinese consensus toward the establishment of social order in man’s society?

---

14 *Yi Zhuan* (simplified Chinese: 易传; traditional Chinese: 易傳).

15 *Xiao Jing* or Classic of Filial Piety (simplified Chinese: 孝经; traditional Chinese: 孝經) is a Confucian classic treatise giving advice on filial piety; that is, how to behave towards a senior (such as a father, an elder brother, or ruler). This document probably dates to about 400 B.C. It is not known who actually wrote the document. It is attributed to a conversation between Confucius and a disciple named Zeng Zi.

16 *Yi Jing* or The Book of Changes (simplified Chinese: 易经; traditional Chinese: 易經) . According to *Yi Jing*, *Ba Gua* or eight trigrams (Chinese: 八卦), were conceived as images of all that happens in Heaven and on Earth. *Qian* (Heave) and *Kun* (Earth) are two trigrams of the eight trigrams (*Ba Gua*) presented in the Fu Xi diagram (Fu Xi, mid 29th century B.C., in Chinese mythology was the first of the Three Sovereigns of ancient China). *Qian* (Heaven) and *Kun* (Earth) are positioned; the *Gen* (mountain) and the *Dui* (marsh) exchange breath; the *Zhen* (thunder) and the *Xue* (wind) approach each other, while *Kan* (water) and *Li* (fire) don’t deft each other; eight trigrams inter-mate one with another wherein they coexist and form sixty-four hexagrams.

17 Chang Tsai elucidates the relationship between Heaven, Earth and Man in more figurative language. He writes in *Xi Ming* or West Inscription (simplified Chinese: 西铭; traditional Chinese: 西銘). He compares the relationship between Heaven and Man to that between parents and children, vividly illustrating the fact that Man is born of Heaven and Earth. See Zhang Dainian (1989: 7).

### § 3.1.2 The Recognition of Subjectivity

---

The history of the development of human ideology is, first and foremost, a history of the separation of man from the ranks of the animals—a history of development from lack of subjectivity to the attainment of subjectivity<sup>18</sup>.

Zhang Shiyong (1989) emphasized in his article “The development of the principle of subjectivity in Western philosophy and of the theory of man in Chinese philosophy” that the difference between man and animal, in a sense, is that animals cannot tell the difference between the subject and the object but man can. Zhang Shiyong illustrates some interesting debates, especially in comparing the development of the principle of subjectivity in the history of Western philosophy with that of the Chinese within the Chinese ancient political development.

Zhang Shiyong (1989) elaborates that the development of subjectivity as it emerged in Western philosophy is an evolution first from the unity of subject and object, second through the recognition of the separation of the two and third, to the demand for the unity of subject and object. According to his observation, this evolutionary process can be summarized in three different stages: first, that human rights were emancipated from the yoke of theocracy; second, the importance of the study of nature is the discovery of object, making it directly useful to man in the Renaissance; finally, the great achievements that were made in all fields of historical dialectics during the 18th century French Revolution and in natural sciences during the period from the late 18th to the early 19th centuries, especially in the theory of evolution.

These achievements enabled modern Western philosophy to reach its highest stage. In Western historical development the subjectivity of man is enhanced. Zhang Shiyong (1989) emphasized that the first step in the process of development of subjectivity in the history of Western philosophy was to separate and distinguish between subject and object in order to realize self-awareness. However, the evolution of distinguishing between subject and object continues until the discovery of nature and the subjectivity of man as a two-sided coin.

---

18

Subjectivity (the German word *Subjektivität*) in classical German philosophy refers mainly to independence, self-decision, freedom, initiative, self, self-awareness, the particularity of the individual, the display of the wisdom and ability of the individual, with the free will and ability of the individual as a basis, etc.

To value pure knowledge and theoretical knowledge is the result of discovering the object and regarding it as important. Only by doing so is the substance of man enriched and can the subjectivity of man be developed. Western historical development of philosophical thinking regarding the continuous evolution of human self-consciousness and subjectivity and the enriched efforts of natural and technological sciences have decisively contributed to its dominating success, especially after the 17th century till present. What was the comparable evolution as it developed in Chinese history?

In reviewing the ancient history of Chinese philosophies and their ideas about Nature and Man, it is not difficult to find the ideas of self-consciousness and subjectivity of man that had been expounded and rather advanced during the Pre-Qin period; however, they had never been developed into a systematic manner in the way Western philosophy did.

Confucius (551–479 BC) was the first great thinker in the history of Chinese philosophy to establish the societal system of life disciplines. In Chinese history, the structure of morality results from the Confucian ethical spirit in the deep level of the Chinese civilization through the long process of historical evolution and cultural integration, which had become the mainstream in feudal China and to a certain degree, hampered the establishment of the principle of subjectivity in the development of Chinese philosophy. Of course, there are historical reasons why and how Confucius's advocacy has become the core philosophy in Chinese history.

The influence of Confucianism on the Chinese philosophical establishment can be seen both in a positive and a negative way—naturally, as any advocacy in human history that has emerged in any specific culture—especially within the specific historical-political Chinese background. But it is not the concern of this research to extend this debate; rather, it is to present the relevant factors in order to understand how the historical-contextual roots of Chinese philosophy are continually contributing to the forming of consensus in Chinese tradition from the past to the present.

In general, Confucius's philosophy of life, indeed, emphasized to subdue one's self and return to propriety. He seldom spoke of the Tao of Heaven like that is emphasized by Lao Tzu; he was more concerned with the Tao of Man. The ethics of humanism constitute the core of Confucianism, which is grounded in the patriarchal society of ancient China. Social life and individual conduct are regulated by the ethical codes that formulate a basic system of Chinese social behavior.

Confucius's thoughts highlighted social order and valued the power of knowledge at the same time. In the view of Confucius, it is important to build up the social order in society based on the *Li* (principle, propriety, formalities and rites)—a philosophy that, in fact, constitutes the moral principle of feudal society. For Confucius, *Li* contains the norms for behavior and the rules for social etiquette under the direction of *Ren*

(benevolence)<sup>19</sup>. *Ren* is the prevailing moral principle of the Confucian ethic. Confucius advocated the idea that “the benevolent should hold love for others,” and proposed “virtuous rule.” He emphasized that *Ren* and *Li* should supplement each other and “rites and formalities” should be based on “benevolence.” The nature of “formalities” was to maintain the social order, keeping every subject under control according to the principle of benevolence.

Obedience to *Li* is likewise commitment to *Ren*, the unity of which causes both personal relationships to be harmonious and the social order to be stable. Social harmony is the great goal of Confucianism and results in part from every individual knowing his or her place in the social order, and playing his or her part well.

His idea of *Li* especially refers to the unity between Man and Heaven under the obedience of the *Tian Li*<sup>20</sup> (the principle of Heaven). *Tian Li* holds that Heaven and Man are in accord with each other, and that the “Way (*Tao*) of Man” coincides with that of Heaven. In addition, he also attached great importance to education and music. Confucius maintained that, in education, there should be no distinction of social status; that is, education should be open to everyone. He thought music could help to edify people’s spirit. In this sense, he proposed “formalities” for the external attainment and “music” for the “internal accomplishment”.

Being rooted in the influence of Confucianism, Chinese philosophy in its core emphasizes that Man should be independent and should be his own master, yet the self-awareness in the acquisition of knowledge depends rather on moral training, which is referring to *Ren* and *Li*, than on the recognition of subjectivity. This mainstream of considering the way of Heaven is the way of Man that should follow continues to influence and support the feudal society of which some characteristics prevail even today and fettered how man’s subjectivity and self-consciousness developed in the Chinese context.

Especially, the name of “emperor” in Chinese means *Tian Tzu*—the son of Heaven, as the highest authority to conduct the way of Heaven in man’s society. This fundamental charismatic quality of the emperor—and his legitimate right of *Tian Ming* (the Mandate of Heaven)—explains why the feudal system has never been really overthrown in Chinese history, until the anti-feudal movement began in the late 19th and early 20th century. An emperor can forfeit his Mandate of Heaven, if he fails to fulfill his duty

---

19 *Ren* (Chinese: 仁).

20 *Tian Li* (Chinese: 天理).

by providing *Li* and *Ren* to people, such forfeit implied the “legitimate” right to rebel against and overthrow the reigning monarch by the new replacement (Baum 2004).

From the observation of Zhang Shiyong (1989), some points can be concluded. First, under the constraint and the sophisticated political principle of feudalism, the idea of unity between man and heaven was predominant in the history of Chinese philosophy, while the idea of separation and opposition between subject and object never dominated. The evolutionary process in Chinese history lacked the stage of transformation into a complete system like what had happened in Western history. In the West the anti-feudal force has been strong and the development was much smoother and lasted for a longer period, while in the Chinese context the combined forces of imperialism, feudalism and capitalism caused the development of subjectivity to be even more arduous.

Second, due to the unstable replacement of new emergent feudal powers from time to time, most philosophers regarded the attainment of virtue to be of primary importance, emphasizing the idea that man should become immortal in this world. The concept of immortality reflected that subject and object were not regarded as separate and opposed to each other, while Chinese philosophy attached too much importance to the unity of Man and Heaven, and neglected the distinction between, and opposition of, subject and object. In other words, the completeness of the history of separation and opposition of subject and object and the long period of time during which it dominated the history of Western philosophy are absent from the history of Chinese philosophy.

Third, as the history of Chinese philosophy was dominated by the emphasis on man and his establishment of immortality, epistemology, methodology and its understanding of thinking were less emphasized. This also results in the lack of a philosophy based upon the principle of subjectivity.

In this sense, the road China took regarding the recognition of subjectivity was different. Aforementioned facts explain that, to a certain degree in China there was no comparable long-lasting movement in Chinese modernization movement resembling the Renaissance in Europe<sup>21</sup>. In the West, the overthrow and weakening of religious power brought about a relatively high development of the rights and subjectivity of man in the movement of the Renaissance. Differently, in China the prevailing idea was that the monarch was the supreme power and the ethical code, feudal patriarchal

---

21

Although, during the late 19th and early 20th century the period of modernization movement begins with rejecting imperialism and to liberate China from the yoke of the feudal ethical code, hierarchical system and patriarchal clan system, yet the real census of subjectivity has not really been established in Chinese society.

clan system and hierarchical system all served to support the monarch. Therefore, the idea of man's subjectivity could not be established unless the monarchical power was overthrown. As Zhang Shiyong (1989: 166) stated: "only after the discovery of nature could people begin to pay attention to science, and only after the discovery of man could people start to respect democracy." Maybe this can indicate the tip of the iceberg of change that Chinese society is going through at this moment.

Chen Kuide's observation (1989: 140) of the debate took another angle:

There are many excellent propositions in the works of Pre-Qin period philosophers. As the ancient Chinese language is highly inclusive and condensed, it is rich in meaning and deep in thought; but as it lacks complete logical form it is often polysemous and metaphoric, and thus relatively ambiguous in meaning. The merit of this concise language lies in its self-protection from questioning and negation by logical argument. On the other hand, the lack of logical forms makes it difficult to establish the objective criterion of its truth and falsehood, its truth or error, and to certify this by facts and deductive reasoning.

Both observations of Zhang Shiyong and Chen Kuide can be seen to elaborate, to a certain degree, an interesting cultural contextual definition that is based on historical understanding. The fundamental contrast between Chinese and Western cultures is that of "monism" and "dualism," "combination" and "separation," "immanence" and "transcendence." (Chen Kuide 1989: 136) The former, with subjectivity as its basic feature and the latter submitting to ironclad scientific law, with objectivity as its basic feature; their attitudes toward the cosmos are divided as well, the former is only the audience and the latter observes, recognizes, studies, and conquers.

I argue this observation provokes another interpretation with regard to the cultural specialty of Chinese language and thinking. Due to the ambiguous and polysemous natures, the aesthetic intent of ancient Chinese philosophical propositions and theories is more important than their logical intent. It is very hard for Chinese culture to totally falsify or reject any proposition due to it is more contextual embedded than subjective oriented. This specialty of Chinese culture could also allow for unexpected creative results and inclusion of associative thinking. I am convinced this is one of the cultural characteristics why Chinese civilization can survive through time. I assume this cultural foundation also enable the different stage of reformation through time till present.



### § 3.1.3 The Integration of Knowledge with Practice

---

The ancient philosophical proposition of cosmology regarding the subjectivity of man and man's attitude towards nature also deeply influenced the relationship between obtaining knowledge and how to transform that into practice. In traditional Chinese philosophy, without a doubt, the basic argumentation of the idea of "Heaven and Man" is to bring harmonious integration between Heaven and Man. The concept of "integration of Heaven with Man" in Chinese philosophy is more a direct description than a detailed analysis. According to the abovementioned interpretation, it indicates that the ancient Chinese philosophical ideal was rather that of humanism, which is related to *Ren* and the ethical value that promotes a social order based on *Li*. It explains why the natural sciences found difficulties growing on the soil of dominant, ancient Chinese philosophical propositions, because the philosophical concepts were developed to guide the human morality intrinsically, especially in order to fulfill the Way of Heaven ethically. By following the ethical concept of the Way of Heaven, although the concern for the Way of Man was strongly related to the dedication of knowledge into practice, nevertheless it was used for ethical purposes instead of for the pursuit of scientific analysis, discovery and knowledge.

Indeed, in ancient Chinese history, several outstanding ideas and elements of knowledge had emerged and were even more advanced than that of any other culture of the same period. However, to integrate the knowledge with practice had a different ethical meaning in the Chinese development in comparison with that in Western society. Confucius emphasized to distinguish the gentleman and villain based on the ethical criterion: "A gentleman feels it is shame not to be able to match his words with action."<sup>22</sup>

It refers to the necessity for gentleman to be able to follow the requirements of five criteria that had already become the moral codes of ancient Chinese society: benevolence, righteousness and justice, rites propriety, wisdom, and promises (*Ren*, *Yi*, *Li*, *Zhi*, *Xin*). In general, like a saint, to integrate knowledge with practice refers to moral practice, which means to foster and enhance, as Mencius advocated, the cultivation of "a noble spirit" that combines his intelligence with sincerity. By doing so, man

---

22

*Zhong Yong* or The Doctrine of the Mean (Chinese: 中庸), The Doctrine of the Mean was preserved as a chapter of the *Li Ji*, Book of Rites (simplified Chinese: 礼记; traditional Chinese: 禮記), a large compendium of discussions of ritual that was completed during the Former Han Dynasty (202 - 9 B.C.), incorporating texts dating back significantly earlier. See translation text in English, [http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Doctrine\\_of\\_the\\_Mean.pdf](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Doctrine_of_the_Mean.pdf).

practices what he knows and what he practices becomes his knowledge. A wise man is one who knows the rites. A man of ritual is one who practices knowledge. In practicing knowledge, all rituals will be properly performed; in knowing the rites all essentials will go to the mind. Here, mind is not only the power of recognition, but also the moral power to transcend oneself.

In the early period of the North Song Dynasty (960–1127 A.D.), philosopher and cosmologist Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073 A.D.), in the course of his denunciation of Buddhism and Taoism and his promotion of Confucianism, established his own ideological system of cosmology, known as Neo-Confucianism. He put forward the idea that all tangible material things came from the absolute substance, while “the absolute” was just the intangible “ultimate”. Cheng Hao (1032–1085 A.D.) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107 A.D.), known to later generations as the “Cheng Brothers,” contributed much to the development of Neo-Confucianism. Both studied under Zhou Dunyi and advanced the idea of “reason” as the source of all material things and the essence of the universe, which had existed before anything else and would last forever. According to them, the broader masses must resign themselves to reality and place themselves at the disposal of feudal order. They distinguished the difference between the knowledge of the virtual and the knowledge of seeing and hearing, while the knowledge of seeing and hearing is from perceptual experience, and the knowledge of the virtual arises from intrinsic intuition and they depreciated seeing and hearing, and hence valued morale. Their advocacy that “knowledge precedes practice” was argued in terms of morality and self-cultivation, as “one who knows but cannot practice is one who does not truly know.” (Cheng Weili 1992)

Later, Zhu Xi (1130–1200 A.D.) of the South Song Dynasty (1127–1279 A.D.) inherited Cheng Yi’s theory that “knowledge precedes practice” but he stressed in particular “knowledge and practice are mutually dependent”. He epitomized the thinking of Neo-Confucianism. He believed that there existed reason and spirit in the universe, with the former the essence and the latter the implementation of all material things. Things in the world came from reasons and reasons from heavenly principles, and heavenly principles (*Tian Li*) were exactly the public orders in which the monarch was the heart. This order and the universal breath (*Qi*) of dense or scattered matter are able to give shape to every being. Every being has the same amount and character of Order, but every being is characterized by a different amount and character of Breath, thus making for individual differences.

For example, Zhu Xi used a metaphorical example to explain that: “taking water out of a river with a bowl or a bucket, you obtain different measures of water”, but it is still water, only different amounts and in different environments. Zhu Xi is the most important person of Confucianism after Confucius and Mencius. He accumulated the whole new cosmological and metaphysical interpretations of the Song Dynasty and incorporated them into a new school of Neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism,

compared with traditional Confucianism, was a great change. Neo-Confucianism consolidated the feudal system and the power of the monarch as Confucianism had emphasized that; additionally, it integrated the notions of the *Li*<sup>23</sup> (reason of Heaven or *Tian Li*) by Buddhism and Taoism. Its influence profoundly penetrated in and deeply influenced Chinese ontology through the centuries afterwards.

The social changes in the middle era of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.) made some scholars feel the constraints of the Neo-Confucianism pioneered by the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi. Therefore, these scholars desired to explore the path to a new ideology. Chen Xianzhang (1428–1500 A.D.) was one of the first Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers. He thought it was not necessary to study the endless number of theories and objects but that the truth of the universal principle is laid down in one's own heart and can be found there in one-self "look for the truth in my own mind; obtain the truth from yourself".

Chen Xianzhang also stressed on self-awareness and self-value as well as subjective perception. Facing the orthodox school of Neo-Confucianism in the early years of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.), he advocated a new learning style, which regarded it as commendable to question authoritative works and to be self-confident about one's own views. His theory caused a sensation in the ideological and academic world of that time and thus broke a path for "The Theory of Mind."<sup>24</sup> The Theory of Mind of the Ming Dynasty was developed and spread widely. Wang Shouren (1472–1528 A.D.), whose alias was Wang Bo'an, was also referred to as Master Yang Ming, advocated the theory of "there is no object, no word, no reason, no righteousness, and no benevolence beyond the mind." The gist of this school of philosophy is the theory of "innate knowledge" (*Liangzhi*) and that "mind is reason." While Zhu Xi emphasized that knowledge comes before action, Wang Shouren brings up the concept that knowledge and action are one inseparable unit (*Zhi Xing He Yi*)<sup>25</sup>.

Although Confucianism had been adopted as "orthodox" state doctrine since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), including the renaissance of Confucianism during late Tang Dynasty (618–907 A.D.), and Neo-Confucianism was effective since the early Song Dynasty (960–1279 A.D.) and lasted to the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368 A.D.), it shows that many liberal and oppositional ways of thoughts developed during the

---

23 *Li* (of Heaven) or *Tian Li* (Chinese: 天理).

24 *Xin Xue* or The Theory of Mind (simplified Chinese: 心学 ; traditional Chinese: 心學).

25 *Zhi Xing He Yi* (Chinese: 知行合一).

Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.). (Neo-) Confucian scholars retired from official posts and developed quietism philosophies that were more oriented to the own person and the place of humans in the universe than to construct an ideal state like the pre-Han (206 B.C.–9 A.D.) philosophers had done. This was strengthened by the integration of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. This integration of cosmological philosophy—from Way of Heaven to Way of Man in reality—constituted the basic principle of Chinese ontology and this basic root and philosophy were transformed into the spatial arrangements as well as Chinese planning culture.

In my opinion, traditional Chinese philosophy that bears the value centered the Way of Man—evolving from the moral principle in harmony with nature, society and other people, is valuable for society today. They closely evolved in the past Chinese social development and we should and can develop these values further for appreciation under the new impact of today. We should reexamine its logic and theory of knowledge with renewable innovation for the modern Chinese society, in which the way of man is profoundly undermined by the pursuit of utilitarianism.

---

## § 3.2 From Moral Ontology to Authentic Spatiality

---

All political systems need some way of assuring social order. (...) Only if some measures of social order are assured will it be possible to interpret the world coherently, to plan and to act rationally. (Ringmar 1980: 1)

Chinese cosmological philosophy indicates that ritual principles inherent in the traditional thinking of moral ontology can also be reflected in the social order and in the spatial domain. The ethical rite of ancient Chinese philosophy suggested how the social order should be established, based on the moral ontology and with a long tradition, using architecture and urban space as spatial tools for reflecting, representing and regulating the social order. The relation between the moral ontology-ritual principle, the social order and spatial arrangements is clearly recognizable in Chinese ancient cities. To understand the effects, it is necessary to reveal how the socio-spatiality was transformed based on the moral ontology of the Chinese cosmological principle.

### § 3.2.1 Ritual Principles and Social Orders

---

Rituals obviate disorder as dikes prevent inundation.<sup>26</sup>

Primarily, ancient philosophers valued the ritual principle. The ritual principle was developed based on the idea of the “Way of Heaven” which enhanced the feudal system and defined social relationships. Furthermore, through the system of social relationships, visible and real spatial organizing principles were applied. This interrelation between ritual principle and social order gave guidance to the way cities should be built and the architectural layout should be composed, down to the small scale of the arrangement of the seats around the dinner table. The emphasis on ritual principle (*Li*) can be dated back to an ancient document *Zhou Li* (Rites of Zhou) of the early Zhou period (ca. 900 B.C.).

*Zhou Li* was compiled during the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.) and was known under the name of “*Zhou Guan*—Offices of the Zhou.” The final editing of this book took place during the Former Han period (206 B.C.–8 A.D.) and it was given the name *Zhou Li*.<sup>27</sup> The obscure book *Zhou Li* consists of a long listing of the officials that the Zhou kings theoretically engaged to run the empire. The offices were divided into six groups that became the foundation for the later six ministries that according to ancient cosmology are correlated to Heaven, Earth, and the four seasons<sup>28</sup>.

Charles M. Nelson (1988: 19) provided an explicit insight of the interaction between the ritual principle and the social order. He concluded that in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), the idea of *Zhou Li* had been synthesized into four principles: archaism, centralism, organicism, and moralism. First, Archaism sought to trace heaven’s mandate through the succession of previous dynasties, using ancestor worship, ancient

---

26 *Li Ji*, Book of Rites (ca. 1050–256 B.C.), translated by James Legge, 1885.

27 During the last decades of the Later Han period (25–220 A.D.) the three books *Yi Li* (simplified Chinese: 仪礼; traditional Chinese: 儀禮), *Li Ji* (simplified Chinese: 礼记; traditional Chinese: 禮記) and *Zhou Li* (simplified Chinese: 周礼; traditional Chinese: 周禮) were canonized as the three ritual books.

28 The six ministries of *Zhou Li* are: *Tianguan Zhouzai* (Chinese: 天官冢宰), Celestial Ministry, headed by the Prime Minister is in charge of the royal palace and its administration; *Diguan Situ* (Chinese: 地官司徒), Terrestrial Ministry is in charge of the local administration; *Chunguan Zongbo* (春官宗伯), Spring Ministry is responsible for ritual affairs; *Xiaguan Sima* (simplified Chinese: 夏官司馬; traditional Chinese: 夏官司馬), Summer Ministry as the overseer of military affairs; *Qiuguan Sikou* (Chinese: 秋官司寇), Autumn Ministry is responsible for jurisdiction and *Dongguan Sikong* (Chinese: 冬官司空) or *Dongguan Kao Gong* (simplified Chinese: 冬官考工紀; traditional Chinese: 冬官考工紀), Winter Ministry is responsible for public works and construction.

architectural forms, and principles of spatial and administrative organization to justify the imperial state. Second, Centralism held that China was the Central Kingdom in the universe, the capital was the center of the empire as a geo-cosmic entity, and the emperor was the animating pivot around which the activities of the empire revolved. Hence, the imperial capital was linked to the empire through an urban hierarchy of state capitals, provincial capitals, county capitals, district seats, communes and hamlets. Third, Organicism elaborated how the theory *Tao* (The Way) was applied into the organization of the administrative functions and especially the Theory of *Yin-Yang* (feminine and masculine) and *Wu Xing*<sup>29</sup>. Fourth, Moralism established the moral right of the emperor to rule and utilized the classic propositions of ancient Chinese scholars to interpret the moral value of the universe that justified the organization of Chinese society.

Besides the ritual principle based on *Zhou Li*, the second dimension of ancient Chinese ritual principle dwells in religious roots and heavily relies upon the emotional security and social supports provided by familial and clan relationships. Richard Baum (2004), in his article “Ritual and Rationality: Religious Roots of the Bureaucratic State in Ancient China”, underpinned the relevant analyses. He examines the religious origins and evolution of the instruments of political legitimation in ancient China by linking the relationship between primitive spiritualism and the emergence of the institution of kingship. He also examined how the routinization of charismatic political power of kingship can be sustained due to the practice and believes of the ritual associated with the idea of *Tian Ming*—the “Mandate of Heaven”<sup>30</sup>.

“Routinization of charisma” is defined by the German sociologist Max Weber (1947) with regard to the classic sociology of religion. It refers to a prophetic leader who attracts followers to his anti-traditional message by his personal magnetism or force

---

29 The theories of *Yin-Yang* (simplified Chinese: 阴阳, traditional Chinese: 陰陽) and *Wu Xing* or the Five Elements (Chinese: 五行) are fundamental principles of Chinese science to establish the cosmic elements of Chinese cosmology. These theories explain the dynamic recognition of processes, objects, and their function in nature. According to *Yin-Yang*, all living objects, as well as their parts, can be identified as *Yin* or *Yang*. Any scientific analysis requires *Yin* or *Yang* designation be given to aspects of processes or objects. Each element is symbolic of qualities in nature: Water, cold: flows downward, Fire: flares upward, Wood: germinates, spreads its leaves, Metal: purification and solidity and Earth: promotion of growth, nourishment. These five elements interactively formed the cycle of *Sheng* (creation) and *Ke* (destruction). Every entity has its opposite. In the cycle of *Sheng* (creation): Water nourishes Wood, Wood feeds Fire, Fire creates Earth (ash), Earth bears Metal and Metal carries Water. In the cycle of *Ke* (destruction): Water is opposite to Fire, Fire is opposite to Metal, Metal is opposite to Wood, Wood is opposite to Earth and Earth is opposite to Water.

30 The path of routinization is fraught with danger since it by definition results in a formalization of the meanings of the original movement, involving institutionalization, and the formation of a new “tradition” resulting in a potential for schism and new “charismatic leaders” to emerge. See more in Weber (1947: 358-392).

of personality, in short, his “charisma”. To keep a movement going after the death of the original founder, however, that charisma must be “routinized”, or redirected to the continuing leadership and meaning of the organization. As Weber noted, routinized charisma is a powerful force that can be used to legitimize not just the activities of priests and other professional spiritual communicants, but political institutions and elites, ideologies, and economic property relations as well.

Baum (2004: 60) concluded, first, in general, that the intimate and powerful connection in ancient China between ritual leadership and the emergence of the institution of kingship were strongly bound together. Second, Chinese social and political institutions initially came to mirror the proto-rational spiritual logic of archaic religious practice and the key structural ingredient in this modeling process provided a paradigm for the proto-bureaucratic stratification of Chinese society. Third, through a combination of charismatic routinization of power and Confucian cooptation, *Tian Ming*—the “Mandate of Heaven”— became politically moralized and ritually formalized, which also was embedded “in the principle of patrilineal kinship and ancestral genealogy.”

Further, Baum (2004: 60) emphasized that the impact of ancient religion upon the formation and articulation of the dynastic Chinese state has been underestimated, because “primordial Chinese religious sentiments and rituals were cloaked in the profane garb of the worldly Confucian propriety and piety.” His propositions provide us, to a certain degree, valuable interlocking clues of the connection between the development of charismatic routinization, ritual secularization and dynastic legitimation, pointing to the essence of the evolution of China’s uniquely enduring bureaucratic political order.

All political systems need some way of assuring social order, as Erik Ringmar (1980: 1) emphasized:

For order to be established a way must be found of dealing with diversity, with the coexistence of potentially conflicting ideas, projects and goals. Working out such conflicts, power will come to be distributed in a particular fashion. The problem of social order will thus presuppose certain ways of setting a public agenda, certain ways of determining rules and reaching decisions, and a certain distribution of legitimate authority.

Ringmar pointed out that in imperial China people were typically seen as connected to each other through long chains of hierarchical relationships stretching from the bottom of society to its very top. If everyone only maintained his or her respective parts of the great network, which is the society, the country would be at peace. Within this framework, the Confucian moralization of power, rooted in the imperatives of propriety and filial piety, extended the legitimizing principle of general hierarchy downward

from Heaven through the imperial bureaucracy to the individual clan and family. This explains how the root of Chinese ritual principles and the social orders are embedded in society.

I would conclude, in Chinese tradition, the ritual principle was used to organize the world in a particular manner and to ensure social order is well preserved. Ritual principle and social order are two poles of value system in the traditional Chinese society. In order to sustain the political superiority of kinship through the establishment of the social order, conceptualized spatial structure becomes a powerful instrument, and at the same time, the representation of the ritual meaning.

### § 3.2.2 Feudal Control, Economic Organization, and Spatial Paradigms

---

As part of *Zhou Li*, the most famous guidebook of the ideal spatial paradigm was well illustrated by incorporating one of the oldest manuscripts to survive in China, *Kao Gong Ji* (The Artificer's Record)<sup>31</sup>. This remarkable document is a guidance for laying out cities, outlining general principles that hold true in large measure for modest residential compounds as well as for the sprawling complex of the imperial household and governmental center (Figure 3.1). In the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), in the reinterpretation of the *Zhou Li*, the synthesis of the abovementioned ritual principles led to the pursuit of urban planning and established an elaborate structural and organizational ideal which has been a major influence in the development of all subsequent ancient cities in China. The ancient Chinese concept of the city-state is a rigid administrative hierarchy modeled into the structure of the city according to the specific needs of its rulers.

---

31 *Kao Gong Ji* or The Artificer's Record (simplified Chinese: 考工纪, traditional Chinese: 考工紀) is a classic work on science and technology in Ancient China, compiled during the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.), the original author is unknown. In Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), it had been edited as the sixth chapter of *Zhou Li*, due to the original sixth chapter of *Zhou Li* had been destroyed.






Figure 3.1 Diagram of Wang Cheng (Capital City) in Kao Gong Ji  
Source: Kao Gong Ji

The binding between bureaucratic control and the spatial paradigm is clearly revealed in the description of *Kao Gong Ji* (The Artificer's Record) <sup>32</sup>:

The ideal capital city is a perfect square, each nine *li*<sup>33</sup> on a side, oriented to the cardinal direction, with three gates to a side. The main gate should face south, and the principal street runs north-south, leads to the governmental center. Each of the cardinal axes and directions is associated with one of the Five Elements, with attributes and colors associated with each of the cardinal directions. East is linked with Spring, Wood, and the color green. South is associated with Summer, Fire, and red. West is associated with Autumn, Metal (gold), and white. North is connected with Winter, Water and the color black. Where the axes of the city intersect in the center, *Zhong* (center) is the location of the ruler's residence and place of administration, associated with a vertical axis mundi, Earth, and the royal color yellow. There, in a room facing southward towards a court sat the emperor, likewise facing south, at the center of all things.

The palace city is at the center, surrounded by an administrative complex and finally the outer city, mirroring the division of the universe into three levels as well as symbolizing the moralist division of Chinese society into the emperor,

32 Translated from the Chinese by C. M. Nelson (1988: 19).

33 *li* (Chinese: 里) is a traditional Chinese unit of distance which has varied considerably over time. In general, the *li* was approximately set at 300 "paces" or *Bu* (Chinese: 步). See Wang Gui Xiang (2007).

scholar-administrators, and the commoners. The outer city was divided in four quarters along the cardinal axes. Each quarter was subdivided into wards with enclosing walls and gates, and each ward was divided into four quarters again. There were twelve city gates, representing the twelve months of the year.

Palaces, administrative buildings, temples, ancestral halls, cemeteries, living quarters, parks and other functions are assigned specific spaces within the city in accordance with their religious and political meaning within the structural cosmology as described in the *Zhou Li*. The correspondence between architectural space, social status, and social role is so close that royal and civil titles often reflect the geometry of the city, as much as they do the function of the official, e.g. gentleman of the left palace, major of the seventh gate, assistant secretariat supervisor of the right, bureau for superintending guests of south and north, director of the yellow gates (Nelson 1988).

The other important fact based on *Zhou Li*, in the Han (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) system of urban planning and the special judicial code of ancient China, is the ethical principle that commercial and financial operations for private gain were suppressed, because they were seen as inherently immoral and were only tolerated to the extent that they were considered necessary to the functioning of the state. Thus, although in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.) commercial markets were accepted as necessary institutes in the city and the state, they were relegated to the north side of the outer city, the least important area in the Taoist interpretation of spatial opposites. Moreover, important commercial activities, such as trade and the use of iron and salt, were held as government monopolies, with the result that merchants were just tolerated as a necessary anomaly in the structure of human society. They were treated as second-class citizens and their sons were prohibited from achieving an administrative or scholarly rank in the civil service (Nelson 1988).

In the Tang dynasty (618–907 A.D.), one of the most flourishing eras in Chinese history, due to the strength of incorporating elements from diverse cultures, the capital city Chang’an was the biggest cosmopolis in the world and a link between Western and Eastern economies and cultures. The whole city covered 84 square kilometers, made up of the City of the Emperor, the City of Palaces and the Outer City. The City of the Emperor was the administrative center and core of Chang’an City and The City of Palaces was an area full of palaces. In the Outer City, there were 108 residential areas, made up of 11 streets running north to south, and 14 streets east to west.

Nevertheless, the market activities were confined within the ward structure and situated in specific locations in the west called West City and in the east called East City<sup>34</sup> and were not allowed to intrude on traditionally sacred and political space and were still strictly controlled by the government. The East City and West City were situated symmetrically to the southeast and southwest of the City of the Emperor, the former of which mainly dealt with the locally produced products; the latter was a trading ground for foreign merchants.<sup>35</sup> The feudal control over the civilian economic activities does not only reflect on cities of small scale, it is found in the highly populated cities as well. Even though Chang'an of the Tang Dynasty (618–907 A.D.) was a society open to the world, with an estimated population upwards of a million people, the close regulation of commercial activities can still be seen. Here, the main administrative center and the palace were moved to the block backing on the north wall. The city structure was more complex both in layout and in scale than the diagram of *Wangcheng*. However, the ideal spatial paradigm still dictated the proper numerological formula and buildings with religious functions are correctly placed.

We can conclude, the bureaucratic control and spatial organization can be recognized in the application of the hierarchical social diagram, which is strongly related to the isomorphic mode of orientation, the geometrical setting and the cosmological representation of the paradigm of Taoism and Buddhism as well as the spatial representation based on the social order and propriety of manners of Confucianism. The ideal Chinese spatial structure is the representation of both the ritual principle and the political function in order to ensure the propriety of the social order, instead of being the social outcome as the Western defined for the civilian and the people. I argue this traditional characteristic regarding the spatial recognition and the establishment of the spatial paradigm shall be considered as one of the cultural elements to reflect today's urban development in China. Further spatial principles in detail are discussed below.

---

34 West City (Chinese: 西市) and East City (simplified Chinese: 东市; traditional Chinese: 東市).

35 See more elaborations about the East City and West City of Chang'an in Heng Chye Kiang (1999: 19-20).

### § 3.2.3 Principles for Building the Actual City and Human Settlement

---

The city as symbol of “Cosmic Order and Harmony” is the fundamental principle of Chinese spatial organization. From time to time, within the ancient philosophical development, different principles that are related to the emergent societies have been accumulated and integrated in the ancient Chinese roots. Chinese people always were proud that their culture enables the creation of an inclusive coherence instead of provoking conflict of exclusion<sup>36</sup>. This inclusion also reflected on how the different ideas and principles were extracted and applied in order to contribute to building the actual cities and spatial environments. Below, three principles are highlighted and elaborated in order to understand the basic roots that have been embedded in the daily life of Chinese people: the integration of landscape, the idea of Feng Shui and orientation, and the hierarchical and isomorphic spatial mode. They are each explained in the following paragraphs.

#### § 3.2.3.1 The Integration of Landscape

---

One of the most important principles emphasized in the ancient Chinese roots concerns environmental integration as one of the most important criteria for building a human settlement. Unfortunately, this principle is often forgotten in the fast urbanization of today and the neglect of environmental sustainability during the brutal transformation of modernization. As mentioned before, Lao Tsu’s idea of *Tao*: “Man follows *Di* (Earth), *Di* follows *Tian* (Heaven, law of Nature), *Tian* follows *Tao* (Way), *Tao* follows Nature” is a fundamental concept of how the “Way of Man” should follow Nature - the world and all things are seen as a living presence.

“Harmony” and “Balance” form the basic value orientation of Chinese philosophy. Harmony refers to the complementation and coordination of various factors. Harmony includes dealing with diversities, differences, contradictions and even conflicts. But on a certain higher level, the diversities can eventually reach the unity of coordination that results in harmony. The emphasis on ecological thinking is also strongly related to the idea of natural changes that have their own dynamics. This means, even though Man, human society and Nature constitutes in certain ways independent systems, they

also form together a closely connected whole. The attitude to pursue harmony means keeping the balance, and the power of balance requires the process of coordination between various factors. As aforementioned, the natural changes driven by inner forces can be interpreted through the idea of *Tao* - *Yin* and *Yang* (feminine and masculine). The process of development of “change” is reflected by the shift of the imbalance between *Yin* and *Yang*, and the process of development of “change” shall continue until a new equilibrium between *Yin* and *Yang* is found again.

*Yin* originally meant, “hidden, secret, dark, mysterious, cold.” It thus could mean the shade, moon and north side—the shaded side of the mountain. *Yang* meant, “clear, bright, the sun, heat,” the opposite of *Yin*. However, *Yin* and *Yang* is not opposed to each other, because within the system of *Yin*, *Yang* is embedded and vice versa. According to Chinese philosophy, everything in the world can be identified with either *Yin* or *Yang*. Such as Earth is the ultimate *Yin* object; Heaven is the ultimate *Yang* object.

The implication of the traditional concept of Harmony and Balance, *Yin* and *Yang* can be recognized in many different aspects.

First, gardens were considered more difficult to design than houses in Chinese tradition. The Chinese philosophy of garden design was to imitate the layout of nature. In contrast to the order of regularity that was applied to houses, the garden was seen as space of *Yin*, the spiritual place for enlightenment and offering places for social and family integration. The house is arranged according to the social order and is thus a place that represents social hierarchy. It was seen as a space of *Yang*. The courtyard house structure is based on the concept of bringing harmony, balance and alignment between *Yin* and *Yang*, as well as integrating man and nature. It illustrated how the two basic Chinese “Ways”—Confucianism and Taoism—were integrated coherently in space, while Confucianism is identified with the *Yang* aspect and Taoism with the *Yin* aspect.

The implication of the traditional concept of Harmony and Balance can also be recognized in Chinese landscape painting: *Shan-Shui-Hua*. *Shan-Shui-Hua* is a work of art in Chinese landscape painting including three characters standing for respectively mountain, water and painting. *Shan-Shui* worship also is one of the unique spatial concepts in Chinese history, which is rooted in the Chinese idea of humbleness. Chinese landscape painting usually includes small human figures that blend harmoniously into the vast world around them; man and nature interact and complement each other to reach a state of balance and harmony. It combines urban construction and the natural environment and is composed of the integration of the mountain (*Shan*) and the water (*Shui*).

The concept of *Shan-Shui* worship can be found almost in all the ancient towns and villages. ChiCheng, a well-preserved ancient town, presents the optimal philosophy of the Chinese concept of *Shan-Shui* worship. As it is illustrated in the ancient drawing (Figure 3.2), ChiCheng town is surrounded by mountains on three sides, north, west and east, facing the Yaojiang River and the Cijiang River on the south side. The town's layout is crisscrossed by a network of canals and ditches. It also reflects the feudal patriarchal codes of ethics and aesthetics of traditional Chinese architecture. The strategic location combines urban construction and the natural environment, composing the integration of the mountain (*Shan*) and the water (*Shui*) (Wang Chiu-yuan 2011).



Figure 3.2 Ancient drawing of ChiCheng Ancient Town and aerial photo around 2008.  
Source: ChiCheng Ancient Town, Ningbo City Development Co. Ltd

The idea of locating cities by observing the earth and examining the water can be dated back to the ancient times. The integration of the mountain (*Shan*) and the water (*Shui*) can enhance the strategic location of a city, not only for the natural resources for living but also for defense.

Chen Yulin (2010) concludes that the characteristic of the “*Shan-Shui-City*” pattern in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei North Region can be summarized as a majestic beauty composed of endless mountains, open plans and cities at the convergence of the mountains and the water. There are many rivers running through the mountains in this region. The city needs, on the one hand, to be close to the water to ease drainage and catch the clean water sources for drinking, and on the other hand to avoid locating in the direct exit of the mountains due to the sudden changes in topography which could cause flooding. The ancient urban planners set the city centrally on an upland surrounded by water that avoids flooding and provides enough space for urban construction, and also provides farmland for agriculture (Figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3 The Characteristic of the “Shan-Shui-City” pattern in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei North Region.  
Source: Chen Yulin (2010): Figure 8

In ancient times, one of the most important criteria to define the location of human settlements was easy access to natural resources. Normally, mountains provide a microclimate, and run-of water can provide resources for agriculture and food provision. These two very important natural resources are logically chosen as the first important criteria to locate both the village of small scale and the bigger scale City of the Emperor. The emphasis on the combination of mountain and water also strongly shapes the diversity of Chinese culture—including the diversity of living styles, the creative norms and languages and meaningful artistic and aesthetic traditions. The integration of “landscape-city-architecture” is the core of traditional Chinese city design theory and method, which has its roots in the integration of landscape in ancient China. Fortunately, the concept of “Shan-Shui-City” has been slowly re-discovered and advocated by scholars in contemporary urban studies and planning<sup>37</sup> (Figure 3.4)(Wu Liangyong 1996; Fu Shulan 2009; Chen Yulin 2010).

37

The concept of *Shan-Shui-City* was put forward by Professor Qian Xuesen in his letter to Professor Wu Liangyong of Tsinghua University on 31st July, 1990. It is suggested that landscape architects should combine landscape architecture into Shan-Shui-City planning by inheriting Chinese classical garden art and forming characteristic Shan-Shui-City patterns, which introduce the traditional idea of Shan-Shui in poetry, painting, and gardening into urban planning, and to make the city ‘a big garden’. This idea led to an extensive discussion and became influential in the field of urban planning in China.




Figure 3.4 Sketches by Wu Liangyong and the application of Shan-Shui Worship in his design for the Red Chamber Museum in Nanjing  
Source: Wu Liangyong (2011: 50).

Tao Yuanming<sup>38</sup> (365–427 A.D.), a Chinese scholar and poet, portrayed an idyllic pastoral life in his famous poem “Peach Blossom Shangri-la: *Tao Hua Yuan Ji*”. In this poetic story the picture of the fairy land of Peach Blossom Village was described:

A fisherman, once while following a stream he forgot how far he had gone. (...) The fisherman came into a mountain with a small opening through which it suddenly opened up to reveal a broad, flat area with imposing houses, good fields, beautiful ponds, mulberry trees, bamboo, and the like. The fisherman saw paths extending among the fields in all directions, and could hear the sounds of chickens and dogs. Men and women working in the fields all wore clothing that looked like that of foreign lands. The elderly and children all seemed to be happy and enjoying themselves.<sup>39</sup>

The story is about a beautiful, idyllic land where people live together happily and peacefully in order to avoid the chaos of war. Since then, *Tao Hua Yuan*, which means peach blossom land, has been used to indicate Chinese utopian society where people can pursue their dreams, protected from the harsh realities of the outside world.

38 Tao Yuanming was born during the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420), which was a time of military uncertainty and political infighting. This background urges him to drop out of official life, reflecting his back-to-basics lifestyle.

39 Translated from the Chinese by R. Davis and D. Steelman. Available at LittleNex.com.



We can conclude, in addition to the application of the *Yin-Yang* system, the revitalization of the *Shang-Shui*-City or the utopian settlement of *Tao Hua Yuan* show that the idea of the integration of landscape has its origin deep in Chinese history. There is wisdom in learning from Nature with humble attitude, meaning also learning from the thousands of years of trials and errors of our agricultural ancestors. Natural disasters, including floods, droughts, earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, as well as the experience of field making, irrigation, and food production, taught our ancestors to create and maintain such lands as the land of peach blossoms. As Yu Kongjian (2006) emphasizes it was the skill and art of survival that rendered our landscape productive, safe, beautiful, and meaningful. The ancient Chinese wisdom is still very update facing today's conditions and challenges. In thousands years ago, Chinese civilization had already accumulated abundant advanced ideas and principles for the spatial development, it is inconceivable why they are barely applied in current modern society.

### § 3.2.3.2 The idea of Feng Shui and Orientation

Following the idea of the integration of landscape the first step is to define the location. To choose the location for the City of the Emperor is equally important to choosing the location for a vernacular settlement. In the first chapter of *Zhou Li* (Rites of Zhou), The Celestial Ministry with the Prime Minister<sup>40</sup>, this is emphasized:

惟王建國，辯方正位，體國經野，設官分職，以為民極。

The only person that constitutes the empire is the King. He determines the [four] regions and fixes the governmental positions; he embodies the cities and measures the countryside; he creates the ministries and separates their respective functions; this all to make a fixed pole for the people.

Therewith, he institutes the "Heavenly ministry" and the office of prime minister, he charges the prime minister to head his subordinates and to take into his hands the administration of the state, to help the king to regulate the fiefdoms and the state<sup>41</sup>.

---

40 The Celestial Ministry with the Prime Minister or *Tianguan Zhouzai* (Chinese: 天官冢宰) defines there are 63 officials for the royal palace and its administration, as well as the core of the central government.

41 Translated by Ulrich Theobald, according to the translation of Edouard Biot (1951). Available at <http://www.chinaknowledge.de/Literature/Classics/zhouli.html>.

“惟王建國，辯方正位”<sup>42</sup>, means it is the responsibility of the King to determine the four regions and fix the position of the empire. The orientation of the city is the first important criterion for building the City of the Emperor. Only when the location and orientation of the city are defined properly, the administrative structure and the respective functions can be embedded and placed accordingly by the division of the hierarchical social order. The purposeful orientation of the urban structure is a very important principle for city building. Most buildings are oriented towards a certain direction and are located with respect to the supply of water, a river crossing, a strategic position, and safeguarding from flooding and other environmental factors, rarely just one of these. The deliberate alignment of settlements, individual buildings and architectural features, down to the layout of interiors and furnishings, is all-pervasive and persist to the present day. Such alignment extends even to the “dwellings” for the dead in cemeteries and tombs (Ali and Hill 2005: 27). Alignments at all scales are controlled by the principles of *Feng Shui*; literally “wind and water.”

*Feng Shui*, also known as *Kanyu*<sup>43</sup>, is the art of placing and situating a building so that it is in harmony with its surroundings. According to *Feng Shui*, cultural and social issues are influenced by natural, metaphysical and cosmological factors. To practically use *Feng Shui*, one needs to understand the influence of cosmology on the earth, have knowledge of how astronomy and astrology influence the placing of buildings, understand classic Confucian philosophy, and understand the forces of nature and the weather on buildings and their surroundings. It is also essential to have knowledge of the magnetic fields in the earth and how they influence man, knowledge on how to place buildings in order to tap “Qi” or the energy of the earth, understand the geographical land forms like hills, valleys, flat land etc. The Chinese people in their daily life have broadly applied the idea of *Feng Shui*. Often, in the West, it is seen as a superstitious belief and a non-scientific idea. However, originally, in order to fully understand and apply the knowledge of *Feng Shui*, one must understand how environmental factors influence buildings externally and internally and how to place buildings so that the building has a comfortable physical environment. Therefore, the idea of *Feng Shui* in the end shows a large concern for environmental integration and a coherent knowledge of psychological and physical factors. Water and Wind are the two fundamental forms of life energy as well as the two major elements of environmental integration and represent the basic geographic science of *Feng Shui*.

---

42            惟王建國，辯方正位 ( *wei wang jian guo, bian fang zheng wei*) means, “the only person that constitutes the empire is the King. He determines the four regions and fixes the governmental positions”.

43            *Kanyu* (simplified Chinese: 堪輿; traditional Chinese: 堪輿).

For example, in ancient China, a city was planned in concentric rectangles surrounded by walls surrounded by lakes, hills, valleys, gardens, courtyards and parks. The Chinese tried to ensure that both the natural and the built environment were planned to enhance positive energy. These were then landscaped according to the Taoist ideas of *Yin* and *Yang*, void and solid, water and hill. Many still-remaining vernacular settlements show how the courtyard typology has taken into account their orientation toward the south in order to receive optimal sunshine in the daytime as well as to ensure the natural ventilation by the wind flow in the courts and inside the house, and to reduce the heat in the house in the daytime, to retain the heat for interior use in the evening and even more so in the winter.

Besides the practical reasons for applying the idea of *Feng Shui* and orientation, Charles Nelson (1988) elaborated how the application of *Feng Shui* is coherent with the cosmological idea that the supreme God ruled in the center of Heaven, animating the universe with *Qi*-the heavenly breath, and sanctioning the rule of worthy Kings with Heaven's mandate. The center of Heaven was marked by the pole star, so *Qi* was distributed to earth along the polar meridians. Hence, ancient Chinese cities were laid out along the polar meridian, with walls and gates spread to face the cardinal directions, encompassing the social world of Man even as the bow of Heaven encompassed the greater Universe (Nelson 1988).

I would argue, the principles of *Feng Shui* applied in practice, especially in relation to settlements and their structural components, have been described by workers in a number of fields: geography, history, anthropology and architecture. Most important of its value system is that it is strongly embedded in the daily life and use in Chinese civilization. Misunderstanding of *Feng Shui* has often occurred as a result of the lack of scientific accessibility of its abundant body of knowledge. Therefore, the systematic studying on ancient Chinese wisdom should be enhanced and open for discussion in order to adapt it to the modern society.

### § 3.2.3.3 The Hierarchical and Isomorphic Spatial Mode

---

The aforementioned highlights of the interrelation between feudal control, social order and spatial organization elaborate, according to *Zhou Li* and Confucianism, the hierarchical and isomorphic spatial mode that are highly charged with social meanings and values; it is supposed to instill a sense of the equivalence between the physical space and social space. Eric Reinders (1997), in his research on the ritual topography elaborated how physical distinction is transformed into spatial distinction. He used the analysis of the vertical space in Buddhist Monastic practice to represent the hierarchical and isomorphic mode of social behavior and spatial organization. He

took the example of “bowing practice” as the ritual placement of bodies serves to both represent and embody the hierarchical distinctions between different social statuses, which in a sense define the conceptual structure of traditional Chinese society. For example, in general, seniority is one determinant of ritual status, which is expressed in directly physical terms as “senior”, equals to “higher” and “junior”, equals to “lower”.

The explicit correlation of certain sets of categories (e.g. seniority to heigher, younger to lower; male to heigher and female to lower) represents the basic metaphor of vertical distinction in physical, spatial and social modes, at the same time it is applied as the notion of hierarchical strategy for retaining social order and social control.

For example, the link between the hierarchical physical, spatial and social modes can be recognized clearly in the traditional Chinese courtyard house structure. Normally, the layout of the courtyard house is defined by the family structure and is thus a hierarchical structure. In the layout of a courtyard house, the main building where the parents live is normally situated on the north (the optimal orientation of the house normally is with its back oriented north and the front south), and the elder son (who normally inherits the main family property) lives in the house to the east side, and the younger son to the west. Unmarried daughters have no space opening into the main courtyard and live in the back courtyard. The servants live in separation from the main courtyard and to the south with a gated wall. The description can be found in the original text of *Kao Gong Ji* (The Artificer’s Record) as follows:

Residences were walled family compounds, ruled by the male master, with lesser authority associated with his wife and several consorts. The walled house was made up of a series of inward-focused courtyards, and the “good wife” was one who never ventured outside the walls. Ideally laid out on north-south axis, the house had a simple door opening to the street, leading to a first inner service court, lined by kitchen and service rooms to the south, with children’s and guest rooms east and west. A door in the north wall of this court led to a second inner court, lined with children’s suites east and west, but on the axis on the north side of this court would be the parents’ suite of rooms, often in the very center of which was a large room, the ancestral hall, with an altar on its north side for the veneration of ancestors and the gods.

The research of Sheng Qiang (2010), based on the research of Chang Yongho (1997), illustrates how the interrelation between social hierarchy and the principles of spatial organization are transferred into an isomorphic mode. Chang points out that the seat arrangement around a dinner table in Chinese custom follows the same principles of the arrangement of buildings in the layout of the courtyard house. The dinner table represents symbolically the inner courtyard of the courtyard house and the courtyard-housing compound represents the Outer City of the underclass in relation to the Inner City of the Emperor (Figure 3.5).

Following the requirements of *Feng Shui* or *Li*, seating arrangements around the dinner table in a traditional family normally obey the following order: parents to the north, the elder son to the east, the youngest son to the west and grandchildren to the south, where there was also a gap for servants to bring in the dishes.<sup>44</sup>




Figure 3.5 The Isomorphic structure existing at various scales and in different historical periods.  
Source: Sheng Qiang (2010), Figure 4.2.

The dominant idea of Confucianism that emphasized the propriety of manners enhanced the hierarchical social status from the ruler class to the underclass on the one hand and on the other hand, the idea of Taoism-following the Way of Nature enhanced the attitude towards the environment through the promotion of natural integration. It proved that within Chinese tradition there was already a very comprehensive and systematic discourse transferring the philosophic ideas into the practical spatial organization with its accumulated body of knowledge continually, not only in social, but also in spatial organization.

44

See Sheng Qiang (2010: 63). In this framework, un-married daughters are not allowed to seat as the brothers around the main table. Normally, unmarried daughters and female family members are eating in the kitchen.

In general, the mode of orientation, the geometrical setting and the cosmological philosophy had their common roots in the thoughts of Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism and many other philosophies. These differed in detail but shared cosmological concepts that were translated into principles of city planning that also supported the aims and organization of the state. In this cosmology, the capital city was the embodiment of the state itself, and the link that unified heaven, man and earth, the three intelligible components of the universe. In this sense, Chinese culture is a culture of inclusive alignment and coherent accumulation of ideas. This special characteristic of Chinese culture can also be recognized in the way Chinese philosophy emphasized learning from the natural environment. However, the aforementioned ideas and philosophies had in common the lack of criticism of feudalism and rather supported it.

We should take into account these special characteristics of Chinese culture when we reflect today's Chinese reformation, particularly debating on how China can step toward a civil society, which may not retain the same meaning that has been defined according to the Western historical evolution. In next paragraph, I elaborate two types of Chinese city, which represents two types of urban culture emerged in ancient China; however, they are built under the same system of feudalism. Nevertheless, they provide different reference to decode the contemporary transformation based on more Chinese cultural-context origin.

---

### § 3.3 The Emergence of Chinese Cities and Urban Planning

---

Following the main argumentation of this research, planning approach has to be regarded as the product of a certain society and a specific urban culture that is embedded in the demands of the transformation of the society and the sequent changes of that urban culture. Like in any other civilization, the emergence of Chinese cities is strongly related to the specifically Chinese political and societal modes that contribute to the accumulation of the various urban cultures. I illustrate different cultural, historical and philosophical elements related to ancient Chinese socio-political-spatial characteristics. In the following paragraph, the linkage between the emergence of Chinese cities and their urban planning approach is shown as it emerged through time, based on societal change and the emergence of a new urban culture. They are used as reference to reflect on the comparable transitional reformation of contemporary China, and how the cultural turn is defined in this research.

### § 3.3.1 The Emergence of Chinese Cities

---

In general, there is no coherent definition among scholars regarding the question of the emergence of Chinese cities. However, the majority holds that the Chinese city was formed as the product of the feudal system, especially to serve the purpose of control of society by the ruling class and to make a clear distinction of social classes between the Emperor and the various other classes. Within this framework, the first ancient city can be dated to the Xia Dynasty (ca. 2070–1600 B.C.), when the first Chinese civilization emerged. The Shang Dynasty (ca. 1766–1111 B.C.) is the first documented era of ancient China. The highly developed hierarchy consisted of a king, nobles, commoners, and slaves. However, not until the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period (770–221 B.C.) the formation of cities became formally established.

Indeed, in Chinese history the ancient word “city” is *Yi* (Figure 3.6), which means “urban center” or “capital” during the Shang Dynasty (ca. 1766–1111 B.C.). The Shang ideograph for *Yi* is a man kneeling beneath an enclosure. Charles M. Nelson (1988) elaborated that the enclosure represents the wall of the city, the power of the capital as the center of the state and the moral authority of the state religion; the kneeling man represents the submission of all people to the temporal and spiritual authority of the state as personified in the creation of the city. Notice that during this period the ideograph for *Yi* appears to exclude the concept of the city as a commercial center, rather it focuses on serving the political, administrative and religious purposes. Nelson emphasized that this is evidently deliberate. When China was unified under the Qin Dynasty (221–206 B.C.) and the resulting empire elaborated and expanded under the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), the hierarchical structure of urban centers, city planning, and administrative and transportation networks between population centers were carefully developed to extend the principles used to organize the traditional capital (*Yi*) as the administrative hub of the state.



Figure 3.6 Archaic and Modern Forms of *Yi*, the Ancient Word for City.  
Source: Charles M. Nelson (1988), Figure 1.

The first imperial capital that fully integrated and promoted the development of commercial activities was Kaifeng (618–906 A.D.), center of the Liang and Northern Song dynasties. By 955 A.D., Kaifeng had grown into the largest and most complicated urban center in the world, while both public and private commercial enterprises were pursued throughout the administrative and outer cities. From the moment the commercial cities arose in China, the concept of the city itself changed. Du, the modern word for capital, linguistically reflected in the modern ideograph for capital, the combination of two symbols: on the left side for “market” and on the right side for “walled city” (Figure 3.7).



*Figure 3.7 Du, the modern Word for Capital, in its archaic and modern forms.*  
Source: Charles M. Nelson (1988), Figure 4.

Zhang Quanming (1998) elaborated that three stages of urban development can be defined in Chinese urban history, depending on the emergence of different urban functions. In general, Chinese ancient urban development had been transformed from the primary stage of defense and political function to the separation of political and commercial functions, then to the stage of integration of the political and commercial elements. The formations of urban political, urban economic, and urban cultural should not be seen as fixed and absolute. Rather they show a dynamic evolution and simultaneously lead to the emergence of diverse spatial planning approaches, resulting in different planning cultures for different periods.

In the late 10th century, during the transitional period from the Tang (618–906 A.D.) to the Song Dynasty (960–1125 A.D.), China experienced a shift from a dominant top-down approach in urban planning to a more flexible system that would give space to citizen’s initiatives. Interestingly, this is comparable to what is needed and happening now. The transformation from the Tang to the Song Dynasty illustrates how new urban planning ideas and concepts are required under the condition of the new society and how a time of change introduces a new planning idea and approach that enables to reshape the urban form in which a new urban space is able to accommodate a new way of living in a new civil society.



### § 3.3.2 The Emergence of a new Urban Culture: the City of Aristocrats and the City of Bureaucrats

---

In his book *Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrats*, Heng Chye Kiang (1999) presents two cases that are representative for this transition: the city of Chang'an—the ancient capital of the Tang Dynasty (618–906 A.D.)—as an example of imperial top down planning order (Figure 3.8), and the city of Kaifeng—the capital of the Northern Song Dynasty (960–1125 A.D.)—as an example of a city developed in the context of free trade (Figure 3.9). The Tang and the Song capitals represent two stages in the development of the Chinese medieval city.

Chan'an was a city built from scratch, tailored to the needs of a new dynasty. In contrast, Kaifeng grew towards being an important entrepôt and prosperous city. The two capital cities, each with its own urban structure and cityscape, reflected the respective periods that produced them. Chang'an was the result of a strong aristocratic power with a highly hierarchical social structure, while Kaifeng was shaped by a diverse and mercantile society and managed by pragmatic professional bureaucrats. This new urban paradigm was introduced in the context of a demand for political reform as well as important social and economic changes of which the transformation of urban institutions and rapid urbanization were integral parts. This transformation took place during the collapse of the regulative power over commercial activities within the late Tang Dynasty (618–906 A.D.). At this time, a new social order was built. It replaced the old ruling aristocracy with a professional bureaucracy that was recruited through open civil examinations. This had a significant impact on the official attitude toward commercial activities and later was followed, during the Song Dynasty (960–1125 A.D.), by an increase in agricultural productivity, rapid growth in population, the development of an extensive communication network and a more efficient method of transporting goods for the rapidly growing urban consumer population.

A new urban paradigm and the concept of an open city were introduced. It included a change in the urban form, layout, and skyline as well as in governance. The city became less controlled and more open to public involvement. It also changed its scale and density. As described by Heng (1999):

The breakdown of the residential wards and their walls and the proliferations of multi-functional streets throughout the city were probably the most obvious manifestations of the popularization of the city. (...) Not only were the streets made available to the urban dwellers at all times of the day and night, business were conducted in them round the clock. Spatially, too, the restrictions were lifted. (Heng 1999: 156)

Physically, the open city was significantly different from its predecessors. Driven by increasing congestion and economic considerations, there was a tendency, slight though it might be, to vertical expansion. (...) Rapid urban population growth also led to the emergence of suburbs at strategic locations around the city. Within the walls the gridiron plan eroded to a subtler network filled with T-junctions, cranked intersections, and oblique streets over a complex urban fabric. Toward the end of the North Song, a new kind of city was born. (Heng 1999: 202)



Figure 3.8 Plan of Chang'an.  
Source: Heng Chye Kiang (1999), Figure 6.



Figure 3.9 Schematic Reconstruction of Kaifeng.  
Source: Heng Chye Kiang (1999), Figure 28.

### § 3.3.3 The Transformation of Planning Approaches between Flexibility and Reliability

---

In Heng's interpretation, the "Cities of Aristocrats" were based on the manner in which the planning system operates. This operation is dominated by strict top-down regulation and control, while the "Cities of Bureaucrats" were introduced as adaptive apparatuses capable of responding to diverse bottom-up initiatives.

Heng (1999:7) illustrated this in his book in the description of the capital Chan'an:

The Imperial City was the administrative heart of the empire. Within its large walled enclosure were government offices of both civil and military functions, headquarters of imperial guards and the residence and offices of the crown prince. It was also here that the emperor came to conduct ritual sacrifices at the imperial ancestral temple and at the imperial heavenly altar. Basically, the separation of official functions and state machinery from the other functions of the city was very clearly defined, although a few of the less critical official departments were located in the wards close to the major N-S thoroughfare. No one without good reasons was allowed into the Imperial City, much less the Palace Cities.

The comparative description of the capital Kaifeng (Heng 1999: 89) is:

The central authorities seem content to be involved only in general zoning, in the transportation network, and in the selection of sites for critical government functions. Installations that were detrimental to health, such as cemeteries and kilns, were relegated to areas distant from the city. (...) The rest of city building—residential, commercial activities, and non-hazardous industries, and perhaps open space—seems to have been left to the initiative of the common people.

The Tang-Song transition period, important in many aspects for Chinese social, cultural, and economic history, is equally critical in the history of Chinese cities. The transformation from one to the other was long and tortuous. The reasons for such a development were equally complex and multifaceted. As Heng (1999: 208) emphasized, "Instead the evolution of city forms was affected, as we have seen, not only by political events, but also by the wider social, economic, and cultural contexts."

When disregarding the causes for change in the social structure, one can conclude that in the spatial and structural dimension in which the transition was taking place the city was forced to adapt a new urban paradigm—the open city that Heng describes, was the result of a transformation in order to dynamically enable spontaneous multifunctional street activities. The transition from one to the other was a nonlinear process

influenced by many factors. However, even today, within the domain of research of urban change and urban transformation, there are urgent demands to explore in depth the reasons behind the transformation, how cities were perceived and what they meant to their founders, planners and inhabitants based on an extension of Heng's research.

In other words: more than a thousand years ago, the planning system of the Tang-Song transition period already realized an optimal balance between a top down and bottom up approach by integrating a reliable long term framework for urban development (general zoning, transportation network, locations for public institutions) with a flexible (open) system—for initiatives of the common people' (residential buildings, commercial activities, non-hazardous industries and open space). The question is to what extent this balance can be retrieved under the conditions of the current urban development in China and within a society that is again in transition?

Before we proceed further, a few points can be underlined for reflection. First, in view of the very different evolution of Chinese civilization, the political formation of ancient China has never understood socio-political interaction in the way it is constituted in Western-democratic societies. In the Western liberal tradition, the basic practice of governance derives from an acknowledged separation between state and society, while in Chinese tradition these were effectively conterminous under state hegemony. Second, based on the evolution of Chinese civilization, the spatial meaning derived either from the implicative ritual principle or from the socio-political functional integration, spaces (and places) are not regarded in the liberal way they are defined in the Western-democratic societies. Third, the case of the Tang-Song transition shows, to a certain degree, the phenomenon of a more open society with less political control allowing for more spatial initiatives. Yet, inherent is still the overall political order that Chinese society reigned by aged-old feudalism. These three notions help to understand what happened when this old country was forced to change by external matters, how the internal and external conflicts were generated, and to what extent we can learn from this condition for assessing the later transformation of the 1980s. In the next chapter, first the recent Chinese modernization is reviewed, which provides further insights in the transformation of the 1980s from the recent historical perspective.

## 4 Modernization and the Contextual Background of Urban Development in China

In the previous chapter, Chinese ancient philosophies are elaborated and linked to the political-social-spatial context. A general cultural foundation is laid out. To discern further, in this chapter, a more recent contextual background helps to dissect and understand Chinese modernization and its initial conditions. Within this framework, four major socio-political systems and their emerged urban cultures are illustrated in order to build up the interrelations between the hybrid layers evolution of Chinese modernity and the external impetuous development.

This chapter argues, first, the reason why China took so long to undertake a real process of modernization. Imperialism could be one obvious reason; however, the main reason was that the Chinese were suffering from a profound malaise: nihilism and self-imposed isolation for centuries. Second, although the sequential Chinese modernization resulted in a painful transformation, at the same time an awakening society, facing the reality of Chinese backward development emerged accompanied by a series of initial movements. Those initial movements play important roles in the early stages of modernity in Chinese society, although the initial intentions were given to Chinese resulting in colonization.

The evolution of Chinese modernization was rooted in a very different soil from the Western context. It is necessary to re-trace the important steps of China through the unknown to evolve and pursue modernity in the contemporary era. The issues to be broached in this chapter are structured to provide useful historical facts for understanding of the evolution of the contemporary development after the 1980s.

---

### § 4.1 Modernization and the Break of National Identity in Chinese Civilization

---

Modernization proceeded with a special mode in the Chinese context. It has not been appreciated by Chinese civilization as in Western countries. The modern history of China began with the Opium War (1840–1842), yet China did not undergo its real process of modernization until the reformation began in the late 1970s. Before then, in general, in the early stage of modern history, both the negation of Chinese tradition

and the Westernization of Chinese culture went through three steps, namely, the Westernization Movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Reform Movement of 1898, and the May 4th Culture Movement of 1919. All three movements began with initiatives to attempt to overcome serious national crisis, such as increasing financial deficits, corruption and incompetence of officialdom, decline in armaments, and the resulting serious gap between the poor and the rich, and the annexation of its territory by foreign powers. The failure of the modernization movements in the earlier stages destroyed not parts of the Chinese territory, but above all the great confidence of this old civilization: its identity. On the other hand, underneath the national crises, a new enlightened consciousness was rising gradually.

### § 4.1.1 The Evolution of Modernization Movements

---

The concept of “modernization” has various meanings across different processes of evolution. Modernization as originating from the root of Western societal evolution emphasizes the significance of economic development and takes modernization as industrialization with a high level of science and technology. In addition, modernization attached more importance to changes in socio-political systems and their reforms. This evolution was occurring in a natural way under the condition of the Western tradition, in which it had slowly become comprehensible as part of the growth of democratic consciousness.

This democratic consciousness included not only the advanced material development of science and technology but also the moral and axiological principles and the full range of spiritual and cultural elements. By nature, modernization is the result of human civilization, the progress of which lies in the transformation of humankind from a slash-burn culture to the utilization of modern science and technology. It indicates the rapid progress in the ability to control nature and improve man’s material and spiritual conditions, which is a concept of evolution resulting from a harmonic relationship between human activities and nature as an external force. Modernization, as a product of human progress, should include thoughts and ideas and should be an unceasing evolution. This condition of evolution was not incorporated in Chinese civilization. As an agricultural country with a less developed economy, the original revolutionary elements of modernization—e.g., science-technology, democracy, and industrial revolution—cannot be created homogeneously but must be imported heterogeneously in Chinese history (Mo Weimin 1992).

Looking back at Chinese history, efforts at modernization have travelled a very long and tortuous road. In ancient times, especially in the Song dynasty (960–1270 A.D.), China has an outstanding history of leading the world in science and technology, typified

by the “four inventions”: printing, gunpowder, paper-making, and the compass. However, at the end of the 18th century, the ruling class of the last feudal dynasty of Qing (1644–1911 A.D.) closed the country to international exchange, being blindly and arrogantly opposed to everything foreign due to its parochialism. It discriminated against any who held different views. Yet it tried to retain its superior position through absolutism and obscurantism—to remain the monarchy power of the government as well as to withhold knowledge from the public. As a result, a large number of its working class lived in an abyss of misery. It gave opportunities to Western powers for annexation. A massive import of foreign opium at great cost not only poisoned many people but also further aggravated the Qing dynasty’s financial difficulties.

Before the Opium War, for centuries a prominent feature of Chinese civilization was isolation from the outside world. Because of such isolation, feudal China had been left far behind. The Chinese believed their civilization to be superior to all others. They referred to their country as the Middle Kingdom because they thought of themselves as living in the center of the world. In the West, modernization began with the period of bourgeois revolution, which sought to provide a certain condition of human life that could transcend that of medieval society and strengthen a nation’s ability to exist. Yet the problem of modernization in the Asian world was the crisis of the existence of nations. Hence, the goal of modernization was to free the Eastern nations from the predicament of conflict with the West (Wang Xinsheng and Wang Ping 1992).

The first modernization movement took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. After the first Opium War (1840-1842), many Chinese intellectuals recognized that Western civilization had an advantage over Chinese civilization through their possession of powerful armaments and advanced technologies. Intellectuals such as Lin Zexu (1785-1850) and Wei Yuan (1794-1856) advocated learning from advanced foreign technology to resist or even control the West. After the second Opium War (1856-1860), Feng Guifen (1809-1874) realized not only that Chinese technology was inferior to the West’s, but more importantly, that China could not even compare to the West in the following ways: the employment of human resources and territory, the close relationship between the ruler and the people, and the correspondence between idea and reality.

However, Feng Guifen advocated that Chinese modernization should retain Chinese feudal ranking as a matter of substance, with Western methods and powers playing a subsidiary or functional role. At this stage, even though the clearest response among Chinese intellectuals was insistence upon studying the Western capitalist world, the ruling class of the Qing dynasty still denied that Western civilization was more advanced than the isolated Middle Kingdom and refused to accept Western democracy and civilization. This idea was supported by bureaucrats such as Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885), Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), and Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909). The ruling class of the Qing dynasty obstinately clung to the creed of

“*Tian* (Heaven) does not change, nor does *Tao* (Way)” to preserve the feudal rule of the Qing government. This was the first stage of China’s modernization, insisting that the Chinese factors remain fundamental, while Western factors play a subsidiary role (Mo Weimin 1992).

Within the framework of the first stage of modernization in the later nineteenth century, albeit with many negative effects under the imperialism invasion and by the pedantocracy<sup>45</sup> of the feudal government, the first stage of industrialization was triggered and slowly awakened the hibernated Chinese society. The Self-Strengthening Movement<sup>46</sup> (1861-1895 A.D.) created a period of institutional reforms and was initiated during the late Qing Dynasty following a series of military defeats and concessions to foreign powers. During the Self-Strengthening Movement, the focus was on enhancing military strength and modernizing the military organization, mobilizing the merchant capital under government protection and to establishing profit-oriented basic industries in support of the production for the national defense. *Guandu shangban*<sup>47</sup> was promoted. The most well-known, government-supervised merchant firms were the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company (1872), the Kaiping Coal Mines (1877), the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill (1878), the Imperial Telegraph Administration (1881), the Moho Gold Mines (1887), the Hanyang Ironworks (1890), the Daye Iron Mines (1890), the Pingxiang Coal Mines (1890), and the Imperial Bank of China (1896)<sup>48</sup>.

Although the founders of government-supervised merchant industries hoped to ward off foreign domination of China’s basic industries and to realize profits through reliance on domestic rather than foreign capital, the industries developed problems that undermined these goals. Their profit-oriented operations under grants of government protection discouraged the establishment of competing private firms. Private shareholders generally invested their profits in land or in traditional economic enterprises, thereby eschewing reinvestment and updating obsolete equipment.

---

45 *Fu ru zheng zhi* (Chinese: 腐儒政治) means government by pedants.

46 Self-Strengthening Movement or *Ziqiang yundong* (simplified Chinese: 自强运动; traditional Chinese: 自強運動). Also called Westernization Movement (simplified Chinese: 洋务运动; traditional Chinese: 洋務運動).

47 *Guandu shangban* (simplified Chinese: 官督商办; traditional Chinese: 官督商辦) means, “government-supervised, merchant operated enterprises” or “officially supervised merchant undertakings”.

48 China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company (CMSNC) was the most important enterprise of *Guandu shangban*, founded as a competitor to western shipping in China and became the hub of a great number of enterprises in mining, manufacturing and communications, all enjoying the protection of the principal official Li Hongzhang, who became the most ardent proponent of the Self-Strengthening Movement.



Official managers tolerated bureaucratic abuses such as nepotism and corruption; they hired foreign personnel to staff key positions and accepted foreign loans, resulting in foreign dependence and possible foreign control (Zhang 1992; Bai Shouyi 2002; Wang Haoyu 2003).

The failure of the government-supervised merchant industries to strengthen China's economy led Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) to establish *Guanshang heban*<sup>49</sup>, but the bureaucratic control and low rate of reinvestment that undermined the government-supervised merchant-operated firms and the joint government merchant firms by 1900 led to the initiation of privately financed and managed (*shangban*) business firms in a further manifestation of economic nationalism (Chan 1977; Bai Shouyi 2002 and Ji Zhaojin 2003).

On the surface, the Qing seemed to have begun its modernization. On the contrary, the early reformists neither established any systematic theories nor brought about any political movement, showing that the Chinese national bourgeoisie was still very weak. One of the main reasons is that these government officials were not proponents of launching an industrial revolution or a modern economy in China; on the contrary, they wanted to restore the traditional economy and were not planning on enhancing the strength and wealth of the country at the cost of its traditional institutions (Wright 1957). Therefore, when Qing dynasty was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895; the loss of this war was considered to be the first failure of the modernization movement. Nevertheless, the fact that the grand Middle Kingdom was defeated had awakened more Chinese, and they began to realize that Western civilization included not only material civilization, but also political and economic systems.

As a result, the second modernization movement was initiated by such intellectuals as Kang Youwei (1858-1927), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Yan Fu (1854-1921), and Tan Sitong (1865-1898) and was called the Reform Movement of 1898<sup>50</sup>. They represented the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords and sharply criticized the weakness and failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement. Kang Youwei as the protagonist of the reformists urged the Qing government to avert national crisis by replacing feudal autocracy with constitutional monarchy. He also encouraged

---

49 *Guanshang heban* (simplified Chinese: 官商合办; traditional Chinese: 官商合辦) means, "official-merchant managed enterprises" or "joint government-merchant", as a result of cooperation between government and enterprises. Zhang Zhidong insisted on a method of relatively conservative reform, summarized in his phrase, "Chinese learning for fundamental principles and Western learning for practical application."

50 Reform Movement or *Weixin yundong* (simplified Chinese: 维新运动; traditional Chinese: 維新運動).

civilians to establish modern industries, develop national capitalism, abrogate the civil service examination system that was regarded as a symbol of backwardness and corruption<sup>51</sup>, and encourages the study of Western bourgeoisie culture (Elman 2000). Both the diehard clique in the court headed by Empress Dowager Ci Xi (1835-1908) and the Westernization group resolutely upheld the feudal order in opposition to any other political reform. Kang Youwei's petitions were intercepted by the national conservatism and failed to reach the emperor. Even though Kang Youwei's advocacy lacked effective political power, his activities had a great impact on the society at large; his petitions appeared in printed pamphlets and were widely read by the public.

In August 1895, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao published in Beijing the World Bulletin (*Zhongwaijiwen*)<sup>52</sup>, a paper published every other day reporting on court affairs and calling for reform. They also formed the Society for the Study of National Strengthening (*Qiangxuehui*)<sup>53</sup> that gave regular lectures and published and distributed books and periodicals recommending Western learning, including European bourgeoisie democratic culture, ideology, science, and technology—all new to China. In this way, they molded public opinion and accumulated strength for reform. From 1896 to 1898, more than 300 study societies, modern schools, and newspapers mushroomed in big cities. Even though the Reform Movement only lasted for 103 days, different from modernization in the later nineteenth century, the tide of reform was surging forward irreversibly after the this (Bai Shouyi 2002).

The bourgeois reformists were progressive in the given historic conditions of their time. Unfortunately, they believed that reform from the top down through the authority of a feudal emperor would make China a strong capitalist country. Yan Fu (1854-1921 A.D.), a scholar who promoted the idea of Darwin's natural selection in the late nineteenth century and criticized feudal monarchy on the basis of Western concepts of popular rights, pointed out that according to the principle of the social division of labor, the king should be elected by the entire populace. Tan Sitong (1865-1898 A.D.)

- 
- 51 Civil service examination system or *Keju* (simplified Chinese: 科举; traditional Chinese: 科舉), a method of recruiting civil officials based on merit rather than family or political connections, played an especially central role in Chinese social and intellectual life which was established in 605 A.D. during the Sui Dynasty. This system was used only on a small scale during the Tang Dynasty and has been expanded under the Song Dynasty. Passing the rigorous exams, which were based on classical literature and philosophy, conferred a highly sought-after status, and a rich literati culture in imperial China ensued. In the late Qing period in particular, corruption was widespread and examiners could be bribed which undermined public morale.
- 52 *Zhongwaijiwen* (simplified Chinese: 中外紀聞; traditional Chinese: 中外紀聞).
- 53 *Qiangxuehui* (simplified Chinese: 強學會; traditional Chinese: 強學會).

called for breaking off of the feudal constraints. Nonetheless, neither Yan Fu nor Tan Sitong called for the abrogation of monarchism, still believing in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Moreover, they were under the illusion that if China would only learn from the West, the imperialist powers would give up their aggressive schemes. All this determined their inevitable defeat.

After signing the unequal International Protocol in 1901, people in every part of the country staged an unremitting resistance. The movement to restore rights and oppose imperialist control of railways and mines developed gradually after 1903. This movement was different from the beginning of the bourgeois reformists; it was not only initiated by the national bourgeoisie but was also supported by workers, peasants, students, and other urban residents. The records show that in 1909, there were more than 130 outbreaks of popular resistance in different regions, and the figures rose to over 290 in 1910 (Bai Shouyi 2002).

At that moment, the reform movement was at the point of breaking through, and in a strict sense the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution was initiated by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). After the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) broke out, Sun Yat-sen came to the conclusion that under Qing rule it would be impossible to make the country rich and powerful. The only way for national salvation was to take the path of revolution and overthrow Qing feudal rule. A bourgeois republican regime came into being in 1912 after the Wuchang Uprising. The Provisional Government, headed by Sun Yat-sen, was founded at Nanjing. Unfortunately, owing to the weakness and compromise of the bourgeois revolutionaries, it was actually a coalition government of revolutionaries, constitutionalists, and former officials. Although the revolutionaries predominated in the government, the constitutionalists and former officials headed the ministries of internal affairs, industry and communications; the Provisional Government in fact could not exercise central government authority over them, so China was still a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society.

However, the victory after the Wuchang Uprising aroused a high tide of revolutionary enthusiasm throughout the entire country. By early November of 1912, thirteen provinces had declared independence from the Qing court, and the disintegration of Qing rule was underway.

On May 4th, 1919, an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal demonstration was held by students in Beijing, which grew into a large-scale and nation-wide movement of students and workers. The May 4th Movement took place as a result of deepening contradictions between the Chinese people on the one hand and imperialism and feudal warlords on the other. The triple yoke of imperialist, feudal, and capitalist exploitation and oppression of the Chinese proletariat became heavier. Beside

the patriotic movement of students, the working class held political strikes as an independent force instead of following the bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes.

In general, the May 4th Movement gave the Chinese people a new awakening which was at once a patriotic political movement as well as a new cultural movement. The new Chinese intellectuals, armed with rudimentary ideas of communism after the October Revolution in Russia, played a leading role in the movement. This led to a rising wave of resistance and paved the way for the spread of Marxism-Leninism in China.

### § 4.1.2 The Confusion of National Identity

---

In the past two centuries, the evolution of modernization in China was triggered mainly by the changes in the political and economic interests. The self-confidence as a cultivated civilization in the world had diminished due to the backward development and the confusion of national identity. The confusion of the break of identity occurred in many different aspects. Historical development indicated how the lack of self-identity had undermined Chinese traditional values and the norms of the culture that had permanently generated confusion and conflict<sup>54</sup>.

In the old cultural mode, the highest political goal was to deal with the confrontation between unity and diversity, which had always been related to the shift between different political favorites of the ruling class through time. In Chinese tradition, even in political terms, the ruling class searched for unity as opposed to variety to ensure its superior position. Yet in philosophical terms, in the Pre-Qin period of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods, the idea of “Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” gave birth to the coexistence of varieties in which the fundamental philosophical root of Chinese tradition was founded. At that time, there was no dominant political power. The exploration and debate between different advocacies for a better social order and political essence were very dynamic. I would argue, despite any short-term breaks resulting from changes from one political favorite to another, undeniably this original inclusive mode is deeply embedded in the value system of Chinese civilization.

Yet, inevitably the political dominance at the same time did have a very strong influence on the devaluation of variety. For example, in the Han dynasty, Confucianism became the overpowering monopoly. The Han Emperor Liou Che (156-187 B.C.) advanced the slogan “to dismiss a hundred schools from office, to have a monopoly of Confucianism”<sup>55</sup> and regarded unity as the highest goal to suit the needs of the feudal system and to pursue the totalitarianism of the ruling superior. Obviously, for the purpose of the ruling power, the emphasis on totalitarianism was always applied by the ruling class to secure its political position. This can also explain why political revolution has been triggered much later in Chinese civilization in comparison to Western societies, because the emphasis on totalitarianism was strongly embedded in the foundation of the feudal system, in which the Chinese political mode had devaluated the development of individuality.

Within this framework, the second reflection is that in ancient society a person was regarded only as a son or brother, not as an independent personality—the country is a great family and the family is a small country. If the individual in a clan is of no account, then a clan also does not count in relation to the country. This was also supported by Confucian filial piety and fraternal duty. The confrontation between the mode of totalitarianism and individualism became one of the most dynamic oppositions by which the civilian’s identity against the feudal control was shaped and defined. This confrontation often is the essential core of debate between the different philosophical advocacies that can be revealed vividly by reviewing the historical development of Chinese philosophies<sup>56</sup>.

In general, under the dominance of the feudal political influence, the control over individuality is immense. Yet initiatives of individuality always emerged within the Chinese civilization. In the reality, the mode and the value of the collective behavior of the society are shaped by the collective behavior of the individuality consistently. The cultural values of the Chinese civilization could be undermined, but had never been halted by the once-emerged interest of political autocracy, and under the dominance of totalitarianism. That is to say, individuality and totality are not two extremes of an abstract antagonism. There is no real unity without a rich variety.

---

55 *Ba chu ba ijia, Du zun ru shu* (simplified Chinese: 罢黜百家，独尊儒术； traditional Chinese: 罷黜百家，獨尊儒術).

56 See also the background of the Chinese philosophical roots in Chapter 3.2.1.

The second confusion occurred from the conflict between the value of political embodiment and the civilian economic initiatives. Traditionally, political embodiment was highly valued by the elite while commercial variety was undermined<sup>57</sup>. This devalued position of commercial variety initiated by civilians also defined the hierarchies in social status. For example, under the emperor there were four categories of social status of civilians, defined by their occupations. In descending order they were *Shi*, *Nong*, *Gong*, and *Shang*<sup>58</sup>. *Shi* refers to gentry, scholars, elites, or low-level aristocrats. *Nong* refers to peasant farmers; *Gong* refers to artisans and craftsman. *Shang*, as the lowest status of the four hierarchical social distinctions refers to merchants and traders. This system postulated that commercial and financial operation for private gain is immoral. Under the feudal system, the scholars in their attitudes towards commerce and business almost universally denounced in their writings the merchant class as greedy and lacking in moral character. This fundamental devaluation of commercial initiatives by civilians strongly influenced social status in Chinese society and even influences it in the present. Within this framework, the direct link between the cultural traits of the enterprise and the political need to control enterprise is inevitable. Enterprise activities must be supported by the political concepts and institutions that can guarantee putting the individual constructive abilities into operation. Traditionally, promotion of private initiative of enterprise was heavily controlled by the ruling class.

It also explains why the early modernization movements had failed to overthrow the feudal system, because political embodiment was valued far higher than any other activities by the elites. And they supported the ruling class as long as they believed that the power of the emperor was inherently given by the mandate of Heaven. The confusion between political embodiment and commercial initiative also influenced urban development, guiding purpose and function. Cities that serve a political purpose and have a political function are different from those built for civilians. Especially, in comparison with Western urban development, the root of Chinese philosophy emphasizes the political urban mode—in its relation to the feudal system—and almost becomes an inviolable command.

The third conflict stems from the confusion between the ethical and the legal spirit. Chapter 4, reviewing the Chinese philosophical roots, provided us with the general idea that Chinese philosophy emphasized ethical value. The primitive ethical spirit based upon blood relationship was adapted in traditional Chinese society. While the legal

---

57 See also the background of the Chinese philosophical roots in Chapter 3.2.2.

58 *Shi, Nong, Gong, and Shang* (simplified Chinese: 士农工商; traditional Chinese: 士農工商).

spirit is a characteristic of modern civil society, the ethical spirit promotes the mode of social hierarchy and undermines individuality. It also creates unequal social status while the legal spirit promotes independent equity of persons. This ethical spirit also undermined the development of modern civil society in Chinese history. The legal spirit based on independent persons and political equality forms the basis of the new society and the new culture. Within the Chinese context, the formation of the independent individuality and the democratization of society that emphasizes totality and legal spirit shall be synchronous in the process of the modernization.

The fourth conflict is the result of the confusion generated by the misunderstanding of science-technology and the lack of scientific spirit. Traditional Chinese culture centered on politics and ethics. Even though historically there were many inventions in Chinese civilization, unfortunately, most of them were used in superstitious ways rather than for the development of a truly scientific spirit. The lack of scientific spirit in combination with the emphasis on the ethical spirit devaluated the development of science and technology. For example, traditional Chinese medicine was rooted in ancient knowledge; however, it was often applied by non-scientific approaches and *Feng Shui* was often used as a superstitious belief and non-scientific idea.

On the other hand, despite the prosperous history of Chinese inventions, the main problem of Chinese modernization was avoiding scientific spirit by only emphasizing the matter of scientific-technological results. For example, in the framework of modernization, the lack of scientific spirit in the ruling class was one of the main reasons why the reform movement failed (Yu Wujing 1992). Furthermore, the Chinese efforts at modernization, indulging in the material aspect while neglecting the scientific spirit, made no real progress. The confusion is due to the lack of understanding of the difference between material science-technology and the scientific spirit or mindset for guidance. Mo Weimin (1992) emphasizes the importance of the thoughts and ideas and that the scientific spirit should be applied to management and administration as well. On the other hand, the essential characteristic of the Western factory or enterprise is not the equipment employed but the combination of the labor and the power resources. All these factors have to be embedded into the enhancement of the scientific spirit. The gap between the promotion of science-technological solutions and the development of a scientific spirit created confusion within the Chinese tradition only later to be overcome by modernization.

The above-elaborated reflections show confusions for the Chinese identity during the past two centuries and continually influenced the Chinese cultural mode till the present. The evolution of modernization became an inevitable process of reshaping the superannated Chinese society—an unpleasant experience. On the other hand, the confusion also provided new opportunities to create a new fusion between modernization and tradition.

For such a century-old civilization, the evolution of Chinese modernization definitely has to be embedded in its own tradition. Hence, tradition should cope with the evolution of modernization as well as meeting the needs of human existence at a high level. The impetus of the confusion between modernization and tradition is the inevitable process to overcome the break of the national identity. Furthermore, in the physical form, it greatly impacted Chinese urban development.

### § 4.1.3 The Fusion of Urban Development

---

Urban development reflects the evolutionary history of society. In human history, most of the features identifying a city in the standard references have been extracted from the European and, for the modern period, North American evidence. Traditional Chinese cities and most of their modern counterparts, as Rudolf G. Wagner (2010: 452) pointed out, “fit only awkwardly into this pattern.” The reason is obvious, as urban development is embedded in the specific history of any urban society within its unique geo-political and socio-political conditions. Urban development in Western tradition was based on the Greek and Italian city-states, with their citizens endowed with special rights, privileges, and duties under a body of laws valid only for that specific city. The idea of “the city air makes you free”<sup>59</sup> defines a civilian society that gives citizens a superior position over peasants and villagers.

The evolution of a society and its urban characteristics can be relatively identified in Western urban history: Venice was the major center for commerce and trade during the fourteenth century; the histories of London and Paris began with the Industrial Revolution’s creation of a network of railways that brought an unprecedented flow of migrants to these capitals in the nineteenth century. New York City is considered by most historians to have been a far-reaching and visionary urban plan in the nineteenth century in the application of a regular grid of streets and property lines without regard to the topography of the island itself. In the last two centuries, most of the urban revolutions in Western history began with the adoption of political and societal transformations internally, while Chinese civilization was imprisoned between the semi-feudal and semi-colonial reluctances. The Chinese experience of modernization had to result in the sacrifice of backwardness and stagnation of urban development.



In general, three categories of urban formations emerged in this period directly by Western influence: colonial, industrial and transportation cities.

The first category is the emergence of “semi-feudal and semi-colonial cities.” Within this framework, there are three types within this category.

The first type is controlled directly by imperialist power. It includes cities ceded, leased, and occupied by foreign powers. Normally, these cities are situated at strategic locations, historically developed with important political functions in the feudal system. They were built under colonial initiative and designed directly by importing the spatial mode from the imperial countries. The ceded cities included Hong Kong (1842 by England), Macau (1887 by Portugal), Kowloon (1860 by England), and Taiwan (1895 by Japan); also included are leased cities such as Qingdao (1898) and Dalian (1898 by Russia and 1905 by Japan).

The second type is that of the “Concessions in China”. Concessions in China were parts or extensions of cities governed and occupied by foreign powers. In these concessions, the citizens of each foreign power were given the right to freely settle, trade, convert, and travel. They developed their own cultures distinct from the rest of China because each administration would try to make its concessions look “like home”. Churches, public houses, and various other western commercial institutions sprung up in the concessions (Table 4.1).

Overview of Concessions in China				
Colonist	City	Period	City	Period
England	Shanghai	1845-1863	Zhenjiang	1861-1927
	Tianjin	1860-1945	Guangzhou	1861-1945
	Hankou	1861-1927	Xiamen	1878-1930
	Jiujiang	1861-1927		
France	Shanghai	1849-1945	Guangzhou	1861-1945
	Tianjin	1860-1945	Hankou	1896-1945
Japan	Hangzhou	1896-1945	Tianjin	1898-1945
	Xuzhou	1897-1945	Fuzhou	1899-
	Hankou	1898-1945	Xiamen	1899-
	Shashi	1898-1945	Chongqing	1901-1937
America	Shanghai	1848-1863	Tianjin	1860-1902
Germany	Tianjin	1895-1917	Hankou	1895-1917
Russia	Hankou	1896-1925	Tianjin	1900-1924
Italy	Tianjin	1902-1945		

Table 4.1. Semi-feudal and Semi-colonial Cities  
Source: Chinese Literature and History Press 1992. Constructed by author.

Overview of Concessions in China			
Austria	Tianjin	1903-1917	
Belgium	Tianjin	1902-1931	
International Settlement	Shanghai	1863-1945	

Table 4.1. *Semi-feudal and Semi-colonial Cities*  
Source: *Chinese Literature and History Press 1992*. Constructed by author.

The third type is the treaty port, which was open to foreign trade through unequal treaties<sup>60</sup>. Jia Ruixue (2011) illustrated in his research the growth of the treaty port system, which historians usually categorize in four waves according to the timing of opening: wave one is from 1842; wave two is from 1858 to 1864; wave three is from the 1870s to the 1880s and wave four is from the 1890s to 1910 (Figure 3.1). Even though opening the market to foreign trade enhanced the connection of the Chinese economy to the outside world, the main purpose of treaty port cities was to serve foreign imperial countries in exploiting Chinese raw materials. In the first wave of 1842, this type of city was concentrated in the coastal areas. Later this has been extended to the areas of the river basins, which had good connections through the rivers to the inland. Urban development here focused mainly on building facilities such as factories, harbors, warehouses, stations, and piers (Twitchett et al. 1978; Jia Ruixue 2011; So, et al. 2011).

60

The treaty of Nanjing in 1842 established the concept of treaty port. The treaty named five-cities: Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai.



Figure 4.1 Growth and locations of Treaty Ports System.  
Source: Jia Ruixue (2010): Figure 1.

The second category is the emergence of industrial cities, including mining cities. These were built under the force of the modernization movement. The promotion of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895) was a period of institutional reform initiated during the late Qing Dynasty following a series of military defeats and concessions to foreign powers<sup>61</sup>. Within this framework, both the textile industries and mining industries were promoted to support military modernization.

61

See Chapter 4.1.1.

Characteristic of these cities was typically that they established a hybrid of entrepreneurial practices of capitalism and government supervised semi-feudalism. In general, the emergence of the industrial cities was concentrated in the south, such as Wuxi and Nantong in the Yangtze River Delta; in the north, such as Tianjin and Qingdao; and in the northeast, such as Dalian and Shenyang. The typical condition of the inner city area of this type was contradictory. Even though they developed during modernization, they still preserved the urban layout of the feudal structure and lacked public facilities and green structures.

The third category is the emergence of cities with a strategic location for the development of transport. The new railways and highways had changed profoundly the layout of the urban geography. Because the connections of the railway and highway network were expanded, cities such as Zhengzhou, Xuzhou, Shijiazhuang, Shenyang, Harbin, and Bengbu acquired a position of centrality. On the other hand, due to the lack of colonial functions, for cities previously known for their water networks, their strategic positions had been decreased and indirectly this resulted in the decline of their political importance (such as Yangzhou and Huaiyang). At the same time, the expansion of the railway and highway systems had also changed the layout of urban features in the inner city areas of existing large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing.

In the past, Chinese cities had a clear division of function. However, under the colonial influences, the characteristics of urban functions had been diversified from the division of the political and the commercial center into the multiple urban developments with mixed functions. This emergence of diversification and spread of urban functions also changed the entire urban geopolitical map. For example, firstly, the imbalance between the coastal cities and the inland cities was increasing, such as the concentration of different conurbations in the northeast where many cities had been ceded, leased, or occupied as well as in the coastal areas and areas alongside the rivers. The second phenomenon was the emergence of new urban features. Many modern public facilities that were built in cities, such as new commercial and business districts that had been developed outside the old city's central area, had replaced the function of the old political center. Banks, shopping malls, and markets introduced the new spatial function of trade of foreign imperial products. However, behind the prosperous façade, those new urban facilities represented a complex capitalist mechanism that did not enhance the urban development of Chinese modernization; instead, it increased class discrimination and social conflict. The third phenomenon is the collage of urban heterogeneity. The urban collage of feudal structure interwoven with the import of foreign colonial urban styles resulted in the typical colonial characteristic of urban fusion. The fourth phenomenon is based on the reorganization of the administrative structures. New laws and a special administrative hierarchy were installed, and within this framework, the management of the city and the rural areas became independent from each other.

Regarding urban development, it is also important to review during this period, what kind of urban planning methods had been applied? In general, there was a rigid breakdown of the application of the ancient urban planning theory during colonialism. The ancient urban planning had not been further developed and applied to modernization because it was regarded outdated and its development had stagnated. From the late nineteenth century, urban development of Chinese cities relied upon ideas from the West. They were either designed to follow Western concepts completely or built based on Chinese self-explored initiatives imitating Western types and forms. Under colonial dominance, most cities applied Western ideas.

The urban planning of these cities originated from foreign imperial powers applying two approaches. One approach was to apply a planning concept only in a confined area. This approach was typically applied to the areas of Concession in China. As a result, in most cases, those confined areas became isolated islands within the city. Short-term colonial interests disconnected planning implementations from the rest of the urban areas. This created a fragmented urban layout (Figure 4.2).



*Figure 4.2 Street plan of the English, French and American Settlements in Shanghai.*  
Source: Fu Si Niam Museum (<http://ms1.fhsh.tp.edu.tw/~lingsun/class.htm>).

The second approach was applied to the cities that had been ceded, leased, and occupied. In general, those cities had a more systematic urban structure and followed a comprehensive planning concept that originally was copied from the ideas of the Western Classical style. The positive dimension was that most cities had an integral plan for a green system and a well-planned underground sewage system. Those facilities became the basic urban foundation, still existing today (Figure 4.3).



*Figure 4.3* Master Plan of Qingdao under German Colonization 1901.  
Source: Zhuang Lin De et al. (eds.) (2002, Figure 7.10)

The second type of city was built based on Chinese self-explored initiatives. Most were built during the period of the establishment of the Provisional Government of Nanjing. The typical example is the master plan of capital Nanjing itself in 1929. The entire plan applied Western concepts and neglected the old urban structure of ancient Nanjing.

Regardless of its primitive urban practice, the urban plan of Nanjing was seen as the first planning document conducted by the self-exploring approach of the first nation-state in modern China (Figure 4.4).



Figure 4.4 Master Plan of Nanjing 1929  
Source: Su Ze Min (2008, Figure 12-8).

In general, reviewing the historical urban development of modern Chinese cities shows that the urban planning of the early modern period was immature and confused. It was the result of a fusion between diverse social-political influences of imperialism, colonization, and semi-feudalism, which all had been infused into the divided geopolitical localities of modernization. Both negative and positive urban interventions had been installed forcedly by external foreign initiatives or had emerged dynamically within the fusion of nation-state explorations. Critiques from historians ascribed the stagnation of urban phenomena in this period to foreign invasion, seeing it as the insolent nature of imperialism and colonization. However, this standpoint may be regarded as rather one-sided.



To get a rundown of the history of urban development of early modern China, historians were confronted with a critical point: the point of view in looking at history, including the value system and systematic approach to accessing and evaluating historical materials. “Restore and Prospect: Speech at the International Symposium for the Research on China’s Modern Architectural Academia in the 20th Century,” a critical reflection of Hou Youbin (2003), provides insight into Chinese architectural history and reflects how Chinese urban development can be engraved in modern history. As the co-author of the Chinese textbook *History of Chinese Architecture*, published in the 1960s, Hou Youbin recalled that when he was involved in editing the book, he and his colleagues could not avoid emotional hatred for foreign intervention in urban construction, especially under the political bias of communism.

He mentioned disdain towards the foreign interventions; the history of Chinese architecture and urban development was interpreted based on a general parameter of political history, so it was seen as part of the shame of national failure. While under foreign direct influence, the few cities that had applied Western-planning concepts had advanced urban development and were seen as the products of deformation of the foreign imperialism. Modern facilities such as banks, factories, and schools were seen as tools of exploitation of Western capitalism to destroy the Chinese national identity. In general, the essential value of the history of urban (architectural) development was strongly embedded into the communist principle of class struggle.

Instead, Hou Youbin (2003) proposed later “modern transformation” as a term to interpret the early modern period. He emphasized that even though the early modern period of China was triggered by the external force of foreign invasion, it was also embedded in the natural evolution of the modernization process, which had to be undertaken one way or the other. In Chinese experience, because of the political turmoil, the process of urban and architectural modernization was slow and was influenced by external forces with unavoidable internal countrywide convulsion. Due to the delay of modern evolution in China, Chinese modernization had to confront advanced Western concepts. On the other hand, in combination with political failure and confusion of national identity, it generated heterogeneity of traditional and modern urban and architectural systems. Furthermore, the modern transformation of Chinese architecture experienced changes in types, technologies, education, architectural styles, architectural theories, and the entire building industry from low to high. In this framework, modernity as well as nationality was the two main pursuits of Chinese architects and the two basic themes in this history.

Hou Youbin’s reflection is particularly important for a country like China, which had been suffering from different political interests. Political influence might be powerful, yet history can only be engraved in a society in which the continual evolution of cultural development can be sustained.



Never the less, political influence and socio-cultural evolution are not separated matters of antagonism; the abovementioned phenomena of urban development revealed that the launch of different political systems had a critical influence on the establishment of urban culture. This interlink can be recognized in the case of China's evolution of modernization. Within the Chinese context and evolution of modernization before 1970, four decisive social-political systems had emerged—the decline of feudalism, the influence of colonization, the establishment of republicanism and the emergence of communism. The focus of the next paragraph is given to the four decisive socio-political systems and their connections to the particular evolutions of the urban culture.

---

## § 4.2 The Major Socio-Political Systems and the Emerged Urban Cultures before 1970

---

In this section, relationships between the different political stages and their urban cultures are underpinned chronologically. Even though historically, in the early period of modernization from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the breaks between different political systems were vague and they almost overlapped, in general, there were four stages of political embodiment that have embedded characteristics into the urban culture of the feudal localities. These stages are critical as well as crucial. In the critical sense, it shows that the political instability had resulted in hitherto unknown and unpleasant damages to Chinese civilization for decades that has to be overcome; crucially, the high awakenings of the people during the first half of the twentieth century also had helped to trigger further modernization and paved the path for the later reformation of the 1970. In this sense, without the sequential socio-political impetuses, it was almost impossible for Chinese civilization to escape from the yoke of feudalism.

### § 4.2.1 Decline of Feudalism and the Sprout of Capitalism

---

What kind of social-urban phenomenon emerged in the last period of the decay of feudalism? One well-known case during Qian Long's reign (1711–1796 A.D.) is indicative. The emperor lived a corrupt life of self-indulgence. Like members of the ruling class of other dynasties, the officials of the Qing Dynasty used a variety of methods, including blackmail, to extort money from the people, and greedy landlords exploited peasants to enrich themselves. One of the favorite henchmen of Qian Long,

Heshen, a Grand Minister of the Privy Council, amassed a huge fortune at the end of Qian Long's reign; his total property was ultimately estimated at around 1,100 million taels<sup>62</sup> of silver, reputedly an amount equivalent to the imperial revenue of the Qing government for fifteen years. The case of Heshen was just the straw that broke the camel's back, indicating the seriousness of the financial difficulties in the government, and the widespread corruption among the officials indicated utter rottenness of the ruling oligarchy.

Corruption among officials reduced the government's income. From the historical archives, it is apparent that at the end of Qian long's reign (1711-1796 A.D.), the government had only about two million taels of silver at its disposal after payment of the salaries of officials and administrative expenses annually. Towards the end of Jian Qing's reign (1796-1820 A.D.), only five provinces were able to fulfill their tax quotas and hand over the receipts to the national treasure. As a result, the total revenue could not match the huge expenditure. To solve the financial deficit, the Qing government again had to introduce miscellaneous and oppressive taxes. A so-called tribute system was installed. Not only offices but also nominal titles, such as the degree of *Jinshi* (imperial college degree)<sup>63</sup>, could be bought and sold. Those who had bought such titles could enjoy higher social positions that enabled them to bully others. This social custom existed at all administrative levels. Taking advantage of the disgraced government, much of the revenue, which should have gone to the national treasury, was intercepted for personal use by officials at various levels. Within this framework, the ordinary people lived a life of slavery (Bai Shouyi 2002).

On the other hand, people's resistance activities did not stop after Qing had unified China, and there were numerous armed uprisings against the Qing authority towards the end of Qian Long's reign. As for cultural activities, there were a number of outstanding scholars during the latter part of the Qian Long period, but fearful of antagonizing the ruling elite, they avoided reality as much as possible.

Gong Zizhen (1792-1841 A.D.), an essayist, poet, historian, and philosopher, compared the society of his day to a sick body covered with scabs and scars, stating that its sickness was so advanced as to be beyond cure. He pointed out the corruption of officials at all levels, the shamelessness of those who exploited others through blackmail and oppression to live a more enjoyable life. He believed that there was no law that could not be changed or

---

62 A measure of the Chinese system of weights and currency.

63 *Jinshi* (simplified Chinese: 进士; traditional Chinese: 進士) who were ranked first class in the palace examination within the Civil service examination system (or Keju).

no precedent that could not be broken. Like many others who took compassion on an ill civilization, he believed that sooner or later, changes had to be made. He wrote a poem, which reads as follows (Bai Shouyi 2002: 365).

- The vitality of China cannot come about
- Until storm sweeps and thunder roars.
- Ten thousand horses are mute:
- How tragic it is!
- May Heaven arouse itself—I plead:
- Send us talents—all kinds of talents!

The poet felt sad due to the deathly situation he faced. He called for storm and thunder so that necessary changes could be made and a new situation be created, metaphorically changing the heavens to override the ruling power. One year before his death, the Opium War broke out and China entered a new historical period. However, the decline of the feudal system did not have an immediate effect; the impetus of rebellion accumulated only gradually.

The Ming-Qing period was marked by the decline of feudalism. Even though politically, the decay of the feudal system created a chaotic and divided society, the social economy continued to develop; the nature of labor power underwent a considerable change. The trade based on capitalism slowly emerged in certain areas and in certain industries. For example, in terms of agriculture, the production of paddy rice and new varieties of crops were promoted. During the Ming dynasty, the most productive areas were the provinces of Jiangsu, Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and areas along the southeast coast. The cultivation of crops increased as planting skills continued to improve. Several plant types were imported to China, such as tobacco, maize, and sweet potatoes, which were first grown experimentally in confined areas and could expand later over large areas. Such cash crops had a direct bearing on the rural economy. In terms of handicraft industry, spinning and weaving remained a major vocation among the peasants in a self-sufficient economy.

After the middle decades of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.), the industry created solely for the manufacture of marketable textiles slowly developed and thrived as independent enterprises in several regions. The porcelain industry reached a high stage of development; Jingdezhen and Jiangxi Province were the most famous porcelain producers. The blue vase and the multi-colored vase were then among the industry's most famous products. Others such as the shipbuilding industry and the building industry had also a long tradition. Commerce thrived in the Ming-Qing period as well, and Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Hankou, Suzhou, and Hangzhou were its major centers. Trade and commerce were particularly brisk in the lower valley of the Yang-tze River. Within this region, because of commercial prosperity, many places developed quickly

from small hamlets of several hundred households to towns or cities of thousands of households. During the Qing Dynasty, the newly developed and nationally known centers of commerce included Foshan in Guangdong Province, Hankou in Hubei Province, Zhuxian in Henan Province, and Jingde in Jiangxi Province. Jointly, they were referred to as the four famous towns of China.

Early during the Ming Dynasty, the sprout of capitalism first appeared in the textile industry. Towards the end of the Ming Dynasty, many weavers in Suzhou and Hangzhou realized that there was profit to be made and gradually increased the number of looms to hire more weavers for increased production. These, who began as self-employed workers who purchased their own raw materials and labored to transform the raw materials into finished products, no longer worked at the looms. There were also cloth merchants who distributed raw materials among the weavers (Bai Shouyi 2002). In this way, the former group—the weavers—developed from small commodity producers to become owners of handcraft workshops, and the second group—the cloth merchants—became contractors. Both groups had capitalistic characteristics and production relationships. This gradual emergence represented the bare beginning of Chinese capitalism.

Though nascent capitalism made its appearance during the late Ming and early Qing period, it did not have a chance to grow further. In general, the main reason was the strong and stubborn resistance of the feudal organization of society, which capitalism, in its initial stage of development, could not overcome. Under this political constraint, it was also difficult to change the traditional formation of production, which was based on the self-sufficient unit or natural economy of the family where men tilled and woman wove; besides, an average peasant had no way of improving his livelihood as he was exploited and oppressed by his government and landlord. In other words, the feudal system, aging and corrupt though it was, was still strong enough to prevent the emergence of a new social system.

In short, the Ming-Qing period saw a change from progressiveness to backwardness in China. In comparison with world history, from the early sixteenth to the middle decades of the seventeenth century was an important era that marked Western Europe's transition from feudalism to nascent capitalism. While the feudal forces of the Ming-Qing period remained strong enough to win temporary victories against the people, the end result was that Chinese people had to face an even sadder fate than ever. But the nascent capitalism had not been extinguished; it had only stagnated.

## § 4.2.2 Colonization and the Emergence of Industrialization

---

To a certain degree, the positive side effect of colonization was the promotion of industrialization. The early stage of modern industry in China came about under foreign initiatives. Soon after the Opium Wars, from the 1860s on factories with foreign investment in many Chinese cities grew steadily. The majority were ship-repairing dockyards, serving the rapid development of inland navigation, and processing factories for making tea, bricks, reeling silk, cotton, and refining sugar from local raw materials. There were also other light industries such as match factories, paper mills, and soap factories, which exploited cheap Chinese labor and the easily accessible local market. The transformation of China into a market for world capitalism under foreign control brought about a depression in agriculture and handicrafts and the impoverishment of Chinese peasants and other producers. Foreign export of capital and the establishment of banks and factories in China were further indications of the semi-colonial nature of the Chinese economy in the early stage of industrialization.

From the 1870s, groups of officials, landlords, and merchants invested in modern industries of a capitalist nature, mainly filatures, textile mills, flourmills, match factories, and local mines. The tension between national capitalism and foreign capitalism was very strong. National capitalism could barely survive in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. For example, whereas foreign countries and their factories and mines in China could sell products and obtain raw materials due to their special privileges, the native industries, in addition to the difficulties in obtaining raw materials and securing markets, were constantly facing the danger of annexation by foreign capital. Ironically, instead of helping native industries, the Qing government levied heavy taxes on them and fettered their growth in every way. However, many of the industrialists themselves were originally officials, landlords, or merchants, so they were on the one hand in conflict with foreign capitalism and domestic feudalism while on the other bound closely to them.

The lowest social class was not the peasants but the first generation of modern industrial workers. This early Chinese proletariat emerged when the British opened up dockyards and factories in the 1840s. Most of the workers were originally destitute peasants and craftsmen. Suffering economic and political oppression, the Chinese proletariat had to fight for its survival. The proletariat in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China was subjected to the harsh and ruthless threefold oppression and exploitation by foreign capitalism, national capitalism, and feudalism.

The gradual development of Chinese capitalism did not change the semi-colonial, semi-feudal nature of Chinese society. The development of national capitalism was also unable to affect the outstanding position of the feudal economy in the national economy as a whole. High feudal land rents, usury, and commercial profit all still restricted the formation

and expansion of industrial capital. In other words, Chinese capitalism was in conflict with Chinese feudalism while depending on it (Bai Shouyi 2002: 468).

However, within this framework, under the circumstances of that time, living in a special period full of ideological conflicts between the new and the old, the east and the west, the conservative and the advancing, some influential reformers with their personal financial strengths and social reputations survived by promoting their commissions to enhance the modern development of China. Wu Liangyong (2005) underpinned the evidence of early modernization by analyzing Nantong, which he called a pioneering city of modern China. Wu's study of Nantong revealed how Chinese experiments in the early stage of modernization stemmed from individual idealists and reformers. Zhang Jian (1853-1926), born in Nantong and a well-known member of the elite, devoted himself to the local urban construction of Nantong (including establishing plants, reclaiming wastelands, improving transportation, undertaking water conservation projects, and initiating education activities. Wu proved that in the early stage of modernization the concept of urban structure, which was based on China's agricultural society, had already emerged under the individual initiatives of reformers, especially those industrialists with a Chinese ideology. Their achievements in modern Chinese cities deserve further study.

### § 4.2.3 Republicans and the Emergence of Nationalism and Modernization of Architecture

---

The republican revolution of 1911 ended the Qing Empire and the long history of dynastic China. Chaos and wars ensued while warlords supported by foreign powers fought each other. After the Beiyang (Northern) warlords replaced the rule of the Qing Dynasty, contradictions in Chinese society deepened. The first nation-state in modern China was established by the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which was short-lived but the only period of formal unification and relative stability in pre-1949 China with Nanjing as its national capital and Shanghai its financial center. Historians name it as the Nanjing decade (1927-1937). Despite the weakness of authority and the disintegration of political coherence, it was before 1949 the most remarkable period of economic recovery, and cultural development of literature. It was also a short period when the first generation of Chinese architects emerged and supported the first Chinese nation-state, producing a new tradition to be carried forward in many decades to come.

Building in China has never been a simple task, but between the end of the Qing dynasty in 1912 and the onset of the People's Republic of China in 1949, tasks associated with building were even further complicated by civil strife, incursions by foreigners, technological transfers that held unforeseen implications, and changing

notions of how Chinese architects might contribute to building a new kind of China. Several Chinese who formed part of what has been sometimes called the “first generation of Chinese architects” (*diyidai*) involved in building in republican China, were challenged by the shifting dynamics of a society seeking a new identity. Those key architectural figures at the time included Zhuang Jun (1888-1990), Shen Liyuan (1890 -1951) Fan Wenzhao (1893-1979), Lu Yanzhi (1894-1929), Liu Dunzhen (1897-1968), Zhao Shen (1898-1978), Dong Dayou (1899-1973), Li Jinpei (1900 -), Lin Keming (1900-1999), Tong Jun (1900-1983), Liang Sicheng (1901-1972), Yang Tingbao (1901-1982), and Chen Zi (1902 -) etc. (Cody 2001).

In comparison with Chinese ancient architecture (especially the imperial and official architecture), China’s modern architectural studies are not the mainstream in the world. Because global modernization originated from the West and Western culture was the basic reference point, modernization of non-Western cultures was a latecomer, passive in its development and marginal in geographical aspects. This non-mainstream characteristic was exactly the challenge that the first generation of Chinese architects and those involved in urban construction faced. At the republic’s inception, the first free exploration gave architecture its modern meaning, and those who devoted themselves to the field of architecture first had professional roles and personal voices. They also played exceedingly important roles in questioning contemporary architectural conventions. The earliest generations of Chinese architects, largely educated in the United States, returned to China as practicing architects, architectural researchers, and/or educators. Collectively, their inter-war works, theories, students, and discoveries remained highly influential for many years after the 1949 socialist revolution (Cody 2001; Jia Beisi and Jia Yuayan 2003).

They confronted the dilemma of searching for modernism and revolution. In immediate terms, architects in both China and Europe had similar social problems, Jia Beisi and Jia Yuayan (2003: 31) pointed out “the socio-economic and political situations in the major cities and ports of Europe and China were comparable and the problems such as low wages of workers, poor housing conditions, workers’ unrest, strikes, and a general feeling of social anxiety resulting from rapid change were common to all”. However, the political-economic constraints led early modern architects in China and Europe to different destinies. On the European continent, counterparts formulated clearly demonstrated modernist tenets with their own theories, statements and charters, competition projects, and new schools, while China as a country was just beginning its exploration of modernization.

In general, anti-colonialism and anti-federalism ranked high among local political issues of the interwar period. It remains difficult to characterize the work or statements of any Chinese architect of this time as “modernist.” Besides, a large effort in Chinese architectural research was devoted to the research of traditional architecture. European research activities focused on urban policy and planning, new technologies, and

architectural prototypes while all were driven by an industrial ideology that did not yet exist in China on a large scale. Within this framework, housing was the core of social progress and the major subject of European modernist design, but not in China. Most of the modern architecture built in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s was later adopted as modern prototypes after World War II, for houses and collective housing projects. These buildings represented common goals: they were economically orientated; they applied and incorporated new industrial technologies; and they offered bright, open spaces as well as a sense of community. Contrary to this, there is no evidence of any leading Chinese architect with a particular interest in housing before World War II. Their commissioned buildings were mostly institutional, governmental, or commercial company apartments for high-income staff as well as private houses. This situation did not change until the 1949 revolution when China chose the socialist path.

Jia Beisi and Jia Yuayan (2003) highlighted that even beyond the general societal background, the role of Chinese architects was different from that of their European counterparts. Firstly, modernism in Europe was about social justice and social progress; modernism in China was merely a style. Secondly, European modernists were among society's leaders; Chinese architectural pioneers regarded themselves as society's servants. Thirdly, the most fundamental difference was that European modernists believed that society could be reformed through the implementation of modern architecture and felt a social responsibility as the presumed leaders of society. Importantly, such features of modern architecture as economic rationality, mass production, and mechanical beauty were the outcome of social ideas. As for Chinese architectural pioneers, they were more interested in architectural business and/or expressing the Chinese cultural identity. Even when considering the design approach during this period, Chinese leading architects designed mainly modernist buildings along with eclectic mixtures borrowed from Chinese or Western traditions and styles.

As one of the key figures of the first generation, Liang Sicheng (1986: 167) reflected on the situation after the revolution:

Most architects of my age have an educational background in eclecticism (which originated in the Beaux-Arts school of Paris). This approach began in the 15th century and declined with the rise of capitalism (...) In the early 1930s, palatial architecture was very popular, which in fact merely added an *Man Han Quan Xi* (a Chinese banquet)<sup>64</sup> to the architects' eclectic menu.



Behind the architectural production in modern China, Wang Haoyu (2003) analyzed the collective characteristics of Chinese architects under the influence of joint social and cultural forces. Four key phenomena can be found: eclecticism, revivalism, Art Deco, and architectural nationalism.

The revival of Chinese tradition received official support and reached its peak in the 1930s under the promotion of architectural nationalism and the association of architects with Chinese educational policy. Architectural education was influenced by the Beaux-Arts school (Lai Delin 2003; Kuroishi 2003). Zhu Jianfei (2003) examined the political nexus with cultural practice in design and explored historical currents with which the national style was formed, and excavated strata of these architectures in which cultural patterns were the consequence of the political transformation. He emphasized that the Beaux-Arts education that originated from France in the nineteenth century and before offered an eclectic design method to combine “essence” and “practical use” and acted as an architectural medium through which ideas and spaces of bourgeois classical modernity from nineteenth-century Europe were brought into twentieth-century China (Zhu 2003: 116).

The early period of the republic provided a new perspective on the profession of the architect. The profession was a new social force with a new body of knowledge even though in the case of China, the architects, designing and constructing by following the requirements of the state, were becoming part of the new intellectuals emerging in China in the 1920s and 1930s, educated in the West and committed to a Chinese national revival. A growing professional elite and middle class, in large cities and especially in Shanghai, needed and further developed a bourgeois-democratic space, and a rationalist outlook in the use of their skills and knowledge. Zhu Jianfei (2003: 115) also argued in the Chinese context that the May 4th and republican and nationalist revolutions engendered social and intellectual changes in eclectic historicism and the use of traditional Chinese forms, as well as patterns of open space and public space for an emerging bourgeois society and a rationalist control of open space and of building an object in open space. In political terms, it embedded the nationalist ideology of the state through the use of “Chinese forms”, which again involved a Leninist left and a fascist right—nationalism against foreign imperialism to promote a nationalistic order, discipline, and traditional values.

As Zhao Chen (2003: 1) emphasized, “as a country with a huge territory and variety of cultures, China’s modernization has shown imbalance. Due to architectural culture’s close relation to social life, the phenomenon of “non-mainstream” inevitably became the characteristic of Chinese architectural culture.” The understanding of the value of being non-mainstream did not imply the negation of mainstream but rather signified its extension and opening of the field. After all, the period between the 1920s and 1940s was the period of the most distinctive group of architecture emerged. Furthermore, it marked a critical moment in the development of a major theme in architecture design in

modern China in pre-1949. Pioneers and unknown architectural students ultimately held important implications for how architecture was taught, practiced, and studied in China for decades. The influence on architectural education was also closely related to the later development of China's architectural academia after the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, which marked the end of a semi-feudal, semi-colonial age in Chinese history and the beginning of its advance into the socialist epoch.

#### § 4.2.4 Communism and the Urban Geo-Spatial Reconstruction

---

After the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, Marxist philosophy became the key characteristic of the philosophical forum of China. Based on the collision and amalgamation of Chinese traditional and Western modern philosophies, the comprehensive innovation in "the localization of Marxist philosophy in China" has come through a tortuous historical process. The initial spread of Marxist philosophy in China happened to emerge under two international conditions. First, as the direct theory of the Chinese Communist Party and the state, the October Revolution led by Lenin marked a great victory for the spread of Marxism into China and set an example. Second, in the May 4th Movement's new culture, Marxist philosophy is an important subject of academic research; Peking University was the cradle of Marxist philosophy in China. Within this framework, propagation of Marxism-Leninism produced the first group of Chinese intellectuals with an elementary knowledge of communist ideology.

The May 4th Movement, parallel to political upheavals in the first decade of the twentieth century, was a nation-wide cultural and intellectual movement associated with a specific incident of student demonstration in Beijing in 1919. All social and philosophical theories then current in the West and Japan were introduced. Scholars argued for different visions and viewpoints. Despite the divergence, the May 4th consciousness shared some common characteristics: it was liberal, modernistic, cosmopolitan, critical of Chinese tradition, and at the same time nationalist and patriotic. The May 4th Movement aimed at finding a path to modernize China so that it could survive and develop in a competitive capitalist world.

Within this framework, two critical themes of Leninism were introduced into China, which contributed to its dramatic success. One is his theory of imperialism. According to Lenin, capitalist powers were moving onto the last, imperialist stage. He argued that imperialists relied increasingly on overseas colonies for further capitalist accumulation. The proletarian revolution against capitalism, therefore, had to be fought increasingly outside Europe, in the colonies of the East. This theory highlighted imperialism as the enemy of the Chinese revolution and placed Chinese's national effort in a global, historical perspective.

Another aspect of Leninism was his revolutionary politics and methods to organize revolutionary forces. The party, full of disciplined intellectual elites, is the vanguard that should lead the army and the masses to wage revolution and transform society. In fact, the force of institutionalization transferred from European Russia to China shaped the structure of the party and the state to emerge for both communists and nationalists.

Within this framework, there were two attitudes to Chinese tradition: one was iconoclastic and remained dominant in the movement for the following decades. It attacked Confucianism as “cannibalistic”. The other was modest and conservative, following a tradition of studying the “national essence”<sup>65</sup> (Zhu Jianfei 2003: 112). In general, both positions of the “left” and “right” of May 4th would find their respective echoes in the pre-1949 period. In another dimension, an important influence during the May 4th movement is the spread of newspapers and journals. As printed materials became more accessible and a public domain emerged for free exchange of ideas and information, urban public space, inside or outside, expanded in large cities—especially Shanghai.<sup>66</sup>

With the above-mentioned initial background in mind, in addition, being embedded within the change of political and economic developments, philosophical advocacy, natural sciences and literature, Chinese urban development under the guidance of “socialism with Chinese characteristic” guided by Marxism also entered a new era. It was almost an immediate task of the Chinese communist regime to reconstruct the entire country. After decades of chaos and putrefaction, what had been left to such an immense country was poverty to be combated and endless works of reconstruction to be undertaken, especially the foundation of public facilities, which were completely destroyed. With the lack of experience it had, the government confronted the enormous pressure of providing long-term guidance for the economic revitalization, and many urgent problems regarding urban construction emerged that needed immediate attention and solutions.

In the communist regime, the interlink between the political interventions and the geo-spatial reconstruction is obvious. In order to show the close link, in this paragraph the focus is on the general structural and spatial changes of China’s urban settlements since 1949 to the reform of 1978.

---

65            Chen Duxiu and Lu Xun were the strongest voices attacking Confucianism. Hu Shi advised careful research on national heritage, and Liang Qichao promoted a spiritual tradition in Confucianism and Buddhism to remedy the excess of Western materialism.

66            One specific reform introduced by Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi was the use of *Baihuawen* (simplified Chinese: 白话文; traditional Chinese: 白話文), which means a form of vernacular speech in writing to replace the inaccessible elitist classical Chinese. At the same time, there was a spread of newspapers and journals using the vernacular. The language and the accessible printed material enhanced the free exchange of ideas and information.

I use two resources as reference. The first main resource is the research done by George C. S. Lin. Lin (1998, 2002a) studied how the structural and spatial redistribution of the urban population and of Chinese cities since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 is transformed gradually under the influence of political interventions. Lin's researches help us to understand how the urban spatial structure and urban geo-spatial construction has shifted before and after the Maoist regime. He concluded that prior to the 1978 economic reforms, the system of cities created by the Maoist regime was dominated by large and extra-large cities because of the imperatives of optimal industrialization. Because of national defense considerations, most of the new cities were created in the central and western interior rather than on the eastern coast. His studies paved the way for a better interpretation of the links between the political-economic interests and the geo-spatial development.

The second main resource is the work of Hua Lanhung, a senior scholar born in Beijing in 1912. Hua Lanhung moved overseas when he was sixteen years old and obtained his architecture degree in France. From 1951 to 1977, Hua Lanhung worked in China, and Liang Sicheng recommended him to become the chief architect in charge of Beijing's master plan. He was active in urban reconstruction during his career as a planner and an architect in China. In his book *Reconstruire la Chine*, he recalled his insights on urban development from 1949 to 1978. This part of history had been studied in a broader sense; however, little research focuses on the urban development and planning perspective, at least in a systematic manner. Between 1949 and 1978, the debate on urban development was becoming an open phenomenon, and different archives have become accessible for public assessment. However, Chinese scholars wrote most of these in Chinese. Therefore, there is an urgent need to publish research in this field in translation to facilitate international reception of this knowledge.

There are two research questions highlighted in Lin's study. The first one is the relationship between the role of different size settlements and cities and their responses to major political and economic changes in different historical contexts. The second one concerns the locational changes of cities and their geographical distribution as a result of the shifting spatial emphasis of national economic development. Based on the chronology of social-political development, there are three phases of development from 1949 to 1978.

#### *First phase: 1949-1961*

The initial period from 1949 to 1961 was characterized by a rapid increase in the number of cities and urban population. The rehabilitation and reconstruction of the national economy after the civil war greatly facilitated the pace of industrialization and urban development. During the initial period from 1949-1952, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made great strides in bringing the country through three critical transitions: from economic prostration to economic growth, from political disintegration to political strength, and from military rule to civilian rule.

From 1952–1954 the Chinese established a central planning apparatus and a set of central ministries and other government institutions that were close copies of their Soviet counterparts. Those actions were officially ratified by the first meeting of the National People’s Congress in September 1954, which formally established the Central People’s Government and adopted the first constitution of the People’s Republic of China.

The basic national development policy for China is embodied in the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) for National Economic and Social Development, also taken from the Soviet example. The key construction projects financed by the central government during the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1953-1957) provided a great impetus for the expansion of existing cities and the creation of new cities; most of them were located in the Northeast and North of China.

The first Five-Year Plan (FYP) was linked to the transition of China’s rural and urban economy to the collective forms. By the end of the Five-Year Plan in 1957, the number of designated cities dramatically increased from 132 in 1949 to 176<sup>67</sup> (Lin 2002a: 103). Within this framework, the housing development in the socialist economy was fully influenced by the Soviet standard. The idea of industrialized housing was imported in China from the Soviet Union. The advantage of industrialized building was that it could be constructed more quickly and at a lower cost by saving labor. A unit was to be designed with standard components conforming to a construction module. A residential unit consisted of several households using the same staircase. The success of the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) was no doubt the result of the original enthusiasm of the Chinese people to build a new nation.

A strong central governmental apparatus proved able to channel scarce resources into the rapid development of heavy industry. Despite some serious policy issues and problems, the communist leadership seemed to have the overall situation well in hand. Public order improved and many saw a stronger China taking form. The march to socialism seemed to go along reasonably well with the dictates of industrial development.

The success of the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) also led to the disastrous campaign of the “Great Leap Forward” (1958-1960). The plan adopted Stalinist economic priorities. In a country where more than four-fifths of the population lived in rural areas, about four-

---

67

The non-agricultural population in a city proper defines City Size; it is divided into four categories, namely extra-large (>1 million), large (0.5-1 million), medium (0.2-0,5 million) and small (<0.2 million). Due to the increasing growth of urbanization, super-large cities with a population above 2 million have emerged in China as well.

fifths of all government investment was channeled into the urban economy. The vast majority of this investment went to heavy industry, leaving agriculture relatively starved for resources. The plan provided for substantial income differentiation to motivate the labor force in the state sector, and it established a “top down” system in which a highly centralized government apparatus exercised detailed control over economic policy through enormous ministries in Beijing. The spatial outcome of this campaign saw drastic growth in the number of cities from 176 in 1957 to 208 in 1961. In the same timespan, the urban population expanded from 54 to 69 million, a net growth of 15 million people in cities. This period can thus be described as a phase of urban expansion (Lin 2002a: 103).

During this period, the People’s Commune System (PCS) was born when Mao Zedong had a vision of surpassing the United Kingdom and the United States in a short period of time in terms of steel production. Mao also wanted to mobilize peasants to undertake huge water projects during the slack winter seasons to improve agricultural productivity. Each commune was a combination of smaller farm collectives, consisting of 4,000-5,000 households, and larger ones could consist of up to 20,000 households. In the commune, everything was shared. Everything originally owned by the households was contributed to the commune. All farming activities were to be centrally assigned by cadres every morning. The communes exercised management and control of all rural resources such as labor and land. The People’s Commune was formerly the highest administrative level in rural areas; in 1985, they were replaced by townships. The formation of the communes’ largest collective units embodied governmental, political, and economic functions in the early stage of social composition of the settlements in the rural areas (Hua Lanhung 2006).

Hua Lanhung (2006: 97) recalled that even though this period was seen as a national disaster due to the stagnation of the urban development, it allowed more in-depth research. For example, the on-site research into housing typologies was carried out systematically. The research results were efficiently applied to the new housing construction. The average living condition improved. New apartment types were established in the provincial and municipal architectural design institutes in charge of the standardized housing construction.

In addition, it is necessary to mention that cities in China are official establishments that require administrative designation and fiscal commitment of the government. Lin (2002a) pointed out that officially designated cities are included in the state budgetary allocation. They enjoy state capital investment in the urban economy and resources allocated by the government to the development and maintenance of urban facilities. Therefore, designation of a few cities or demotion of the existing ones has become a means for the state to either speed up or slow down the pace of urban development in response to changing political and economic situations.

### *Second phase: 1962-1965*

The second phase constituted a period of economic readjustment beginning in 1962 after the “Great Leap Forward” campaign turned out to be a great disaster. Economic mismanagement, natural catastrophes, and ideological dispute with the former Soviet Union in the early 1960s resulted in a tragic casualty of 15 to 30 million people. Within the framework, a large number of cities previously established were eliminated from the list of state budgetary allocation, and excessive urban population were either deported or “sent down” (*Xiafang*) to the countryside. From 1961-1965, the number of cities dropped from 208 to 168; the urban population declined from 69 to 66 million (Lin 2002a: 103). This period appeared to be the pattern of de-urbanization, described by Lin as the “contraction” phase.

### *Third phase: 1966-1977*

The third phase is the stagnation and under-urbanization from 1966-1977. The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was a period of revolutionary upheaval, power struggles, and domestic turmoil. Mao launched the campaign of “up to the mountains and down to the villages” (*Shang Shan Xia Xiang*)<sup>68</sup> by which an estimated 12-17 million urban educated youths were forced to move out of the cities to resettle in rural villages. In addition, urban cadres, university professors, schoolteachers, artists, musicians, medical doctors, and other professionals in cities were “sent down” (*Xiafang*). Another dimension is that the rapid industrialization based on a selected number of cities was essential to the expansion of military capacity and the maintenance of the national security. During this period, only seventeen additional cities were designated, of which sixteen were located in the central and western regions that were thought to be strategically less vulnerable to potential military attack. The result is a unique pattern of industrialization without the parallel growth of urbanization. The urban population in cities grew from 67 to 74 million, but its proportion in the total population dropped from 9 to 8 percent. This period appeared to be a pattern of urban stagnation, which also had been identified as the model of “under-urbanization” (Murray and Szelenyi 1984; Chen Xianming and Parish 1996). Unfortunately, Marxist China ignored the national economy and societal development, which for a long time led the country backward.

Geographically speaking, the evidence showed that Chinese urban development over a few decades before the 1978 reformation was shaped by the articulation of the state through investment strategy; simultaneously, administrative changes and reclassification of urban population and urban settlements were strongly related to the political interests and state control. Until its end, the Maoist regime maintained a strong anti-urban stance (Bergère 2000; Lin 2002a). The peculiar system of cities under the Maoist strategy of regional development favored inland regions over the eastern coast for both ideological commitment to spatial equality and national security (Fan 1995 and 1997; Wei and Ma 1996). This strategy has been reversed since Deng Xiaoping, and other reformists initiated institutional changes in 1978. Nevertheless, even though after the reformation China seems to embrace the market economy, the urban geo-spatial construction is still strongly influenced by the political-economic dominance. This relationship remained critical after the reformation.

In only a few decays, Chinese society had evolved from feudalism to communism. The great impacts that society experienced introduced an extreme case of new conditions for the evolution of modernization. In each period, it shows that modernization is a great social project even though the Chinese experience shows obstacles and stagnation. The evolution of the modernization movement in China showed the path that China took was not linear but a sequential result of combining diverse significant historical "turn".

A few reflections are stated from this chapter. First, modernization is a synthetic process that includes political, economic, cultural, and social evolution that is rooted in the need for human existence and is the embodiment of the human desire to pursue a high level of existence. From this perspective, the evolution of Chinese modernization is rather an on-going process of hybrid bricolage, than an established system of synergy. Second, there is no short cut for such a massive country to accomplish its reformation without sacrifice. The construction of material civilization is an essential condition and foundation for the construction of spiritual civilization. In the evolution of the three major movements, modernization proves to not be able to develop without the self-awareness of the ruling class, bourgeois reformists, and finally the proletariat. Reformation of the structure and a system of organization are essential criteria as well. Third, shifting ideas that had been promoted by different advocacies during the process of modernization showed a lack of self-confidence, and the confusion of identity had decreased the value of traditional culture, which subsequently had been abandoned in shame. Without reformation of the organization, advocacy of new, external ideas would unavoidably conflict with old ideas. Four, despite the condition that Chinese modernization was triggered both by internal decay and external force, overall the earlier evolution of Chinese modernization contributes to the reformation of the 1980s, as the outcome of sequential reformations and political decisions.



## PART 3 Initial Reformations and the Modification of the Planning System

### “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”: The State of the Art or the Art of the Bricolage?

The overall reformation of the contemporary China is guided by Deng Xiaoping’s famous advocacy: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, or phrased in Chinese “Crossing the river by groping for stones”. This has been interpreted as the essential guideline for the success of Chinese taking off. What is the specialty of the reform era introduced to make this process possible? What kind of “turn” can be recognized? What new challenges has the new “cultural turn” generated to contemporary urban development in China? These are the themes to explore in Chapter 5.

Further, in chapter 6, research focuses on the planning formation that has been introduced in accordance with the reformed policy, including the application of planning systems and the establishment of the planning institutions as well as its installed software, including plan forms and their legal status.

The crucial notion in this part, following the setting of the second parameter planning formation, is to decode the “reformation with Chinese characteristics”, to reveal the new contemporary “turn” as part of the historical continuity, yet a progressive strategy of gradualism, that is carefully supervised by step-by-step by Communist-state leadership.

This part reflects the Deng Xiaoping’s famous phrase “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. Can it become an innovative state of the art of Chinese political paradigm, or it gets stuck in the dilemma of the institutional bricolage, which is cleverly combined by the communist regime in the transitional process?

## 5 Contemporary Urban Development: Reformation and New Urban Phenomena

In December 1978, during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of power. The economic reforms accelerated the development of the capitalist approach that gradually dismantled the commune system. The transition of power from the ideological Maoist plan to the regulatory market reformation of Deng Xiaoping marked the 1978 watershed that started the new era of the People's Republic of China.

Reformations were on two levels: the reformation opened up the country to the outside world while at the same time this created the opportunity for China to learn new ideas and knowledge from foreign countries. There is a double meaning behind this: to open up means not only to open the country to the outside world but also to make it possible for other countries to get acquainted with China.

In this chapter, the selected factors of the initial policies of reformation are constructed in five major dimensions: urban and rural land reform, political reform, economic reform, social reform, and spatial reform. In order to elaborate each dimension, they are addressed separately. Notably, those diverse dimensions of the reformation cannot be regarded as divided or fragmented; they are actually all intricately connected in one entity with one goal: to modernize the country while retaining the legitimacy of the communist regime.

## § 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform

Mao Zedong once said, “China’s problems are rural problems, and rural problems are land problems”<sup>69</sup>. His statement remains highly relevant in terms of ensuring the livelihoods of China’s mass rural households. Prior to 1978, the rural land system of China had gone through a winding course. Economically, the country followed up on the Soviet Five-Year Plans (FYPs). The country went through a transformation whereby means of production were transferred from private to public entities.

The first land system reform was launched at the beginning of the founding of the new China. After coming to power in 1949, the Communist Party initiated land reform through the Land Reform Law and other accompanying regulations in 1950. The core of this reform was to confiscate the holdings of landlords and wealthy peasants and to distribute the property among all farming households on an egalitarian basis<sup>70</sup>. Under this law, China redistributed over half of its arable land to 50-60 million poor rural households, more than 60% of its rural population. The peasants obtained both the ownership and the right of use of the land individually. Such a “land to the tiller” program proved a huge success in increasing agricultural productivity; annual grain production went up from 113.2 million tons in 1949 to 166.8 million tons in 1953 (Zhu Keliang et al. 2006: 769). Thus, agriculture became a small peasant economy, based on private ownership and household operation.

The second reform of the land system began in 1953, under the influence of the Soviet system, Mao Zedong initiated the land collectivization program that transformed individual to collective landownership and reinforced Party micro-management (Spence 1999). Closely following the first land reform, turning private ownership of land into public ownership during the rural socialist transformation movement by upgrading and adjusting gradually from primary and advanced agricultural production cooperatives to people’s communes<sup>71</sup>. The smallest unit of the organization of

---

69 In 1946, the Outline Land Law of China was passed by the Land Conference of the Communist Party that highlighted the need for emphasize equal redistribution of land to win the civil war, for this was deemed as necessary to meet the demands of the poor and thus organize them in combat.

70 Art. 20 of Land Reform Law of P.R. China (1950) provides that land confiscated from landlords, except for that owned by the state in accordance with this law, should be allocated to poor peasants fairly, rationally and uniformly for them to own.

71 The program was followed by the creation of production cooperatives, beginning in 1956, followed in 1958 by a dramatic scaling-up to communes, averaging 5,000 households and consisting of several production brigades, further divided into production teams of 20-30 households. See more Bruce (2009: 5).

productive activities was the production team, but most tasks were managed at a higher level and the production team had no real power. Within this framework, farmers became collective farms' "working members" who normally received pay based on how much time they showed up for work.

This land reform changed all the means of agricultural production, including land into collective ownership and management. The ownership and use of land remained unified in this land reform, but the major distinction is the change from the individual peasant to the collective. Although the collectivization of the agriculture was expected to benefit from the economies of scale predicted by Marx and to provide a base for the development of rural industries, under the collective management, there was a lack of economic incentives and motivation for the masses as well as for the local bureaucrats, who had no resources to improve agricultural efficiency (Wu Jinglian and Bruce 1988). As a result, the impacts of collectivization on production were disappointing<sup>72</sup>. In addition, the Great Leap Forward brought the country the suffering from the serious famine in 1960-1963. Shortages of food supplies spread throughout the country, and coupon food rationing was introduced in urban areas. Rural areas suffered from food shortages from the early 1960s till as late as 1987 (Bruce and Li Zongmin 2009: 5).

In 1976, Mao Zedong died and the Cultural Revolution came to an end. The country was in chaos, and there were grain failures and famine in parts of China. The third reform started in the late 1970s after the open-door policy that China launched, which transformed the collective production system of the people's commune into the Household Responsibility System (HRS)<sup>73</sup>. By the mid-1980s, a nation wide Household Responsibility System (HRS)—based on contracts between the state and rural farm households—was in place as the communes were broken up and small plots of land were leased to households. This brought the land reform of the contemporary China into the new stage of the early reform period (Lin 1987, Ho 2001, Ding Chengri 2003, Guo Xibao 2004, Trichur 2012).

The background of the initial Household Responsibility System (HRS) originated in 1978 with a few production brigades in Anhui province, which was frequently victimized by flood and drought (Wang Tao 2007). Farmers in Xiaogang began to experiment with contracting land, other resources, and output quotas to individual

---

72 Grain production during the agricultural cooperatives period (1953-1958) rose less strong than the pre-period of land to the tiller.

73 The Household Responsibility System (HRS) or *Jiating Lianchan Chengbao Zerenzhi* (simplified Chinese: 家庭联产承包责任制; traditional Chinese: 家庭聯產承包責任制).

households by dividing their communally owned farmlands into individual plots. A year later, these teams brought in yields far larger than those of others teams in the same region. Soon some brigades in Anhui province that returned to household farming had production increases of two to five times compared to those in unconverted brigades (Bruce and Li Zongmin 2009). The experiment was carried out under the protection of local officials and the provincial governor<sup>74</sup>. I would argue this could be seen as an early example of the experimentation tactics that developed later into the experimental spirit of the government.

In 1978, the Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party allowed the option of breaking up the communal lands into household holdings. However, at first the Party considered the system appropriate only for the poor areas of western and central China that were affected by famine; many considered it a temporary expedient. The formula under which the change was permitted did not refer to “land reform,” but rather conferred “five rights” to production team: the right to select production crops for production appropriate to local conditions, the right to make rational decisions for management and administration, the right to adopt other measures to increase output, the right to distribute products and cash according to their wishes, and the right to reject improper instructions from administrative agents (Zhang Hongye et al. 2006: 611).

At this stage, the new system spread by voluntary decision of the local collectives and it spread rapidly and not only in the poorer areas. In January 1980 only 1.02 percent of all production teams in China had changed over to household farming, but by December 1980 the figure was 14.4 percent, then 28.2 percent by July 1981, and 45.1 percent by October 1981. By 1981, when the government finally recognized that the Household Responsibility System (HRS) reform was broadly applicable, 45 percent of the production teams in China had already been dismantled (Lin 1988: S201; Lin 1992: 36; Lin 2003: 144). By the end of 1983, about 97.7 percent of production teams and 94.2 percent of the farm households in China were farming under the new system (Lin 1988: 222).

The Household Responsibility System (HRS) first developed in many different forms in rural areas of China, but eventually settled into two main forms: “fixing output quotas for each household” and “fixing tax quotas for each household”, the latter becoming the most popular form by 1983 when the Household Responsibility System (HRS)

was implemented all over China (Guo Xibao 2004: 63). At the end of 1983, farmland contracted by peasant households accounted for 99.5 percent of the total farmland area in China, of which “fixing tax quota for each household” accounted to 98.3 percent of the total Household Responsibility System (HRS). Under the Household Responsibility System (HRS), land was assigned to each household according to the number of its members or according to the number of both its members and workers. Households were required by the contract to pay state taxes, fulfill contracted procurement quotas, and submit certain amount of produce to the production team as public accumulation funds and public welfare funds. After these obligations had been fulfilled, all remaining output belonged to the household<sup>75</sup> (Lin et al. 1996: 142).

At this stage, the government did not ban the collective ownership system but rather decided to install a new mode of agricultural management and distribution. The main characteristic was to separate the property right of land from the use of land so that land is still owned by the collective and operated by peasant households according to contract (Guo Xibao 2004).

Compared to the People’s Commune System (PCS), the Household Responsibility System (HRS) provided farmers with stronger rights to land and to production. It demonstrated the value of unified management combined with the individual possibilities of the peasants. This stimulated growth in agriculture and rural income. The land tenure system is based on land lease contracts. Farmland is de facto owned by village collectives that extend 30-year land lease contracts to individual farm households under the condition that households can use, sub-lease, and transfer the land, but they cannot sell it<sup>76</sup>.

The special characteristic of the initial Household Responsibility System (HRS) was that it worked without the knowledge and approval of the central government<sup>77</sup>. It was not imposed by the central authority, unlike many other institutional changes that occurred in the decades after the reform. Besides the growth in agriculture and rural

---

75 The development of the household responsibility system itself can be roughly divided into three phases: the work-quota contract phase, the output-quota contract phase, and the responsibility contract phase. Every phase experienced the same evolution process from the contract with a group of workers, to the contract with each individual worker, and finally to the contract with a household. For more detail information about the condition of each phase, see Lin (1996: 141-149).

76 These contracts were validated for fifteen years in 1984; in 1993, they were extended for thirty years; and in 1998, the Party-State legalized the contracts with households for another thirty years. See Trichur (2012: 76).

77 The HRS evolved from being absolutely illegal, to being partially legal, to eventually being promoted by the government.

incomes, the success of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) also increased rural productivity and generated a huge surplus of farm laborers. In fact, the Household Responsibility System (HRS) had in fact already spontaneously appeared in some rural regions early in the 1960s during Mao's regime. However, it was not allowed or authorized by the central government and was soon criticized and forbidden due to the disturbance of "leftist" thought.

The Household Responsibility System (HRS) could be sustained and practiced by farmers due to the changing political interests of the late 1970s, gradually underpinning Deng Xiaoping's advocacy of "four modernization" of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military. Coincidentally, the innovative emergence and success of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) constituted in part the decentralization promoted by the Party-state in the broader scope of economic reform. The success of rural reform since the late 1970s encouraged the central government to promote further reforms in the urban sector through a series of policies.

Before 1978, the state confiscated land in cities and proclaimed state ownership. The state allocated land use rights free of charge to socioeconomic units, called *Danwei*<sup>78</sup>, for an indefinite period, and the constitution banned land transactions. Land was neither considered a commodity nor an asset for producing economic wealth. The old land allocation system produced enormous land-use deficiencies. Under the planned economy, land value and land income were hidden in the overall profits of the state-owned enterprises. Such as, the acquisition of a prime site for urban development was more or less reflected in the sequence of development, which was a random event that could not be explained by a transparent process and in many cases depended upon the political atmosphere prevailing at the time (Ding Chengri 2009: 112).

The land tenure system was first challenged when China adopted the open-door policy in 1978. The old land allocation system conflicted with the ultimate goal of economic reform to introduce a market mechanism in the allocation of resources to increase economic efficiency. The process of urban land reform went through many different stages. In the early period of reformation, "tax exemption" and "land-use right system" were first exercised in the "Special Economic Development Zones" in specially allocated areas along China's east coast. The land use rights system, similar to the land leasehold system in Hong Kong, was first developed to accommodate the needs of foreign direct investments. (Ding Chengri 2009: 110)

This early experimental reform of the land tenure system marked a new era of land policy: for the first time, land use rights and land ownership were separable. Its impact on land policy reform soon became profound.

The 1982 the Chinese Constitution recognized two kinds of land ownership: urban land is property of the state and rural land is collectively owned by the villagers<sup>79</sup>. The most significant changes to land policy occurred in the late 1980s. Within this framework, the bureau of land administration was established in 1986. The bureau was responsible for and in charge of land policy reform, land allocation, and acquisition, monitoring land development, comprehensive land-use plans, and the implementation of land laws. The Land Administration Law (or Land Management Law)<sup>80</sup> passed in 1986 had legalized private organizations and individuals to access state-owned land in an attempt to develop the land market in China. However, the Law was in conflict with the Constitution of 1982 that banned any transferring of land-use rights. With additional amendments, the 1988 Constitution was the first national document that legalized the separation of land ownership from land use rights; it also allowed the transfer of land use rights. A separation of land use rights and land ownership and the state's remaining ownership of land not only avoided political turmoil but also helped to promote land market development. The 1988 Constitution and the Land Administration Law laid the foundation for land policy in the post-reform era. Although there is still no privately owned land in China, a land market has been created and land use rights entered the market under the policy of separation of use rights from ownership. Land became a main source of profit for real estate companies, villages, individual farmers, and governments of all levels. These interest groups thus emerged with the rebirth of land as a market force in China, strongly influencing spatial development.

To provide concrete legal guidance, the State Council announced "The Provisional Regulation on the Granting and Transferring of the Land Rights over State-Owned Land in Cities and Towns" and enacted the regulation in 1991. The objectives of the provisional regulations was to reform the land-use system for state-owned land in

---

79 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 1982, Ch. 1, Art. 10.

80 Approved at the 16th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on June 25th, 1986. Revised in accordance with the Decision on amending Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China. Revised and adopted at the fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the ninth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on August 29th, 1998, to be put into effect as of January 1st, 1999. Revised at the 11th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress on August 28th, 2004. See more about Land Administration Law in Chapter 6.2.3 System of Plans.



cities, to rationalize land development and land use, to enhance land management, and to promote urban construction and economic development.

According to the 1991 regulations, there are two kinds of land transactions. One is the sale of land-use rights and the other is the transfer of land-use rights. The former defines the “first” level land market, where a municipal government as a representative of the state sells land-use rights for a fixed period through auction, tender, or negotiation and where the state intends to control land markets through its monopolization of land supply. The transfer of land-use rights defines the “second” level of land market (Ding Chengri 2009: 112) where the government is not involved except for land registration, legal protection, and taxation (Liu Weixin and Xie Jingrong 1994; Walker and Li Ling Hin 1994).

This marked the end of free land use and opened a new era of lawful transactions of urban land. There are three key features of China’s urban land-use reform. The first is land taxation, which requires all urban land uses, including both work units and individuals, to pay a land-use tax. The second is the separation of land-use rights from ownership so that the state retains ownership of the land and only the use right is leased. The third is a dual-track land system, in which the administrative land allocation of the pre-reform era and the newly established land leasing system coexist (Zhang Xin-Qiao 1997).

However, following the rapid urbanization and urban expansion in the mid-1990s, negatively, the unbalanced between rural and urban development was recognized as a negative result. Rapid urban expansion caused the depletion of farmland at an unprecedented rate due to the lack of a coherent legal framework to regulate urban and rural development. Ho (2001: 395) pointed out that despite the fact that substantial agricultural growth was generated predominantly by increased use of chemical fertilizers, land is still one of the basic inputs to farm production. The official figures mention a decrease of 4 percent in the total arable area over 1978-1996, an annual loss of 218,000 ha<sup>81</sup>. The rapid reduction of farmland had alarmed top officials who believed that “self reliance” on agricultural crops for the country was important to maintain not only sovereignty but also social stability<sup>82</sup>. The government of China has pronounced concerns

---

81 From the viewpoint of the government of China, the average area of farmland per capita is low; only one-third of the world average. Ho also emphasized that compared to a country with a strong export-oriented agricultural sector but with a much lower land per capita ration, such as the Netherlands it can be seen that taking the world average as the standard is irrelevant.

82 Lester Brown (1995) shocked the Chinese government with his prediction that the People’s Republic would face critical food shortages.

about its ability to continue feeding a growing population due to the government targeted conversion of farmland to industrial and residential uses, especially in the most productive agricultural regions (Lichtenberg and Ding Chengri 2006).

In accordance with the Agricultural Law of the People's Republic of China and the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China the intention is to practice special protection of basic farmland and promote sustainable development of agricultural production in a social and an economical sense. The State Council responded to the fast depletion of farmland by passing the "Basic Farmland Protection Regulations" in 1994. These regulations prohibit basic farmland conversion to non-agricultural activities and mandates counties and townships to designate the basic farmland protection districts in accordance with provincial farmland preservation plans<sup>83</sup>.

The law requires government at or above the county level to designate a basic farmland protection zone in every village or township; determination of basic farmland and designation of these farmland protection districts is subject to approval by higher government bodies up to the level of the State Council. In general, there are two kinds of basic farmland protection districts. The first level consists of high-quality land with high productive; the law prohibits converting such land to nonagricultural uses. The second level consists of good-quality land with moderate productivity; the law permits conversion of such land to nonagricultural uses under certain circumstances<sup>84</sup> (Lichtenberg and Ding Chengri 2006: 60). We can recognize, among the five classes of land, the fifth category empowers the government to determine when it is necessary without explicit definition, which indicate the macro-control of the state can be implemented adaptively.

---

83 The Basic Farmland Protection Regulation applies to five classes of land: (1) "cultivated land" currently planted with food grains, cotton, and oilseeds; (2) "cultivated land" with good irrigation, drainage, and erosion control, along with medium and low quality land on which irrigation, drainage, and erosion control measures are being installed;(3) land planted with vegetables; (4) experimental plots for agricultural research and development; and (5) other cultivated land as determined by the State Council. See Lichtenberg (2006: 60).

84 The regulation further stipulates: (1) if the conversion of land within farmland districts is unavoidable in order to build national projects, such as highways, energy production or transportation, the state must approve the conversion of land parcels of more than 500 mu (1 mu is approximately equal to 666.7 m<sup>2</sup>, 15 mu is 1 ha) while the provincial governments must approve those of less than 500 mu; and (2) the same amount of farmland lost to conversion must be replaced by new farmland somewhere else. The act thus imposes a so-called "dynamic balance" (what in the US would be termed a "no net loss") policy the intent is to keep the total amount of basic farmland constant in the face of pressures from urbanization and infrastructure construction. See Lichtenberg (2006: 60).

On the other hand, since the Household Responsibility System (HRS) has been practiced from 1983, government and other groups have undertaken extensive rural field researches. Many shortcomings related to rural land tenure security have been observed, including the short or uncertain length of the use term, the lack of written land-use contracts and the practice of frequent land readjustments etc. (Li Ping 2003).

The legal framework of land use management is based on the revised Land Administration Law in 1998, which represented a watershed in the rural land tenure reform process<sup>85</sup>. Its objective is to cope with the rural and urban development and their interrelationship. It requires that annual quotas be set for land conversion from agricultural and unused categories into construction land (to accommodate the industrial, energy, transport and social projects set forth in the Five-Year Plans, sectorial plans and city development plans). Based on the annual quotas and the city development plans, the size and number, location, and character of grants and allocations of construction lands are fixed. On the other hand, the law also defines the rights and responsibilities of citizens, enterprises, and governmental agencies to achieve protection of environmentally and agriculturally important areas, and to promote market development, to encourage citizen involvement in the legislative process and to coordinate the planning and development of urban land (Ding 2003: 113).

Through the establishment of land-use management, land-use efficiency has improved and government revenues increased. Local authorities and agencies were main actors in the implementation of land reform, supported by reform of the fiscal system<sup>86</sup>. Together with the disposal rights of land granted by the Land Administrative Law, the role of the local government started to change. It also triggered the gradual reform of the housing sector while the state faced a severe housing shortage and allocated insufficient budget to construct more housing stock. It was not until 1998 that the allocation of housing based on the state work-units (*Danwei*) was abolished. The objective of housing reform was to develop commodity housing to boost domestic demand and thus to stimulate economic growth. The direct housing distribution by work-unit (*Danwei*) employers came to an end while a multiple supply system was established, including state-supported affordable or low-cost commercial housing and high-standard commodity housing.

---

85 The revised Land Administration Law adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 28th August 1998.

86 The main reason why the local government has encouraged privatization is because private firms are more productive which can significantly increase the budgetary as well as extra-budgetary revenues of the local government. See Li and Rozelle (2003: 1005).

The adoption of the land-use rights system in China has had a remarkable influence on land development, government finance, real estate and housing development, infrastructure provision, and urban growth. However, like in any other country, it has negative side effects. Social inequity and injustice, urban-rural incoherent development, and speculation in the real estate market led to the restructuring and reshaping of the urban-rural landscape and in many cases, serious corruption became crucial for the government to combat in considering land reform policy. For the first time in modern Chinese history, land had value and was integrated as one of the most decisive entities in the urban-rural development. All these side effects accompanied the boosting urbanization under the market-driven land-use policy and will continue to challenge further land-use reform shall proceed.

In recent years, rural protests have become increasingly common as disgruntled farmers have demonstrated against illegal appropriations or corrupt local officials. At the same time, the creation of an urban real estate market saw an explosion of wealth in the cities that contributed to a sharp income divide between increasingly affluent city dwellers and impoverished peasants; tens of millions of mostly young farmers have flocked to cities in search of work, leaving plots of land to be tended by their elderly parents. Reducing the rural-urban income gap has been a major priority of the country's leaders, but the gap has continued to widen in recent years and China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world<sup>87</sup>.

Increasing incomes in the countryside is a major part of the government's effort to raise China's domestic consumer spending at a time when the overall economy is slowing. More than 700 million people are still designated rural inhabitants, and their spending is minimal. Economists say that jumpstarting the rural economy is one way to offset the possibility of a recession, as exports are expected to slow because of the global financial crisis.

In 2008, the Chinese government announced a rural reform policy that for the first time would allow farmers to lease or transfer land-use rights, a step that advocates say would raise lagging incomes in the Chinese countryside. Under the new policy, the government will establish markets where farmers can "subcontract, lease, exchange or swap" land-use rights or join cooperatives. The fate of this reform program in the future is uncertain.

---

87

The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security's 2011 Salary Report shows the growth in the people's income has seriously lagged behind the growth in national GDP and fiscal revenue. While the government's treasury increased by 20.4 percent from 2003 to 2011, the people's average income growth was 13.7 percent. China's overall economic growth over the past three decades has been excellent, but it has been accompanied by a widening wealth gap. (China Daily 2012-12-31) See more about rural-urban migration in Chapter 5.4

Critics had warned that weakening the existing system of collective village ownership could deprive peasants of the security of having a piece of land and possibly lead to millions of landless farmers. But the existing system has become rife with corruption, as local officials and developers have illegally seized farmland for urban expansion while paying minimal compensation to the farmers. (New York Times 2008)

Should the country return land to farmers and establish a primary land market, or just fix the existing system by limiting reform? Most farmers and experts advocate distributing land ownership to each farmer equally and granting farmers the same equal political and economic rights that urban inhabitants have been enjoying.

An encouraging element in the decision of the last party plenum was the admission that “the urban-rural dualist structure is a great contradiction”, along with the pledge to “break this structure by integrating urban-rural socio-economic development”. The government will also implement the rectification and registration necessary to issue titles for rural land use rights. People now ponder what China’s legislature should do next. Perhaps it should revise the related laws such as the Land Administration Law and the Property Law and remove the many restrictions imposed on peoples’ rights to their rural land.

Based on increasing awareness of the importance of property rights and secure access to land for sustainable economic growth, the above briefly highlighted rural and urban land reform in China provides insights in a process of legal change which, starting from a completely collective structure in the late 1970s, has gradually increased the security of property rights, aiming to facilitate a higher level of land transactions and to limit arbitrary political interference. After all, to secure farmers’ rights, it is critical that the central leadership takes the lead in clarifying the legal boundaries of collective ownership. The Chinese government is confronting the responsibility to shape the future institutional framework for land policy and administration and guarantee its social credibility<sup>88</sup> (Ho, 2001). To what extent could political intervention and institutional reformation be recognized to accommodate the transformation of new demands?

---

88

Based on FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) statistics, (1) the yields of maize and wheat almost tripled, and the yields of rice almost doubled in China from 1965 through 2002; and (2) China is currently one of the countries with the highest yields in the world, more than double of those in African countries. See Yu Xiaohua (2009:633). The disparity between the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector will increase due to resource constraints in agriculture after economic takeoff. So far, China might temporarily solve the main shortage of the food problem by a continuous increase in yields; however, China currently is urgently facing the poverty problems of farmers.

## § 5.2 Political Reformation: The Relaxation of State Control

The period since 1978 has been characterized by a rapid surge of the number of designated cities as a result of both the relaxation of state control over city designation and the operation of spontaneous forces of market reform and globalization. Lin (2002a) concluded this remarkable reversal has been inseparable from the three powerful forces: the state shifting the emphasis of development from the interior to the eastern coast; phenomenal growth of rural industries; and the relaxation of state control over the upgrading of towns into cities<sup>89</sup>.

This resulted in two major developments. First, existing cities of different sizes have expanded both in population and land area; second, a large number of newly designated cities have been added to the existing system of cities. The change of the political-economic interest also strongly influenced the direction of urban development as well as urban planning. Unlike the previous Maoist period, it unveiled that structural and spatial changes of Chinese cities over the past three decades have been shaped by the re-articulation of the socialist state, whose functions shifted from interventional to regulatory. The transition of power from the Maoist ideological plan to the post-Maoist market/regulatory regime has ushered a new development strategy that values efficiency over equity, individual creativity over collectivism, and regional comparative advantages over considerations of defense or ideology (Fan, 1995 and 1997; Lin, 1997 and 2002a).

The basic national development policy for China is embedded in the adaptive guidance of the planned economy; in general, there are six stages of political-administrative reformation<sup>90</sup>. The reforms have displayed a cyclical pattern of centralization and decentralization of administrative functions that reflect the efforts of the Chinese leadership to find an “optimal” balance between central control and subnational limited autonomy.

---

89 Upgrading town into city means to relocate the central resources by allowing more towns to get the advantaged status of urban function.

90 The division is in general based on the different political directions, which had been announced by the Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China.

### *The first stage of institutional reformation: 1982*

In December 1978, during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China, the main national policy emphasized economic reform. Within five years, the number of the institutional departments within the State Council had expanded to 100 units, and the total number of employees reached 500,000, the peak of governmental organization after 1949.

Governmental institutions below the central level were regulated by the provisions of the State Constitution of 1982. These provisions are intended to streamline the local state institutions and make them more efficient and more responsive to grassroots needs; to stimulate local initiative and creativity; to restore prestige to the local authorities that had been seriously diminished during the Cultural Revolution; and to aid local officials in their efforts to organize and mobilize the masses. As with other major reforms undertaken after 1978, the principal motivation for the provisions was to provide better support for the ongoing modernization program.

In 1982, to adapt to the increasing economic development and to reduce the governmental overhead, the departments of the State Council were reduced to 61 units. In general, during this period, the real reformation of the functions of governmental did not occur; it still embodied in the unity of governance and management.

Another administrative reform directly related to economic modernization was the establishment in 1979 of the special economic zones, which included Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou, all in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. Supervising China's special economic zones were the Guangdong provincial committee, headquartered in Shenzhen, and the Xiamen Construction and Development Corporation. The Guangdong provincial committee controlled Zhuhai, Shenzhen, and Shantou and shared its authority over Shekou (a small port zone within Shenzhen) with the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company. The latter was a Hong Kong subsidiary of China's Ministry of Communications that had been empowered in 1979 to negotiate all foreign ventures in Shekou.

The special administrative region, another administrative unit, was developed to serve foreign policy goals. Article 31<sup>91</sup> of the State Constitution of 1982 empowers the National People's Congress (NPC) to enact laws to establish special administrative

---

91

"The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law, enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions."

regions to accommodate local conditions. Hong Kong came under this rule when Britain transferred its sovereignty to China on July 1, 1997, as delineated in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, signed on September 26, 1984. Macao was slated to become a special administrative region on December 20, 1999, when Portugal was to transfer governmental authority over Macao to China, as stipulated in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao, initialed on March 26, 1987. In 1986 and 1987, the State Council's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office was drafting the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which would define Hong Kong's system of government. The new law was due for completion in 1988.

#### *The second stage of institutional reformation: 1988*

In 1986, due to the demands of the urban-economic development, the units of the departments of the State Council had again increased to 72. It showed that without the decentralization of governance and management, it was impossible to cope with the real demands of the economic development. The lesson learned was that the reformation had to be embedded in the functional-intuitional transformation of the state governance both in its roles of governance and management. Within this framework, it was the first time that the institutional reformation had applied the concept of division of governmental functions between governance and management. The state control of governance gradually ceded legal rights to the entrepreneurial institutes, including private and governmental enterprises, to participate in marketing practices.

The first two stages of reformation can be defined as the early stage of the exploration of the opening-up policy (Feng Xianxue 2001: 72). However, the confusion about the practice of marketing capitalism remained and resulted in conflicts among the ruling group as well as the people. Voices argued that China was heading into the direction of capitalism. Therefore, in January 1992, Deng Xiaoping inspected south China and delivered a series of speeches to clarify the muddled idea about whether China's reform was related to capitalism or socialism. Deng Xiaoping's speeches clearly defined the term of "building up socialism with Chinese characteristics" and Marxism in terms of history and philosophy<sup>92</sup>.



### *The third stage of institutional reformation: 1993*

The big ideological breakthrough occurred after all this in the Fourteenth Party Congress held in September 1992 when the Party, for the first time, endorsed the “socialist market economy” as China’s goal of reform. The watershed historic decision of November 1993, “Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure”, was adopted by the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The November 1993 decision is a historic event because it constitutes a real strategic shift in the course of China’s reform. For the first time, it decided in essence to abolish the planning system altogether and set the goal of reform to be the establishment of a modern market system that would eventually incorporate international institutions recognized as “best practice” (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 6).

To adapt the reformation to promote a marketing economy within a “socialism with Chinese characteristics” framework, the third stage focused mainly on deeper institutional changes of governmental function. It changed the role of government from controller to regulator, which main task was to provide guidance on a micro scale by decentralizing the direct control of the entrepreneurial activities as well as decentralizing the management to various newly established institutes.

The most significant effect is the rapid rise of the “non-State sector” (Qian Yingyi and Xu Chenggang 1993; Wu Weiping 1999). The non-State sector includes a variety of ownership enterprises, such as collectives, cooperatives, private businesses, joint ventures with foreign firms, and sole foreign invested firms. The non-State enterprises soon became the initial engine of growth and industrialization and growth. In 1978, the share of the State sector in industrial output was 78 percent of the national total; by 1993 it was down to only 43 percent. China’s market development was also pushed by its quick expansion of foreign trade. Due to the opening-up policy, both export and import increased much faster than the GDP. The export to GDP ratio increased from less than 5 percent in 1978 to more than 20 percent by early 1990.

In general, even though the third reformation emphasized the fundamental change of the role of the government, in practice, reformation progressed mainly in the areas of economic measures in order to serve a market economy. The application of the new political-institutional reformation was as yet unable to completely free the government from its double role as controller and player.

### *The fourth stage of institutional reformation: 1998*

The Third Plenum of the Fifteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1998 decided the reformation had to be continued to realize the division between governance and management—especially in the practicing of marketing. The main mission of the government was clearly defined: to provide political guidance and public management and service. The management of marketing practices belonged to the entrepreneurial institutions—including private or government-owned enterprises. The reformation of this stage was broad, including administrative (re-)organizations of the institutes of governance and management as well as the installation of a new institutional mechanism. The scope and scale of this stage were further developed than the previous ones.

The second major breakthrough of the Fifteenth Party Congress, which was somewhat overshadowed by the ownership issue but nevertheless more important, was its explicit emphasis on the rule of law. However, “The rule of law is not the same as democracy. Chinese leadership seemed to decide to give priority to the rule of law rather than democracy: the rule of law is clearly crucial for a modern market economy, but not directly and immediately threatening the governing power of the party.” (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 11)

In view of the increasing non-state sectors, both private ownership and the rule of law were formally incorporated into the Chinese Constitution in March 1999. An amendment to Article 11 placed private business on an equal footing with the public sector by changing the original clause “the private economy is a supplement to public ownership” to “the non-public sector, including individual and private business, is an important component of the socialist market economy.” Furthermore, Article 5 of the Chinese Constitution was amended to include the principle of “governing the country according to law and establishing a socialist, rule of law country.” These Constitutional amendments were a major step in China’s transition to a full market system based on the rule of law (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000).

### *The fifth stage of institutional reformation: 2003*

Following the fourth reformation, the fifth made governmental organizations more transparent and efficient. Compared to the previous reformation, the global context was different. China had become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Jiang Zemin's report delivered at the Sixteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002 emphasized seeking truth from the facts: "The Chinese Communists will creatively combine socialism with market economy, opening up the glorious history of national revival."<sup>93</sup> In the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2003, a fine-tuning of the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is defined; after twenty-five years of market economy practices, China proved that the socialist market economy system was possible.

In this stage of the reformation, China demonstrated its success to the world. After years of development, China's food and clothing and overall well being had improved. It was the first time that China's GDP had exceeded \$1 trillion and the per capita GDP exceeded \$800; the people were becoming more affluent. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, China in 2007 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-income. Annual inflows of foreign direct investment in 2007 rose to \$75 billion. By the end of 2007, more than 5,000 domestic Chinese enterprises had established direct investments in 172 countries and regions around the world<sup>94</sup>.

### *The sixth stage of institutional reformation: 2008*

To increase the reform of the socialist market economy and to enhance a balanced rural-urban development was the key issue of the sixth stage of reform. In the Third Plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2008, the main agenda was to study the problem of rural reform and development. The National Party Congress (NPC) proposed a moderately prosperous society and a sound strategic plan for the socialist market economic system and then approved the socialist market economic system goals, tasks, guiding ideology, and principles. It proposed that to improve the socialist market economic system, a deeper understanding of the laws of a socialist market economy was necessary, as was reform of institutions to better allocate

---

93 Jiang Zemin, "Build a Well-off Society in the All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," report delivered at the Sixteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002.

94 *Economy Overview*, World Factbook, 2008. Posted at: <http://www.bartleby.com/151/fields/68.html>.

resources to basic roles. Macroeconomic control had gained experience even though the rapid economic growth led to the emergence of unstable and unhealthy factors. The State Council would apply more legal and necessary administrative means, timely control, and fewer ups and downs of the economy, helping China's economy to become more stable and to grow more quickly for several years.

After the more pragmatic Deng Xiaoping gained power in 1978, the Chinese government began to shift its focus from class struggle to economic development, from social and spatial equality to economic growth (Lin, 2002a). The socialist Chinese government that desperately wanted to demonstrate its legitimacy and superiority had to deal with the balance between social and spatial equality on the one hand and the need for economic efficiency in urban development on the other. Therefore, no single factor, whether ideological conviction or rational economic consideration, is able to claim sole responsibility for the process of China's urbanization.

I would argue that the experimental "doing by learning" initiatives from the bottom-up within a top-down policy show that changes in the Chinese urban development strategy from the socialist era to the reform era are in fact a continuation of this struggle. For more than thirty years, the Chinese socialist market economy has not only proved the success of enhancing the general Chinese welfare in a radically globalizing society but has also demonstrated that the Chinese characteristics of evolutionary modernization, with their specific conditions, can contribute to set up a scale and scope of reformation that the Western countries could not possibly imagine, let alone realize.

However, political and economic reform is a complex issue, and in many imbalance and conflict cannot be predicted in advance in an ever more complex global environment. The Chinese reformation approach to a certain degree has proved that advancing the reform of the political initiative could reduce unnecessary conflict in society and avoid public demands while reducing the risk of one-sided interests becoming dominant—either from the government or from the private market.


### § 5.3 Economic Reformation: Crucial Economic Measures and the Reform of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs)

Political reform cannot be sustained without corresponding economic measures and vice versa. Besides the fundamental land reform system, within the economic framework, two economic sectors—State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and housing reform illustrate how the former planned economy gradually became a market economy; corresponding to this transformation, related financial systems were established.

In the late 1970s, the state was the dominating sector. One crucial reform relates to the privatization of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the rise of the non-state sector.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are those that are wholly or mainly owned by the central (state), provincial, or municipal government. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) used to be the most important actors of the economy, accounting for 90 percent of the output in 1980 and employing the majority of the urban work force. Before the reform, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were directly controlled and managed by the government. There are two separate worlds in the state sector: one of small and medium State-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the supervision of local governments, and another of large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the central government. Small and medium State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often located in competitive industries, such as machinery, electronics, textiles, and food processing. The central government supervises most very large enterprises in natural monopoly industries such as telecommunications and railroad transportation and in government monopoly industries such as airlines, banks, electricity, oils and petrochemicals (Cao Yuanzheng 1997).

The economic reformation was crucially related to the reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the emerging engine of economic growth based on the performance of non-state sectors. The reform of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) since the mid-1980s played a critical role in China's economic growth in later years (Figure 5.1) (Kang Yong et al. 2008).



*Figure 5.1* China's Industrial Output, by ownership in 1985  
 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China (2008).

In May 1984, the State Council issued "On Regulations of Further Expanding Autonomy of State-owned Enterprises," which allowed State-owned enterprises (SOEs) more autonomy in production plan and profit retention. Due to the success of the Household Responsibility System (HRS), the government started promoting a "contract responsibility system" in the reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) by installing financial incentive measures, which allows each state enterprise to keep the remaining profit for distribution to its staff and workers and for capital investment after paying a fixed tax to the government having jurisdiction over it. By the end of 1987, about 80 percent of the large and medium-sized State-owned enterprises (SOEs) adopted a "contract responsibility system," and by 1989, almost all State-owned enterprises (SOEs) adopted this system (Wang Xiaozu 2003; Chow 2004).

In 1990, China formally established the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)<sup>95</sup>, and a new government body, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), as the country's main regulators of the newborn stock market. Within this framework further measures were adopted by the Chinese government in reforming State-owned enterprises (SOEs). One of the first steps was to publicly list these state-owned companies in both domestic and foreign stock exchanges to turn formerly State-owned enterprises (SOEs) into modern shareholding companies and improve their efficiency along the lines of "expanding

---

95 The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was established on November 26, 1990 and began operations on December 19 of the same year. It is a membership institution. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) was established on December 1, 1990. Both are directly governed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).

enterprise autonomy and increasing profit incentives." In July 1992, the State Council issued "Regulations on Transforming the Management Mechanism of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises," granting State-owned enterprises (SOEs) further rights to set their own prices and wages, hire and fire labor, and invest in fixed capital and foreign trade.

In general, prior to 1992, even though the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform had been promoted for about a decade, the core of central planning remained. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were still controlled by the State and the Party in an old-fashioned way, if not in daily operation, then certainly in strategic decisions. Top managers were still appointed by the Party. And new market-supporting institutions were not built yet to replace the old planning institutions, including the marketing-supporting fiscal system, financial system, social security system for private investments, and legal system (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000).

Economic reform in the earlier stages had reflected the constraints of the confusion within the political consensus. The reform was not intended to change the state's ownership, but rather to remedy the inefficiency of State-owned enterprises (SOEs). Similar to the political reformation, in the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping initiated his famous southern tour to mobilize local support for further and more radical reform. The clear direction of the overall reformation was set. The mindset of the leadership started to change. In combination with the political reform and the decentralization (the third stage of institutional reform in 1993), local governments gradually were allowed to have an independent plan as well as autonomy in economic management.

The political will of the Party strongly influenced the steps of the economic reform. In 1993, the Communist Party's Economics and Finance Leading Group, headed by Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin, worked together with economists to prepare a grand strategy of transition to a market system. The final outcome was the "Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure", adopted by the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1993 (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 9). This document was to replace China's centrally planned system with a modern market system and incorporate international institutions recognized as best practices; this landmark document represented a turning point in China's road to a market economy. Based on the promotion of a "rule based system", the decision called for building market-supporting institutions. In this stage a series of reforms was launched, according to the November 1993 decision, beginning in January 1994, mainly in five areas: foreign exchange and external sector reform, tax and fiscal reform, financial reform, state-owned enterprise reform, and the establishment of a social safety net (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 18).

Qian Yingyi (2000: 20) pointed out:

In 1994, China introduced major tax and fiscal reforms more aligned with international practices. This reform introduced a clear distinction between national and local taxes and established a national tax bureau and local tax bureau, each responsible for its own tax collection. This tax reform has made it very difficult for local government to erode national taxes as they did in the past. Reform also established fixed tax rules between the national and local governments. For example, under the new system, the value-added tax (VAT) became the major indirect tax shared by the national and local government at a fixed ratio of 75:25<sup>96</sup>.

In addition, reforms of the banking system were gradually undertaken by giving a framework of law when the People's Congress passed respectively the Law on The People's Bank of China (effective on the same day) and the Commercial Banking Law (effective July 1, 1995).

Related to the fiscal and tax reform policy, the central government put forth a series of policies to expand the power of local authorities in local finance (Lin et al. 2003) and decided to transformed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into "modern enterprises" with "clarified property rights, clearly defined responsibility and authority, separation of enterprises from the government and employing scientific internal management" (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 6).

In addition, local authorities opened their doors to the outside world, fully utilizing local resources and enhancing the performance of the non-state sectors. Industrial and commercial taxes were the major contributors to the government revenue. A negative effect was generated by the competition in financial performance, which focused mainly on short-term, quick revenue-generating projects rather than on investing in long-term, production-enhancing projects. The state was confused as to its role as a regulator and social planner to maximize the aggregated social welfare, versus its role as an investor to maximize shareholder profit. Non-state institutional investors and individual investors, confined by their lack of power in governance as well as insufficient legal protection, usually ended up engaged in speculative behavior rather than investment behavior (Kang Yong et al. 2008).



The first comprehensive law, “Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China”, which fully delineated the rights and responsibilities of modern companies in China, was issued in 1993 and marked the beginning of experimentation in modern enterprise structure. More importantly, it was the first major business law in China that did not differentiate legislation for companies based on their ownership structure. Instead, the 1993 Companies Law classified companies into two groups: limited liability companies and joint stock limited liability companies, based on the number of shareholders. This law was regarded as a major step toward the modernization of Chinese enterprise legislation<sup>97</sup> (Wang and Cui 2006).

Furthermore, following the Asia financial crisis in 1997, the export industry declined, and millions of Chinese workers were laid off from state-owned enterprises (SOEs)<sup>98</sup>. The Third Plenum of the Fifteenth Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China in September 1997 made another major breakthrough in ownership issues: state ownership was downgraded to a “pillar of the economy” and private ownership was elevated to an “important component of the economy”. While in 1993, state ownership was still regarded, as a “principal component of the economy” while private ownership was a “supplementary component of the economy”<sup>99</sup> (Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian 2000: 10).

During this period, the Fifteenth National Party Congress further promoted the privatization of small State-owned enterprises (SOEs) by putting forward the slogan of “grasping the large State-owned enterprises (SOEs), letting go the small State-owned enterprises (SOEs),”<sup>100</sup> which encouraged “small or medium size” State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to become private; only about 1,000 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were considered “large” and had to remain state-owned.

Within this framework, ownership reform became a focus of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform, and shareholding companies became the main form of State-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were still under the

---

97 In the past, Chinese enterprise laws were enacted according to the type of ownership: examples are the Sino-Foreign Joint Enterprises Law (1979), Foreign Companies Law (1986), SOEs Law (1988), Temporary Regulations of Privately Owned Enterprises (1988), and Rules for Rural Collectively Owned Enterprises (1990).

98 Laid off or *Xiagang* (chinese: 下岗). By 1996 it appeared that a soft landing of the economy had been achieved, It was widely anticipated that the economy was in a position for a soft take off thereafter. However this has not eventuated, and instead a further slowdown of the economy is occurring.

99 Both the rule of law and private ownership were formally incorporated into the Chinese Constitution 1999.

100 *Zhua da fang xiao* (Chinese: 抓大放小).

management of the central government with regard to their importance to national security and the lifeline of the national economy.

In 2003, the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Congress issued a “Decision Concerning Issues of Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy System”. For the first time, the Party acknowledged property rights as the “core issue” of ownership reform and made building a “modern system of property rights” an important task of future reform. Furthermore, the Party promoted a “mixed economy”; it put private enterprises on equal footing with State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in terms of financing and taxation.<sup>101</sup>

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform demonstrated again how the incremental reform approach was highly related to the incremental mindset and the political will of the leadership, reacting to economic reality. The primary political objective of the Party was maintaining its power and successfully applies macro-stabilization policy action. The lesson that the Chinese leadership had learned from the past was that maintaining economic development is the key to maintaining power, and the crucial criterion is always based on the dynamic balance between the decentralization of central power and the concentration of local power. Incremental reform avoided the central power losing economic control too quickly over public or non-state sectors; this avoided threats to the national security<sup>102</sup>.

A similarly gradual development of reform occurred in housing reform. As soon as the Chinese government launched its economic reform in 1979, housing reform was put on the agenda.

Before the economic reform, the urban housing sector had been subjected to heavy subsidizing. Housing was considered as a “non-productive sector” and thus deemed a low priority compared to other capital investments (Zhou Yu 1999). Under the old

---

101 For further economic reform of ownership and the development of China’s stock market, see Wang Xiaozu (2003).

102 On the other hand, in the previous ten years, it is recognized that the supercharged SOEs have become the main problem of Chinese political economy. The Communist Party has become a deeply entrenched political interest, a privileged class that will find reform fundamentally detrimental to its existing privileges and interests. Pei Minxi argued, “If you look at state-owned enterprises, the bureaucracy, the local government, the military, there’s one line that runs through all of them, that’s the Communist Party.” (China Real time Report 2012, November 12). Ma Damein said, “the power of SOEs has been supercharged since the state used them as channels for stimulus money during the economic crisis. The growth of this money allowed them reversed the trend towards a largely private economy- and further increased SOEs’ already powerful political pull.” (China Power 2011, August 20).

system, housing was treated merely as a component of social welfare and was provided mostly for free by government institutions and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As the nominal rent collected did not cover the cost of basic maintenance, there was little incentive for housing investment and improvement of these “work unities” (Danweis). The per capita living space, for example, declined from 4.5 square meters in the early 1950s to 3.6 square meters in the late 1970s (Li Rongxia 1998).

In the early stage, even though several experiments were carried out in selected areas to test the feasibility of various public housing reform measures, a nationwide housing reform did not begin until the “Implementation Plan for a Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns” was issued by the State Council in 1988. This document marks a turning point in the urban housing reform from pilot tests and experiments in selected cities to overall implementation in all urban areas (Zhou Yu 1999: 18). As a result, public housing units throughout the country were sold to their sitting tenants at discount prices, and for those that could not be sold, the government raised the rent. But the efforts were insufficient to compensate for the deficit of maintenance.

Within this framework, work units during this period still treated housing provision as their core obligation. Enjoying the new fiscal freedom resulting from economic reform, many work units significantly expanded housing production for their employees. Housing thus continued to be allocated as a welfare good, rather than as a commodity traded on the private market. Public housing stock grew to an unprecedented level (Deng Lan et al. 2009).

In 1992, a more radical phase of China’s reform began. The official announcement of the transition from the socialist planned economy to a “socialistic market economy” greatly accelerated the market-oriented reform, but also brought the socialistic public housing system to its epilog in 1998 (Hui Xiaoxi 2012: 105).

In 1994, the Chinese central government issued “The Decision on Deepening the Urban Housing Reform”, which established a comprehensive framework for further housing reform. Within this framework, the government decided to build a multi-layer housing provision system for different income groups. From the supply side, the Economic and Comfortable Housing (ECH) was introduced, by providing subsidized housing units, and in combination with the Housing Provide Fund (HPF) from the demand side, potential homebuyers would get subsidized mortgage loans. In addition, there were five policy measures included the Co-ownership of Housing Responsibility, Housing Provident Fund as a Cornerstone in the Reform, Socialization and Professionalization of Housing Management, Selling of Former Public Rental Housing to Sitting Tenants, and More Housing for Middle- and Low-Income Groups (Li 2007: 7).

The overall objective behind all these efforts is to establish a functional housing market so that families could purchase housing directly from the market and work units would be relieved of their housing responsibility. Unfortunately, this did not happen easily. In 1996, 3 billion square meters of residential units have been finished. The average of urban per-capita living space was raised to 8.47 square meters. Nevertheless, there were still 50 million square meters of unsold housing. Although a quasi-urban housing market had been established, most participants in the market were not yet individual buyers. Instead of being sold to individual urban families, most of the newly built housing units were purchased by work units, which then resold them at enormously discounted prices to their employees (Wang Yaping and Murie 1996). One of the recognized reasons was that, although the increased average income in urban areas had made the progress of urban housing reform possible, during the 1980s and 1990s, most families spent their savings on consumables including electronic goods. Concurrently, most people were still unwilling to purchase their homes. Therefore, most participants in the market were not yet individual buyers. (Zhou Yu 1999: 20).

In 1998 the Chinese central government decided to take abrupt action to cut the link between work units and housing provisions. Specifically, A Notification from the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System and Accelerating Housing Construction was issued. This notice prohibited work units from building or buying housing units for their employees. Instead, they would have to provide monetary subsidies to their employees to help them buy homes on the market. (Deng Lan et al. 2009: 5).

Being embedded in a broader context, Lee (2006) observed that the 1998 reform followed the Asia Financial Crisis in 1997 and corresponded to the poor performance of State-owned enterprises (SOEs). China needed a new growth strategy that would stimulate domestic demand; the housing industry was chosen as the new growth engine. As a result, the Chinese government decided that it was time to terminate the old system and switch from in-kind housing provision to a cash-based housing subsidy<sup>103</sup>. Hui Xiao-xi (2012:106) pointed out the termination of the socialistic public housing system, as well as the large-scale housing privatization, by the radical housing reform in 1998 was an integral part of the economic stimulus plan.

In addition, decentralization of the government in housing reform allowed local government to adopt local conditions. Corresponding to the local governments, the representatives of the state are in charge of expropriating rural land for urban uses and allocating it to different users. Local government by controlling both the land supply and the zoning regulations can decide what can be built under their jurisdictions, subject to the requirements of the central government. Even though the central government lays out the framework for housing reform, it commits only limited resources; local governments are asked to pay for most of the costs involved in reform. This stimulated the local initiatives to cope with the central policy by installing local measures. Therefore, there has been considerable local variation in the timetable and degree of reform. The divergent pattern of the resources available affects the options and strategies appropriate for different provinces and cities. So the legislative and regulatory framework has guided the direction of reform in local conditions, shaped by differences in practices and local policy.

For example, owing to their strategic location, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou witnessed large-scale expansion of the commercial sector. Reform policies in those cities had much to do with housing market finance and housing mortgage services to individual buyers. New policies were tested in these large cities before application to other smaller cities.

Today, the housing industry is the new engine of growth, and private market housing transactions are normal for the new middle class Chinese households. From 2000 to 2004, China's annual investment in real estate averaged about 746 billion Yuan and accounted for almost 7 percent of the nation's GDP (Yeh et al. 2011). Urban residents' living conditions have also significantly improved, and homes have become the new form of private property for urban Chinese<sup>104</sup>. Unfortunately, on the negative side of the real estate market, and in a sharp contrast with the initial economic improvement, housing inequality between urban and rural areas, rich and poor people was a more important form of economic inequality than income inequality in pre-reform urban China (Wang Feng 2003).

Both the reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the housing reform illustrate that whether it is an "incremental reform" approach as with State-owned enterprises (SOEs) or a "gradualist" approach as with housing reform, the Chinese government still has a tremendous need for improvement, resulting from the challenges in housing

inequality, urban poverty, social segregation, how to accommodate housing needs for the continued urbanization process, or to manage the balance between market efficiency and political accountability. The major task is installing new measures to ensure social stability and legitimacy of the regime.

The government and the urban individuals had been moving away from a work organization-based employment and welfare provision system within the framework of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a result of the reform. Millions of rural laborers started to move into the urban centers to seek better economic opportunities and enhanced social status. All these structural changes have had profound impacts on the lives of Chinese citizens and the structural changes had profound social consequences that have redefined the Chinese social landscape. The major social structural changes results from the overwhelming rural migration and the rapid urbanization this causes.

---

#### § 5.4 Social Reformation: Administrative Control of Migration and Urbanization

---

Although China has an urban tradition of thousands of years, modern urbanization of the country commenced rather late. Throughout most of its long recorded history, China has been an agrarian society. For thousands of years, Chinese people lived in the countryside and engaged in agriculture in a societal context that valued self-sufficiency. Cities and towns as marketplaces were never well established under the firmly entrenched “physiocracy” (Yeh et al. 2011: 1), an ideology that encouraged farming and restrained trade and commerce in feudal China. While entering the modern period, Mao also promoted an anti-urban ideology by introducing several anti-urban and anti-migration policies and sending young people from cities to work on farms in the countryside in 1960 to endure hardship and learn about hard work. As a result, China was still a predominantly rural society as late as the 1970s.

In 1978, only 172 million people (18 percent of the total population) lived in cities (China Statistic Yearbook 2001). However, after the reversal of Chinese policies in 1978 and the opening-up of the country for market initiatives and foreign investments, the perspectives have changed profoundly.

Due to the market reform and the socialist economy, an accelerated urbanization was initiated that was unprecedented in the history of mankind (Logan 2002). There were doubts since the mid-1980s because of obviously exaggerated official estimates

of the size of China's urban population<sup>105</sup>. However, the last census of 2011 showed China's urban population at 665.790 million, reaching 49.68 percent of the entire population; 674.148 million persons were rural residents, accounting for 50.32 percent (Statistic Communiqué of the P.R.C 2011). Compared with the 2000 census, the number of urban residents increased by 207.137 million and the number of rural residents dropped by 133.237 million. The proportion of urban residents rose by 13.46 percentage points<sup>106</sup>. Since 1978, Chinese urban development has been characterized by a rapid surge of the number of designated cities as a result of both the relaxation of state control over city designation and the operation of spontaneous forces of market reform and globalization. Recognition of the inherent economic comparative advantage led to the open door policy through a strategy of gradualism, with an initially implemented in coastal cities before it was adopted nationwide (Lin, 2002b; Huang Youqin 2006).

The urbanization process is an inevitable outcome of the modernization of China. The definition of urbanization by the United Nations notes that the movement of people from rural to urban areas with population growth equates to urban migration. However, urbanization means not only the statistic migration from rural to urban areas; it also means an overall change of living conditions shifting from rural-agricultural to non-agricultural urban welfare.

China's urbanization has created a tension between the state and the individual. Until now, the *Hukou* (household or residential registration) system has served to bind individuals to the state as one of the major tools of social control<sup>107</sup>.

---

105 Regarding how to define an "urban area" and what proportion of the population within that area should be counted as "urban" is particularly complicated in the case of China. In general, there are two criteria: the geographical definition of an urban area related to the actual spatial coverage of the built environment that has certain "urban" characteristics, such as urban infrastructure or residential blocks. The second concern is the proportion of the population within the defined urban areas that should be counted as urban. In the case of China, it refers to the household registration or "Hukou" status. Yue et al. divided China's post-reform urbanization into three main stages, according to the forces that affected it: rural urbanization driven by industrialization (1978-1987); urbanization driven by land reform (1988-2000); and urbanization driven by the service industry (2001-). Each of these three stages of post-reform urbanization had different impacts on the pace and reform of urban development. See Yeh et al. (2011: 2-3).

106 [http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomeingevents/t20110428\\_402722244.htm](http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomeingevents/t20110428_402722244.htm).

107 The *Hukou* system (Chinese: 户口) controls the household register system. It officially identifies a person as a resident of the specific area of birth, which provides the State with a mechanism to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Unlike population registration system in many other countries, the Chinese system was designed not merely to provide population statistics and identify personal status, but also directly to regulate population distribution and serve many other important objectives desired by the State.

The evidence shows that the Chinese urban development over the past few decades has been shaped by the state through the means of a nationwide investment strategy; the administrative changes and the reclassification of urban population and urban settlements were strongly related to the policy of relaxation of state control. The transformation of the administrative system had a decisive influence on the evolution of the Chinese city and social formation.

The Hukou system was introduced in the early 1950s, originally for population registration and later also for migration control<sup>108</sup>. However, as influxes of peasants into cities escalated and began to be a serious burden, the first set of Hukou legislation was promulgated by the National People's Congress in 1958. This new legislation established a fully-fledged Hukou institution and granted state agencies much greater powers in controlling citizens' geographical mobility through a system of migration permits and recruitment and enrolment certificates (Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang 1999).

The rigid *Hukou* system of registration prescribes where each individual will live and determines whether he or she will be an urban or a rural resident. There are two classifications of *Hukou*: *Hukou* identity, such as the agricultural *Hukou* population (*Nongye*<sup>109</sup>) and the non-agricultural *Hukou* (*Fei Nongye*); the other defines residential location. Individuals register their *Hukou* at an administrative unit, such as the *Hukou* of Beijing or Shanghai. A *Hukou* in each administrative unit can be either agricultural or non-agricultural. Holders of a non-agricultural *Hukou* received grain and other goods and services allocated by the state. Those holding an agricultural *Hukou* were assumed by the state to practice farming and so they received no allocated goods or services. In the pre-reform period, the categorization of *Hukou* type was an effective way of controlling the movement of populations into cities. As most goods and services were controlled by the state, people could not live in the cities without state-provided resources.

Within this system, all civil rights are tied to the place of registration and the urban citizens are privileged over the rural ones. In this way, the Chinese state created a highly unequal society in which people were categorized and divided based on their geographical location (Wallen 2009).

---

108 The *Hukou* system was first set up in cities in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955. The early 1950s was a period of relatively free movement into and out of the cities and throughout the countryside in China. The constitution promulgated in 1954 even guaranteed citizens' rights of free residential choice and migration. See Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang (1999: 820).

109 *Nongye* (simplified Chinese: 农业; traditional Chinese: 農業); *Fei Nongye* (simplified Chinese: 非农业; traditional Chinese: 非農業).



The *Hukou* system is a unique institutional arrangement aimed at closely controlling population movement, but with the additional function of making sure that the great surplus of laborers in China is used in a way that benefits urban development. Under the Chinese *Hukou* system, all citizens must be registered, and every change of residency and location is closely monitored. Like all bureaucratic control systems, the *Hukou* system ultimately is a determining factor in the lives of the people<sup>110</sup>. The *Hukou* system fettered the mobility of labor, and the success of the Household Responsibility System (HRS)<sup>111</sup> led to a proposal for reform that aimed to take pressure off surplus rural labor<sup>112</sup>. In 1984, the State Council issued a landmark policy that allowed holders of an agricultural *Hukou* to migrate to nearby market towns and other small towns as long as they could provide for their own livelihood. This loosened the constraint on migration. Subsequently, industrialization in these towns absorbed the labor surplus released from the countryside (Yeh et al. 2011: 9).

Early reform and urbanization were mainly triggered by rural reform. The degradation of control over the *Hukou* restriction contributed to the early urbanization and reform. In general, rural urbanization was driven by industrialization. The Household Responsibility System (HRS) and the promotion of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) enabled millions of farmers to continue living close to their home villages while working in rural industries.

Traditionally, in the Maoist period, all economic activities in the countryside were included in the system of Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs). The people's communes played a dual role in the rural areas: they were both the lowest government apparatus and the highest level of the rural collective system. The commune itself was organized hierarchically—the immediate subordinate units of the commune were

---

110 The one-child policy is another example of the social regulations. It was introduced in 1978 and initially applied to first-born children 1979. It was created by the Chinese government to alleviate social, economic and environmental problems. It officially restricts married, urban couples to having only one child, while allowing exemptions for several cases, including rural couples, ethnic minorities and parents without any siblings themselves.

111 Chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform..

112 The HRS allowed individual households to take full charge of production on their allocated land plots; peasants' initiative galvanized rural productivity and generated a huge surplus of farm laborers. The number of surplus rural workers exceeded 100 million each year between 1982 and 1987, accounting for 33.5 to 43.5 percent of the entire rural labor force. See (Ma and Lin 1993).

brigades, and at the bottom level of the collective hierarchy were production teams<sup>113</sup>. In addition to Mao's policy of encouraging rural industries, the budgets of communes and brigades mainly came from the Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs). All of this gave the communes and brigades strong incentives to set up Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs).

As a result of the success of the reform of agriculture the commune system was officially abandoned in 1984. Consequently, all the commune governments were converted into township governments and the brigades into villages. Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs) were officially renamed Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). The major function of a township government was transformed from agriculture to managing or setting up Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) are collectively owned enterprises located in townships or villages. All the people in the township or village that "set up" the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) own the firm collectively. A township government is regarded as the "representative" of the people in the community, and thus it is the de facto executive owner of the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in the community. Typically, the control rights of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) are partly delegated to managers through a contract (officially called the management responsibility contract). It was common for employees of a Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) to collectively sign a contract with the executive "owner"—the township government (Weitzman and Xu 1994).

Yeh (2011: 12) summarizes that throughout the 1980s, the process of rural industrialization was based on the integration of the different decisive factors. Initially, rural reform generated surplus rural labor and supplied sufficient farm produce to sustain non-agricultural activities in towns and cities, and further, changes of the Hukou system facilitated rural migration to small towns. Both factors were supported by the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) system to ensure the flourish of rural industries, and the entrepreneurship of local leaders. Yeh characterizes the urbanization in this stage as an endogenous and spontaneous growth of rural industries in small towns, leading to the urbanization of the countryside (Figure 5.2).

---

113

The Production Team was formerly the basic accounting and farm production unit in the people's commune system in People's Republic of China from 1958 to 1984. Production teams were largely disbanded during the agricultural reforms of 1982-1985. In the administrative hierarchy, the team was the lowest level, the next higher levels being the production brigade and the people's commune. Typically, the team owned most of the land and was responsible for income distribution. Since 1984, production teams have been replaced by village groups.




Figure 5.2 Process of rural industrialization.  
Source: Yeh et al. (2011: 12).

At this stage, the development of rural industries enabled millions of former farmers to continue living close to their home villages. It was recognized as “leaving the farm but not the village; enter the factory but not the city”. This urbanization brought on by rural industrialization and a shift of employment out of agriculture into non-agricultural sectors had been called “urbanization from below”. The aforementioned relaxation of upgrading town to city is called “urbanization from above”<sup>114</sup> (Ma and Fan 1994).

In the mid-1990s, the pace of rural industrialization began to slow down. This was mostly due to the competition from the enterprises in cities. Urban land reform, which was initiated in the late 1980s in combination with the housing reform, which began in the late 1990s had contributed to the rapid urban expansion (Yeh et al. 2011: 17).

The new opportunity of urban development provided new working opportunities for rural-to-urban migrants, much more strongly than in the previous period. According to the 2000 Census<sup>115</sup>, more than 30 percent of the Chinese population lived in

114 To further promote the growth of small cities and towns, the government’s criteria for designating towns were relaxed in 1984, which led to a surge in the number of designated towns, which went from 2,781 in 1983 to 6,211 in 1984, and to 9,121 in 1987. Between 1980 and 1994, 287 new cities were so designated (K. W. Chan 1994).

115 China Urban Statistic Yearbook 2002.

a place different from their birthplace. There are in 2001 an estimated 100–120 million in the so-called floating population—temporary migrants looking for new job opportunities in cities. Rural-to-urban migrants unquestionably contributed to rapid urban development by providing labor, skills, and talents and by filling employment and service gaps in cities (Huang Youqin 2006; Yeh et al. 2011).

However, even though the relaxation of the restriction of the Hukou system had increased social benefits for rural-to-urban migrants, these migrants were still discriminated against by both existing institutions and permanent urban residents. Based on the *Hukou* system, there are “permanent migrants” who are able to change their registration to their destination cities, and “temporary migrants” who are registered at places other than their destinations. The latter constitute the majority of migrants in Chinese cities. Although permanent migrants enjoy employment opportunities and welfare benefits similar to those of urban residents, temporary migrants, who are mostly from the countryside, are not eligible for state employment and benefits in cities.

The disadvantage of the “temporary migrants” can also be found in the conditions of their temporary jobs, so called “3D jobs”: demanding, dangerous, and dirty (K, W, Chan 2001). They often cluster in a few undesirable occupational niches such as in construction work for men and sales, restaurants, and maid service for women (Huang, 2006). Normally, they cannot participate in the housing stock, such as the accessibility to subsidized housing, and the unreasonable development of the private rental market had become rigid, so they had no other choice but to choose unbearable living environments such as dormitories, trading markets, and construction sites. They also lacked access to government services such as health care, pension, and public schooling. Migrants are often blamed for rising crime rates, overcrowding, overburdening of the public facilities, and the deterioration of the urban environment, so local municipal governments have periodically attempted to deport them and demolish their settlements (Zhang Li 2002; Huang Youqin 2006). Thus, temporary migrants became the stigma of the cities. This top-down neglect has created enormous tension to urban planning practice and development; further, poses a serious threat for future social unrest.

Another social group forced to participate in such urbanization are the urban villagers<sup>116</sup>, whose land has been taken away for city expansion. They lost their houses or production land. Migrants who come to the city have no rights to affordable housing; villagers who had built houses in their collective residential settlements provided a reasonable and affordable alternative shelter to migrants. This is a spontaneous and extremely innovative needs matching of two groups in the city. Ironically, both groups are not counted as urban populations in the hardcore urban demographical statistics; yet they are integrally embedded in the urban economy that would not be able to function without them.

At the same time, a similar social impact occurs in urban areas. Another special social formation is confronted by the transformation: the *Danwei*, the labor and neighborhood unit, the self-sufficient unit that provides its members with food, shelter and work, and assumed responsibility for all social security benefits up to and including pension. Since 1949, these multifunctional associations have developed within defined geographical areas; they were cities within a city. The *Danwei* system was an indispensable social building block that originated from the commune during the planned economy era, adopted from the Soviet model<sup>117</sup>. Since 1949, the *Danwei* communes have played important roles in planning urban expansion and suburbs. Today, their significance is declining as work and social services are becoming increasingly detached and from each other. The newly emerging private sectors provided more efficiency through independent entrepreneurship as the urban economy, due to current urban development, is more and more characterized by specialization.

Unlike the *Danwei* compound, as part of China's overall market transition, housing reform has contributed to a rapid development of private housing and to a profound transformation of the urban landscape and socio-spatial structure. In the socialist era, housing was considered part of the social welfare benefits that the government should provide to its urban citizens. Through massive construction of public housing and the socialist transformation of existing private housing, the government successfully transformed a market-oriented housing system into a welfare-oriented system dominated by public rentals. At the beginning of reform in the 1980s, less than 20 percent of all houses in China were privately owned. Housing reform brought both

---

116 See further elaboration of urban villages in Chapter 8.4.

117 Three categories can be found regarding their nuclei: communes established around state-run factories and mines, communes established around administrative organizations and universities, and communes established around residents of street areas. See Koshizawa (1978: 20).

negative and positive results to the social transformation. Per capita living space increased from 3.9 square meters in 1978 to about 10 square meters in 1998 (Chinese State Statistic Bureau 1999). Yet compared to international standards, housing consumption in urban China is still low, and Chinese households still suffer from severe residential crowding.

China's relatively homogeneous urban society based on work-unit compounds was rapidly disappearing, and one with social separation and residential segregation emerged. With increasing globalization, Chinese urban residents got a taste of Western consumption and lifestyles. In addition to import of Western goods and recreational activities, they embraced the Western fast foods provided by major chains in the city. Luxury and leisure commercial activities became part of the daily lifestyle for urban citizens. All those changes within 20 to 25 years in the societal dimension asked for a new type of habitation and spatial configuration.

It remains unclear to what extent China's increased urban population should be attributed to such factors as administrative changes and modification of the urban definition. Nevertheless, the outcome of continued economic development in the twenty-first century will be the massive economic and spatial transition from the rural to the urban sector if the current trend of market reform and the relaxation of state control continue (Lin, 2002b). Such a massive transition from rural to urban will pose great challenges not only to the Chinese decision makers but also to anyone concerned about the sustainability of global development in general and human habitats in particular. China's renewal cannot be viewed apart from a worldwide civilization process that is complex and extreme. Radical urbanization will be inevitable due to the demographic developments, making urban planning a key to the future.

The social and spatial reformations are strongly interrelated systems. The social transformation has led to spatial reformation. With ongoing urban land reform that allowed land transactions and rent capitalization, large business and commercial centers that require intensive land use were developed and significantly change the skylines of many Chinese cities: new urban paradigms were emerging.

---

## § 5.5 Spatial Reformation: New Urban Paradigms

---

Since institutional changes were initiated in 1978, the trend of structural and spatial redistribution of cities has shifted. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, three fairly distinct phases of development in geographic terms can be identified. First, soon after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the country

was characterized by two distinct “poles”: the eastern coastal regions and the inland regions. Second, after the reform and opening up, the economic landscapes evolved and there were three geographical groups distinctive in character: eastern, western, and central. Third, in recent years, further spatial reconstruction was emphasized, namely a division of mega regional development and cooperative development among different regions, and between the cities and rural areas. Obviously, this remarkable reversal was inseparable from the political-economic forces of the state’s shifting development emphasis from the interior to the eastern coastal areas (Figure 5.3) (Lin 2002a).




Figure 5.3 China's three macro-regions, Open Cities, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs).  
Source: Lin (2002a, Figure 2).

The geographical situation, drawing from the trend of geographical redistribution of cities, was reversed before and after the institutional changes of 1978. The distribution of cities shifted from the west to the east; the eastern region demonstrated the highest growth rate in terms of the addition of cities (Figure 5.4).

Whereas small cities suffered from contraction in the Maoist era, they became the most dynamic urban settlements with the highest annual growth rate; the small and medium size cities also showed a substantial increase in the total urban population at the expense of their large and extra-large urban counterparts (Table 5.1) (Lin 2002a).




Figure 5.4 Growth of the number of cities in China 1978-1998.  
Source: Lin (2002a, Figure 5)

City Size (Non-agricultural Population in City Proper)	Number of Cities			Annual Growth (%)	
	1949	1978	1998	1949-78	1978-98
Extra-Large (> 1 million)	5	13	37	3.35	5.37
Large (0.5-1 million)	7	27	48	4.76	2.92
Medium (0.2-0.5 million)	18	60	205	4.24	6.34
Small (<0.2 million)	102	93	378	-3.18	7.26
Region	1949	1978	1998	1949-78	1978-98
East	69	69	300	0.00	7.63
Central	50	84	247	1.81	5.54
West	13	40	121	3.95	5.69
<b>Total</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>668</b>	<b>1.32</b>	<b>6.40</b>

Table 5.1 Number of Chinese cities by sizes and locations, 1949-1998  
Source: Lin (2002), Table 1 (revised by author).



Notably, extra-large cities enjoyed significant expansion because of their inherent advantages of agglomeration economies; these large urban settlements received more than 60 percent of all fixed asset capital invested in cities since the 1990s (Table 5.2).

		Fixed Assets Investment				Utilized Foreign Investment			
		Billion Yuan		Percent		Billion US\$		Percent	
		1990	1998	1990	1998	1990	1998	1990	1998
City Size (Non-agri- cultural Population in City Proper)	Extra-Large (> 1 million)	86.81	707.23	46.53	52.56	0.84	13.00	35.34	43.56
	Large (0.5-1 million)	31.14	184.49	16.69	13.71	0.28	4.87	11.68	16.33
	Medium (0.2- 0.5 million)	53.61	340.65	28.74	25.32	0.90	8.89	37.88	29.79
	Small (<0.2 million)	15.00	113.22	8.04	8.41	0.36	3.08	15.11	10.32
Region	East	117.58	874.60	63.03	65.00	2.23	26.10	94.54	87.44
	Central	47.07	304.17	25.23	22.60	0.10	2.85	4.11	9.55
	West	21.90	166.81	11.74	12.40	0.03	0.90	1.35	3.00
	Total	186.55	1345.58	100.00	100.00	2.36	29.85	100.00	100.00

Table 5.2 Domestic and foreign investment in Chinese cities, 1990-1998  
Source: Lin (2002, Table 4), revised by author.

As aforementioned in Chapter 5.4, the development of China's small towns has been understood as primarily a bottom-up phenomenon facilitated by such forces as the spontaneous marketization of the rural economy and the dramatic growth of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)—due to the reduction of state involvement in local economic affairs and relaxed restrictions on village-town migration. With the result that this new urban paradigm polarized the co-existence of a dual-track system: on the one hand, a top-down manner from the dominance of large and super-large cities in the urban hierarchy and on the other hand, a large number of newly emerged small cities and towns subsequent to the rural reform of political relaxation from below<sup>118</sup>.

McGee (1991) and Ginsburg (1990) have argued that both models have seen urban transition as a city-based process shaped by the forces of agglomeration in economies and comparative advantages, which may not be the only option for Asian urbanization.

It has been observed that a distinct process of regional-based urbanization has been taking place in the extended metropolitan regions as a result of economic restructuring, influx of foreign capital investment, and revolutionary advances in telecommunication and transportation. This process has led to the formation of zones of intensive urban-rural mixture and interaction of areas surrounding and between metropolitan centers. In some areas it shows the emergence of polycentric regions, and a pattern of multi-layered governance, which originated in some regions of the European Union, has been established (Yang Chun 2008).

During the period of new urban development, many problems were recognized. The most rigid challenge among them was the question of how the reformation can be realized as the “market” was an unknown economic mechanism for the country and had never been addressed in the communist regime. Therefore, the idea of an experimental base (*Shi-Dian*) was addressed in the central government. In this framework, the city played an essential role in the experiments with “the market.” At the same time, the central government started to study many comparative cases in a multitude of other countries, such as the export processing zone, tax-free district, and trade-free zone. Even though the open-door policy was recognized as being on the right track, for a communist society it was a tremendous new experience, and the existing facilities and programs were not built to support it. China had been isolated from the outside world for a long time and there was a lack of experience in trade with other countries. Therefore, the establishment of the Special Economic Zone and the initiative of the urban experimental base was a very unique and most important factor that triggered and influenced the contemporary urban development of China.

In general, development is concentrated in the two coastal provinces, particularly the lower Yangzi region (Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou), the Pearl River Delta (Hong Kong-Shenzhen-Guangzhou-Macao) and the grand Beijing region (Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan). Cities of these regions were given greater autonomy to attract foreign investment and practice free market forces. They were seen as catalysts of development, pioneers of economic reform, and centers of modernization. The special task of the Special Economic Zones<sup>119</sup> was to attract foreign capital. They were Shenzhen on the border to Hong Kong, Zhuhai on the border to Macao, and Shantou

---

119

Recognition of the inherent economic comparative advantages of the cities, particularly those along on the eastern coast, led the government to set up four Special Economic Zones in 1979 and designate 14 coastal open cities in 1984 (Yeung Yue-man and Hu Xu-wei 1992; Wu Weiping 1999). Along with the emergence of Guangdong and Fujian, these cities were given greater autonomy to attract foreign investment. Now they have become pioneers of economic reform and centers of modernization. The four Special Economic Zones established in 1979 included Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. In 1988, Hainan Island, previously part of Guangdong Province, was designated as the fifth and largest Special Economic Zone.

and Xiamen near Taiwan. The concept of Special Economic Zones was extended to fourteen other coastal cities following the program's initial success in 1984. The idea is for each city to establish its own development zone, the purpose of which was to permit a flexible economic policy similar to that practiced in the Special Economic Zones. The approach of Special Economic Zones was made successful in a very short period and Chinese resulted in an immense urban development and economic growth (Huang Youqin 2006) (Figure 5.5).



Figure 5.5 Gradual open-door policies and emerging metropolitan regions  
Source: Huang Youqin (2006), Map 9.3.

One main strategy of the state-controlled economic modernization of China is to lead to an urban development that attracts a globally networked economy. The increasingly international character of the economic structure affects especially those cities, which due to their function and importance assume a key position in the global economy. They become hubs of a globally operating economy and their international ranking depends upon the extent to which they are able to attract global investment activity. In addition, in order to serve the new urban function, new urban features were

emerging in the metropolitan agglomeration. In contrast to the previously cellular urban structure based on work-unit compounds with comprehensive functions (*Danweis*), specialization and differentiation are now being pursued in Chinese urban planning, and the results are evident in the spatial restructuring of land use and the transformation of the urban landscape. First of all, large housing estates separate from employment centers have been developed—mostly on the outskirts of cities—to accommodate households from different work units. This increasing separation of housing and workspace together with a surge in the use of private automobiles have made traffic a daily concern in most Chinese cities. The improvement of public transport and the extension of the city have produced a massive development of new housing in these suburbs.

The ideology of “production first, consumption later” in the Maoist era was reversed. Consequently, large business and commercial centers were developed, often at city centers, while high-rise buildings and skyscrapers mushroomed, which significantly changed the skylines of many Chinese cities. In the case of Beijing and Shanghai, the new central business district (CBD) became the location for high-rise office buildings, large hotels, and convention facilities. Chinese urban planners and decision makers clearly envision Western-style CBD’s comparable to those in Hong Kong, New York, London, and Paris. Another fashionable term is to build what is called specialized districts—such as High-Tech Zones. Urban makeover projects are taking place elsewhere by the municipal governments. In addition, Chinese cities, especially the large cities, are transformed by international architectural firms and designers, with foreign architects designing major landmark buildings in many cities (Huang Youqin 2006). Not to mention, entire residential districts with traditional architecture in Beijing and Shanghai have been torn down, resulting in the palpable loss of urban identity built up over the centuries. A predominantly faceless investor’s architecture now defines the image of the cities. Western media portray Chinese cities as the stage for new scenarios in which the frantic pace of construction threatens to disrupt familiar social constellations.

The newly emerged spatial paradigm in the Chinese urban evolutionary process should not be categorized based solely on the interpretation of the Western-centered discourse even though the established, Western-centered urban discourse and theory seems to be handy and helpful in the level of a rational planning approach. However, emerging forces are coming from many different initiatives and form many different factors of reform; the whole process was generated within an extremely short framework of time and in the hybrid geo-context of China.

A few reflections from this chapter are summarized. First, the earlier stage of the reformation was not initiated by the central government with full confidence. It was the mutual awareness among the central group of party leaders as the planned economy entered a dead end and could no longer promise future development of

the country that led to the understanding that economic reformation needed to take place. The selected factors of political intervention indicated that the force of the reformation was not mainly triggered by external forces of a changing global-economic environment: initially, it was more the urge of the internal desire for better living conditions. Second, still dominantly, the political decision-making process is the core subject during the evolution of modernization, which can be recognized throughout the whole process of reformation. Third, following the logic of the political interest and guidance, in comparison with the earlier stages of modernization of chapter 4, open-door policy demonstrates the contemporary China by avoiding the sudden collapse of “turn” through gradualism of learning by doing. Fourth, regarding the path that Chinese civilization has been taking over the past 200 years—and particularly in the past three decades—we can see how the country has been shifting toward a more open society balanced between decentralization and centralization. In addition, beyond the impact of the reform policy from the top down, a positive reflection on the modernization of thoughts and ideas has been slowly embedded in Chinese civilization. Fifth, the gradualism of the transition of the Chinese political economy from central authoritarianism to local corporatism and from plan to market means that the nature of cities as both administrative and economic entities is undergoing a profound transformation. Sixth, from these perspectives, is China becoming an open and democratically planned society, as being defined by Mannheim? Or does Chinese modernization and urbanization experience prove actually a new model of urban evolution that is an alternative to Western trajectories?

Undeniably, after years of practice in a stable and gradually improving environment, Chinese modernization has taken a turn for the better in many aspects. Practices show that reform can provide thriving vitality by importing advanced technology and science, establishing experimental Special Economic Zones, and importing foreign capital. Chinese self-exploration steadily and synchronous with the global context of development implemented modernity. While the global environment was becoming more dependent on international collaboration, as a member of the global society China could no longer be absent and ignored. The profound change of the interrelation between the government and the public has demonstrated that a society of emerging bottom-up initiatives, individual interests and hybrid evolutions is now on its way.

In the following chapters, the research further explores to what extent that the planning system and practices in contemporary Chinese urban development could cooperate with this unique context of overall reformation and smoothen the process of transition within the framework of the planning execution.

# 6 Transformation of Planning in China

Urban planning must be accompanied by the maintenance of statistical social and political control mechanisms, while varied urban practices at the level of the local and central governments have to serve new social and economic demands of the different sectors involved in urban development.

This chapter, following the highlights of the reformation in Chapter 5, focuses on how the role of urban planning has been adaptively reforming under the new condition of the emergence of the new “Cultural Turn” after the 1980s. In this framework, three components related to the changes of planning entity are elaborated. The first part, which gives an overall framework of the planning structure, focuses on the general background of the political embodiment and indicates the interrelation between the governmental function and the role of planning as it has shifted and has been modified. The second part focuses on the planning system: the overview of the planning administration and the instruments of laws and plan forms. The third part focuses the planning execution: the illustration of the execution of the planning procedure and the implementation.

In this chapter, the planning entity provides a referential framework as top-down intervention, to be compared later<sup>120</sup> with the micro-implementation of the local execution in Shenzhen.

---

## § 6.1 Planning Formation

---

The 1950s and 1980s were the first and second springtimes of Chinese urban planning<sup>121</sup> (Zhao Shi Xiu 1999). If the 1950s gave birth to urban planning, a single entity to serve communism derived from the design professions of the socialist Soviet Union, then the socio-political reformation in the early 1980s provided the resurrection of urban planning after decades of dissolution. From 1980 to 1990 was

---

120 Chapter 7 Planning for the Reality.

121 The 1990s were defined as the “third spring.”

the second springtime of urban development. In early 1984, the Chinese State Council issued the “City Planning Ordinance”<sup>122</sup>. Through this state directive, all municipal and county governments were required to develop master plans to guide their spatial development in accordance with existing practices of local economic planning. The principle is to embed planning practice into the existing mandate of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and economic opening up.

In this paragraph, a general background of the shifting role of planning and the Chinese political structure as well as a background of the governmental apparatuses and their relative functions of planning are elaborated. It is important to mention that these three elements—political structure, governmental apparatus, and planning system—are highly interrelated. However, in order to decode their essences in a systematic manner, they are addressed separately.

### § 6.1.1 The Changing Role of Planning

---

In history, in comparison with Western planning, urban planning practice in China had a much narrower mandate. The field of planning in the West is defined as being derived from two streams or traditions: a rationalist stream that comes from the design professions and scientific thought as well as a critique from the social sciences (Abramson 2002: 167). In Chinese tradition, urban planning (*guihua*) mainly derives from economic planning (*jihua*)<sup>123</sup>. In the Maoist economy, urban planning was a profession with a single traditional role: to serve an economic mission. The establishment of urban planning was based on the Soviet socialist model. Under the centrally planned economy, urban planners have had little opportunity or reason to include economic or social analyses in their activities, and unlike in the West, neither theory nor practice has been fundamentally influenced by the social science critique.

---

122 The “City Planning Ordinance” was the first ordinance issued by the central government after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, which clearly defined the requirement of regulations in the field of urban planning, urban construction, and urban management.

123 *Guihua* (simplified Chinese: 规划; traditional Chinese: 規劃) and *Jihua* (simplified Chinese: 计划; traditional Chinese: 計劃).

The reason for this is obvious. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China organized its science establishment along Soviet lines—a system that remained in force until the late 1970s, when China's leaders called for major reforms. The Soviet model is characterized by a bureaucratic rather than a professional principle of organization. Mostly emphasizing the separation of research from production, the principle and purpose of scientific work was to develop the natural sciences and to serve the construction of industry, agriculture, and the national defense. The Sino-Soviet relationship was very influential in the establishment of the national guidance in many different fields during the first few decades.

For example, the Chinese Academy of Sciences was explicitly modeled on the Soviet Academy of Sciences, whose director, Sergei I. Vavilov, was consulted on the proper way to organize Chinese science<sup>124</sup>. Soviet influence also occurred through large-scale personnel exchanges. Since the 1950s, China has sent about 38,000 people to the Soviet Union for training and study. Most of these people had backgrounds as technicians in key industries. The Soviet Union also dispatched some scientific and technical personnel to China.

With regard to planning, the first Five-Year Plan began in 1953 and stemmed from the Soviet tradition. Since the founding of the Republic and the transformation of society and the urban development, the urban planning system in China has gone through three stages: the period from 1949 to 1957, guided by the first Five-Year Plan and focusing on urban planning and the establishment of the new nation; from 1958-1978, when urban development was suspended due to societal stagnation that resulted from class struggle; and during the 1980s, when urban development was restored and promoted following the adoption of reform and an open-door policy.

During the 1950s, the role of planning was to serve the planned economy of the national economic development, used mainly to provide the executive framework for key national constructions. In the 1980s, with the accelerating of social and economic construction as well as the development of urbanization, the role of urban planning in guiding and regulating the development of urban economy and social construction was widely understood and accepted.

---

124

Sergei I. Vavilov, 1891-1951, Russian physicist. In 1932, he became director of the P. N. Lebedev Physical Institute, which he organized around the laboratory of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 1945, he became president of the academy. He is known for his work in radiation, luminescence, the creation of cold light through the conversion of ultraviolet rays, and optics. His book *Thirty Years of Soviet Science* was translated into Chinese to serve as a guide. The Library of Congress Country Studies; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook.



The reform and shift from a planned economy to a market economy in the 1980s brought profound change to the role of urban planning as well as redefined the scope of planning, the role of the government, the scope of planning, and the participation of different sectors in the process.

First, urban planning gained importance while incorporating the new approach into urban development. Therefore, urban planning became a critical and useful instrument for accomplishing the embodiment of political, social, economic, and spatial reform.

Second, the Chinese government highlighted the role of urban planning in guiding and comprehensively regulating urban constructions. The government regarded urban planning as an important instrument in guiding the rational development of construction and administration, and it asked local governments at various levels to take urban planning, construction, and administration as their main responsibility. This is in contrast with the government's role in the stage of planned economy, when the government played a dominant role in the allocation of resources and urban planning was just a continuation and detailed implementation of the national economic plan.

Third, the decentralization of reform that enhanced the legal system in urban planning and administration progressed continuously, and the modernization of administration was improving. Furthermore, a working mechanism for urban planning that fitted the national condition of China was forming. Corresponding plans were made in all cities, and most towns and villages, which effectively guided and coordinated the land use and construction activities, promoted economic and social development and improved living conditions in urban and rural areas.

Overall, the legal status of urban planning was developed rather late. The Urban Planning Law was issued by the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1990<sup>125</sup>. Since then, the central government of China has sped up the creation of a legal system for urban planning. As stipulated in the Urban Planning Law, the legal system consists of planning national cities and towns systems along with provincial and autonomous regional cities<sup>126</sup>. Urban planning had never had such an important role, and it had to start responding to the rapid growth of urban development and the urban economy.

---

125 Urban Planning Law or City Planning Law. Adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on December 26, 1989, promulgated by Order No. 23 of the President of the People's Republic of China on December 26, 1989, and effective as of April 1, 1990, at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34354.htm>.

126 See further elaboration on the legal system of urban planning in Chapter 6.2.2.

The 1990s are regarded as the third springtime of Chinese planning. During this period, China has gradually created a system of urban planning administration and technical regulations, with the Urban Planning Law as a framework and with relevant laws, regulations, rules, and norms included. The number of organizations responsible for the formulation and scientific study of the urban planning is 2,000, with a working staff of more than 60,000; the Urban Planning Society of China<sup>127</sup> has more than 2,000 members. Furthermore, various urban planning societies and associations are established, forming a network of societies and associations in this sector has been established (Tang Kai 2004).

Tang Kai, the former director general of the China Department of Urban and Rural Planning, Ministry of Construction (MOC) (the precursor of the Ministry of Housing and Rural-Urban Development (MOHRUD)) emphasized that a new Chinese era of planned economy has gradually stepped into the market economy; different societal conditions have to be recognized—the market plays the main role in resource allocation, and the most important task of urban planning was to maintain public interest and fairness. Solving conflicts between public-interest administrations and the protection of private rights should be taken into consideration in urban planning. He argues there is a tendency toward diversification among citizens in their choices of living places, environments, and standards of living. There is an unprecedented power struggle that competent administrations of urban planning and staff have to face. The only way out was to comply with the law of the market economy and to reform the existing urban planning system gradually (Tang Kai, 2004).

The efforts that the government has made during the past few decades are clear and obvious. Urban planning decisions have increasing effects on urban development, and a new discourse of urban planning is gradually defined.

First of all, urban planning has, in fact, become a very important part of public policy. The Chinese government makes urban planning a legal procedure; it executes administrative power, which is authorized by law. Regarding implementation, the fundamental purpose is to fulfill its regulating and guiding function so as to promote the reasonable use of resources and to protect nature and the environment.

---

127

The Urban Planning Society of China, voluntarily incorporated by urban planners across the country in 1956, is the only legally registered academic organization at the state level.

Secondly, urban planning is employed in correspondence with economic initiatives. In accordance with economic reform, urban planning is used to influence the allocation of national resources in relation to private investment. Particularly based on the logic of the market economy, urban land has become the substance of economic accumulation.

The third characteristic of urban planning involves becoming a social activity. Due to the diversification of subjects who are investing, urban planning has to deal with many different interest groups. Therefore, not only public interest but also private rights should be guaranteed in the process of formulation and implementation. Urban planning requires broad public participation and needs to provide a system of openness, fairness, justice, legalization, rationalization, and sensibility.

Last but not least, its role is to serve a political function as well as a social one; urban planning is becoming a comprehensive subject that involves multiple fields, such as natural science, social science, and environmental science, and above all, it serves as an embodiment of culture.

The evolutionary role of urban planning requires momentous change and recodification of the existing planning mechanism. Within the past four decades, the modification of the planning mechanism has become a crucial driving force for the new discourse of urban planning. This is accredited to a society characterized by the reformation of governmental functions that are gradually adapted to the emergence of a civil society; an actual reinvention of the government is demanded.

## § 6.1.2 Reinventing Government and Civilian Society in Transition

---

In general, the Chinese reformation of the planning mechanism involves two related modes that sometimes contradict one another. The first is the state-led, top-down, dominant government. In the past, in a planned economy with urban planning that as subjected to the continuous and detailed implementation of the national economic plan, the government was superior to civilian society and was dominant in resources allocation.

Since China's reform and the promulgation of the Urban Planning Law, the Chinese urban planning administration system has gradually become a dual-track system. The former "big government" and "small society" became conflicting civilians increasingly demanded to be allowed to participate in bottom-up planning of spatial development (Feng Xianxue 2006: 79).

The participation of civilians in the decision-making process, implementation, and superintendence of public works increasingly came into confrontation with the government mandate. However, an evolution in this direction in order to comply with a market-orientated society can only be attained under the condition in which the modification of existing planning still belongs to the government. Thus, reform of the government is inevitable.

David Osborne and Peter Plastrik (1992) stated five core strategies for institutionalizing the process of transforming unresponsive government bureaucracies —local, state, or national—into entrepreneurial systems that are open to innovation and change. The authors set forth a heady vision of community empowerment, whereby citizens organize as residents, neighborhood associations, and non-profit organizations and where business groups play their specific roles in planning. They promote an “entrepreneurial culture” of government in which agencies offer services, citizens are customers, and the rewards and perils of a market-like environment improve the performance of traditionally inflexible bureaucrats. Implementation is to occur through five common-sense strategies: clarify purpose (core), create incentives for employee performance (consequences), obtain feedback from service recipients (custom), empower people to do what is needed (control), and replace old habits with new commitments (culture)<sup>128</sup>.

In general, entrepreneurial governments support competition between service providers. Authority is decentralized, and entrepreneurial governments encourage the involvement of the public, private, and voluntary sectors. They empower citizens by shifting control of the bureaucracy into communities. Rules and regulations are of little importance compared with providing a goal and a mission that drive every organization.

Skeptics challenge Osborne’s and Plastrik’s emphasis on the “entrepreneurial culture” and doubt whether it does produce actual benefits for citizens rather than mere enthusiastic cheerleading from management mavens as a pure policy outcome.

---

128

Furthermore, David Osborne and Peter Plastrik (1992) pointed out ten principles for the reinvention of government: A “Catalytic Government” provides direction and vision instead of acting as regulator and administrator; a “Community-owned Government” decentralizes authority in civil society by providing a broader scope of participation; a “Competitive Government” installs a competitive mechanism in governmental services; a “Mission-driven Government” establishes reflexive institutional adaptation to fulfill dynamic missions; a “Results-oriented Government” and “Customer-driven Government” emphasize governmental efficiency; an “Enterprising Government” promotes an entrepreneurial culture in the governmental apparatus; and finally, an “Anticipatory Government” and “Decentralized Government” can lead to a “Market-oriented Government.”

Delusions and problems occur in practice. For sure, the ongoing evolution of the two entangled modes of the centralized-control of empowered government and the entrepreneurial-decentralization of emerging civil society will continually confront Chinese society.

The extreme tension between the government and civil society is in general a critical issue, which is confronting Chinese modernization on a daily basis. Embedded in a complex evolutionary procedure, in order to achieve economic development, sometimes the sacrifice of social justice is unavoidable. One of the examples is the overheated real estate development, resulting the speculation in the housing market and land appropriation. However, failures of market practice were immediately recognized, and actions were taken from the top down when necessary. In 2004, the government began to apply a series of policies to reinforce the taxation of house ownership so as to constrain the housing market and to control land leases against the public opinions of those who belong to the group most benefitting from market speculation. Macro-scale adjustment is a powerful governmental intervention and a Chinese specialty. Due to the governmental monopoly, these interventions can become immediately effective.

After the 1980s China became a more active civil society. In general, Chinese political formation is still constrained by a monopolizing government that is still similar to what it was in the former period of planned economy. However, speedy urbanization and globalization have reinforced the development of diverse sectors and actors from a society in which they can only be sustained if the opportunities for civilian participation are ensured. Political reformation and the market-oriented practical evolution under the phrase of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” have sometimes generated collisions and sometimes conflicts that make Chinese urban planning an extremely interesting subject. Apparently, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” still has an unclear meaning and future. Awareness of these features can be helpful to understand Chinese institutional reform and Chinese political culture. Furthermore, it can help to decode the planning practice and planning experiments in contemporary China while we analyze its political environment and governmental structure and their interrelationships with the planning administrations and practices.

### § 6.1.3 Hierarchical Structure of Governance

---

Without a doubt, planning is one of the most powerful governmental and political instruments that can influence the allocation of national resources. In China's case, this interrelation between the function of planning and its political status is even more extreme. The given political condition and its governmental structure determine state of the art of the planning system. Therefore, without understanding the hierarchical structure of Chinese politics, it is impossible to decode the decision-making process of planning that is influenced by the opaque political shift in secrecy.

From the beginning, the political formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was communist and authoritarian. The main political structure of the PRC comprises two vertically integrated institutions. One is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party), headed by the Party Political Bureau (Politburo) and its standing committee; the nominal leader of the CCP is the general secretary, but control of the Party is held collectively by its standing committee. The other is the state government apparatus, headed by the president, who presides over the State Council of the PRC, a de facto cabinet<sup>129</sup>. Throughout China, Party and government structures closely parallel one another. In addition, two other major institutions play important roles in Chinese politics: the National People's Congress (NPC) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA)<sup>130</sup> (Figure 6.1).

---

129 Formally, the president is elected by the National People's Congress (NPC) in accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution. The PRC president is a state organ instead of an administrative post; also, it is an important national symbol that serves as the nominal head of state. The most important position in the PRC has been that of the general secretary (as chairman before 1982); the post holders are usually the de facto leaders of the PRC. In most cases, the PRC president holds the position of general secretary of the Communist Party of China, making him China's paramount leader.

130 China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is not a national army belonging to the state. Rather, it is an armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the party's exercise of "absolute leadership" over the military a fundamental guarantee of Communist Party rule.




Figure 6.1 The structure of the Chinese central cadre and organization  
 Source: Han, Haoying, and Nishimura Yukio (2006, Figure 2).

In the Maoist period, the state government bureaucracy was relatively weak, and the National People's Congress (NPC) was under the mandate of Party leadership<sup>131</sup>. Therefore, in the planned economy period, the hierarchical structure was in line with the political entity of the Party and was supported by the military coalition among the major political actors, under which the planning system was bonded to the authoritarian Party system with loyal support of the administration and a weak bureaucratic government.

131 According to Article 57 of China's Constitution, "The National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power." Its highest officers are the president and vice president of the NPC, who are directly elected by the members of the NPC. Articles 85 and 92 of China's Constitution state that the State Council of PRC is the executive arm of the government and reports to the NPC. However, in reality, the NPC has been subordinate to the State Council of PRC and the Party Standing Committee. <http://www.constitutionofchina.com/>.

In view of the evolution of reformation and decentralization, the dominance of economic players, a proliferation of research groups and other actors in the political system, and the explosion of the Internet and other alternative sources of information, policy and administrative processes decentralized further and power diffused (Martin 2010).

Even though the central political system still remains strong at the nexus of Chinese politics, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leadership are not always able to dictate policy decisions. Instead, the Chinese political process is infused with a number of bureaucratic and non-central government actors that influence and sometimes determine government policy. These political actors include a muscular ministerial bureaucracy; provincial and local officials; a growing body of official and quasi-official policy research groups and think tanks that feed proposals directly into the policy process; and a collection of state sector, multinational, and even private business interests that bring more pressure to bear on policy decisions.

On the other hand, the political shift to establish an efficient and transparent government is required by a vigorous academic and university community, and diverse media groups to a certain degree are allowed to expose issues of official malfeasance to the public, which has enhanced a better-informed citizenry that demands more transparency and accountability from the government. New forms of communication and information availability have also pressured the PRC government to make changes in its political system and to simultaneously provide the Party with new means of maintaining political control (Martin 2010).

Chinese politics is further complicated by other factors. In the absence of a more formalized institutional infrastructure, personal affiliations can play a significant role in political decisions, adding unpredictability to an already murky process. In addition, discipline between the different levels of party and government structures can be tenuous, leading to ineffective implementation of policy and, in some cases, serious problems with corruption.

This paragraph highlights the different institutional systems and their main tasks, explaining how the diffusion of political power between party and government can make it difficult and complex to determine who has the authority to set and/or implement specific policies. The selection of highlighted institutional systems is based on criteria of strong relations to the field of planning.

#### *The (National) People's Congress (NPC)*

The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's highest legislative body, and, according to the Chinese Constitution, the ultimate power of the Chinese government. Even though the National People's Congress (NPC) is not China's sole legislative body,



it is the uppermost layer of a nationwide system of “people’s congresses” at various levels of government in the PRC. The National People’s Congress (NPC) deputies are not elected by public vote, but instead, they are selected for five-year terms by the next lower tier; deputies in the people’s congresses at the provincial and municipal levels, in turn, are selected by deputies at the county level. Although the public directly elects deputies for the lowest level, the Party controls candidate lists, and candidates for all levels are subject to Party approval.

Officially, the full National People’s Congress (NPC) selects the PRC’s president, premier, and cabinet, allowing the PRC government to assert its legitimacy through “elections” by representatives of the Chinese people. However, many leadership decisions are made earlier and in secret by senior Party officials after a lengthy process of negotiation and maneuvering. Due to its overwhelming majority in the People’s Congress, the Communist Party has total control of the composition of the Standing Committee, thereby controlling the actions of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The local people’s congresses are the National People’s Congress’ (NPC) local counterparts, and whose functions and powers are exercised by their standing committees at and above the county level when the Congresses are not in session. The standing committee of a local people’s congress comprises a chairman, vice chairmen, and members.

Before 1980, people’s congresses at and above the county level did not have standing committees. These were considered superfluous because local congresses did not have heavy workloads and, in any case, could serve adequately as executive bodies for the local organs of power. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decision in 1978 to adopt the Four Modernizations<sup>132</sup> as its official line, however, produced a critical need for broad mass support and the means to mobilize that support for the varied activities of both Party and state organs.

The establishment of the standing committees in effect also meant restoring the formal division of responsibilities between Party and state authorities that had existed before 1966. The 1979 reform mandated that the Party should not interfere with the administrative activities of local government organs and that its function should be confined to “political leadership” to ensure that the Party’s line was correctly followed and implemented.

---

132

These refer to the modernization of China’s industry, agriculture, national defence, and science and technology. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1250.html>.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) view was that the standing committees were better equipped than the local governments to address such functions as convening the people's congresses; keeping in touch with the grassroots and their deputies; supervising, inspecting, appointing, and removing local administrative and judicial personnel; and preparing for the election of local deputies to the next level congresses. The use of standing committees was seen as a more effective and rational way to supervise the activities of the local people's governments compared to requiring that local administrative authorities check and balance themselves. The proclaimed purpose of the standing committee system was to make local governments more responsible and more responsive to constituents.

The local people's congresses and their standing committees were given the authority to pass local legislation and regulations under the Organic Law of the People's Courts of 1980. This authority was granted only at the level of provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities. Its purpose was to allow local congresses to accommodate the special circumstances and actual needs of their jurisdictions.

China's approximately 3,000-member National People's Congress (NPC), largely a symbolic organization for much of its existence, has become somewhat more assertive in recent years, although it still cannot veto basic Party policies. To a great extent, the fragmentation of the process of decision-making has blurred lines of authority in China.

### *The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)*

With the inherited root of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) operated based upon the principle of "democratic centralism"<sup>133</sup>. In theory, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) democratic centralism allows for debate and discussion of policy among Party members, but requires unquestioning support of policy once a decision is made. In practice, democratic centralism has created a hierarchal political dynamic where senior Party officials expect disciplined compliance from junior officials, but junior officials are allowed to comment on policy proposals before decisions have been made. It is an important interactive relationship between the senior and junior

---

133

"Democratic centralism" is the name given to the principles of internal organization used by Leninist political parties, and the term is sometimes used as a synonym for any Leninist policy inside a political party. The democratic aspect of this organizational method describes the freedom of members of the political party to discuss and debate matters of policy and direction, but once the decision of the party is made by majority vote, all members are expected to uphold that decision. This latter aspect represents the centralism. As Lenin described, democratic centralism consisted of "freedom of discussion, unity of action."

officials where, even though the lower party organizations are subordinate to higher organizations, lower party committees select the members of the higher party congress. Thus, it is crucial for the senior officials to obtain and to retain their political power by maintaining the loyalty and support of the lower party organization.

The National Party Congress<sup>134</sup> is, in theory, the highest body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Party convenes in Beijing once every five years to establish the country's overall policy direction and to choose the members of the Politburo and other senior Party officials. Political power is formally vested in the much smaller Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s Central Committee. Central committee meetings are known as plenums (or plenary sessions) that are to be held at least annually<sup>135</sup>.

The day-to-day work of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is carried out by the Secretariat and its various departments—all placed under the direction of the Party's most powerful policy and decision-making entity, the Party's Political Bureau (Politburo), which comprises the Party's two dozen or so most powerful senior officials and its standing committee, which is formed by a much smaller group of elite Party members that wields much of the political power in China<sup>136</sup>. The official head of the Party's Political Bureau (Politburo) is the Party's general secretary. The other important department is the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Central Military Commission, which is also elected by the central committee and exercises authority over the military through the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)<sup>137</sup>.

- 
- 134 The National Party Congress should be distinguished from the National People's Congress (NPC), China's highest legislative body. After its ascent to power in 1949, the Party held no congress until 1956. This was the eighth congress since the party's founding in 1921. The ninth National Party Congress convened in April 1969, the tenth in August 1973, the eleventh in August 1977, and after 1977, meetings were held once every five years until the present.
- 135 There are partial, informal, and enlarged meetings of central committee members where key policies are often formulated and then confirmed by a plenum.
- 136 The Politburo Standing Committee that emerged from the 17th Party Congress now has nine members. See <http://English.cpc.people.com.cn/>.
- 137 Organization chart of the 18th CCP central leadership, see <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/207121/index.html>.

In this framework, below the central level, party committees and congresses were formed in the twenty-two provinces, five autonomous regions, and four directly governed municipalities<sup>138</sup> that were directly under the central government. The rest of the Party's formal structure consists of layers of local, municipal, and provincial party congresses and committees.

Even though membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not obligatory for citizens, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has more than 77 million members involved in over 3.6 million grassroots organizations<sup>139</sup>. The contemporary Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is organized into many extensive, hierarchal networks of organizations that reach into many aspects of society. There is a wide variety of institutions, including universities and schools, think tanks, state-owned enterprises, and private corporations. An applicant for Party membership must complete an application form and be introduced by two Party members, and every Party member must be in a branch, cell, or other specific unit of the Party in order to participate in the Party organization's regular activities. Joining the Party was once a wholly ideological act, but it has become a way for many young people to make connections for career advancement.

The composition of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) "Chinese-style" meritocracy emphasizes the compromised balance among the different factions. Loyalty to officials who are higher in the Party organization can be crucial to a person's career, more often, it follows a behind-the-scenes principle of familial and clan relationship that is reminiscent of imperial China. This peculiar socialization of talented and motivated individuals into an ideological elite community engenders both feeling of loyalty to a club with strong mutual ties and the opportunity to develop a specific type of *guanxi*<sup>140</sup>: interpersonal networks based on quid pro quo relations (De Jong 2013: 92).

- 
- 138 The five autonomous regions are Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxi, Xinjiang, and Xizang. The four directly governed municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin.
- 139 The total Chinese population is approximately 1.3 billion. See the official webpage for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), <http://English.cpcnews.cn/92247/6279373.html>, based on the report of the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2007.
- 140 *Guanxi* (simplified Chinese: 关系; traditional Chinese: 關係).

For example, some Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders use their influence (*guanxi*) to secure positions of authority for their family members, regardless of their abilities or experience. This is low-level corruption at best and a serious threat to the Party's legitimacy with the public at worst, although some of the "Princelings" have used their preferential access to power for social causes<sup>141</sup>.

The PRC's Communist Party-led political system has proven exceedingly resilient to past and current challenges, but it is still under stress and undergoing reluctant transition. The Party's commitment to remaining in power forces it to adapt continually to changing circumstances and to make incremental compromises with other participants in the political process. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but in practice, the Party often makes the decisions.

Within this framework, two major tensions are influencing the continuously shifting balance. On the one hand, the Party's authority rests primarily on the government's ability to maintain social stability; appeals to nationalism and patriotism; party control of personnel, media, and the security apparatus; and continual improvement in the living standards of most of the country's 1.3 billion citizens. On the other hand, to the Party leadership, the exploration of reform is no longer defined by how closely it reflects hallowed political quotations or ideas but by whether or not it produces demonstrable benefits for the reform program.

Because the fourth generation of China's leaders belongs by and large to the postliberation generation, selected from the best-educated segment of the Chinese population, most of China's new leaders, who came of age in the new socialist China, studied natural sciences or engineering in college and worked as specialists in production-related fields in bureaucratized organizations. Thus, the new leaders are not "critical intellectuals" who, by virtue of their knowledge of tradition, values, norms, or ideology tend to act as critics of the existing system. With their career backgrounds as engineers and specialists who are trained in hard science—possessing narrowly defined technical knowledge that is related mainly to a formal rationality that helps to choose the best means once the basic goals of society are agreed upon—the new leaders likely see their mission as improving and perfecting the existing system (Lee Hong Yung 1991: 402).

---

141

*Tai Zi Don* (simplified Chinese: 太子党; traditional Chinese: 太子黨) in colloquial Chinese, or "Princelings" refers to an important but informal politically influential group. The group consists of relatives of senior Chinese government officials who use their family relationship to obtain access to privilege, positions of power, and wealth—often by circumventing the official channels and procedures. Ironically, more than 90 percent of China's billionaires are children of senior government officials, and they represent the type of "class privilege" that the Cultural Revolution was supposed to eradicate.

Since the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, China has had no supreme leader. The central leaders, who sit on the Politburo Standing Committee, form a collective leadership in which each man has a rank. In general, many of China's central leaders wear multiple hats, holding positions concurrently in all three systems of government, military, and Party. This adds to the difficulty of knowing how exactly PRC decision-making occurs. Often, the internal hierarchical structure is based on a range of intangible factors apart from their actual positions and the official criteria. These intangible factors include experience, seniority, personal connections, degree of expertise, and to some extent association with past performance in the economic realm. Those intangible factors are influenced by the relationship between the distinct systems that may be well known to the respective parties involved, although not necessarily apparent to the outside world.

Age and term limits for top Party and state positions are a recent innovation introduced in the beginning of 1997. All top officials have since been limited to two five-year terms in the same posts. Those age and term limits define the number of positions that will turn over at each Party Congress and limit the pool of possible candidates. The fifth generation came to power at the eighteenth National Party Congress in 2012, when Hu Jintao stepped down as Party secretary and Xi Jinping was appointed as successor. In the fifth generation, one sees fewer engineers and more management and finance majors, including successful entrepreneurs. Most of the fifth generation of China's leaders was born in the post-war years between 1945 and 1955 and was educated at top Chinese universities<sup>142</sup> (Table 6.1).

---

142

See Michael F. Martin (2010: 5). The recent development of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) shows that it has split between two distinct leadership camps: the "populist" group, represented by Li Keqian, and the "elitist group," by Xi Jinping. According to the analyst, the "populist" group favors balance in economic development, focuses on improving the livelihood of the poor and disenfranchised, and emphasizes the principles of a "harmonious society". The "elitist" group favors continued rapid economic development, less emphasis on social issues, and nurturing China's growing capitalism and middle-class populations. Xi Jinping and Li Keqian, two newly appointed Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members, had been tipped as successors, respectively, to Hu Jintao as Party secretary and to We Jiabao as premier at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. They are the only Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members born in the 1950s, making them the first of the "fifth generation" of China's potential leadership to rise to this level.

Generations of Chinese Leadership			Position	Characteristic
First	1949-1976	Mao Zedong as core	Chairman	The guiding political ideologies for the first generations were the general principles of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought.
Second	1976-1992	Deng Xiaoping as core	Paramount leader	This turns of focus from class struggle and political movements to economic development, pioneering Chinese economic reform. Dominant political ideology of the era was Deng Xiaoping Theory.
Third	1992-2003	Jiang Zemin as core	General Secretary	Continuing economic development, the establishment of the early stage of reform. Continuing the direction of Deng Xiaoping, the dominant ideology was Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents Theory" <sup>1</sup> .
Fourth	2003-2012	Hu Jintao as core	General Secretary	A new technocratic style of governance and a less centralized political structure. The majority of this generation was engineers; unlike their predecessors and likely successors, they have spent very little time overseas. The dominant political ideology of this era is Hu's Scientific Development Concept with a goal for a Harmonious Society. They are seen as more populist than the previous generation.
Fifth	2012-	Xi Jinping as core	General Secretary	Incorporating the Scientific Outlook on Development into Constitution, along with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important "Three Represents Theory" of Jiang Zemin <sup>2</sup> .

Table 6.1 Generations of Chinese leadership

Source: Constructed by author.

After the 1980 speech of Deng Xiaoping "On the Reform of the Party and State Leadership System", the evolution of the reform has been based on fine-tuning the banner slogan "socialism with Chinese characteristics". It implies that considerable leeway would be allowed in doctrinal matters to achieve the overriding goal of rapid modernization. The problematic challenge to the reform leaders prior to communism's stabilization of political authority, came from the awareness that successful implementation of the broad reform program required a stable, professional bureaucracy to direct the course of events, which includes a more rational division of powers and functions of the Party as well as of the government.

Even though China is a one-party state that has been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1949, rather than being rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian, political power in China is now becoming more diffuse, complex, and highly competitive. The political struggle still remains in the spirit of the Chinese political realm; only it is now hidden deeper in its camouflage of reformation.

### *The Governmental Apparatus*

The second major institute of the Chinese political structure is the entire governmental apparatus. Under China's Constitution, the highest government administrative body is the Chinese State Council. This Council functions essentially as the cabinet of the PRC government. The entire government apparatus is effectively divided into two parts.

The first part is a system of ministerial organizations, which is generally organized by type of activity. Like the Party, the ministries are organized into hierarchical layers with offices at the provincial and local levels and consolidations between different ministries are often taking place. Besides the ministerial arm, there are many special agencies and commissions.

The daily administration of the government is generally handled by the Chinese State Council's Standing Committee (SCSC). It includes the premier, four vice premiers, the five state councilors, and the Chinese State Council's secretary general. The State Council's Standing Committee (SCSC) generally meets twice a week. Each vice premier and state councilor oversees a different aspect of the administration of the government. However, the actual administrations make sure that the central policy relies on ministerial functions. Despite their subordination to the Chinese State Council and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the ministries wield decisive influence on policy making by virtue of their role in interpreting, implementing, and overseeing what central leaders often broadly and somewhat ambiguously define as Chinese policy goals. Ministries often function as independent operators, with the minister functioning as a chief executive officer over his or her agency. However, ministers are still answerable ultimately to the government's board of directors, the Party's Political Bureau (Politburo), and must frequently contend with the secretaries of the ministerial Party committees when establishing and carrying out policies.



The second part of the Chinese government system is related to the system of geographic organizations, the administrative arm of the people's congresses, the local governments. It consists of four levels of government entities: provincial level (provinces, autonomous regions, directly governed municipalities, and special administrative regions), prefecture level (prefectures, autonomous prefectures, prefecture-level cities, and leagues), county level (counties, autonomous counties, county-level cities, districts under the jurisdiction of the city, banners, autonomous banners, forestry areas, and special districts), and township and village level (towns, townships, sub-districts, ethnic townships, village committees, and neighborhood committees)<sup>143</sup>.

According to China's official statistic report, there are 33 provincial-level governments<sup>144</sup>, and more than 300 prefecture level governments, nearly 3,000 county-level governments, and more than 40,000 township-level governments (Martin 2010). In addition, in 1982, the Chinese Constitution defined that the State would set up special administrative districts whenever necessary. On July 1, 1997, China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong and set up the special administrative district of Hong Kong. In 1999, Macao returned to China, and a new special administrative district was set up (Table 6.2)<sup>145</sup> (Table 6.3).

- 
- 143 The levels of local government have undergone several changes since the foundation of the PRC. There were six levels from October 1949 to September 1954: large region, province, city, county (urban district), district, and country (township). In September 1954, the number of levels dropped to five: province, city (prefectures, leagues, and autonomous prefecture), county (autonomous county, banner, and district under the jurisdiction of the city), city district, and village (people's commune, township, and autonomous county). At present, the organizational system of local government is divided into four levels (town merged with the village).
- 144 This is based on the official statistics of the PRC, which includes twenty-two provinces (*Sheng*), five autonomous regions (*Zizhiqu*), four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) and two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau).
- 145 *Sumu* (simplified Chinese: 苏木; traditional Chinese: 蘇木) are a type of administrative district used in Mongolia, China. In Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol) it is equivalent to the township. *Gacha* (Chinese: 嘎查) is an type of administrative district used in Mongolia, China. In Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol) it is an equivalent to the village level. *Qi* (Chinese: 旗) or Banner is an type of administrative district used in Mongolia, China. In Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol) is an equivalent to a county level. Each banner had *Sumu* as nominal subdivisions.

Central Government (Population: 1.3 billion)				
Provincial level	Prefecture level	County level	Township level and Village level	
<b>Province</b>	Sub-provincial-level city	District Ethnic district	Sub-district Town	Role to serve as executive organ for the central Village committee (village groups, villages, Gacha) Neighborhood committee (Communities, neighborhoods)
	Prefectural-level city	Special district County-level city	Township Ethnic township	
	Autonomous pre-fecture	County Autonomous county	County-level district	
	Sub-prefectural-level city		Sumu	
	Administrative office		Ethnic sumu	
	Forestry district			
<b>Autonomous Region (Zizhiqu)</b>	Sub-provincial-level autonomous prefecture	District County-level city County		
	Prefectural-level city	Autonomous county		
	Autonomous pre-fecture	Qi (banner) Autonomous Qi (banner)		
	Prefecture Leagues			
<b>Directly Governed Municipality (Zhixiashi)</b>	Sub-provincial-level new area			
	District			
	County			
<b>Special Administrative Region (Region of the One country, two systems)</b>	Region	District		
	Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau			

Table 6.2 Structural hierarchy of the administrative division

Source: [www.gov.cn](http://www.gov.cn) (Official website of the central People's Government of the PRC) Administrative divisions of the People's Republic of China. Constructed by author.

Provinces (Sheng)			Autonomous regions (Zizhiqu)	Directly Governed Municipalities (Zhixiashi)	Special administrative regions (SAR)
Anhui	Henan	Shannxi	Guangxi	Beijing	Hong Kong
Fujian	Hubei	Shangdong	Nei Mongol	Chongqing	Macau
Gansu	Human	Shanxi	Ningxi	Shanghai	
Guangdong	Jiangsu	Sichuan	Xinjiang	Tianjin	
Guizhou	Jiangxi	Yunnan	Xizang (Tibet)		
Hainan	Jilin	Zhejiang			
Hebei	Liaoning				
Heilongjiang	Qinghai				
Sub-provincial-level city			Sub-provincial-level autonomous region	Sub-provincial-level new area	
Changchun	Harbin	Shenyang	LLI Kazakh	Binhai New Area	
Chengdu	Jinan	Shenzhen	Autonomous		
Dalian	Nanjing	Wuhan	Prefecture	Pudong New Area	
Guangzhou	Ningbo	Xiamen			
Hangzhou	Qingdao	Xi'an			

Table 6.3 Subnational government in China

Source: www.gov.cn. Constructed by author.

The main function of the local government is to manage the economy of its jurisdiction. It includes drawing up socio-economic development strategies for the regions as well as middle- and long-term plans for economic development, year plans, measures of developing resources, transforming technologies, importing technologies and capital, solving important economic contradictions between branches and between branches and regions, mediating economic relations, organizing and coordinating production and circulation, enforcing economic laws and regulations, appointing and dismissing cadres, and providing infrastructure, basic conditions, and services for economic development.

After the reform of the economic system in 1978, local governments have increasingly participated in economic construction and played an important role in rural industry promoting economic development. The most well known example is the economically well-developed Pearl River Delta (PRD). The rapid development of rural industries resulted to a large extent from the impetus of local governments. Local governments directly intervened in the economy and played a leading role by providing favorable conditions for market-oriented development. In this framework, transferring governmental functions to reinforce market development is emphasized. In addition to managing the economy, local governments are also responsible for other societal functions, such as culture and education. They are also in charge of the urban and rural development construction, and finance and taxation.

Regarding the formation of government in China, an indirect rather than direct election system is adopted for electing local administrative officers. Local voters elect the representatives to the people's congresses and have the right to elect the officers of local governments. The candidates for senior officers and vice officers have to be nominated by the presidium of the people's representatives or co-nominated by more than ten representatives. The people's congresses at the provincial, city, and county levels each elect the heads of their respective government organizations. These include governors and deputy governors, mayors and deputy mayors, and heads and deputy heads of counties, districts, and towns. The people's congresses also have the right to recall these officials and to demand explanations for official actions. Specifically, any motion raised by a delegate and supported by three others obligates the corresponding government authorities to respond. The people's congresses at each level examine and approve budgets and the plans for the economic and social development of their respective administrative areas. They also maintain public order, protect public property, and safeguard the rights of citizens of all nationalities. All deputies are to maintain close and responsive contact with their various constituents.

The authorities of the local governments follow a hierarchical structure with a characteristic of leadership at different levels, the lower level being subordinate to a higher level. This means that lower-level governments must accept the leadership, instructions, supervision, and examination of higher-level governments and complete the tasks received from them. In reality, it is impossible for higher officials to fully monitor the activities of lower-level officials, and it is equally impossible for lower-level officials to fully comply with instructions from their supervisors. As a result, there is a fair amount of policy slippage between the directives of the central government and the actions of local officials. In general, the ministries rely on local authorities to implement national laws and regulations. Because of a lack of personnel, local officials are frequently responsible for carrying out the policies of the Party, the central government, and multiple ministries—often forcing them to prioritize among competing requirements and restrictions (Martin 2010: 15). As a result, the goals and objectives of the central authorities may not be adequately reflected in the local situation.

The central government can exert its influence on local administrations in many ways. The Chinese State Council, in terms of administrative legislature, controls local administrative procedures. The local governments must follow the laws and regulations of the central government. The Chinese State Council guides the local administrations in terms of policies and assigns tasks to local governments in terms of plans. In doing so, the central government confers on the local governments the necessary authority. The Chinese State Council examines and approves the works of local governments through general supervision of the subordinate administration, special supervision of supervisory branches, and economic supervision of auditing branches. The central government evaluates the local governments' policies, laws, and plans. Local

governments can work against the central government to some extent. In recent years, some local governments have exerted a certain influence on the central government in decisions on finance, import, export, trade, and so on.

Reform programs have brought the devolution of a considerable amount of decision-making authority to the provincial and lower levels. Nevertheless, because of the continued predominance of the fundamental principle of democratic centralism, which is the basis of China's Constitution, these lower levels are always vulnerable to changes in direction and decisions originating in the central government. In this respect, all local organs are essentially extensions of central government authorities and thus are responsible for the "unified leadership" of the central organs.

This challenges governmental officials to develop new collaboration and negotiation skills, especially in the field of regional development, where one can see that the trends of collaboration and negotiation between different hierarchical levels of government are more often active. In general, local governments at different levels compose the system of complete political power; in practice, each tier of government exercises varying degrees of autonomy.

The other important personnel system within the governmental apparatus is related to the organization of cadre personnel management, which consists mainly of organization branches of the Party committees at different levels and personnel management branches of local governments at different levels. As is the case with the central government, virtually all of the lower-level governments contain a parallel Party administration (headed by the secretary of the Party Committee) and governmental body (headed by the governor, mayor, or county head). In most of the cases, at the provincial level, these are two separate people; at the county level, one person may have both roles (Martin 2010). The relationship between the local Party leader and the local top government officials is critical to the effectiveness of the local government<sup>146</sup> (Lee Hong Yung 1991; Zhong Yang 2003; Guo Hong Tao 2007; Martin 2010; De Jong 2013).

## Think Tanks and Government-sponsored Research Institutions

In recent years, think tanks (Zhiku)<sup>147</sup> and other research institutions have proliferated greatly in China. China's think tanks serve multiple functions for the government. They are often linked to various government entities and especially value a close connection with the upper stratum of the Chinese leadership. Broadly speaking, China's think tanks are autonomous organizations that conduct research and that provide consultancy services on policy issues.

Based on the research of Zhu Xufeng (2006), there are three types of policy research institutes: official policy research institutes, semi-official think tanks, and civilian think tanks (Table 6.4).

China's Policy Decision-making Consultant System				
Official Institutes	Semi-official Think Tanks	Think Tanks		
		Civilian Think Tanks		
Research Office in Bureaucracy	Research Institute in Public Institute	Research Institute in University	Enterprise Research Institute	Civilian and Non-enterprise Research Institute
Government Agency	Public Institute		Enterprise	

*Table 6.4 Three types of Policy Research Institutes in China*  
 Source: Zhu, Xufeng (2006: 5). Constructed by author.

China's official policy research institutes include the Chinese Research Office of the State Council and the Offices of Policy Studies of the local governments, ministries and commissions. Under Chinese law, an official policy research institute is regarded as a "government agency". Although the first task of these policy research institutes is to conduct research on policy issues, they are often responsible for drafting important policies, releasing information and organizing studies on policy issues. Zhu Xufeng (2006: 3) argued that China's official policy research institutes function as immediate actors in the government's policymaking process, not as "outer brains" of the government, the basic feature of think tanks, thus they cannot be counted as "think tanks".

Semi-official think tanks are independent legal bodies founded by the government that acts as their supervising unit. Under Chinese law, semi-official think tanks are

147

Zhiku or Think Tanks (simplified Chinese: 智库; traditional Chinese: 智庫).

“public institutions”. Semi-official think tanks are not completely autonomous. Various ministries and local governments established many semi-official policy research institutes after the reform in 1978. They are headed by government-nominated personnel and accept startup capital from their supervising government agencies. They also receive a steady flow of funds as fees for regular research tasks assigned to them. In general, semi-official think tanks can run their research in a more autonomous manner than official policy research institutes can. After the reform, they gradually received fewer sponsored funds from the government. They have more freedom, as they can accept other research tasks from other government departments and organizations. Following the reform policy of privatization and decentralization, semi-official think tanks have also become increasingly market-oriented and acquire assignments from private organizations, enterprises, and even foreign funds.

The last type of think tank emerged with the open-door policy. On-campus policy research organizations were an emerging category of civilian think tanks, with college scholars beginning to exert influence over China’s policymaking process. In general, they have fewer links with the government and are sometimes supervised by a government department. Yet, the tie between supervisor units and civilian organizations is very loose. This reflects their independence and diverse sources of funds.

The growing importance of think tanks in China and the frequency with which they are able to facilitate international exchanges has to be understood within the context of China’s rise on the world stage. In 2006, the Chinese State Council approved the founding of a new think tank in Beijing, the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE). Within this framework, for the first time in the PRC’s history, the top ten think tanks in the country were designated (Table 6.5). The formation of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) reinforces what some scholars see as an emerging trend in China’s research institutes to facilitate broad domestic and international policy discussions by knitting together and drawing on the expertise of government officials, private entrepreneurs, and internationally renowned scholars<sup>148</sup> (Li Cheng 2009: 1). According to its charter, the China Center

Four months later, the CCIEE organized an international conference on the global financial crisis and the role of think tanks in promoting international cooperation on issues of global importance. This so-called “Global Think Tank Summit” attracted approximately 900 attendees. Among them were 150 former or current government leaders (Chinese and foreign), officials from such international organizations as the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, about 450 scholars and think tank representatives from around the world, roughly 200 businesspeople and 150 journalists. China’s top leaders were among those who made their presence felt at the conference, with Premier Wen Jiabao on hand to meet with distinguished guests and Executive Vice-Premier Li Keqiang delivering a keynote address. For almost a week, Chinese media outlets covered this event widely as part of the headline news.

for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) is to operate “under the guidance and supervision of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in terms of its business scope” (Li Cheng 2009; Zhu Xufeng 2006; and Martin 2010).

Rank	Name	Current Head	Year	Location
1	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	Chen Kuiyuan	1977	Beijing
2	Development Research Center of the State Council	Zhang Yutai	1981	Beijing
3	Chinese Academy of Sciences	Lu Yongxiang	1949	Beijing
4	Academy of Military Sciences	Liu Chengjun	1958	Beijing
5	China Institute of International Study	Ma Zhengang	1956	Beijing
6	Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations	Cui Liru	1980	Beijing
7	China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation	Mei Ping	1986	Beijing
8	China Association for Science and Technology	Han Qide	1958	Beijing
9	Chinese International Institute of Strategic Society	Xiong Cuangkai	1979	Beijing
10	Shanghai Institute for International Studies	Yang Jiemian	1960	Shanghai

*Table 6.5 Top 10 Think Tanks in China (Compiled by Chinese Authorities at the “First Forum on China’s Think Tanks” held in Beijing in 2006.)*  
 Source: Li Cheng (2009, Table 1).

The Office of Policy Studies (OPS) of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the biggest ministry in the State Council of China, was established at the same time that the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was reorganized from the Chinese State Development Planning Commission in 2003. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), whose purview is the macroeconomic management of the Chinese economy, is widely considered to be the most important ministry in the Chinese government. The Office of Policy Studies (OPS) acts not only as a research entity but also is in charge of the press and journals under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)<sup>149</sup> (Zhu Xufeng 2006: 4).

The two most important institutes in the second category of think tanks are the Development Research Center (DRC) of the Chinese State Council and the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS). The Development Research Center (DRC) focuses on

149

The press and journals under the NDRC include *The Chinese Planning Press*, *The China Economic Herald*, and *the Journal of Macro-economic Management*, in which policy information from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is released.



policy research projects, while the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) conducts both policy and academic research. They are also the top two think tanks of the top ten.

Li Cheng (2009) in his research points out that there are three distinct groups of elites—current or retired government officials, business leaders, and public intellectuals—who have become increasingly active in promoting their personal influences, institutional interests, and policy initiatives through these semi-governmental organizations. In present-day China, think tanks allow retired government officials to pursue a new phase in their careers, but they are also a crucial institutional meeting ground where officials, entrepreneurs, and scholars can interact. In addition, China's think tanks are becoming more transparent and operate with greater visibility than do other parts of the PRC government. In other ways, they play a crucial role in informing policy discourse and in proposing alternative courses of action for PRC policymakers.

Zhu Xufeng (2006) emphasized that with the broadening of reform, China's think tanks have also diversified their research interests. Emerging issues have caused think tanks to expand their scope of interest from macroeconomic issues to include other related topics. Second, think tanks can take part in the open policy debate and have started to hold differing viewpoints. Besides, government officials are paying more attention to the opinions proposed by civilian think tanks, especially those that have knowledge and experience in the field of international matters and relations.

China is still in the early stages of developing a network of think tanks that can engage in systematic and well-grounded research and that provide balanced and independent policy analysis for policymakers and the Chinese public on the one hand. On the other hand, the strong coalition among the prominent officials, business leaders, and well-known scholars might result in a "wicked coalition" that may influence government policy for their own benefit. Li Cheng (2009: 19) concludes,

In the large scheme of things, this development adds a new analytical wrinkle to the long-standing and complicated relationship between power, wealth and knowledge. Only time will tell whether these dramatic changes in the composition of Chinese think tanks will contribute to profound and positive development in elite politics—or whether this new confluence of political, economic and academic elites will spell trouble for China's near-term future.

Since the reform, the interactive wrestling among the Party and government, the central and local government, governmental institutes and think tanks, and Party leadership and public civilians has increased much, leading the Chinese reformation toward an unknown future. Consequently, such interactive wrestling is exerting influence toward redefining the new planning culture of China. What follows is an analysis of the planning structure of China, which brings us one step further in examining how such interactive tensions are reflected in the planning domain.

## § 6.2 Planning System

In general, Chinese planning systems are embedded in two types of institutional management. One is the system of macro-scale economic management, and the other is related to the physical construction of the spatial development. This dual-track institutional mechanism of management is guiding interactively the major direction of land-use policy, spatial planning, and urban development. Within these two systems, planning is organized hierarchically based on the scope and scale of planning objects geographically and administratively.

### § 6.2.1 Authorities Relating to Spatial Policy

On the national level, land and resources planning is an important part of the state planning system, through government macro control of the development and the utilization of resources to establish a policy on a harmonious and sustainable development. The basic national development policy for China is embodied in the Five-Year Plan (FYP) for National Economic and Social Development. This plan serves to outline the physical/geographical distribution of large-scale construction projects and centers of productivity as well as to decide how resources are to be portioned out to different sectors of the national economy. The plan also sets objectives and attempts to lay out a course for the national economy while the nation's revitalization and reconstruction are urgently needed in all fields.

Within this framework, two administrative systems under the Chinese State Council are responsible for the spatial plans at national and regional levels. One is responsible for national economic development. The Five-Year Plan (FYP) is approved by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (formerly the Chinese State Planning Commission, which was formed in 1952), which is responsible for drafting plan proposals and has a broad administrative and planning control over the Chinese economy. In addition, the National Development and Reform Commission's (NDRC) functions are to study and to formulate policies for economic and social development, to maintain the balance of economic development, and to guide the restructuring of China's economic system.

The other is within the ministerial system, such as the Chinese Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) (formerly the Ministry of Construction), which provides housing and regulates the state construction activities in the country, and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) which is responsible for the regulation, management, preservation, and exploitation of natural resources, such as land, mines, and oceans.

In general, since the establishment of the PRC, regarding the demands of the governmental management of the national economic development and the physical construction of spatial development, there are four types of formation based on either the collaboration or the demarcation between these two poles.

Before 1958, spatial plans at the national and regional levels were divided into two parts, based on the demarcation of the two systems. The State Planning Commission (SPC) (*Guo Jia Ji We*)<sup>150</sup> (the precursor of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)) had managed China's centrally planned economy since 1952 and was in charge of setting the planned economy guidelines, the regulations, and the approval of planning. The ministerial system (*Jian Gong Bu*)<sup>151</sup> was responsible for the supervision of the implementation. During this period, the division was based on the dual track system of macroeconomic management and physical construction. However, the physical construction of spatial development mainly served the economic development of the country based on the top-down blueprint of the economic plan (Zhao Shi Xiu 1999).

Since 1960, due to the economic stagnation of the entire country, spatial planning of the State Planning Commission (SPC) was centralized, while spatial development stagnated and was suspended.

In 1979, the Chinese State Administration of Urban Construction was established, and in 1982, it merged with the State Planning Commission (SPC). The Chinese Ministry of Construction was founded (the precursor of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)). After large-scale economic construction and house building began in 1978, problems appeared, such as the absence of an exact overview of land resources, fuzzy ownership, and the abusive occupation and illegal use of land. Meanwhile, contradictions among land and population, urban land, and agricultural land use became obvious.

The serious land problems had become a great obstacle for the development of the national economy and for social development. Strengthening land management was put on the agenda. In 1981, the Chinese State Council issued the Urgent Notice on Forbidding Invasion of Farm Land for Building Houses in Rural Areas, and in 1982, it released the Regulations on Land Management for House Building in Villages and Towns and the Regulations on Requisition of Land for State Construction to strengthen the

---

150 *Guo Jia Ji We* (simplified Chinese: 国家计委; traditional Chinese: 國家計委).

151 *Jian Gong Bu* (Chinese: 建工部).

management of land requisition. In 1982, the central government decided to set up the Chinese Land Management Bureau under the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery. The bureau exercises the power authorized by the Chinese State Council for national land management; however, the improvement is still imperfect because a unified land management system is missing, due to the lack of a coherent mechanism of land management and legislation. Therefore, overall reform is needed.

Since 1986, the state has implemented a series of major reform measures in land management<sup>152</sup>:

In March 1986, the central committee and the Chinese State Council issued a Notice of Strengthening Land Management and Forbidding Abused Occupation of Land, and based on this document, it emphasized the establishment of comprehensive measures to strengthen land management, especially noting the use of economic means to control the non-agricultural use of land.

In June 1986, the National People's Congress (NPC) promulgated the Law on Land Management of the People's Republic of China; and in December 1988, the National People's Congress (NPC) revised the Land Management Law. In April 1998, the Ninth National People's Congress (NPC) approved an overall revision of the Land Management Law. The revision of the approval system adopted the land use management system to strengthen the protection of non-urban land, especially farmland.

3. Also, in 1986, the National Land Management Bureau (NLMB) was established to manage national land and land institutions in cities and towns on a unified basis. The efforts resulted in a unified management system from central to local governments, and unified land management institutions at the county level and above were established. Land management branches and personnel were installed at the township level. A five-level land management network (state, provincial, prefecture (city), county, and township) was formed (Ding Chengri and Knaap 2003).

4. Reform of non-agricultural land use systems was carried out smoothly and steadily. Paid use of national land as well as the renting and transfer of land use rights were initiated in accordance with international practice.

5. In July 1995, the National Land Management Bureau (NLMB) promulgated the Provisional Regulations on Land Supervision, which provided land management departments with legal protection to enforce land supervision. In June 1996, China invited, for the first time, twenty-one special national land inspectors to strengthen enforcement of land supervision and to help establish a social supervision mechanism for land management.

6. In April 1998, the Chinese State Council revamped its structure and combined the National Land Management Bureau (NLMB), the Geological and Mineral Ministry, the National Ocean Bureau, and the National Survey Bureau into the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). This was a major reform of national land resource management. It symbolized that China had begun a unified management of national land resources from land to underground, from continent to ocean. It was also an important step in the management of China's natural resources.

In 1998, the State Planning Commission (SPC) was renamed the Chinese State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), which then merged with the State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System (SCORES) and became part of the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) in 2003. Since then, the organization further shifted its policy from a planned economy to a socialist market economy. The restructured organization merged into a newly created National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2003, which gained greater responsibility and power in overseeing China's economic development.

However, the major workload of regulating urban development and planning had shifted to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). The dual-track system between macroeconomic management and physical construction was reestablished, different from the first Five-Year plan (FYP). Broader reform reflected a desire to keep abreast of the shift in focus toward the establishment of a market economy. It also proved that the reforms and paradigm shifts in the systems of government in China were inevitable. As of the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) in 2003, the government replaced the Chinese term corresponding with the English "plan" with the equivalent to "guidelines"

The abovementioned three major state departments<sup>153</sup> are influential in guiding the economic-spatial planning and development of the state, and their functions are clearly prescribed by the Chinese State Council.

#### *National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)*

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is one of the most powerful governmental agencies under the Chinese State Council. In terms of planning formation, it is the responsibility of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to draw up Five-Year Plans (FYPs). It seeks input from all relevant ministries and organizations of the Chinese State Council. The latter can, in turn, solicit information from provincial and lower-level governments if necessary. There should be two components in the proposals submitted by each ministry or organization, one requiring central government action and financing (to be included in its budget) and the remainder to be left to provincial governments—which, in turn, need to coordinate and direct local governments under their jurisdiction—or to market forces (Tang 2004).

According to the prescription of the Chinese State Council, the main functions are as follows.<sup>154</sup>

From an economic perspective, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is responsible for formulating and monitoring macroeconomic and social development by providing strategies for economic measures, such as the formulation of fiscal, monetary, and land policies. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is also responsible for coordinating the restructuring of the economic system and for formulating regulatory targets, such as drafting the layout of key construction projects. In addition, from the perspective of planning regulation, it is responsible for carrying out research and analysis of the domestic and international economic situation by providing a draft of plans and relevant laws and regulations concerning national economic and social development.

They have two main tasks: To provide, formulate, and coordinate economic factors that can contribute to the overall economic strategy as well as to organize, draft, analyze, and study the relevant laws, plans, and regulations to underpin the implementation of

---

153 Here refers to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR).

154 See more information on the official website of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/default.htm>.

the economic and social developments. In accordance with relevant regulations of the Chinese State Council, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is also responsible for the administration of the Chinese State Grain Administration and the National Energy Administration.

### *The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)*

The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) is responsible for drafting policies, laws, and development plans related to city, village, and town planning and construction, the building industry, and municipal works. In the Chinese State Council's 2007-2008 round of reorganization, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) was created from the older Ministry of Construction (MOC). Since the mid-1990s, the MOC/ MOHURD has had three broad issues to tackle.

First, the central government has used the building of infrastructure projects as a mechanism to keep the Chinese economy growing. Thus, the construction industry has been a recipient of significant funds from the central government throughout both the ninth Five-Year Plan 1996-2000 and the tenth Five-Year Plan 2001-2005. The Ministry of Construction (MOC) manages competition for these funds and oversees many of the projects, which include urban planning and infrastructure development, improvement in water supply and wastewater treatment facilities, and the expansion of public transport.

Second, the MOC/ MOHURD has helped to privatize the national public housing system as China transitions into an economy where families own their own houses. In view of the increasing liberalization of the property sector, the MOC/MOHURD must manage construction in the real estate market, the displacement of low-income families because of new construction, and the resulting shortfall in affordable housing.

Third, the MOC/MOHURD has been plagued in recent years by a series of construction-related incidents, such as the collapse of bridges, dams, and buildings. Many of the problems stem from lack of oversight, corruption in the issuance of construction licenses, the use of inferior materials, poorly trained construction workers, the insufficient enforcement of standards, and local officials' unwillingness to cooperate.

In response, ministry officials have introduced new inspection procedures, issued more standards on construction materials and building codes, and established a national program to train project owners, engineers, managers, and technicians. They have set national standards for construction projects and have overseen market access, project bidding, and quality and safety supervision. This includes preparing plans for scientific and technological development and technical economic policies for related industries. Due to the booming housing market and serious problems arising from the imbalanced

housing provision, it tries to increase control of the housing sector by directing housing construction, overseeing the reform of the urban housing system, and managing the real estate industry. In addition, there is a strong focus on methods of economic appraisal for project feasibility studies, economic parameters, land-use targets, and the cost management of construction projects. Special attention is given to develop sustainability in public facilities, such as the use of underground urban water and space; the work related to fuel, heat, municipal facilities, public transit, gardens, and urban greening, landscaping, and environmental sanitation; and national scenic spots and historic cities.

#### *The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR)*

The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) was established in 1998 as part of the restructuring of the Chinese State Council. On the basis of the Scheme for the Organizational Reform of the State Council approved by the first meeting of the 9th National Party Congress and the Notice of the Organizational Setup issued by the Chinese State Council, the former Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources, the State Land Administration, the State Oceanic Administration, and the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping merged to form the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), a department of the State Council responsible for the planning, administration, protection, and rational utilization of land, mineral, and marine resources. The Chinese State Oceanic Administration and the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping are state bureaus under the administration of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR).

The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) is responsible for land reform regulations, such as developing and implementing regulations for the assignment, lease, evaluation, transfer, and governmental purchase of land use rights; for working out a catalogue guide for the allocation of land use rights for state-owned land and measures for land utilization by villages and townships; and for administering the transfer of the use right of non-agricultural land owned by rural collectives. Within this framework, it works to administer the evaluation of land prices (benchmark and standard land prices), to validate the qualification of the land evaluation and appraisal agencies, to confirm land-use prices, and to examine and submit applications for land use that require the approval of the Chinese State Council, as prescribed by law.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) is in charge of the supervision and examination of the approval, registration, and licensing of the rights of mining mineral resources and the transfer of rights according to relevant provisions of the collection and use of mineral resources compensation; the examination and validation of the qualifications of the institutions that are responsible for the evaluation and



examination of exploration rights and mining rights; and the confirmation of the results of evaluation and estimation.<sup>155</sup>

To a certain degree, in comparison with the earlier stage of reformation, the restructuring of the planning administration is progressive. The major tasks among the three departments are becoming well divided and defined. Urbanization and sustainable environmental issues are becoming more and more critical in China, as in the global society in general. Certain subjects are highlighted and included in major national missions that demand more collaborative and cross-department reinforcement. This requires more responsive and reflexive mechanisms of the administrative system (Table 6.6).

Ministry/Committee	Department in Charge	Functions of Urban Planning
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)	Department of Development Planning and Department of Regional Economy	To draft a comprehensive plan and a yearly plan of the national economy and social development, including long-term and mid-term plans; To decide on important national projects; To decide on the plan for the national distribution of productivity.
Ministry of Land and Resources	Department of Planning	To draft the national land use plan; To frame the drafting methods of land use plans; To supervise and approve land use master plans and other thematic plans of provinces, autonomous regions and some big cities.
The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)	Department of Urban and Rural Planning	To frame the drafting methods of urban planning, and town and village planning; To supervise and approve towns system plans of provinces, autonomous regions, and some big cities; To supervise and approve plans of important national parks.

*Table 6.6 Functions of Urban Land Use Planning and control in three main central government sectors*  
Source: Han, Haoying and Nishimura (2006). Revised by author.

## § 6.2.2 Legal System and Administrative System of Planning

According to the Organizing Law of All Levels of Local People's Congresses and Local Governments in 1979, the Chinese Constitution in 1982 (Chiu Huangdah 1985), and the Chinese Legislation Law in 2000 (Paler 2005), the legal system of China has three levels: 1) the Chinese Constitution and all the laws based on it; 2) the administrative ordinances promulgated by the State Council; and 3) the local ordinances promulgated by the local congresses, the local regulations issued by the local governments, and the sectional regulations issued by the ministries and committees of the State Council. The Chinese Legislation System has given the government sector comprehensive power of legislation, and it gave the State Council administrative legislative power superior to local regulations (ordinances) (Figure 6.2) (Paler 2005; Han Haoying and Nishimura 2006).




Figure 6.2 Legal System of China  
Source: Han Haoying and Nishimura (2006, Figure 4)

Chinese written laws use a number of terms to define the scope of application and the level of authority of enactment. Terms include law (*Fa*), regulations or provisions (*Tiaoli*), rules (*Guize*), detailed rules (*Xize*), methods or measures (*Banfa*), decisions (*Jueding*), resolutions (*Jueyi*, *Guiding*), and orders (*Mingling*). Prior to the open-door policy, the publication of China's laws was irregular, and often, the use of the various terms was confused and sometimes overlapping. The Chinese State Council has taken

steps to emphasize that the terms should be used properly in order to reflect the level of authority and the scope of enactment.<sup>156</sup>

A law (*Fa*) is a statute that has been enacted by the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) or its standing committee. Regulations or ordinances (*Tiaoli*), also translated, as "provisions" or "measures," are administrative rules that are designated to implement a law or policy and are usually issued by the Chinese State Council. "Regulations" or "ordinances" are issued by the Local People's Congress to designate implementation of a local law.

Within this framework of legislation, a set of rules (*Guize*) or detailed rules (*Xize*) is used to give specific interpretations or explanations of a law or regulation. Methods or measures (*Banfa*) are rules or regulations that are more detailed in order to address an issue of limited scope.

Decisions (*Jueding*) and resolutions (*Jueyi*, *Guiding*) have little prescriptive legislative value but record common concerns and opinions expressed at a particular meeting or forum. An order (*Mingling*) refers to a proclamation issued by a state organization that is intended to prescribe legal standards (Table 6.7).

Classification	Item	Legislation Institution	Promulgator
Law	Fa	National People's Congress	President
Administrative Ordinances	Tiaoli, Guiding, Banfa	State Council	Prime Minister
Sectional Regulation	Guiding, Banfa	Ministries and Committees of the State Council	Minister
Local Ordinances	Tiaoli, Guiding, Banfa	Local People's Congress of Provincial Level and of Big Municipalities	Local People's Congress of Provincial Level and of Big Municipalities
Local Regulation	Guiding, Banfa	Local People's Government of Provincial Level and of Big Municipalities	Provincial or Municipal Governor

*Table 6.7 Instruments of legislation*  
Source: Han, Haoying, and Nishimura (2006, Table 2).

156

See Chinese Legislation Law (National People's Congress PRC 2000), Organizing Law of All Levels of Local People's Congress and Local Government (National People's Congress PRC 1979), and Management Method for the Document of State Government (State Council 2001).

The promulgation and implementation of the Urban Planning Law in 1990 was a major milestone in planning legislation. Since its enactment, China has gradually come up with a working system of urban planning administration and technical regulation.

The new Urban and Rural Planning Law<sup>51</sup>, which emphasized the integration of urban and rural areas, was promulgated in 2007. A series of related planning laws were also issued to form a multilevel and comprehensive system of laws and regulations along with the Urban and Rural Planning Law<sup>51</sup>.

Compared with the original Urban Planning Law of 1990, the new legislation was a profound change. The act describes distinctly that urban and rural planning is an important public policy for government to guide and to control the legality of urban-rural construction and development, which means the legality of planning management (administrative management procedure, law accountability in urban planning) and planning implementation (supervision of planning and modification of planning). Urban and rural planning became an integrated system. It emphasized strengthening the supervision of the people's congress. The new law set specific regulations to discourage local officials from blind enlargement of city scales. On the other hand, the new law also clearly stated that local authorities are not allowed to make any random amendment or alteration to the legal procedures concerning urban-rural planning. All plans that have already been announced, except for those related to national security, should be accessible to all people and organizations in the country.

Based on the Urban Planning Law, the urban master plan should use national economic development planning as a foundation, and it should link to the general land-use planning. The urban master plan is to be limited by land supply and has to cooperate with land use planning for urban spatial development. The scale of urban development is defined by the urban master plan and must be based on the national land allocation index. In the past, land-use planning and urban spatial planning did not have a clear relationship; urban planning breaking through the land supply index was very common (Liu Yun et al. 2008).

As stipulated in the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the legal system of urban planning is divided into two sub-systems: vertical and horizontal. The vertical system is a four-tier system of planning laws, ordinances, regulations, and directives issued by different levels of authority (Table 6.8).

Four Tiers of Planning Laws and Regulations	Issued by
National Laws	National People's Congress
National Administrative Ordinances	State Council
Local Ordinances and Regulations	Provincial Authorities
Local Regulations and Directives	Municipal Authorities

*Table 6.8 Vertical system of legal system of urban planning*  
Source: Derived from *Urban and Rural Planning Law* and constructed by author.

Horizontally, the system consists of principal act, subsidiary legislation, and other relevant laws (Table 6.9).

Principal Act	Urban and Rural Planning Law
Subsidiary Legislation	Guidelines for making City Plans
	Regulations on Assignment and Transfer of Land
	Use Right on State-owned Land in the Urban areas
	Various Technical Standards and Norms
Other Related Laws	Land Administration law, Environmental Protection Law, Water Law, Construction Law etc.

*Table 6.9 Horizontal system of legal system of urban planning*  
Source: Derived from *Urban and Rural Planning Law* and constructed by author.

As stipulated by the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the competent administration (presently, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)) under the Chinese State Council is responsible for the organization of formulating planning for national cities and towns; the provincial government or the government of an autonomous region is responsible for the organization of formulating planning for local cities and towns; and the city government is responsible for the organization of formulating planning for the city. In generally the framework of the present urban planning administration is shown in Table 6.10.

Administrative hierarchies	Relevant authorities
National Level	Ministry of Housing, Urban and Rural Development (MOHURD)
Provincial Level	Construction Administrations/Commissions, Planning Bureau
City and County Level	Planning Bureaus

*Table 6.10 Framework of the urban planning administration*  
Source: Tang Kai (2004). Constructed by author.

All cities are required to compile Statutory Plans, the fundamental and most important city plans specified in the Urban and Rural Planning Law. The Chinese Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) is in charge of planning administration at the national level. The provincial construction administrations/ commissions and planning bureaus are in charge of planning administration at provincial levels. The municipal and county planning bureaus are in charge of planning administration at local levels (Table 6.11 and Figure 6.3).

Administrative hierarchies	Relevant authorities
National Level	Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)
Provincial Level	Construction Administrations / Commissions, Planning Bureau
City and County Level	Planning Bureaus

Table 6.11 Hierarchy of planning authorities and administrations Source: Derived from Urban and Rural Planning Law and constructed by author.




Figure 6.3 The framework of the present urban planning administration Source: Tang Kai (2004: 4).

In view of the increasingly complex and diverse conditions of spatial development, the sector administrations of urban planning and design as well as the market administration of planning and design are responsible for much broader and diverse administrative functions such as the formulation of relevant regulations and policies, qualification checks, approval and annual checks, qualification recognition of registered planners, and administration of the registration (Tang Kai 2004). However, the work cannot be completed and realized by governmental administrative sectors alone; in addition, China has established a qualification certificate of urban planning and design.

Individual planners should be registered by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) by passing a registration exam to become registered planners. However, they are not allowed to perform planning services on an individual basis but may join a qualified planning-services provider to do so. A planning-service provider should be qualified by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) to obtain a certificate that specifies requirements on its plan-making activities, including numbers of registered planners and other professionals. Within this framework, since the structural reform of the Chinese State Council in 1998, detailed work, such as qualification checks of planning-formulating units, annual checks, and appraisals of good performance, have been shifted to the Chinese Society of Urban Planning. The qualification recognition of registered planners and the registration administration have been shifted to non-governmental institutions specifically for registration (Tang Kai 2004).

There are nearly 2,000 institutions that have access to the urban planning and design market. Individual planners and designers also have to obtain qualifications at institutions, most of which have design personnel who are engaged in urban planning. The new legal and administrative and registration mechanism provides much broader access to participants' involvements in urban planning practice. Therefore, setting up the formulation and approval of implementation of urban planning is a crucial element. In general, the formulation of urban planning is still hierarchical, from the top down.

### § 6.2.3 System of Plans

---

Within the framework of the administrative system of planning and its legal status, there are three major components of systems and plans, related to China's spatial planning policies.

The basic national socio-economic development policy for China is embodied in the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), which are drafted at the national, provincial, and county levels. The second component is land use (spatial) plans, which are drafted at the national, provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels. The last component is urban and rural plans, which are drafted at the national, provincial, prefectural, and county levels (Table 6.12).

System of plans	Authorities
The Five-Year Plans	National Development and Reform Commission
Land Use Plans	Ministry of Land and Resources
Urban and Rural Plans	Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development

Table 6.12 Plans and responsible authorities

Source: Constructed by author.

### Five-Year Plans (FYPs)

China's policy process is not known for surprises but rather reflects the demands and evolution of a socialistic society and its economic development. Embedded in democratic centralism, Chinese policy prefers a predictable and steady regulatory environment conducive to meeting its long-term development goals. China's Five-Year Plan (FYP) for National Economic and Social Development is a critically important tool used by the government to achieve its development objectives by mapping out in five-year cycles the country's future progress via guidelines, policy frameworks, and targets for policy makers at all levels of government. Five-Year Plans (FYPs) provide economic guidance and indicate China's major political maneuvers.

A Five-Year Plan (FYP) is a key characteristic of centralized, communist economies, and one plan established for the entire country normally contains detailed economic development guidelines for all its regions. Although most consider the Five-Year Plan (FYP) to be a single document, it represents a complex web of Chinese policy-making, containing previously implemented regional and long-term development plans and hundreds of targeted policy initiatives, all of which undergo constant review and revision during the course of the five-year cycle. Although this process might seem rather chaotic and mysterious, since the reformation, the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) process is increasingly standardized, open, and under the oversight of a wider and more transparent bureaucratic framework.

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, there was an economic recovery period until 1952. Starting in 1953, the mechanism of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) was implemented. Except for a two-year hiatus for economic adjustment in 1963-1965<sup>157</sup>, the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) have been continuous (Table 6.13).

157

Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the 1960 nationwide famine, the Chinese leaders emphasized four guidelines in the three years (1963-1965) of the readjustment period. The four guidelines in this period referred to adjustment, consolidation, enrichment and elevation (rising standards). See Liou, Kuotsai Tom (1998:11).



Five-Year Plan		Key feature	Leadership
First	1953-57	Stalinist Central Plan	Mao Zedong
Second	1958-62	Great Leap Forward	Mao Zedong
	1963-65	Economic Readjustment	Mao Zedong
Third	1966-70	Agricultural Push	Mao Zedong
Fourth	1971-75	Cultural Revolution	Mao Zedong
Fifth	1976-80	Post-Mao, Reforms and Opening Up	Hua Guofeng (Chairman), Deng Xiaoping (Paramount leader).
Sixth	1981-85	Readjustment and Recovery	Hu Yaobang (Chairman), Deng Xiaoping (Paramount leader).
Seventh	1986-90	Socialism with Chinese Characteristics	Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin (Chairman), Deng Xiaoping (Paramount leader).
Eighth	1991-95	Technical Development	Jiang Zemin (Chairman), Deng Xiaoping (Paramount leader).
Ninth	1996-00	SOE Reform	Jiang Zemin
Tenth	2001-05	Strategic Restructuring	Hu Jintao
Eleventh	2006-10	Rebalancing Alert	Hu Jintao
Twelfth	2011-15	Pro-Consumption	

*Table 6.13 Key features of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs)*

Source: *about.com* and *China.org.cn*. Edited and constructed by author.

In summarizing the highlights of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), we noticed that the economy of China is developed based on a rapid and sustained economic growth. The major economic growth is directly reflecting the evolutionary progression of society. Not only does it show the demands of Chinese society for the future, but also it responds to dynamically to global development.

Before the reform of 1978, the first four Five-Year Plans (FYPs) emphasized the laying of a preliminary foundation for socialist industrialization. For two decades, even though the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward plus natural calamities severely affected the development of the national economy, a policy of readjusting, consolidating, filling in, and raising standards for the national economy was permanently adopted by the Chinese government to ensure that China's economic construction stayed on track.

The fifth and sixth Five-Year Plans (FYPs) (1976-1980 and 1981-1985) established Chinese socialist modernization through a policy of revitalizing the domestic economy and opening up to the outside world. A fresh situation appeared in economic development through the introduction of economic construction by increasing efficiency.

The institution of the Household Responsibility System (HRS)<sup>158</sup> for farming and the rise of quasi-private township and village enterprises created unprecedented growth and capital accumulation in China's rural sector. During this period, the central government for the first time opened China's economy to foreign direct investment. Beginning in 1980, Special Economic Zones were created in southern coastal areas, where it was legal for foreign companies to invest in export-producing joint ventures using local Chinese labor.

In addition, the sixth Five-Year Plan (FYP) included massive investment in energy conservation, with funds equal to about ten percent of the energy supply investment for energy conservation projects. The major policies included restructuring energy-intensive industries; reducing the direct burning of oil; increasing equipment and process efficiency with technology; eliminating the most inefficient equipment and production processes; issuing energy consumption standards for energy-intensive products; using a system of rewards and penalties to encourage energy-conservation activities; providing low-interest loans for some energy conservation projects; and supporting research and development in energy-conservation technologies. These two periods marked the transition away from the Soviet-style command economy.

The seventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1986-1990) continued to carry out the reform of Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) designed mainly to establish a modern entrepreneurial system and progressed steadily. Reform of social security, housing, education, and science, and technology also made new strides.

Pushing by Deng Xiaoping's south tour, the eighth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1991-1995) marked a period of high-speed economic development with little fluctuation. The central government put forward the basic policy of "seizing the opportunity to deepen the reform and open wider to the outside world". As a result, the national economy maintained a rapid and sustained development while inflation was brought under effective control. On the other hand, the state increased its investment in infrastructure and basic industries and established new development mechanisms for these industries through reform. This ensured a sustained, rapid, and sound development of the national economy to stimulate growing foreign trade. During the eighth Five-Year Plan (FYP), China's foreign trade expanded considerably, and it managed to become one of the ten major export countries in the world.

There were significant achievements of the new financial system with tax decentralization at its core, and the new tax system with a value added tax as its main component was set up. Policy finance and commercial finance were gradually separated. A macro regulating system emerged, and the market started to play a major role in resource allocation. More than 1,100 cities at the country level were opened to the outside world; 13 bonded zones<sup>159</sup> and other Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established.

In the two decades after the initiation of reform and opening-up, China's economy underwent a fundamental change from a planned economy to a market economy. The economic strength of the country was increased. The standard of living of the people improved gradually. The annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) was about 10 percent, and the target of quadrupling the annual industrial and agricultural output value of 1980 by the end of the century was fulfilled ahead of schedule. In 1996, China worked out the outline of the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1996-2000) for National Economy and Social Development and the Long-range Objectives through the Year 2010. Through national engineering efforts, new achievements were made in reform, open-door policy, and modernization.

However, following the boost of economic performance, the central government recognized and was challenged by two aspects of risk. The financial risk occurred as a result of the overdraft of public expenditure, which had swallowed nearly all of the capital reserve of the state banks. In addition, the social-political risk was recognized due to the local government's pursuing urban development by taking massive lands from the farmers. This became a major source of social conflicts. Thus, to obtain macro-control, China's economy initiated a "soft landing"<sup>160</sup>. This was a sign that China's economy had entered a period of sound operation and thus laid a solid foundation for the fulfillment of the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP). In 1997, adhering to the principle of "seeking progress in the midst of stability" and macro control policies, China continued to develop at a moderately high speed.

- 
- 159 Besides the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), there are a variety of bonded areas throughout China: trade zones (FTZs), export processing zones (EPZs), bonded logistic parks (BLPs), bonded ports (BPs), and comprehensive bonded zones (CBZs). All of these areas are under the special supervision of the Chinese customs authorities and are called customs specially supervised areas (CSSAs). Each type of CSSA featured different business activities, and there are substantial regulatory differences from customs, tax, and foreign exchange perspectives. See Pfaar and Wang Xiaodan (2011).
- 160 Jiang Zeming and Zhu Rongji, as the core of the third generation of collective leadership, were forced to take action and to launch three-year macro control under the name of "soft landing", and they fought back with the political slogan, "stability is the top and top priority".

The fifteenth National Party Congress in 1997 saw a breakthrough in terms of state property ownership reform. The restructuring had three primary components. First, the state-owned economy's scale was reduced through privatization, and state capital was withdrawn from key branches of the economy. In addition, various methods for accelerating productivity and development through public ownership were sought. In addition, the National Party Congress declared an important part of a socialist market economy by encouraging the development of individual and private enterprises. Within this framework, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) changed from a structure-based system with complete capital control by the state to an enterprise system based on diversified shareholding (Wu Jiannan and Ma Liang 2009).

The Second Plenary Session of the Fifteenth National People's Congress (NPC) was held in March 1999. The session stressed that 1999 was a crucial year for achieving the objective of getting most of the large and medium-sized State-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating at a loss out of their plights and accomplishing the initial steps in the establishment of a modern enterprise system in most of the large and medium-sized State-owned enterprises (SOEs). In 1999, governments at all levels put a stop to redundant development and quickened the pace of industrial restructuring and reorganization; continued to guarantee the basic needs of workers laid off from State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and helped them to find new jobs; promoted the separation of the functions of the government from those of the enterprises; improved the supervisory system and consolidated and improved the leadership of enterprises. China continued to relax control over and invigorate small State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in various ways<sup>161</sup>.

The 1982 Chinese Constitution recognized two kinds of land ownership: urban land is the property of the state, and rural land is collectively owned by villagers. With additional amendments, the 1998 Chinese Constitution was the first national document that legalized the separation of land ownership from land use rights. It also allowed for the transfer of land use rights. The Chinese State Council passed the regulation of urban land use rights in 1988 and enacted the regulation in 1990. The 1988 Chinese Constitution and regulation laid the foundation for the land policy in the post-reform era. Although there is still no privately owned land in China today, a land market has been created, and land-use rights entered the market under the policy of separation of use rights from ownership. Land became a main source of profit for real

---

161

See Chapter 5.3 Economic Reform.

estate companies, villages, individual farmers, and government of all levels. These interest groups thus emerged with the rebirth of land as a market force in China.<sup>162</sup>

During the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1996-2000), China's information industry emerged as a new growth area for national economic development, becoming the principal part of a hi-tech industry and the representative of new productivity. The information industry not only exerted significant influence on Chinese people's daily lives but also became an important indication of China's comprehensive national strength. It promises to be a strategic industry for China's economic and social development in the near future. China's information industry not only made its contribution to the national economy and played its role in promoting other industries but also became a strategic industry in boosting the readjustment of China's economic structure. It marked China's entrance in the global informational society.

The tenth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2001-2005) continued to elaborate goals for the sustainable economic and social development of China. The significance of this plan lies in the Energy Conservation and Resources Comprehensive Utilization, formulated to thoroughly implement and carry out energy conservation, reduction of the consumption of energy, and the comprehensive utilization of resources. It also promoted a shift in the mode of economic growth and sustained economic development. Energy objectives focused on the development of clean burning, renewable and efficient technologies. It elaborated certain means, including clean fuel demonstration projects, energy efficiency standards, a labeling/identification system, efficiency incentives, and the introduction of the "Energy Conservation Publicity Week". The period is divided into the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) period, 2006 till 2010, and the period from 2010 to 2020. The energy conservation objectives and the focus on development by 2010 are planned, whereas the objectives for 2020 are proposed. In its "alternative to oil strategy," part of the Five-Year Plan (FYP), Beijing called for a doubling of renewable energy generation to fifteen percent of the country's needs by 2020, including major increases in wind power and biomass use.

Almost immediately after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao ascended, they began to distinguish themselves from Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji by introducing the notion of "putting people first". The Hu-Wen team also cultivates a more open and consultative image, one that has been conducive to the incorporation of different views into the plan as well.

The eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2006-2010) was a major policy shift for the Chinese government, as it moved away from a focus on “growth at any cost” toward a pattern of a more balanced and sustainable growth, under the policy framework of the “harmonious society” and the “scientific development concept”. For example, the shift from economic planning (jihua) to urban planning (guihua) is symbolic because the former connotes a central planning mode of administration, whereas the latter has a more open tone (Fan 2006).

Besides, the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2006-2010) had the heavy responsibility of combating corruption and building a clean government with the trust of the Party and the people. During the past three decades of reform and open-door policy, facing complicated and changeable international surroundings and difficult and onerous domestic tasks, the central government embarked on a new path to build an honest government and combat corruption. New missions lay ahead, and China announced the establishment of a scientific, history-based decision to fight government corruption by improving publication and further promoting Party integrity<sup>163</sup>.

In October 2010, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee approved the guiding principles of China’s twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) for National Economic and Social Development (2011-2015), ratified by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2011. The government sought to focus on “inclusive growth”, which means ensuring the benefits of economic growth are spread to most Chinese citizens. The key themes are balancing the economy, ameliorating social inequality, and protecting the environment.

However, the recently enacted twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2011-2015) is, first and foremost, a strategic framework aimed at changing the economy’s remarkably successful growth structure of the past 40 years. Even though it is expected to pick up where the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) left off in terms of broad policy direction, its environment is markedly different, internally and externally: The global financial crisis, rising property prices, and increased risk of social instability are all salient issues in China that will be dealt with by this plan in the coming five years.

---

163

In order to avoid corruption, “in 2009, the discipline inspection and supervision organs at various levels will carry out supervision and inspection around the most important objective of enhancing scientific development through maintaining a stable and rapid economic growth and preventing excessive rises and falls as well as around the implementation condition of the Central Government’s policies and measures.” Xinhua News Net Time, February 15, 2009.

According to Roach (2011: 9),

China's twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) stands to be a major milestone on the road to its development and widening prosperity. It sets the stage for the long-awaited transformation of a production-led economy into one that provides greater sustenance for its 1.3 billion consumers. This is hardly a shocking outcome for any developing economy—let alone, China. After all, there is a reason why this nation is called the People's Republic of China (...) While absolutely essential in order to take the Chinese economy to the next stage; a pro-consumption model also introduces new and important tactical challenges. The key will be for China to strike the right balance between strategy and tactics. The stakes are enormous—for China and for the broader global economy.

Learning from the development of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), I would like to emphasize that for more than 60 years of modern China's development, much time has been spent on carrying out various economic reforms: from original class struggles to system reform and developing a market system while maintaining a system of public ownership and a planned economy, and then going on to a complete transformation to a market economy. Simultaneously, the fifth Five-Year Plan (FYP) of the late 1970s ushered reform and open doors, and the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) of the mid-1990s set the stage for an historic ownership transition leading to an era of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform and the corporatization of China's increasingly market-oriented economy. To sum up, property rights reform, market reform, enterprise reform, and reform of the political system, working together, unleashed vitality in the national economy, and led to an average growth rate of close to 10 percent per year for the past 30 years. The rapid pace of development allowed China to become the world's third-largest economy.

China's economic reforms have already been wading into deep waters. There will undoubtedly be bumps in the road. However, now there is no turning back, and there is a reason to expect that more practical and effective reform plans will push the country further forward. It can be done not only economically but also spatially; it will all, hopefully, continue to modernize the country.

The timeline of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) gives us an overview of the evolutionary political-societal-economic context of China. The second background for the spatial planning system is given below in the introduction of the two major systems of spatial plans in urban China: the land use (spatial) plans and the urban and rural plans. It shows how the political-socio-economic guidance is realized within the legal planning framework.

## *Land-use Planning*

Land-use planning is a part of the National Land and Resources Planning, which is an important part of the Chinese state planning system. National Land and Resources Planning is an aggregate of various kinds of land and resources planning, and it is used by the government for macro control and development and utilization of resources. In the reform era, the focus of the planning system has shifted to emphasizing the realization of a well-off development. The function of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) is the planning, management, protection, and reasonable utilization of natural resources, such as land, ocean, and mines. Newly introduced measures included land planning, land utilization planning, mine resources planning, ocean resources planning, and biologic resources planning.

Concerning current socio-economic development, the nature of land planning is land development and renovation of an entire nation or a certain scope of areas stipulated according to general strategic directions and objectives of national social economy development balanced with natural, economic, social, and scientific and technological conditions of planning areas.

As mentioned before, real land-use planning in China began in 1986, when the National Land Management Bureau was established and the Land Management Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated, and it has been in place now for more than twenty years. Different phases of land-use planning have been carried out since the founding of the PRC (Cai Ymei et al. 2009). Although land-use planning began late in China, and its theories and methods have not yet been fully developed, the different phases have in practice achieved great progress due to a constant trial and error, studying, and learning from mistakes.

The first stage was an exploration phase before 1986 when land-use planning focused on cultivation systems, land improvement, fertilizer increase, and irrigation. The applied theories and methods were copied from the Soviet Union and focused on agricultural land-use planning.

The second stage began with the enactment of the Land Management Law in 1986 at the beginning of the reformation. It still had service-oriented characteristics under a socialistic planned economy. Although it was an ineffective piece of legislation, it laid the foundation for land-use planning in China under a five-level land-use system and a three-level structure of land-use planning. During this period, the land-use plans of the country, all provinces and most cities, counties, and towns were compiled (Cai Ymei et al. 2009).



In 1996, the second round of land-use planning was undertaken according to the requirements of the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) and the Long-term Targets for the Year 2010 to meet the demands of establishing a socialistic market economy and to meet the demands of socialistic modernization. This planning established the land-use mode of “index with zoning,” promulgated the regulations and processes related to the making of plans and published the examination and approval methods for land-use plans<sup>164</sup> (Pan Wecan 2004).

The new round of land-use planning began after the 16th congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (2002-2006) put forward the goal of “building an all-round, well-off society”. The third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) put forth the Several Issues of Improving Socialist Market Economy System and established the concept of comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development. Under the guidance of “government organizing, expert-led planning, sectorial cooperation, public participation and scientific decision making”, the focus was on enhancing the application of intensive usage of land by introducing GIS technology in plan-making and management, coordination principles of regional land-use policy, and a land-use planning index system (Cai Ymei et al. 2009).

China’s land-use planning progression is recognized: the three-structure, Land Use Master Plan, Sector-specific Land Use Plan (including land coordination and reclamation, protection planning of basic farmland), and Detailed Land Use Plan. In terms of national and regional plans, Overall Land Use Plans are drafted to address the entire country as well as individual provincial regions. These plans are mandatory in the Land Management Law. Overall Land Use Plans dictate the general allocation of land resources, and serve as strategic guidelines for the development, use, improvement, and conservation of land resources (Figure 6.4).

---

164

In 1998, the Chinese Minister of Land and Resources (MLR) was established, with land planning as one of its important functions. To promote the practice, the Chinese government established trial land-planning organizations in many provinces, cities, and municipalities, such as Tianjin, Shenzhen, Liaoning, and Xinjiang.




Figure 6.4 Five levels of Land Use Master Plan  
 Source: Han Haoying and Nishimura (2006), Figure 5.

In addition, the highest level of the National Land and Resources Planning is land-use planning, and different natural resources planning systems, such as general planning of land utilization, mine resources planning, and ocean planning are included as well.

To make land-use planning more scientific and normative, abundant guidance and measures have been published and compiled, such as the Key Points of Land-Use Master Plan Compilation at Provincial Level and the Key Points of Land Use Master Plan Compilation at County Level, Regulations on Land Use Master Plan Compilation at County Level, and Technical Guidelines of Environmental Impact Assessment of Land Use Master Plan Compilation at Provincial Level (Cai Ymei et al. 2009).

To guarantee the implementation of land-use planning, there is a system of rules, policy suggestions related to planning management, examination and approval of management, and a series of documents: the Regulations on Examination and Approval of Land-use Planning, the Measures for Examination of Land-use Planning at

Provincial Level, the Notice on Strengthening Management of Recording the Land-use Planning Files and Outcomes, and the Opinions about Implementation Management of Land-use Planning.

China's land-use planning was established gradually during several decades. Scholars and governments have studied its problems of systems and management (Pan Wencan 2004; Han Haoying et al. 2006), perspectives of legality and rights in land expropriation (Ding Chengri and Knaap 2003; Zhao Min and Wu Zhicheng 2005), and land reformation of urban-rural interrelations and urban planning (Zhu Jieming et al. 2007 and Cai Ymei et al. 2009). To implement scientific development and to improve the methods and apply suitable theories of land-use planning for Chinese society, it is crucial to elaborate on the tools and systems that support land compilation, examination, approval, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

### *Urban and Rural Plans*

The third component is urban and rural plans. The Urban and Rural Planning Law of the PRC was adopted at the thirtieth meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress (NPC) on October 28, 2007, and came into force in 2008; it replaced the Urban Planning Law<sup>165</sup>. Previously, urban and rural areas were governed by different laws. The Urban Planning Law governed urban areas and the Administrative Regulation on Country and township Construction Plans governed rural areas. The new Urban and Rural Planning Law ushered an era of integrated urban and rural planning. According to Article one, "This Law is formulated for the purpose of strengthening urban and rural planning administration, harmonizing urban and rural spatial layout, improving people's living environment and promoting the integrated, harmonious and sustainable development of urban and rural society and economy."

According to Article two, "Making and implementing urban and rural planning as well as conducting construction activities in planning areas shall be governed by this Law. (...) The term 'planning area' as mentioned in the Law refers to the built-up areas of cities, towns and villages as well as areas that must be under planning control for urban and rural construction and development."

The statutory plan-making system is compatible with a top-down administrative system. It has defined “planning area” as a built-up area of cities, towns, and villages as well as areas that must be under planning control of urban and rural construction and development. The specific scope of a planning area shall be defined by the people’s government in light of the urban and rural economic and social development level and the needs for an overall development of urban and rural areas in organizing the establishment of the overall planning of a city or county (town), a township, or a village.

The Urban and Rural Planning Law notes that an urban and rural plan should include Urban System Planning, City Planning, County Planning (Town Planning), Country Planning (Township Planning), and Village Planning (Table 6.14). In urban areas, City Planning and County Planning are divided into City Master Planning<sup>166</sup> (*Zongtiguohua* or overall planning) and Detailed Planning (*Xiangxiguohua*). Detailed Planning includes regulatory detailed planning and site detailed planning. City Master Planning, County Master Planning, Country Planning, and Village Planning should consider the National Economic and Social Development Plan (FYP) of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and should integrate the Comprehensive Land Use Plan by the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources. Although Country Planning (township planning) and Village Planning were recently included in statutory plans, they are not widely practiced due to a need for further development.

Statutory Plans		
Urban System Plans	National Urban System Plan	
	Provincial Urban System Plan	
City Plans and Country Plans	City Master Plans	
	Detailed Plans	Regulatory Detailed Plans (applicable to cities and towns)
		Construction Detailed Plans (applicable to designated areas)
Country Plans and Villages Plans	Country Plans and Villages Plans	

Table 6.14 Statutory Plans  
Source: Constructed by author.

166

According to the Chinese Urban and Rural Planning Act (has been in effect since 1 January 2008), the Chinese urban planning system consists of two tiers: the master plan (*Zongtiguohua*, simplified Chinese: 总体规划; traditional Chinese: 總體規劃) and the detailed plan (*Xiangxiguohua*, simplified Chinese: 详细规划; traditional Chinese: 詳細規劃). The detail plan is composed of the Regulatory detailed plan (*kongzhixingxiangxiguohua*) and the urban design and parcel-based Construction detailed plan (*xiujianxingxiangxiguohua*).

In general, urban and rural planning shall be worked out and implemented by following a reasonable layout; saving the land; implementing intensive growth and planning before construction to improve the ecological environment; enhancing the construction and comprehensive utilization of resources and energy; protecting farmland and other natural resources as well as cultural heritages; maintaining local features, ethnic features, and traditions; preventing pollution and other public nuisances; satisfying the needs of regional population development; and promoting natural defense, disaster prevention and alleviation, public health, and public safety.<sup>167</sup>

The Urban System Plans are drafted to address an entire country as well as individual provincial regions. These plans are legally required under the Urban and Rural Planning Law. The Urban System Plans affect the development of specific regions. Because the development of urban areas has tremendous impact on an entire region, the goal of the Urban System Plans is the development and arrangement of urban areas to change the economic development of the broader regions in which they are located.

The department of urban and rural plans under the Chinese State Council shall together with other relevant departments under the State Council organize the establishment of the National Urban System Plan, which shall be used to guide the establishment of a Provincial Urban System Plan and a City Master Plan.

A Provincial Urban System Plan shall include a spatial layout of cities, counties, scale control, significant infrastructure, and areas under strict control to protect ecological and environmental qualities and resources.

At the local level, the master plan outlines the general land use pattern of a city and usually has a planning horizon of 20 years and shall consider long-range development strategies. The main content of master plans includes the city's development direction, functional zones, land use layout, comprehensive transportation planning, construction-forbidden areas, construction-constrained areas, construction-suitable areas, green land planning, and tourist planning. The Detailed Plan deals with areas that face immediate development or are specified in the master plan.

In general, the Urban and Rural Planning Law also introduces many other promising aspects: emphasizing procedural requirements such as a notice and comment period; tightening environmental protection and natural and cultural heritage protection; integrating and strengthening rural planning; introducing public participation and

---

167

See Urban and Rural Planning Law of PRC, Art. four.

increasing supervision and inspection; and providing relevant legal liabilities to punish local governments for non-compliance.

According to Article four, urban and rural planning shall be worked out and implemented by principles of urban and rural area planning as a whole. This was not emphasized in the Urban Planning Law. In Article ten, the state encourages adopting advanced scientific technologies to make urban and rural planning more scientific and to improve the efficiency of the implementation, supervision, and administration of urban and rural planning. According to Article nine, any entity or individual shall have the right to report or accuse of any act in violation of any urban and rural planning to the competent department of urban and rural planning or other related department. Such department shall promptly accept the report or accusation and organize manpower to investigate and handle it. Article twenty-six notes that before filing an urban or rural planning for examination and approval, the entity establishing it shall announce the draft of the planning and collect opinions from experts and the general public by way of argumentation, hearing, or other. The draft shall be announced for at least 30 days.

The Urban and Rural Planning Law formalizes and systematizes various levels of the plan introduced by provincial and local authorities to cope with problems emerging from economic reform. Regional development, infrastructure construction, urban renewal, conservation, and environmental and sustainable development became priorities in urban planning.

On the other hand, to adapt to local development needs, there are non-statutory plans not specified in the Urban and Rural Planning Act. There are no compulsory requirements regarding their content and approval. In general, they provide guidelines for strategic plans, conceptual plans, specialty plans, developments plans, and action plans.

The following paragraph illustrates the mechanism of planning implementation that follows a wide scope of planning systems based on the establishment of approval, evaluation, and monitoring of urban planning in China.

## § 6.3 Establishment of Statutory Planning

The statutory planning procedure contains the following steps: preparation, approval, implementation, and monitoring and supervision.

### § 6.3.1 Preparation and Approval of Urban Planning

As stipulated by the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the competent administration departments of urban and rural planning under the Chinese State Council together with other relevant departments under the State Council are responsible for the organization of formulating planning for the national urban system plans. The provincial government of an autonomous region is responsible for formulating planning for local cities and towns. A city government is responsible for formulating the overall planning of the city. The county government shall establish the overall plans of the town where the county government is located. The overall plans of any town shall be established by the people's government of the town (Table 6.15).

Statutory Plans	Responsible Authorities
National Urban System Plans	Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and other relevant Government Departments under the State Council
Provincial Urban System Plans	Provincial Governments
City Master Plans (City and County System Plans Included in City Master Plans and Detailed Plans)	City Governments and City Planning Bureau
Country Plans and Villages Plans	Country Governments

*Table 6.15 Statutory Plans and responsible authorities*  
Source: constructed by author

In general, the preparation of a lower-tier plan shall follow the guidance of the higher tier plan while small adjustments and feedback are allowed. To make a typical statutory plan, a qualified planning service provider is normally commissioned by a responsible government authority. This provider then puts forward a number of planning proposals through site investigation, research, and analysis of problems. Relevant stakeholders such as government departments, professionals, and the general public are consulted on objectives and strategies. Through supplementary investigation, modification, improvement, and consultation, a final planning proposal is then formulated and submitted to the responsible authorities for approval. The final planning product shall

include written documents, relevant drawings, and maps. Government authorities at different levels approve the statutory plans.

The national urban system plans and provincial or autonomous region urban system plans shall be filed by the competent department of urban and rural planning under the Chinese State Council with the State Council for examination and approval.

The overall plans of a municipality directly under the central government shall be filed by the people’s government of the municipality and the Chinese State Council for examination and approval.

The overall plan of a city where the provincial or autonomous region’s people’s government is located or which is specified by the Chinese State Council shall be filed with the State Council for examination and approval after it is examined and approved by the provincial or autonomous region’s people’s government.

The overall plan of any other city shall be filed by the people’s government of the city with the provincial or autonomous region’s people’s government for examination and approval; the overall plans of the county shall be filed by the people’s government at the next higher level for examination and approval and the overall plans of any town shall be filed with the people’s government at the next higher level for examination and approval (Table 6.16).

Statutory Plans		Approval Authorities
National Urban System Plan		State Council
Provincial Urban System Plans		State Council (Endorsed by MOHURD)
City and County System Plans		Approved along with City Master Plans
City Master Plans		State Council
	Other Designated Cities	Provincial Authorities
	Designated Towns	County Authorities
Detailed Plans		City Authorities

*Table 6.16 Statutory Plans and approval authorities*  
Source: constructed by author.

At the national level, planning of cities and counties is submitted to the Chinese State Council for approval by the competent administration responsible for urban planning. The competent administration under the State Council responsible for urban planning checks the planning of cities and counties in provinces and autonomous regions; it then submits the plan to the State Council for approval. After obtaining consent from the State Council, the competent administration then approves the implementation of the planning.



The overall planning of municipalities, provincial capitals, and cities assigned by the Chinese State Council is checked and agreed to by the municipal and provincial government and then submitted to the State Council for approval. It is stipulated that a city government may make partial adjustment to the overall urban planning but must report to the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress at the equivalent level for deliberation and submit it to the original approving administration for the record.

The city government must obtain consent from the people’s congress at the equivalent level or its standing committee and then obtain approval from the original approving administration for important adjustments to the overall urban planning’s nature, scale, development direction, and overall layout (Tang Kai 2004).

### § 6.3.2 Implementation of Urban Planning

A city government shall promulgate the City Master Plan when it is approved and prepare the procedure for implementation. As stipulated by law, administration procedure and system are implemented with the legal urban planning zones, defined in the overall urban plans. In terms of managing individual land lots, “Proposal for site-choosing,” “Land-use Planning Permit,” and “Construction-project Planning Permit” are basic administrative instruments used by the local planning bureaus (Table 6.17).

Instruments		Prior to
Proposal for site-choosing		Official setup of a development project
Land-use Planning Permit	City level	Land use application submitted to local Land Administration
	Country and village level	
Construction-project Planning Permit		Building Permit

Table 6.17 Instruments of urban planning in China  
Source: Constructed by author.

The following procedures are included in the implementation of urban planning in China (Figure 6.5):

Urban planning that is approved in legal procedures must be announced and open to the public;

Land use and land construction within legal urban planning zones must be in line with urban planning and be subordinated to the planning administration.

### *Proposal for site choosing*

A proposal for site-selection, which is checked and granted by a competent administration responsible for urban planning, must be presented for a construction project within the legal urban planning zone.

### *Land-use planning permit*

If land is needed for construction within legal urban planning zones, legal documents about the construction project must be prepared when an application is submitted to the competent administration responsible for urban planning. Then, the competent administration will define the location and border of the needed land, put forward a design, check it, and grant a license for construction.

### *Construction-project planning permit*

Legal documents are needed for the building, expansion, and change of buildings, roads, pipelines, and other engineering facilities within legal urban planning zones. An application has to be submitted to the competent administration, which will put forward terms for design, and then check and grant the license to plan the construction project;

The competent administration supervises and checks the construction activities and land use of the city by checking and accepting the beginning operation, process tracing, completion check and acceptance, and examination of illegal activities. It relies on the law to examine and settle illegal activities in the land use and project construction process;

The competent administration is authorized to participate in the completion check and acceptance of important construction projects within legal urban planning zones; it will check whether the construction is in line with the urban planning by six months after the completion check and acceptance; it will file the relevant materials about the completion check and acceptance with the competent department of urban and rural planning;

Additionally, as stipulated by law, any unit or person must be subordinated to the decisions made by the government in terms of the adjustment of urban planning of the city.




Figure 6.5 Implementation of Urban Planning  
Source: Pu Hao (2007: 24)

### § 6.3.3 Evaluation and Monitoring

China is undergoing rapid urbanization and responding to many demands for plans to guide city development. The Urban Planning Law provides little specific information about evaluation and monitoring. Evaluation of planning, especially plan implementation, is normally of secondary consideration; there is an absence of discussion and dialogue about planning performance among both the local authorities and professional planners. Most evaluations focus only on alternative plans that depend on the application of indicators based on the plan's character.

For various reasons, evaluation is not popular in Chinese tradition. Many factors demand sufficiency of information systems and expertise; lack of evaluating institutions and procedures is one reason—particularly in the planned economy period planning officials are not trained to qualify for this mission (Talen 1996; Seasons 2002; Chen Xiao 2009). Since the economic reform, urban planning activities involve many different interest groups with different values, needs, and expectations; those expectations affect planners during the evaluation as well. On the other hand, in China it is generally the government and developers who carry out planning evaluations. Most evaluation is carried out internally, i.e. within the planning organization, municipality, and higher levels of planning departments. In-house staff usually only assess a plan's adherence to its own stated goals and objectives. There is seldom any involvement of external evaluators, such as community groups. Internal staffs, comprising academic experts, officials, and professional planners, often have a comprehensive and sound understanding of the planning, but they might be affected by personal biases as well as organizational considerations of politics and culture.

As monitoring implies a continuous evaluation of activities in policies, processes, and plans, there are deficiencies in the methods of monitoring plan implementation. Monitoring is normally carried out after construction or development has started, sometimes even after it is finished—and after any damage has already occurred. By then, negative social impact and economic loss are hard to undo (Chen Xiaoyan 2009).

However, in recent years, the importance of evaluation and monitoring is explored in policy and academic discussions and is considered in planning practices. With policy reform and the advancement of information, efforts have been made to reform the evaluation and monitoring processes, which is reflected in planning laws, regulations, and policies.

The Urban and Rural Planning Law came into effect on January 1, 2008. It contains an entire section about monitoring. According to Chapter 5, the monitoring system for planning has three levels: local administrative departments, the local People's Congress or Standing Committee, and the public. Monitoring shall be carried out for the entire process of plan preparation, approval, implementation, and amendment.

The Urban and Rural Planning Law also contains policies and regulations for planning evaluation. It requires that urban system plans and master plans be evaluated in two circumstances: before they are submitted to the government and when they need to be amended. The organizer of a plan should perform evaluations by holding consult and public meetings. The local People's Congress, experts in relevant departments, and the public are involved in the evaluation at different stages. The result of the evaluation and strategies dealing with it are open to the public.

These regulations and policies on evaluation and monitoring reflect momentous progress in Chinese urban planning.

Reform of urban planning systems is a natural requirement of building a socialist market economy. It is also a premise for an urban planning system to keep track with the existing international mechanism after China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Reform of an urban planning system has become a part of the reform of the administration system of the Chinese government. The evolutionary reform of planning in China demonstrates how urban planning administration in China is active in exploring reform of its urban planning system. A gradual establishment of urban planning and implementation of an administration system is a process in a socialistic-market economy, and making Chinese society more open to democracy requires science and legalization in the process of planning formulation, decisions, administration, and supervision.

This chapter focuses on the planning structure, system, and implementation to provide a contextual framework of the system of Chinese planning and its evolution from an official perspective. Without a doubt, enormous efforts have been made to persist in political reform for the survival and development of the nation without threatening to the Communist Party-led regime and keeping up with time the need for China to develop and advance economically. Being embedded in these two fundamental principles, strengthening institutional and system innovations, and reforming law-based systems and mechanisms have been consistently implemented by the government throughout the whole reformation in the past few decades. One could say that reform is the driving force, development is the goal, and above all, stability is the prerequisite. Under the phrase of Den Xiaoping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics", many results had been progressively achieved. However, contradictions and conflicts were recognized and caused by the not yet fully defined socialist democracy under the Communist regime. To achieve the establishment of a socialist democracy, besides the legal system, efforts need to be made for the collective emancipation of the mind, not only by the government but also by the people. All of these criteria cannot be simply described and written down in blueprints and lines of rule.

In view of planning practice and spatial development, very often, various challenges, subjects, and unforeseen factors are emerging outside of the rules and regulation. Overcoming these challenges can only be achieved through consistently learning from the practice and execution of doing the real cases.

In the next part, the case of Shenzhen, one of the most promising cities after the reform and an experimental lab for urban planning, leads us further into the practice of urban planning in relation to the planning outcome.



## PART 4 Planning Practice and emerged Socio-spatial Challenges

Spatial Planning beyond the political intervention while socio-spatial meaning can be retrieved.

Part III reveals, within forty years, enormous efforts have been made from the top-down initiatives of the Chinese central government to launch a soft-landing reformation with Chinese characteristics.

Spatial planning is one of the most helpful and powerful instruments in China to coordinate the new demands of society and urban development, as well as to serve the political stability practically for the unique Chinese political demands. In Part III, it shows after the reformation, providing a reliable framework of planning system is becoming even more critical than the Maoist period.

Within the evolutionary development of the past few decades, spatial planning evolves in a broader scope of participations, changing the monopoly of the central government as the sole actor in the spatial-planning domain. The application of the Chinese planning system after 1987 was a gradual progression of confrontation between, on the one hand, the top-down planning policy based on the central interventional framework as shown in Part III, and on the other hand, the local adaption to solving the problems in reality from bottom-up, which is elaborated in this part.

Part IV following the setting of the third parameter planning outcome focuses on the exploration of these confrontations between the planned framework and the spatial realization in reality. It comprises two parts, first part Chapter 7 focuses on the planning implementation at the municipal level, Shenzhen is chosen as a case study. In Chapter 8, three projects in Shenzhen are selected to reflect the challenges between the planned and emergent spatial demands.

It argues, recently, for various reasons, many other Chinese cities have been appointed as experimental bases for practicing new principles of spatial planning. This development has mirrored the rise of a new Chinese society moving from collectivism toward consensus based on individualism. It is a society in which the traditional top-down structure is asked to become more reflexive and responsively. A bottom-up civil society is gradually emerging and required by the people in the socio-spatial domain.

# 7 Planning for the Reality

The application of planning approaches by local authorities is one of the most challenging and advanced experiments of spatial development in China.

Shenzhen is chosen for further exploration of planning implementation at the municipal level. The reason is Shenzhen was built by following the market liberation policies of the early 1980s. Its birth was an experiment in implementing and testing the effects of market economy principles, which, until that time, barely existed under the communist regime. In the context of these special circumstances, many new strategies and approaches to urban development were introduced that were driven by the guidance of a dynamic and free market. Indeed, knowledge and approaches of spatial planning that were introduced during the reformation were accumulated through the experience of the Shenzhen model.

This chapter explores how the planned system is asked to adapt the new challenges of the local demands. It elaborates the urban evolution of the city of Shenzhen chronologically. Further, it focuses on the establishment of planning mechanism through time in local practice.

---

## § 7.1 The Application of the Chinese Planning System after 1978

---

Deng Xiaoping's widely quoted phrase "Crossing the river by groping for stones" had pushed the situation of reformation forward, yet, how far can China go across the river? To be able to achieve Deng Xiaoping's advocacy, the efforts have to be directed to both the dimensions of flexibility and of reliability. For this reason, Shenzhen can be regarded the epitome of China's new planning culture.

### § 7.1.1 The Given Condition: An Accident of Conjunction and an Iron-hard Fact

---

David Harvey (2005) argued that after almost two decades of national disaster and societal catastrophe, we might well look upon the years 1978-1980 as a revolutionary turning point in the world's social and economic history. In the same global contextual background, Chinese society took a major cultural turn.



One must recall that China of the late 1970s was an extreme society, which was experiencing a great political, economic, and cultural reshuffling.

In the cold winter of 1978 in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping and his comrades from the Party's Central Committee decided that reform was the only way out of the economic and political difficulties facing China. At that time, China was a poor, closed, agrarian economy on the verge of collapse. The path that Deng Xiaoping defined was to transform China in two decades from a closed backwater country to an open center of capitalist dynamism with sustained growth rates. At that time, many factors contributed to the momentum of the reform. One could say, taking the path of reformation had been influenced by, different coincidental elements as well as by then emerged facts in pursuing the economic survival of the country.

Internally, besides facing the difficulties of political uncertainty in the wake of Mao Zedong's death in 1976, China was an extremely poor country in serious economic stagnation. The decade-long debacle of the Cultural Revolution had just ended, leaving the economy dormant and the people physically and emotionally drained<sup>168</sup>. The dwindling national income growth rate and widening disparity between China and other countries forced Chinese leaders and elites to reconsider the economic system China had implemented prior to 1978. At that time, the new idea of opening up the country to global contacts and influences after three decades of self-imposed isolation seemed a no less drastic measure to China's leaders than the original policy of economic and social closure (Yeung et al. 2009).

With regard to the conjuncture of the initial reformation of China, Harvey (2005: 120) argued:

We may never know for sure whether Deng Xiaoping was all along a secret "capitalist roader" (as Mao Zedong had claimed during the Cultural Revolution) or whether the reforms were simply a desperate move to ensure China's economic security and bolster its prestige in the face of the rising tide of capitalist development in the rest of East and South-East Asia. The reform just happened to coincide—and it is very hard to consider this as anything other than a conjuncture accident of world-historical significance—with the turn to neoliberal solutions in Britain and the United States.

---

168

Based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measures, the share of the Chinese economy in the world was at its historical low of close to 4.6 percent in 1973, sliding down from 32.9 percent in 1820. See Maddison (2008: 87).

Furthermore, he emphasized:

The outcome in China has been the construction of a particular kind of market economy that increasingly incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control.

By then, despite the global trends of neoliberalism and development, the open-door policy was triggered by a fundamental, regional, economic restructuring as shown in Chapter 5. The initial success of Chinese open-door policy highly depended upon the Hong Kong connection (Logan, 2002; Harvey 2005; NG 2005). Due to the booming world market, Hong Kong was already a significant center of capitalist dynamism. Unlike the other states in the region, Hong Kong became an export-oriented industrial powerhouse in the 1960s and 1970s by adhering to an economic policy of “positive nonintervention”. As Harvey (2005: 136) pointed out, Hong Kong’s manufacturing had developed along labor-intensive and low-value-added lines, and it conveniently stood at the center of a Chinese business diaspora that already had significant global connections.

By the end of the 1970s, Hong Kong suffered from severe foreign competition and acute labor shortages. Rising land and labor costs had pushed low value-added and labor-intensive industries to relocate north to the mainland of China (NG 2005; Schenk 2010). Consequently, the economic restructuring process of Hong Kong intensified and coexisted with the reform of Chinese economy in general.

The open-door policy of the PRC announced by Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978 marked a new era for Hong Kong’s economy. Guangdong province, just across the border in China, had all the cheap labor. In the framework of industrial restructuring, Hong Kong capital seized the opportunity. On the one hand, Hong Kong took advantage of its many hidden connections across the border in China; it played the role of the intermediary for whatever foreign trade China already had, while on the other hand, on the other side of the border, the conditions of that moment in time also provided a perfect opportunity for China to engage in international trade and investment.

From 1978 to 1997, visible trade between Hong Kong and the PRC grew at an average rate of 28 percent per year. At the same time, Hong Kong firms began to move their labor-intensive activities to the mainland to take advantage of cheaper labor. The integration of Hong Kong with the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong province is the most striking aspect of these trade and investment links. The effect continually intensified, and at the end of 1997, the cumulative value of Hong Kong’s direct investment in Guangdong province was \$48 billion, accounting for almost 80 percent of the total foreign direct investment (FDI) there. Hong Kong companies and joint ventures in Guangdong province employed about five million people. Most of these businesses were labor-intensive assemblages for export, but from 1997 onward there has been increased investment in financial services, tourism, and retail trade (Schenk 2010).

This conjuncture coincident<sup>169</sup> as Harvey (2005: 121) described it led the reform starting from the setup of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract further foreign investment. To supplement this effort, China's reform policy was under strict state supervision. Experimentation was initially limited, mainly to the Guangdong province close to Hong Kong, conveniently remote from Beijing.

The choice of location for experimenting with trade liberalization was not simply a one-way process dictated by Beijing. It involved local initiatives as well (Lai Hongyi 2006: 72). In January 1979, the Guangdong provincial authorities and Ministry of Communications jointly proposed to the State Council to invest in sectors related to naval navigation in Bao'an County<sup>170</sup>, which is the border county adjacent to Hong Kong. In addition, at that time, the central and local governments realized that the only way to stop the flood of illegal emigration to Hong Kong was to accelerate development of Bao'an County (Lai Hongyi 2006: 75). Within this framework, in July 1979, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued No. 50 Document<sup>171</sup> and approved the requests from Guangdong and Fujian provinces for special policies and flexible measures and for setting up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Shenzhen (2020), Zhuhai (1687.8 km<sup>2</sup>), Shantou (2064 km<sup>2</sup>) within Guangdong province, and Xiamen (1565 km<sup>2</sup>) of the Fujian province<sup>172</sup>.

The main consideration of Deng Xiaoping and other top reformist leaders was to set up the first Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces because of the geographical, economic, historical, and political advantages of these provinces (Ota 2003; NG 2005; Lai 2006; and Yeung Yueman et al. 2009).

- 
- 169 Harvey (2005:121) emphasized that:  
"The gathering strength of neoliberal policies on international trade during the 1980s opened up the whole world to transformative market and financial forces. In so doing it opened up a space for China's tumultuous entry and incorporation into the world market (...) The spectacular emergence of China as a global economic power after 1980 was in part an unintended consequence of the neoliberal turn in the advanced capitalist world."  
"
- 170 Shenzhen was known as Bao'an County before it had been promoted to prefecture level in 1979. Later Bao'an became a district of Shenzhen.
- 171 See *Guangdong Dangshi* (2010). The central government announced the official establishment of Shenzhen's "Special Export Zone" on July 15, 1979. The original planned population was 350,000, of which 77 percent was to be agricultural. To cover the comprehensive characteristics, tasks, and functions of the Shenzhen Special Zones, its name was formally changed in March 1980 to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
- 172 For more detailed information about the designation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), see Lai Hongyi (2006: 72-74).

Shenzhen is adjacent to Hong Kong; Zhuhai is connected to Macao; Xiamen is close to Taiwan and Shantou is located between Hong Kong and Taiwan (Figure 7.1). These cities could offer both inexpensive land as well as labor for the first cluster of investors from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, as well as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Besides, many overseas Chinese came from Guangdong and Fujian provinces and became successful entrepreneurs, yet had strong sentimental ties to their Chinese hometowns. Traditionally, Cantonese and Fujianese were enterprising and receptive to foreign business and the world markets and for the last thousand years, both provinces had a tradition of trade and entrepreneurship, especially in foreign trade. Importantly, they are located far from the center of political power in Beijing, minimizing potential risks should any problems or negative political effects be generated (Tian Hao 2004; Lai Hongyi 2006; Yeung Yueman et al. 2009).




Figure 7.1 Regional Setting of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs)  
 Source: Yeung Yueman et al. (2009, Figure 1)

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are essentially a type of free ports. The government reduces or eliminates tax tariffs to create a favorable investment environment, and encourages foreign investment and the introduction of advanced technology and scientific management to promote economic and technical development. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) use flexible economic measures and special economic management systems to develop an export-oriented economy.

By 1984, when the early success of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) had been confirmed, China resolved to open its economy further by extending similar favorable policies to fourteen “coastal open cities.”<sup>173</sup> At the beginning of 1985, the Party-state decided to expand the open coastal areas, extending the open economic zones of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in south Fujian province, Shandong Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula, Hebei province, and Guangxi province into an open coastal belt. In 1988, a fifth, the Hainan Special Economic Zone, was established. After the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the Chinese government decided to open the Pudong New Zone in Shanghai to overseas investment in 1990, and opened more cities in the Yangtze River Valley. In this way, a chain of open cities extending up the Yangtze River Valley was formed, with Shanghai’s Pudong as the “dragon head” (Figure 7.2).




Figure 7.2. Coastal Open Cities

Source: Adapted from World Bank World Development Report (2009: 254).

173

Unlike the first four Special Economic Zones (SEZs), all located in southern China, the selection of the fourteen coastal cities reflected the central government’s determination to expose a much greater area to change. From north to south, they include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai. See <http://www.china.org.cn/e-china/openingup/sez.htm>.

However, after 1989, there was increasing debate in China's ideological and academic circles about whether the country should continue reform and recognize its fledgling market economy and whether a pro-socialism or a pro-capitalism approach should be adopted.

One could say the initial success of Deng Xiaoping's strategy grew, especially after his "southern tour" in 1992<sup>174</sup>. In Deng Xiaoping's speech, "the practice of using a planned economy is not equivalent to socialism because there is also planning under capitalism; but the practice of using a market economy is not equivalent to capitalism because there are also markets under socialism"<sup>175</sup> he defined socialism as "the pursuit of common prosperity" and arbitrated a debate among officials and scholars about the proper way to implement a market economy in China. Inspired by Deng Xiaoping's words, Chinese people began to break the shackles of tradition. The importance of economic development, reform, and open-door policy took deeper root in China's soil.

Since 1992, the State Council has opened a number of border cities, and in addition, all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions. 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level economic and technological development zones, and 53 new and high-tech industrial development zones have been established in large and medium-sized cities<sup>176</sup>. As a result, a multi-level, multi-channel, omni-directional, and diversified pattern of opening-up formed in China, integrating coastal areas with river, border, and inland areas.

As these open areas adopted different preferential policies, they developed a foreign-oriented economy by generating foreign exchange through exporting products and importing advanced technologies and accelerate inland economic development. As China had just reopened to foreign trade and investment, the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) had an almost immediate impact. In 1981, the four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) accounted for 59.8 percent of total FDI in China, with Shenzhen accounting for the lion's share at 50.6 percent and the other three roughly 3 percent each (Wong Kwanyiu 1987). In 2001, China became a new member of the World Trade Organization (WTO); to meet WTO requirements, China cut its import tariffs

---

174 See "Record of Comrade Deng Xiaoping's Shenzhen Tour", available at [http://english.people.com.cn/200201/18/eng20020118\\_88932.shtml](http://english.people.com.cn/200201/18/eng20020118_88932.shtml).

175 See [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-02/21/c\\_131422589.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-02/21/c_131422589.htm); "Excerpts from talks given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Shuhai and Shanghai," available at <http://www.olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/dengxp92.htm>.

176 Information available at <http://www.china.org.cn/e-china/openingup/sez.htm>.

from 23 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 2002 (Lardy 2002: 34). The state has been overhauling its legislation, regulations, and administration<sup>177</sup>. Since 2003, China has become the top recipient of FDI, surpassing the United States. Its total global trade volume improved from the twenty-seventh place in 1978 to the third in 2004<sup>178</sup>. By the end of 2010, China had been the world's largest exporter and second-largest importer for two consecutive years<sup>179</sup>.

Statistical evidence shows that China managed to construct a form of state-manipulated market economy that delivered spectacular economic growth and rising standards of living for a significant proportion of the population for more than thirty years, even though it was accompanied by similarly growing environmental degradation and social inequality.

The Pearl River Delta (PRD) has been the most economically dynamic region of China since the launch of China's reform program in 1979. The region's GDP grew from just over \$8 billion in 1980 to more than \$89 billion in 2000. During that period, the average rate of GDP growth in the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone exceeded 16 percent, well above China's national figure of less than 10 percent. In 1991, almost 50 percent of foreign investment in China was in Guangdong province, and 40 percent in the Pearl River Delta (PRD). By 2001, its GDP rose to just over \$100 billion, and it experienced an annual growth rate of more than 3 percent above the national growth rate. The abundance of employment opportunities created a pool of wealthy, middle-income, professional consumers with an annual per capita income that puts them among China's wealthiest. Since the onset of China's reform program, the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone has been the fastest growing portion of the fastest growing province in the fastest growing large economy in the world (Xu Jiang 2008).

The path that China has taken has never been an easy one. As Harvey emphasized (2005: 122), China did not take the "shock therapy" path of instant change and managed to avert the economic disasters by taking its own peculiar path towards "socialism with Chinese characteristics". I agree that the path that China has been taking during the past few decades of reform is progressive and persistent which is an

---

177 See Lai Hongyi (2003: 154-158).

178 The utilized FDI grew to \$61 billion in 2004.

179 See "Historic progress in China's Foreign Trade" in White Papers of Government, available at <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm>.

art of institutional bircologe<sup>180</sup> (De Jong 2013). Furthermore, it is an art of inclusion that is deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition and reflects the philosophical thinking of the “Way of Tao” which has been elaborated in Chapter 3<sup>181</sup>. It is the same ideological foundation that was applied to construct the form of Shenzhen’s initiative.

## § 7.1.2 From a Fishermen’s Village to An Open Economic Practice Laboratory

---

In the first decade of the millennium, like many other world cities, Shenzhen is promoting a more green and environmentally friendly urban perspective for living, investment, and leisure. Unlike most world cities, leading to this stage, Shenzhen has experienced a miracle over the past few decades.

Recently, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and Shenzhen Municipal Government jointly signed a framework agreement on China’s first low carbon eco-demonstration city. As the first low carbon eco-demonstration city approved by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Shenzhen will embark on a road to low carbon and green ecology as the result of the joint efforts of the ministry and the municipal government.<sup>182</sup>

Today, as a gateway to the world for China, the city is the high-tech and manufacturing hub in southern China, the world’s fourth-busiest container port, China’s fourth-busiest airport and China’s fourth-largest tourist destination. The high-tech, logistical, financial, and cultural industries are mainstays of the city. In addition, Shenzhen was the first mainland city to use the green GDP and to index economic growth with the environmental consequences of growth as a performance measure for the city’s development. It promotes economic development of low-cost, low-energy consumption but with at the same time high yield and high profit. In addition, as a

---

180 Martin de Jong (2013: 95) claims that the cautious and selective approach of Chinese reform reflects a generic Chinese tradition of institutional bricolage. In many cases adoption of original examples from elsewhere is not automatic and mindless, but far more selective and conscious. One could call this effectual practice in and perspective of policy borrowing one of low uncertainty avoidance, allowing policy-makers to tamper selectively, practically and synthetically with policy ideas and institutions from foreign and home grounds.

181 Further augmentation is given in Chapter 9 Conclusions.

182 *People’s Daily Online*, January 18, 2010.



major innovation-oriented attraction, it ranked first in China in the number of patent applications for inventions. The city is also well known for design, boasting more than 6,000 design companies employing a total of more than 60,000 people. Shenzhen was named a member of UNESCO's Creative Cities Network and awarded the title of City of Design by UNESCO in 2008.

From the very beginning, the building of Shenzhen was based on the concept of an ecological garden city, with more than half of its total area within the natural protection demarcation line, in which construction is banned. As a young city in China, with a deeply rooted volunteer culture, Shenzhen has been voted as China's most favorable city by migrant workers—particularly for young talent. When Friedmann (2005a: 189) defined Shenzhen as “the best planning practice” in China, he meant that Shenzhen was built as an “instant” city from a fishermen's village as an open economic laboratory. Within 30 years, Shenzhen, a small border town of 30,000 people in 1979, has grown into a modern metropolis. It established many firsts in the world's history of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization. Undeniably, it is one of the most noticeable successful economic laboratories of China and has drawn enormous attention worldwide.<sup>183</sup>

In 1979, Shenzhen was a municipality just north of the border of Hong Kong. Within 30 years, it became a metropolis that by the turn of the millennium already boasted a residential population of over 4 million (Shenzhen's actual population, established in the 2000 census). Data of 2006 shows the residential population at over 8 million and this is still expected to increase with an annual growth rate of 9-10 percent (Shenzhen statistics in 2006). At present, the average age in Shenzhen is less than 30. Of the total population, 8.49 percent are between the age of 0 and 14, 88.41 percent between 15 and 59, 20 percent between 20 and 24, and 1.22 percent 65 or above. The population has two extreme peaks: intellectuals with a high level of education and migrant workers with poor education. In June 2007, over 20 percent of China's PhDs worked in Shenzhen.<sup>184</sup>

The numbers do not include the unknown floating population. The latest data according to the sixth National Population Census of 2010 shows that Shenzhen's residential population had reached 10.3 million (Shenzhen statistics in 2010). More importantly, roughly 70 percent of Shenzhen's official population comes

---

183 See “What has Shenzhen's Significance Been in Post Mao China?” Available at <http://maryannodonnell.wordpress.com/2012/01/05/what-has-shenzhens-significance-been-in-post-mao-china/>.

184 Shenzhen Government Online, “Citizens' life”, available at [www.sz.gov.cn](http://www.sz.gov.cn).

from someplace else. This data again does not include the illegal population, which is estimated to be about 2 million now. Their presence in the city is thus not acknowledged, and master plans typically exclude them from calculations (“floaters” have no “right to the city”.) (Friedmann 2005a: 189).

From an economic-political perspective, the region has served not only as a testing site to develop an open market economy within a socialist context, but also as a valuable laboratory for investigating how local and global forces are interacting in the Chinese context. Despite the geographic advantage of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in general and Shenzhen in particular, its implementation has to be accredited to the significant political leadership of Deng Xiaoping and the reformists (Lai 2006, Yeung et al, 2009 and Wang Tao 2010). The thoughtful selection of locating the first Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China is also highly supported by careful selection of appointed leaders as well as by the institutional arrangements resulting from the local initiatives in Special Economic Zones (SEZs).

Deng Xiaoping and other reformists also carefully appointed leaders to head Guangdong and Fujian provinces as well as the mayors of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to accomplish different tasks for reform. Normally, these leaders were loyal cadres who received the trust of the party politically. In general, they tended to be open-minded and possessed a wealth of political experience (Lai Hongyi 2006: 76-77).

Xi Zhongxun<sup>185</sup> is an open-minded veteran politician who was one of the few senior level leaders who voted in 1980 for open reform. From 1978 to 1981, Xi Zhongxun was sent by Deng Xiaoping to lead Guangdong province.

In 1979, Xi Zhongxun arranged for the creation of special economic zones in Guangdong province, including Shenzhen. When he first arrived in Guangdong province, the provincial government was struggling to hold back the tide of Guangdong residents trying to flee to Hong Kong<sup>186</sup>. At the time, monthly wages in Guangdong province averaged 40-50 yuan and GDP per capita was 376 yuan, while that in Hong

---

185 Xi Zhongxun is the father of Xi Jinping, the incumbent General Secretary of the Communist Party of China.

186 The loosening of social controls in China after Mao Zedong’s death led to an influx of over 0.5 million legal and illegal immigrants into Hong Kong from 1976 to 1980. Unlike the refugees of the 1950s, the illegal immigrants of the late 1970s were looking for better economic opportunities instead of fleeing from political persecution. Sung Yun-Wing (1998: 16).

Kong was \$5,000<sup>187</sup>. Besides, Xi Zhongxun needed to win over leaders in Beijing skeptical of capitalism. With the support of Deng Xiaoping and the reformists, Xi Zhongxun's proposal was approved by the national government in 1979. At the beginning, the constraint was that the central government had no funds, but as Deng Xiaoping said, "we can give you some favorable policies and you have to find a way to fight a bloody path out."<sup>188</sup> One year later in 1980, the National People's Congress (NPC) approved the articles on Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which means that the legislation on Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was passed and the construction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was started (Wang Tao 2010; Shih Tsuen Miao 2010).

The second important figure in this framework is Ren Zhongyi. If Xi Zhongxun is regarded as the founder who stabilized the Guangdong provincial government and began to liberalize the economy, then Ren Zhongyi, as Xi Zhongxun's successor and one of the foremost pragmatic politicians, is widely regarded as the bold reformer who led Guangdong province to reform. Ren Zhongyi encouraged the reform initiatives and protected them from national conservative criticism, and he was prominent for his decisive action under the major principle of "more opening outward", "more revitalization inward", and "more decentralization downward", which provided future guidelines for Guangdong's opening and reform, laying a steady ideological base for rapid economic growth in the region. Ren Zhongyi (2000) advocated:

Improving the leadership to the Party means establishing a system that can effectively supervise and constrain the Party. Deng Xiaoping thought that the absence of constraints on the Party was dangerous. The Party needs to be led well but it needs to be supervised as well.

---

187 *Guangdong Sheng Dui Wai Kai Fang Cheng Gong De Di Li Xiao Fen Xi* (廣東省對外開放成功的地理學分析) In China Review Academic Publishers Limited (in Chinese). Available at <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/cbspub/secDetail.jsp?bookid=33661&secid=33683>.

188 *Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang Guangdong lishi Dashi Ji* 1949.10-2005.9 (中国共产党广东历史大事记1949.10-2004.9). In *Guangdong Dangshi* (The history of the CCP in Guangdong) (in Chinese). Available at [www.gddsw.com.cn](http://www.gddsw.com.cn).

Furthermore,

The Communist Party supervising itself is like having the left hand supervise the right hand, it just won't do. The Party needs to be supervised not just by the Party but also by the people, the democratic Party group and by independent persons. Not only must it be subject to the supervision of society and public opinion, it must be constrained by law as well.

Ren Zhongyi's advocacy was similar to that of other reformists at that time. His upright character enabled him to rise above charges of corruption. Reform in Guangdong province was consolidated under his leadership from 1980 to 1985.

The given condition of Guangdong's reform initiative also helped to speed up the establishment of Shenzhen. In May 1980, Guangdong province established a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) management committee. In June, the Guangdong Party Committee, presumably directed by Ren Zhongyi, decided that Wu Nansheng, a native of Shantou and a provincial party secretary, would become the first Party Secretary of Shenzhen. In March 1981, Liang Xiang, a native of Kaiping in Guangdong province and the second Party Secretary, was appointed by the National Party Committee and government to the position of first Party Secretary and mayor of Shenzhen. The message that was conveyed from the political consideration regarding the selection of leaders was loud and strong, and politically clear: Liang Xiang's role in the reform of Shenzhen was comparable to that of Ren Zhongyi in Guangdong province.

However, what Liang Xiang was facing at that time in Shenzhen was very rigid. Given its humble beginning, the lack of central resource infusions into Shenzhen posed a particularly daunting problem, making its initial progress rather modest. The city desperately needed a foundation for urban development, infrastructure, and facilities.

Politically, additional administrative powers were granted to Shenzhen to allow it more freedom in pursuing new policies and development measures. In 1981, the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee granted Shenzhen the same political status as Guangzhou, the provincial capital.<sup>189</sup> In 1982, the State Council under Zhao Ziyang's leadership created a Special Economic Zone's Affairs Office led by Premier Zhao Ziyang and Vice Premier Gu Mu. Shenzhen, along with other Special Economic Zones (SEZs), could communicate directly with the central government while also earning the support of leaders of their home province.

Liang Xiang took numerous bold and liberal measures to speed up development. He assembled a work team that comprised talented people from various fields; the team quickly formulated a comprehensive, ambitious, but workable blueprint for Shenzhen's development.<sup>190</sup> The first administrative reform took place in 1982, aimed at changing government bureaus and executive units into economic entities. From 1981 to 1982, the government of Shenzhen was downsized and its structure and organization streamlined. For instance, management units within the government responsible for staple products, resources, construction, foreign trade, and commerce were transformed into economic enterprises (NG 2005: 128). Three new offices responsible for economic policies in the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) were placed under the jurisdiction of the mayor's office: the General Office of the city government, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Development Company, and the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Construction Company. These changes installed predominant control of the mayor over the course of the city's development. This centralized and efficient economic decision process in the hand of local leaders in combination with an unparalleled advantage allowed it to experiment with whatever policies and practices it deemed expedient to vitalize the economy. This paved the way for rapid formation and operation of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ).

Economically, Shenzhen enjoyed preferential treatment in tax and tariff reductions and exemptions from the requirement of submitting tax revenues to the central and provincial government over its first ten years<sup>191</sup> (Zhu Jieming 1996) as well as granted preferential fiscal arrangement (Lai Hongyi 2006: 80). Shenzhen is where the first overseas bank established its presence in China in 1982 and where the first post-1949 Chinese stock exchange came into existence in 1983.

Yeung Yuetman (2009: 226) summarized the special roles assigned to the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and outlined the innovations with which they have been associated (Table 7.1). Among the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Shenzhen has consistently been at the cutting edge of reform.

---

190 Under Liang Xiang's leadership, Shenzhen created a number of benchmarks in China's economic reform in the early 1980s, called "Shenzhen efficiency." In 1984, when Deng Xiaoping toured Shenzhen, he was impressed by Shenzhen's persistent reform and rapid growth and urbanization. The success of Shenzhen also seized the conservative attacks on the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). See Lai Hongyi (2006: 77-78).

191 For example, the corporate income tax on the SEZs was set at a preferential rate of 15 percent, even lower than the 18.5 percent in Hong Kong. According to national and provincial provisions, Shenzhen did not have to remit revenue to the national and provincial government until 1989, nor would the province and Beijing provide subsidies. See more about tax exemption of Shenzhen in Zhu Jieming (1996: 187-194).

Eschewing undue reliance on limited-term government incentives, Shenzhen instead focused on private sector-led, innovative measures and technological up scaling to improve its competitive position<sup>192</sup>.

	Special roles	Innovations
Shenzhen	Slow but steady shift to market conditions on a greenfield site (fishing village). Learn from Hong Kong methods of global capitalism, modern management methods. Raise capital.	New contract labor and wage system. New tender system. Home-purchase scheme for workers. First urban land development rights auction (1987). Separations of commercial functions from the state and government departments. Increasing emphasis on the role of the legal system and the democratic election of factory managers. First stock exchange in China (1990). Market-led individual upgrading.
Zhuhai	Capitalize on geographical proximity to learn from and work with Macao. A bridge to Europe and Portuguese-speaking countries. Raise capital.	First local legislation in China. Speed and success in developing infrastructures. A state-of-the-art airport built in 1994 but not founded on sound market principles.
Shantou	Chaozhou culture with extensive domestic and global links to overseas China. Once second largest city in Changdong, with a fair chance of rapid development.	Somewhat off-center location in terms of regional growth and institutional innovations. First legislation in China on individual self-funded enterprises.
Xianmen	Established itself as a central city in southeastern China. Play a constructive role in peaceful relations with Taiwan. Possible free port status to facilitate cross-strait travel.	Particularized culture predicated on a competitive spirit to acquire efficiency, and entrepreneurial environment, an urge to innovate, and a healthy human environment.
Hainan	A model of reform with local characteristics. Tropical climate, rich resources, strategic location relative to Southeast Asia, and large land area are strengths to pursue special development.	Top-down administration from province to cities and counties; end of "small government" mentality. First in China to: abandon dual-track reporting on production/livelihood data; simplify procedure for company registration; implement un-gated highways; implement comprehensive social insurance protection; and engage in large-scale infrastructure projects via a stock-sharing system.

Table 7.1 Special roles and innovations in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

Source: Yeung Yue-man et al (2009, Table 1). Revised by author.

192

See Yeung Yue-man et al. (2009: 222-240).

In early years of development, Shenzhen became the base industrial development, specializing in electronic industry. Because foreign investments were not forthcoming, Shenzhen had to turn to domestic sources of investment<sup>193</sup> (Wong Kwanyiu 1987). In 1983, Shenzhen appointed eight State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be the developers undertaking comprehensive urban construction in the market environment in all districts.

Consequently, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) captured many domestic investments from central ministries and other provinces that were eager to capitalize on the preferential policies offered. One example was the Shekou Industrial District established by the State Council in 1979 and owned by the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company (CMSNC), under the Ministry of Communication. Another one was Shangbu, where one square kilometer of land was allocated to the Ministry of Electronic Industry and several additional pieces of land were allocated to departments from the central government (NG and Tang Wing- Shing 2004: 201).

In 1984, some of them became independent enterprises to compete with other foreign or private developers. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Shenzhen began to transform from government land distributors to market-oriented construction firms (or real estate firms). To attract investment from central ministries, tax exempt and free land tracts were offered. In 1984, enterprises of more than 24 bureaus and departments from the central government had committed to investment in Shenzhen, either operating factories or building industrial estates (Tian Hao 2004: 65).

The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) also adopted an official minimum wage and implemented the first labor contract system among all enterprises and public and social institutions in 1982. In 1983, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) introduced social labor insurance for employees in labor contracts. In this framework, migrant workers soon began to gravitate to the city from many parts of China, and by 1989, more than 1 million temporary workers had already converged on the Zone. Improvements in labor productivity followed and the beginnings of a free labor market emerged by the early 1990s (Yeung Yueman 2009: 229).

However, early on, local initiative in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) also played a critical role in Shenzhen's success. The guiding principal was "learning by doing"; within this framework, Shenzhen's forward and backward linkages encompassed a large number of foreign and domestic-funded enterprises capable

---

193

About 90 percent of FDI in Shenzhen originated from Hong Kong.

of synergistic learning. Due to the difficulties in accessing the Chinese market, the non-convertibility of the Chinese currency and unfamiliarity with the rules deterred foreigners from investing in China. The most popular form of investment during this period besides government enterprises was through the operation of cooperative joint ventures (CJVs) to reduce risk<sup>194</sup> (Ota 2003: 19).

On the other hand, in Shenzhen, Liang Xiang was confronted with a severe shortage of qualified talent and of office floor space. To overcome these problems, Liang Xiang promised spacious apartments, generous wages, and easy urban residency to attract talent. From 1979 to 1983, the number of engineers grew from 2 to 732. Building office space was another top priority for the city. Active recruitment allowed the number of construction workers to grow from several hundred to 100,000. In addition, Shenzhen was short of funds necessary for building streets and urban infrastructure. The army had to be brought in to help build basic infrastructure, and early reliance was on joint ventures (JVs) in housing and other basic facilities with Hong Kong developers.

The city solved the problem by taking bank loans, investing in urban infrastructure such as roads, power, water, telephone, and sewage in new districts, and charging rent on land use. It also reinvested earnings and loans in new urban development projects. Within a few years, the city accomplished an amazing amount of urban development (Lai Hongyi 2006: 81).

Since 1984, embedded in the seventh Five-Year Plan (FYP), improvement continued and allowed for a comprehensive system to control and coordinate economic development at the macro level. Policies related to land initiated and implemented in the last 30 years are of key importance to the socio-spatial development of reform. Before land reform, the urban land use all over China had the following aspects: land was acquired through free administrative allocation; there was no limited land use; and the local government and its agencies were the largest users of land<sup>195</sup> (Han Haoying and Nishimura 2006).

From 1982 to 1985, external projects flocked to Shenzhen with twofold annual increases. Shenzhen and all of China had no land market, with all urban land owned by the state and distributed to State-owned enterprises (SOEs) without fees. Many

---

194 In 1980, within the framework of FDI, cooperative joint venture (CJV) was the most popular cooperative operation in comparison with equity joint venture (EJV) and whole foreign owned (WFO). See Ota (2003: 12), Statistics and Information Yearbook of Shenzhen 1998.

195 See land reform in chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform.



investors demanded premises to rent or to buy land to construct factories and start production immediately. Pushed by this market impulse, in January 1982, the Shenzhen Land Management Regulation declared the end of the era of free land use in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). From 1982 to 1983, the Shenzhen Development Company (SDC), one of the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) of the city, leveled and made infrastructure connections for an area of 80 hectare in the Louhu commercial district and lent 40 hectare of buildable land to tenants at an average lump sum rent of Hong Kong \$4000-5000/m<sup>2</sup>, valid for 30 years (Tian Hao 2005: 65). This was a unique transitional period when urban development could be conducted based on the commercial principle<sup>196</sup>.

Three major events marked the course of land reform in Shenzhen. In the old system, the government decided the allocation of land without use. This was replaced by various channels for obtaining land use rights (Xie Liou and Sit 2007).

The first and most important reform was in 1987–1988. In 1987, rights associated with a parcel of land were first auctioned in Shenzhen<sup>197</sup>, which ended the age-old free land allocation system. Although the state still owned the land, land use rights henceforth could be sold or transferred as a commodity in the market, which forced planners to re-think their practice. In January 1988, the Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Land Management were promulgated. The system of compensatory and conditional usage of land was legally established in Shenzhen<sup>198</sup>.

The second change was due to the promulgation of the Provisions on Land Trading Market of Shenzhen in 2001. A tangible land market was established, and all transactions in land use rights were required to take place publicly in the land market.

- 
- 196 Within this framework, the Shenzhen Housing Company obtained 3 km<sup>2</sup> of land and began the first test in China of a commercial residential housing project. See Tian Hao (2005: 65).
- 197 Shenzhen Development Company (SDC) (the predecessor of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Real Estate (Group) Co., Ltd.) had the land-use right to a parcel of land in Luohu at auction for 5.25 million yuan.
- 198 With additional amendments, the 1988 Constitution was the first national document that legalized the separation of land ownership from land use rights; it also allowed the transference of land use rights. The State Council passed the regulation of urban land use rights in 1988 and enacted the regulation in 1990. The 1988 Constitution and the Regulation laid the foundation for land policy in the post-reform era. Although there is still no privately owned land in China today, a land market has been created and land use rights entered the market, under the policy of separation of use rights from ownership. Land became a main source of profit for real estate companies, villages, individual farmers, and government of all levels as well. These interest groups thus emerged with the rebirth of land as a market force in China. See more about land reform in Chapter 5.1 Rural and Urban Land Reform.

The office managing the tangible land market is the Shenzhen Land and Housing Trading Center.

The third change was in 2005 when the first industrial land was leased successfully on the land market. This indicated that the range of land resources regulated by market mechanisms in Shenzhen had expanded to include industrial land.

The new land system retained public ownership of the land but allowed its use rights to be leased or transferred. Land use rights could be obtained from the state by four means: mutual agreement, invited competitive bidding, public auction, and listing (starting from 2004). This established a tangible land market. The supply and demand of land was largely regulated by the market mechanisms with some intervention of government (Han Haoying and Nishimura 2006: 14). The allocation of land use rights grew rapidly since reform. Reform of housing policy was also crucial to continuing urban development in Shenzhen.

Following the framework laid out by the central government, the focus of Shenzhen's housing reform changed from a physical allocation system to a monetized system. The scheme stopped the physical allocation of housing, it incorporated increasing rent and providing subsidies while encouraging house purchasing and setting up a housing fund (Xie Liou 2007).

The first official housing reform document was the "Housing Reform Scheme in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone" of July 1988.<sup>199</sup> It included two objectives. First, it transformed the welfare in-kind benefit to monetary distribution in the housing sector. Housing should be tradable in the market. Within this framework, the Shenzhen Housing Trading Center was established in 1989 and the Housing Provident Fund was established in 1992. A new housing directive was adopted by the Shenzhen government in the early 1990s, the "Dual-Track, Three Categories and Multi-pricing System", to accommodate high, middle, and low-income groups. The official interpretation of the new direction is as follows<sup>200</sup> (Wong Ngai-ching 1994; Lau Kwokyu 1997; Li Jian-lin 1999).

---

199 See more in Chapter 6.3 Economic Reformation: Crucial Economic Measures and State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) Reform. In 1988, the Chinese central government issued an important document, Implementation Plan for a Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns, which marked the beginning of a nationwide housing reform.

200 Retrieved from Shenzhen Housing Bureau.

- Dual-track: the source of housing investment from both the local government and private developers. The local government is responsible for building welfare housing and low-profit housing. Private developers are responsible for the construction of commodity housing in the market.
- Three Categories: There are three categories of housing provided. Welfare housing will be provided for the civil servants. Low-profit housing will be offered to the staff and workers in SOEs and government subsidized institutions. Welfare housing and low-profit housing are built by the Housing Bureau. Commodity housing (marketing housing) is built by private development companies and could be purchased in the market by anyone.
- Multi-pricing System: It aims to provide different housing prices with regard to the affordability for various income groups. The price of welfare housing would be set in line with construction cost (RMB 1,000 -2,000). Low-profit housing would be sold at slightly above construction cost (RMB 2,800-4,400). Commodity housing would be purchased at market price (at an average RMB 5,500 per square meter) (Table 7. 2).

Type of housing	Price (RMB) per square meter construction space	Monthly Rent (RMB) per square meter construction space
Welfare Housing (multi-storey, below-cost)	930	5
Welfare Housing (multi-storey, full-cost)	1,000	6
Welfare Housing (high-rise, full-cost)	2,880	17
Low-profit Housing (multi-storey)	1,680	10
Low-profit Housing (high-rise)	4,000	15 to 25
Low-profit Housing (duplex)	2,500	Not available
Market Housing (multi-storey)	5,133	38
Market Housing (high-rise)	6,973	54

Table 7.2 Price and rent level of different types of housing in Shenzhen 1994

Source: Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Nianjian 1994 (Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Yearbook 1994: 80); Shenzhen Fangdichan Nianjian 1995 (Yearbook of Shenzhen Real Estate 1995: 95 and 104). Retrieved from Lau Kwokyu (1997, Table 5).

However, problems of housing inequality were recognized due to the housing need of temporary residents being unmet and neglected. Although enterprises are generally expected to provide dormitory type housing to workers with temporary resident status as the operation of the enterprises expands and land price increases, enterprises find immense difficulty in accommodating these workers. With the result that many of the temporary residents have to rely on their limited wage to solve their accommodation

problems. In reality, the rapid growth rate of the number of temporary residents, who became the main workforce to create wealth, has forced the Shenzhen government to reconsider its housing provision strategy. A renewed understanding of the housing need of temporary residents is required.

Furthermore, some work units still provide houses for their employees as they did in the socialist era. Normally, these work units are highly profitable state enterprises or government institutions such as research institutions that have capital for housing construction as part of the welfare for their employees. The differences between housing provision in the transitional era and the socialist era are that these houses may not necessarily be located within a walled neighborhood, and the employees may have to pay a small part of the cost of construction. Preferential policies are also given to government officials or staff in government agencies, who have privileges to acquire cheaper or higher-quality houses. Shall government employees continue to receive favoured treatment in housing provision such as purchasing public sectors housing at below cost and with subsidised interest rate? This has to be justified by further development of the housing provision strategy (Lau Kwokyu 1997).

Nevertheless, due to the variation of housing reform measures offered, the rigid connection of the individual and its employer in terms of housing was broken. Shenzhen established a new system of housing provision and allocation. Although land was still publicly-owned, the increased ability to obtain and transfer land use rights spurred booms in real estate development<sup>201</sup> (Chiu 1993; Wong Ngai-ching 1994; Lau Kwokyu 1997).

Like land reform and housing reform, fiscal autonomy generated tremendous fiscal incentives and exerted heavy pressure for Shenzhen to reform and develop. These privileges also enabled investors to enjoy the lowest corporate income tax rates and tariffs on imports and exports, as well as a freer play of markets in Special Economic Zones (SEZs). To help foreign firms in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), the Shenzhen government agency reduced taxes and land use fees, lowered wage standards, and streamlined administrative approval procedures for foreign enterprises.

In response to Deng Xiaoping's speech of 1992 during his tour of the southern provinces urging local governments to speed up the opening-up of the economy for further development, there was a surge in the inward FDI between 1992 and 1993,

---

201

Housing reform is not the main subject of this research; more detailed information and research about housing reform can be found in the referenced literatures.

which had increased at an unprecedented rate. Within this framework, new sectors and areas were opened to FDI. Even previously forbidden sectors such as domestic retail, finance, tourism, real estate, shipping, and resource development were allowed. On the other hand, due to rapid economic development in open coastal cities, the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were losing many advantages and competitive edges they once enjoyed; it was no longer possible to continue the same development strategy as before (Ota 2003: 21).

In reaction to cooperate with the increasing demands of economic development, since 1992, the government has broadened administrative reform.

With the growth of foreign investment and trade, a Trade Development Bureau was set up to take care of commercial and trading activities. In the central level, the Ministry of Planning and Land Management was set up to take over the functions of the Ministry of Construction. Combining planning and land management was a bold and innovative move for planners in Shenzhen and helped to guarantee funding for planning works. Gradually, Shenzhen became a real city; it was no longer a testing site for the industrial backyard of Hong Kong. Urban development was becoming a crucial and complex issue. Building public works became the focus. Many advisory committees were established as bureaus. The government's directive was "government nurturing market, market liberating government, government liberating enterprises, and enterprises liberating productivity" (NG 2005: 131).

In 1994, the Shenzhen municipal government ordered the separation of governing and economic functions within the government<sup>202</sup>. All the economic entities had to unlink from the government, in terms of function, finance, manpower, and names. These economic entities can no longer rely on the government for survival. NG (2005) showed that with the broadening reform to separate the administrative and economic functions in the Shenzhen municipal government, the number of state-owned and collective enterprises decreased. On the other hand, investments from overseas and from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan increased (Figure 7.3).




Figure 7.3 Number of establishment under different types of ownership in Shenzhen (1984-1999)  
Source: NG (2005, Figure 6.9).

Furthermore, even though Shenzhen is still basically an industrial economy, it has been gradually moving toward high-tech industries. The foreign investors from 67 countries and regions around the world, including 76 on Fortune magazine's top 500 list, had set up more than 14,000 foreign-funded enterprises in Shenzhen. This development helped speed up the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy in the ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) announced in 1996. This precondition also encouraged the Shenzhen municipal government to emphasize building a world-class city that is attractive to global investors (NG 2005).

Special Economic Zones (SEZs)—particularly Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)—had miraculous GDP, FDI, and urbanization growth. The transformation of China has been successful, and the driver of the market approach was planning. Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), as an instant city, had to provide space for market elements to grow. It was a planned product, and Shenzhen was built according to basic parameters laid down by different master plans. As a result, the Shenzhen government was entrusted with the formidable task of reforming existing economic entities under the planned economy while learning to accommodate private investment.

For a city that had experienced rapid growth, forward-thinking city officials and planners were crucial to its success. Shenzhen officials were able to implement a total of four master plans within the span of 30 years, each adding to the growth. The open-door policy, location, leadership, policy, and institutional arrangements accounted for the success of China's Special Economic Zones (SEZs). While some of the initial policies and measures utilized in Shenzhen were common to all Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Shenzhen independently adopted many of the bold and creative measures that made it stand out from the others (NG 2005; Lai Hongyi 2006; Harvey 2005; Xie Liou and Sit 2007; Yeung Yuetman et al. 2009). In the next paragraph is illustrated how the innovation has been applied for the evolution of the urban development in Shenzhen.

### § 7.1.3 The Evolution of Urban Development

---

Shenzhen is a new city. Its convenient position as a neighbor of Hong Kong and the status of Special Economic Zone (SEZ) allowed building for economic expansion rather than solving the existing problems of an old city. Nevertheless, Shenzhen, like other cities of China, had to plan within the broad development framework set by the central government through various government policies: to fulfill the overall economic goals of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) while being creative to accommodate emerging market demands in planning the city's development. New mechanisms to sustain these two tasks were invented by the municipal government, their planners, and decision makers. Interactively, these two forces are determining the urban development.

Over 30 years, Shenzhen revised overall city planning and development strategies nine times. Influential and significant were the master plans of Shenzhen in 1986, 1996, and 2006. These three plans were each prepared for a period of ten years as Shenzhen transformed from a border city of 300,000 in 1979 to a metropolitan area with a population around 11 million at present<sup>203</sup>. The fast growth of Shenzhen's economy and its spatial expansion exceeded expectations of the master plans of the past three decades. The market is more difficult to manage through central planning and is becoming the third force to shape the urban development. Market forces and planning guidance have to be confronted by the emergence of changing ideas simultaneously, and changing ideas have to be taken into account in each adjustment of the master plan in order to adapt to new conditions in the transition period.

Although Shenzhen was born as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), at the time Bao'an County was just a minor producer of crops. Shenzhen was not planned as a new city; providing services for industrial activities made it a prime spot for an export economy. The first master plan of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which was drafted in 1980, delineated the geographic boundary of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ): bordering on Hong Kong to the south, Dapeng Bay to the east, the Pearl River estuary to the west, and the mountains to the north; 49 km from east to west with an average width of 7 km from north to south. The total area covered 327.5 km<sup>2</sup> with an estimated population of 600,000 in 2000. Within Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) boundaries, not only export processing activities were promoted, but also agricultural, touristic, and real estate development. To prevent smuggling, an 80-km-

---

203

According to Shenzhen's published population statistics, in 2011 the total population with Shenzhen Hukou was 2,594,000 and without Shenzhen hukou was 9,017,000, making the official population 11,611,000.

long abattis, a 2.80 m high wall, and 7 m wide patrol road were constructed in May 1982, with six joint checkpoints to its surrounding established along the path to it's surrounding (Tian Hao 2004: 37).

Based on the "Guideline of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) Socio-economic Development Plan of 1982", the structure of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was adjusted by following a nonlinear "multi-centered" development strategy, establishing three clusters: from west to east, Shekou-Nantou, Luohu-Shangbu and Shatoujiao clusters. Shekou-Nantou cluster was developed as the main industrial zone; Luohou-Shanbou was based on the existing Ban'an town center; and Shatoujian was by then the commercial center.

The total planning area was 118.6 km<sup>2</sup>, and the population was about 1 million by 2000. Major industrial sectors with 1,500 factories occupying 7.2 km<sup>2</sup> of land and residential areas for 200,000 workers were projected, with proposals to attract foreign investment. Different land uses were functionally separated. At this time the two-tier planning system of the 1950s was in use: master plan and specific site plan (detailed layout plan). Both plans intended to support industrial projects approved by economic planning, and both lacked a clear definition of the legal responsibility for land development (such as a zoning system), and an operable control mechanism to modify the rights of both the private and public sectors (Tian Hao 2004: 52).

In the plan, the city's layout was based on traffic backbones. To enhance comprehensive economic efficiency, residential areas were close to industrial zones, warehouse close to train stations and ports. Zoning was flexible to adjust to local demands. At the same time, the concept of a Garden City was studied and incorporated into the layout by creating green belts to separate the three clusters. This green concept was retained in later plans.

In general, the spatial structure of that time emphasized on providing the industrial services to Hong Kong and attracted traditional industries of Hong Kong to Shenzhen to help develop an export-oriented economy (Figure 7.4).






Figure 7.4 The Conceptual Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 1980  
 Source: Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010, Figure 1.2).  
 Caption here.

In the early 1980s, the economic success of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) led to the "Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 1986-2000" in 1984. This plan actually established the basic spatial structure of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and contributed to the broader development scheme of the entire city planning. The main concept was to set up the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) as the base for industrial development in Shenzhen, supported by surrounding multi-functional special zones. Within this framework, the Futian cluster was separated from the former Luohu-Shangbu cluster as it was designed as a financial, commercial, and administrative center. Shahe cluster (later named Overseas Chinese Town, OCT) was added between Nantou and Futian as the area expanded. Together with the three existing clusters, it formed a belt along the coastline, and became the skeleton of Shenzhen's spatial expansion. Due to fast urban development and to encourage growth and greater density many infrastructures were constructed: highways and a massive subway system. Three major east-west highways became the main axes of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ): from south to north Binhe Avenue, Shennan Boulevard, and North Central Avenue (Figure 7.5).



Figure 7.5 Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 1986-2000  
 Source: Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010, Figure 1.3).

Based on the cluster system, the planned area was divided by rivers and other features of the topography into fifteen industrial districts. These were clearly specified as relatively independent systems. To reduce cross traffic within the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), mixed functions were allocated within each cluster. Each had its own role: the Futian cluster was used for international financial, commercial, trading, and convention purposes; Shahe cluster comprised the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) and colleges, touristic, and industrial zones; the Luohu-Shangbu cluster was for commerce, storage, housing, government offices, and industrial zones; the Eastern cluster had tourist attractions and ports, and as the largest cluster, Nantou included Shekou, Qin Hai reserved land, Nantou Oil Logistic Service Base, Science and Technology Park, Shenzhen University, and Mawan Port (a comprehensive expansion area) (Tian Hao 2004).

For the long term, the master plan also defined paramount strategic issues such as the city's coordination with Hong Kong after its handover in 1997; century-crossing projects such as the utilization of the Yantian and Mawan deep water ports; and the construction of a petrol-chemistry base.

The urban structure of Shenzhen was developed based on the master plan of 1986; the concept of "cluster cities" that concentrated growth and infrastructure along three main axes from east to west formalized the basic urban layout that is still valid today.

Planners paid attention to city design and environmental protection<sup>204</sup> (Tian Hao 2004: 73). Some heavily polluting factories from the first planned period were forced to move out of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and wastewater was treated before discharge into the river. Land was reserved in advance for ambitious future needs. For instance, Gongmin and Hengang counties outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) were reserved for satellite city development. In addition, the plan also outlined the design of a potential new downtown, a 4 km<sup>2</sup> site located in the Futian District for the city's future CBD development.

Economically, from 1986 onward, Shenzhen entered a takeoff period.

The plan also adapted a flexible enactment process to meet the rapid economic development and population growth. It was the first time that each cluster was encouraged to seek its own characteristic spatial development. It was the first time a plan integrated socio-economic guidelines and spatial planning coherently. However, rural towns outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) were still not covered by the plan.

The 1989 Urban Planning Act first set up a comprehensive urban planning system. The Shenzhen Development Strategy in 1989, by the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Resources Bureau and the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, first reported Shenzhen as a modern, international city. Shenzhen's urban planning system evolved from a two-tier to a five-layer system<sup>205</sup>.

Deng Xiaoping's tour of the south in 1992 encouraged the mayors of Shenzhen and Guangzhou to speed up the formation of a market economy. Rapid growth in the market economy of 1993 showed the planner that the planning process should not be just a top-down procedure. They began to balance requests from the general public as the planning's feedback mechanism, and public engagement gradually merged into the planning process.

The Pearl River Delta (PRD) and Hong Kong entered a new stage of economic restructuring in the mid-1990s. Hong Kong's economy became conspicuously dependent on financial services. It provided a good opportunity for Shenzhen to update its manufacturing to foster high-tech industries by creating science parks. The

---

204 For instance, they attempted to use buildings to create an alternating "open" and "compression" spatial rhythm along Shennan Boulevard.

205 See chapter 6.2.3 the two-tier planning system and chapter 7.2.2, the five-tier of Shenzhen planning system.

future perspective allowed Shenzhen to become a regional nexus of finance, trade, information, logistics, commerce, transportation, and tourism. Furthermore, Shenzhen was losing its advantage as other Chinese cities were granted more special policies<sup>206</sup>. Shenzhen needed a better macro-strategy to guide its future development. Due to a new strategy for industrial restructuring, substantial regional coordination and cooperation became necessary.

To maintain Shenzhen's leading economic position in the nation and counteract its diminishing uniqueness, Shenzhen decided to incorporate the "rural" areas outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) (*Guanwai*)<sup>207</sup>, bring them under the control of the Shenzhen Municipal Government and integrate them into Shenzhen's planning strategy. In 1993, Bao'an and Longgang counties officially became districts of Shenzhen and provided land to replenish the city's already shrinking land resources.

Even though the rural areas outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) enjoyed speedy development, inside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) former native villagers built a lot of illegal housing on their compensated residential lots, leading to the concept of the "urban villages". This new phenomenon was completely out of the control of urban planning<sup>208</sup>.

As the activities were decentralized outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), the master plan of 1996 included the entire municipality. Based on the belt of clusters and the major transportation axes, a new "network-based" conglomeration system was planned. The 1996-2010 plan formed three other north-south axes to connect the gradually expanding clusters. Nine functional clusters (three of which are in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)) created a basic future city structure. The central conglomeration comprises the two centers of Futian and Luohu. The total area is 74 km<sup>2</sup>. This is the political, economic, and cultural center of Shenzhen. In addition, the western axis, passing through Xin'an, Xixiang, Fuyong, Shajinn, and Songgang, connects with the western part of Dongguan which will be an important traffic corridor between Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and the industrial base. The eastern urban cluster comprises Shatoujiao, Yantian, and Meisha; and the Nabshan

---

206 Since 1992, the State Council has opened a number of border cities, and in addition, all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions. 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level economic and technological development zones, and 53 new and high-tech industrial development zones have been established in large and medium-sized cities. See chapter 8.1.1.

207 *Guanwai* or areas outside the SSEZ (simplified Chinese: 关外; traditional Chinese: 關外)

208 Further elaboration on urban villages, see Chapter 8.3.

Urban Cluster, with 1478 hectare reserved construction land and driven by the Yantian Deepwater Port, would become an important logistic corridor and industrial base. At the same time, the boundary of the Shenzhen Central District was located in the Futian district and delimited to a total area of 6 km<sup>2</sup> (Figure 7.6).



Figure 7.6 Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 1996-2010  
Source: Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen.

Starting in 1996, after fifteen years of transformation, the post-reform development of Shenzhen reached a stage of stable growth. The original goal set by the state in 1996 was to develop Shenzhen into a high level, export-oriented commodity production base, combining manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism for Hong Kong tourists—a new type of border city became a large international city.

The plan is divided into three stages, and the population would be limited to 4.3 million by 2020. The first stage (1996-2000) maintained a compact urban form based on clusters along the transportation spines and protection of the environment by enforcing intensive use of already used land. The second stage (2001-2010) was to build and consolidate Shenzhen into a well-managed, major, livable city. And the last stage (from 2010 onward) was to establish the city as a modern international city with a strong identity within twenty years.

In 2000, the State Council approved the Master Plan of Shenzhen City 1996-2010.

Lower labor costs enhanced the industrial production processes relying on just-in-time transportation. To alleviate bottlenecks in land transport, many projects for highways and railways have been proposed and are being implemented (Tian Hao 2004:105). Within this framework, in 1995, Guangdong province completed the “Pearl River Delta Regional Plan” (Figure 7.7). It suggests that a well-planned, integrated transport network of high quality and efficient coordination shall be established in the Pearl River Delta (PRD). Although the plan contained insufficient detail to truly guide the transport development, it pointed out the network within the region and between the region and other provinces, between the southwest China hinterlands, Hong Kong and Macao. However, at this stage, regional development was still rather weak.



Figure 7.7 Pearl River Delta Regional Plan  
Source: Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen.

China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 further embedded China’s economy in a global world. Shenzhen’s economy gradually changed from quick industrial development to multi-functional urban development. Socio-economic guidelines emphasized improving the ecological environment, developing culture and education, and



improving people's livelihoods. The stakeholders continued to operate in this transitional urban development and influence social and spatial structure. Since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the implementation measures for the Integration of Shenzhen into the Pan-Pearl River Delta (PRD) by enhancing the Shenzhen-Hong Kong connection have been emphasized.

In 2005, the Shenzhen municipal government officially issued the "Implementation Measures for the Integration of Shenzhen into the Pan-Pearl River Delta", which proposed that the "Shenzhen-Hong Kong Cooperation Circle" be established as the first tier, as well as a critical foundation, of Shenzhen's integration into the Pan-Pearl River Delta. 2007 saw the formal launch of the "Shenzhen-Hong Kong Innovation Circle"<sup>209</sup>.

The role for Shenzhen in the long run is to strengthen its link to the global urban network. To become a hub of logistics, information, services, and tourism, and to become a high-tech nexus between the Pearl River Delta (PRD) city network and Hong Kong, the construction of infrastructure—particularly projects linking Shenzhen to Hong Kong and other Pearl River Delta (PRD) metropolises—is crucial.

Within this framework, regarding to the regional connections, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link will connect Hong Kong (west Kowloon) in the south (known as Hong Kong Section) and Shenzhen (Futian Station), Guangzhou (Guangzhou South Railway Station), Guangdong in the north (known as Guangshen Section). The expected travel time from west Kowloon, scheduled to open in 2015, to Shenzhen's Futian station is 12 minutes, and from Shenzhen's Futian station, scheduled to open in 2014, to Guangzhou south railway station is 36 minutes. In addition, Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link connects to the Beijing-Guangzhou High-Speed Railway Line, which belongs to a part of the national high-speed rail network, stretches 2,298 km (1,425 miles) in length and can accommodate trains traveling with an average speed of 300 km per hour<sup>210</sup>. The urban metro system was inaugurated in December 28, 2004, making Shenzhen the sixth city in China to have a subway after Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Wuhan. The Shenzhen

---

209 As early as June 2004, with an eye toward establishing a world-class Hong Kong-Shenzhen metropolis, the two governments signed a memorandum and eight cooperation (1+8) agreement in December 2007 and six additional (1+6) agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation. On May 21, 2007, the Hong Kong and Shenzhen governments entered into the "Shenzhen/Hong Kong Innovation Circle Cooperation Agreement" in the presence of Mr. Cheng Jingpei, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology and Mr. Song Hai, Vice Governor of Guangdong Province, marking the formal launching of the "Shenzhen/Hong Kong Innovation Circle". See Bauhinla Foundation Research Center (2007: 7) and Yeung Yue-man et al. (2009: 233).

210 GAOTIE.CN (in Chinese), available at <http://crh.gaotie.cn/guangshengang/>

Metro currently has 5 lines, 137 stations, and 178.44 km (110.87 miles) of total tracking in operation. The network underwent rapid expansion prior to the 2011 Summer Universiad, opening 110 km (68.35 miles) of track in June 2011. Proposals for expanding the system by five more lines were accepted in July 2011 and are expected to be completed between 2015 and 2018.

Taking a cue from Hong Kong's long-term plan for 2030, Shenzhen mounted a parallel study<sup>211</sup>. In 2003, the municipal government commissioned the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design of Shenzhen to undertake a research study: "Shenzhen 2030 Development Strategy". It was published in July 2006, stating that Shenzhen shall position itself as part of an international metropolis with Hong Kong. This is a very important topic for Hong Kong. In February 2007, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's Chief Executive Mr. Donald Tsang proposed for the first time in his campaign platform that Hong Kong should develop a strategic cooperation partnership with Shenzhen to establish a world-class metropolis. In March 2007, Mr. Li Hongzhong, Secretary of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), made a favorable comment on such a proposal during the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Mr. Xu Zongheng, Mayor of Shenzhen, also made some favorable remarks to the media after the conclusion of the National People's Congress (NPC).

It has been argued that the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), in many aspects has already been integrated economically with Hong Kong. The new perspective of collaboration in the social and cultural dimensions is becoming crucial to synergize the concept of a Hong Kong-Shenzhen mega-metropolis. According to the "Building a Hong Kong-Shenzhen Metropolis Research Report", Hong Kong-Shenzhen Metropolis is not a concept that is being force-fed to Hong Kong and Shenzhen. It is an instinctive judgment of the current status of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen relationship and a generalization of the pattern of change in the history of cooperation between the two cities. Solid facts from practices are the basis of all concepts, as well as subsequent policy proposals derived therefrom.<sup>212</sup>

---

211 "Hong Kong 2030 Planning Vision and Strategy," available at [http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland\\_en/p\\_study/comp\\_s/hk2030/index.htm](http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/hk2030/index.htm); "Shenzhen 2030 Development Strategy," available at <http://www.szpl.gov.cn/main/sz3/index.html>.

212 Bauhinla Foundation Research Center (2007).



This statement exactly reflects the evolution of Shenzhen's urban development in the past 30 years. From a backyard wetland to center of the arena, the Hong Kong-Shenzhen cooperation promises "one country, two systems". This new perspective will definitely lead to a revival of the planning culture of Shenzhen anew, in terms of administrative systems, political situations, economic policies, and legal framework.

In 2010, the State Council approved the fourth Master Plan of Shenzhen City 2010-2020<sup>213</sup>. According to the plan, in Shenzhen by 2020 the control of the urban resident population shall be less than 11 million people and urban construction of land shall be limited to 890 km<sup>2</sup>. The master plan determines the 1953 km<sup>2</sup> of urban planning area by implementing unified planning and management. For the downtown core, it focuses on improving the urban functions by forming a "three-axis, two corridors and multi-center" structure, based on which the axis and corridors of the structure will integrate the joint-clusters of sub-centers.

To enhance the development of the coastal zones, planning and guidance, strict control of land reclamation, conservation, and rational use of coastal resources are emphasized to properly handle the relationship between development and protection. Hopefully, this would strengthen the villages in these zones, urban-rural reform and improvement, and promote the coordinated development of urban and rural areas (Figure 7.8).

## 深圳市城市总体规划（2010-2020）

THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF SHENZHEN CITY (2010-2020)

城市布局结构规划图



Figure 7.8 Overall Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 2010-2020  
Source: Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen.

I would like to summarize in a few points as follows after the review of the urban development of Shenzhen. An overview of Five-Year Plans (FYPs) is given in Table 7.3.

Even though the major urban development is under the guidance of the central policy and guidance of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), very often, regulations and approaches are created anew based on adjustment to the local conditions.

- 1 Even though the major urban development is under the guidance of the central policy and guidance of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), very often, regulations and approaches are created anew based on adjustment to the local conditions.
- 2 In the early stage of urban development, the main emphasis and focus was to build Shenzhen as an industry-led export zone. This changed due to the unexpected success of the urban growth. During the ten years after the first master plan, urban planning could not manage the fast urban development and became quickly outdated.

- 3 During the implementation time of the third master plan (Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 1996-2010), Shenzhen's urban development entered a period of stable growth. The planning scheme began to focus on both urban expansion and urban spatial quality, and the basic urban feature of Shenzhen was gradually shaped by the diversity of urban characteristics.
- 4 In the fourth master plan period (Master Plan of Shenzhen City, 2010-2020), Shenzhen became one metropolitan region. The urban planning of the city's future was integrated in regional plans, which brought up the question to what extent the Hong Kong-Shenzhen link will proceed further.

Year	Five-Year Plans (FYPs)	City Plan and Strategy	Surface (km <sup>2</sup> )	Planned area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Planned Population
1976	Fifth FYP. 1976-1980				
1977					
1978		Draft Shenzhen City Master Plan		10.65	Long term: 100,000 (2000)
1979	Establishment of "Export SAR".	Shenzhen City Master Plan	Bao'an County became Shenzhen Municipality	35	Long term: 300,000 (2000)
1980	Fifteenth meeting of the Standing Committee of Fifth National People's Congress decided: Approval of "Guangdong Province Special Economic Zone Ordinance"  "Export SAR" was renamed "Special Economic Zones"	The first Overall Master Plan of SSEZ (version of 1980s).	Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEEZ): 327.5  West-to-east: 49km and north-to-south: 7km.	64.5	Short term: 300,000 (1990)  Long term: 600,000 (2000)
1981	Sixth FYP. 1981-1985			98	Long term: 1,000,000 (2000)
1982		Shenzhen Special Economic Zone socio-economic Development Plan Outline			
1983					
1984	Macro-economic control.  "Regulation of Urban Planning"	Second Socio-Economic Development Plan (1984-1989)			
1985					

Year	Five-Year Plans (FYPs)	City Plan and Strategy	Surface (km <sup>2</sup> )	Planned area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Planned Population
1986	Seventh FYP. 1986-1990	The second Overall Master Plan of SSEZ 1986- 2000 (version of 1986s)		123	2000: 800,000 (permanent residents) 300,000 (temporary residents)
1987					
1988		Promulgation of "Ordinance of land management" and "Housing reform program"			
1989	"Urban Planning Act"	Modification of the second Overall Master Plan of SSEZ  According to (Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Urban Development Strategy), planning area was expanded to include the whole Shenzhen city into four rankings:  1. SSEZ, world city. 2. Bao'an and Longong central district, first tier satellite city. 3. Fu-jong etc, second tier satellite city. 4. The rest, third tier satellite city.	1. SSEZ: 327.5 2. 115.00 and 124.00 3. 233.3 4. 2020.00	123	1.1,44 million 2. 218,000 and 110,000 3. 320,000 4. 728,000
1990					
1991	Eighth FYP. 1991-1995	Draft Ten-year Plan for Socio-economic Development in Shenzhen and the Eighth Five-Year Plan			
1992					
1993		Modification of Shenzhen Overall Master Plan		170	1,500,000- 1,700,000 (2000)
1994		Guideline for modification of Shenzhen Overall Master Plan			
1995	Pearl River Delta Regional Plan	Municipal government approved the outline for modifying the Shenzhen Overall Master Plan  Draft "Shenzhen City Urban Planning Ordinance"		Urban land use: 100m <sup>2</sup> /capita	5,000,000 (2010)
1996	Nineth FYP. 1996-2000	Draft third Shenzhen Overall Master Plan : Shenzhen Overall Master Plan 1996-2010 (version of 1996s)	Planning area: 2,020 Built-up area: 380 (SSEZ: 130) in 2000; 480 (SSEZ: 160) in 2010. Urban land use: 112m <sup>2</sup> / capita		Short term plan: 1996-2000 Long term plan: 2001-2010
1997	Hand-over of Hong Kong				
1998		"Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen" Introducing Statutory Plan System (Fadingtuze)			
1999		"Regulation of the technical requirement for the Statutory Plan of Shenzhen"			

Year	Five-Year Plans (FYPs)	City Plan and Strategy	Surface (km <sup>2</sup> )	Planned area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Planned Population
2000		The Third Overall Master Plan of SSEZ 1996-2010, approved by State Council		Three major clusters within SSEZ:  a. Central Urban Cluster: 74 (Futian District and Luohu-Shang-bu area).  b. Eastern urban Cluster: 15 (Shatou-jiao, Yantian and Meisha areas)  c. Nabshan Urban Cluster: 72	a: 1.15 million b: 180,000 c: 470,000
2001	Tenth FYP. 2001-2005	Tenth Five-Year Plan for socio-economic development in Shenzhen			
2002					
2003					
2004					
2005		Implementation Measures for the Integration of Shenzhen into the Pan-Pearl River Delta.			
2006	Eleventh FYP. 2006-2010	Eleventh Five-year Plan socio-economic Development in Shenzhen "Shenzhen 2030 City Development Strategy" Draft fourth Shenzhen Overall Master Plan Shenzhen Overall Master Plan 2010-2020 (version of 2010)			
2007		Shenzhen/Hong Kong Innovation Circle Cooperation Agreement			
2008					
2009					
2010		The Fourth Shenzhen Master Plan of Shenzhen City 2010-2020, approved by State Council		Planning area: 1953 Built-up area: 890	Long term: 11 million (2020)
2011	Twelfth FYP. 2011-2015	Twelfth Five-Year Plan for socio-economic development in Shenzhen			
2012					

*Table 7.3 The highlights of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) and the making of Master Plans for Shenzhen  
Constructed by author*

Clearly, the future critical role of Shenzhen in the regional economic development of the Greater Pearl River Delta (PRD) is two-fold. Due to the proactive planning culture of Shenzhen under a constrained framework at the central level, planning Shenzhen with limited available land for urban growth local government and planners had no choice but to learn through trial and error. In addition, imaginative and bold administrative, legal, and planning measures helped to accommodate the dynamic challenges of various economic entities in the transitional process and made Shenzhen a world city in Asia with a "socialist market economy".

## § 7.2 Planning Shenzhen in Practice

Although urban development and urban land use is basically a local issue for cities, many important policies from the central government to ensure the national interest set goals and present constraints and limitations. After the practice of the socialist market economy, although with most of the authority and responsibility for urban land use planning and control delegated to the local government, the central government keeps the power to withdraw this at any time. Therefore, the interaction between the central government guidance and local operation in daily practice of urban development is crucial. The evolution of planning involves three types of reform: of administration, of planning formation, and of planning execution. Overlooking these, it shows that administrative intervention is the most important instrument to lay the groundwork for directing planning execution.

### § 7.2.1 Administration and Management of Planning

When the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was established in 1980, its administrative system was just a copy of the highly centralized and unified management model of the socialist administrative system of China. The adoption of the open-door policy was not just an economic experiment because it required concomitant institutional changes in the central, regional, and local government. It was difficult for Shenzhen, as a frontier experimental base, to accommodate market elements in a centrally planned economy, which was new to the country. However, under the national structure of planning sectors during the past 30 years, intended to cope with the evolving demands of building a socialist market economy, eight major rounds of administrative reforms within the Shenzhen city government were carried out. As a part of this reform, the departments within the municipal government responsible for urban planning were restructured. These eight rounds of reform were proposed and implemented in 1981-1983, 1984-1985, 1986, 1988, 1991-1993, 2001, 2003-2004, and 2009<sup>214</sup>.

## 1. 1981-1983

When Shenzhen was established, the government was built on the administrative structure of Bao'an County. The old system, characterized by central-structure of power, an oversized bureaucracy, overlapping of administration and economy, and low efficiency, was not suitable for the establishment of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The first administrative reform, which took place in 1981-1983, aimed at decentralization, establishment of a large-scale system of management, and changing government bureaus and executive units into "economic entities". For instance, management units within the government responsible for staple products, resources, construction, foreign trade, and commerce were transformed into economic enterprises. The number of vice mayors was reduced from 19 to 8, and the number of cadres was cut with 60 percent, from over 2,200 to 800 (NG 2005: 128).

In this period, the responsible department of urban planning has been restructured in total three times based on the redistribution of administrative powers initially. When the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was established, the responsible department of urban planning in the municipal government was the Urban Construction Bureau. In 1980, the planning and land-use divisions merged into the new Urban Planning and Design Bureau, which, in 1981, split: the design function belonging to the Office of Projects, and planning belonging to the Urban Planning Bureau. They were both subordinate to the Land Management Bureau of the central government.

## 2. 1984-1985

The second focus of reform was to strengthen the government's macro-control functions and improve the macro-control mechanism to enrich the management system. New advisory committees were set up for economic development, industry, import, export, and urban planning, as were new offices for infrastructure, financial trade, transportation, and agricultural trade. This reform was set to support the development of export. Four committees (Social and Economic Development Committee, Industrial Development Board, Board of Urban Planning, and Committee of Import and Export) and five offices (Infrastructure, Finance and Trade, Transportation, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, and Culture and Education) were newly installed. The function of the offices was to assist the mayor in inspection and guidance of the system.

In general, the basic administrative structure of urban planning in Shenzhen followed that of the previous period.

### 3. 1986-1987

The third administrative reform, which took place two years later in 1986, aimed at improving the coordination, consultation, and monitoring functions of the government. Like the reform of the civil service system and politics, this separated party and government functions, improved the legal system, improved the system of dialogue between different parties, and more.

In this period, the basic administrative structure of urban planning in Shenzhen again followed that of the previous period. However, the decentralization had empowered the local government to practice urban planning by planning management reform. The Urban Planning Bureau was no longer subordinate to the Central Committee; instead, it was directly under the supervision of the municipal Urban Planning Committee<sup>215</sup>.

### 4. 1988

The fourth reform focused on economic development and the management practices of the infrastructure agencies. Executive control over the establishment of economic enterprises was terminated.

In 1987, Shenzhen's municipal government implemented a two-level management, streamlining agencies, ministries, commissions, offices, and bureaus. The Urban Planning Bureau was under the supervision of the Urban Planning Committee. Under the Urban Planning Bureau, there was a Planning Office, a Planning Department, a Construction Department, a Land Use Department, and the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design of Shenzhen.

In general, all the reforms of the 1980s aimed at simplifying government structure and decentralizing power to enhance efficiency. They also showed a lack of a model to follow; Shenzhen had to grope for a suitable regulatory regime to cope with an economy that had been developing by leaps and bounds.

---

215

Yet the decentralization allowed the local planning authority to gradually gain the administrative power of planning. However, at this time, the division of the actual responsibility between different bureaus and offices was still blurrily defined. The Urban Planning Committee of this period was more a legal review and approval organization but not a legal decision-making organization like the role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) latter in 1998.



## 5. 1991-1993

Since 1992, the government has deepened administrative reforms. Due to the increase of foreign investment and trade, the government has realized the need to reform its administrative system to complete its move towards a market economy.

The watershed occurred when the National People's Congress (NPC) made a significant amendment to the Constitution by endorsing the term "socialist market economy" to replace the old term "planned economy" in 1993. It is commonly said that a market economy is a rule-of-law economy. For this reason, law is indispensable to the development of the Chinese market-oriented economy and the new type of governance over economic activities (Paler 2005 and Zou Keyuan 2006).

Drafting of the Legislation Law began following the eighth National People's Congress (NPC) in 1993. It took seven years, from 1993 to 2000, to move from drafting to passage of the Legislation Law, attesting to the number, interest, and power of the various actors engaged in the process (Paler 2005: 303). This law represents an attempt by the National People's Congress (NPC) to rationalize China's legal system, establish a uniform legislative hierarchy, and consolidate its authority over other important lawmaking institutes<sup>216</sup>.

The fundamental administrative reform began in 1993 when the new Civil Services Regulations were promulgated, which reinforced the separation of administration and economic enterprises.

According to the 1993 Provisional Regulations on Civil Servants: 1) civil servants are to be recruited into the service through open, competitive examinations, rather than through labor allocation; 2) civil servants are to be paid according to levels of compensation paid to managers of economic enterprises; and 3) the content of training for civil servants is to be revamped to meet the needs of a market economy (Burns 1993: 355). Within this framework, training for senior civil servants is provided by various agencies, including the National School of Administration and the Central Party School, both located in Beijing. The training infrastructure also includes cadre and party schools established at all levels of the administrative hierarchy. Education levels of leading officials in China have risen dramatically in the past 20 years. Currently, more than 80 percent of all those working at

---

216

Paler (2005:301) argued that the politics behind the Law's development offer insight into the balance of power in China's lawmaking arena, revealing how key institutions—the National People's Congress (NPC), the State Council, and local People's Congresses—engaged in bureaucratic bargaining over fundamental questions of their existence and authority within an evolving system.

ministry, bureau, and division levels of the central government are university graduates. Official policy gives a high priority to training, and local governments in particular are now buying training opportunities for their employees from universities in China and from overseas and regional providers (Zou Keyuan 1998: 205).

This round of administrative reform focused on restructuring the government for a market economy. This involved: 1) strengthening macro-economic management functions and agencies (such as banking, taxation, auditing, statistics collection, and setting up new agencies to regulate newly established stock markets); 2) transferring economic production functions to enterprises and abolishing government departments with economic production functions (parts of many government departments were corporatized); and 3) downsizing.

On the level of central government, the Ministry of Planning and Land Management was set up to take over the functions of the Ministry of Construction. Shenzhen's urban planning administrative structure followed the same procedure. To coordinate coherent management, the former flat structure of urban management became vertical and decentralized in each district and was led by a responsible office. To integrate the land-use planning and urban planning, Shenzhen's Urban Planning and Land Resources Bureau was established. Planning Departments and Urban Design Departments were established. Combining planning and land management was a bold and innovative move for planners in Shenzhen. In 1998 the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality<sup>217</sup> set up an urban planning system centering on statutory detailed planning, and defined the legal statue of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ)<sup>218</sup> through local legislation.

## 6. 2001

The requirements from the WTO constituted a second main factor for the transformation in China's legal environment and law enforcement rationale and methods. As a WTO member, China brought relevant laws and regulations in line with those of the organization; those that were in conflict with WTO rules were revised and/or abolished. The WTO requires its member governments to behave in accordance with its requirements, including transparency and accountability.

---

217 *Shenzhen Cheng Shih Gui Hua Tiao Li* (simplified Chinese: 深圳市规划条例; traditional Chinese: 深圳市規劃條例).

218 *Shenzhen Cheng Shih Gui Hua Wei Yuan Hui* (simplified Chinese: 深圳城市规划委员会; traditional Chinese: 深圳城市規劃委員會) and the successor of Urban Planning Committee.

## 7. 2003-2004

The focus of the seventh reform was to integrate government agencies and to enhance government functions in the public domain and to strengthen the government's public service function. The government has attached great importance to finding solutions for the reduction of the overlap of functions between government agencies. Based on the concept to build a "Scientific and Harmonious Society" proposed by Hu Jintao in 2004, the intention was also to realize further transformation of the government functions, to protect the configuration of government institutions, to adjust the division of functions of government institutions, to improve management level, and to form an administrative system featuring standardized behaviors, coordinated operations, fairness and transparency, honesty and high efficiency (Wang Yukai 2008).

In 2003, due to the restructured organization on the national level, a newly created National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was established, that gained greater responsibility and power in overseeing China's economic development.

In 2004, the State Council laid down and issued a "Program for Comprehensively Implementing Government Administration in Accordance with the Law", clarifying the guiding ideology, specific goals, fundamental principles and requirements, major tasks, and steps for comprehensively implementing government administration in the following ten years. It is a landmark in the history of government law construction, manifesting that administration in accordance with the law has stepped into a new stage.

In general, following the previous structure, the Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau is responsible for the urban planning and urban project development of the entire city. Under the bureau, three major offices are responsible for different tasks: the Chief Planner Office for the comprehensive plan and long term strategy; the Urban Planning Office for the District Plan and Detailed Control Plan; and the Department of Urban and Architectural Design for the Detailed Blueprint Plan and the final control of the implementation and urban design guidelines.

With regard to directing and supervising the implementation of construction project plans, the role of the Urban Planning Bureau is to regulate the use of construction-purpose land; to issue the Comment Paper on Construction Project Location, the Urban Planning Permit for Construction-purpose Land, the Urban Planning Permit for Construction Project (also known as "One Paper and Two Permits"), as well as the plan drawings for construction-purpose land; to relocate construction projects as required by the overall urban plans; to direct and supervise the public bidding procedures for urban designs; to review construction projects for fitting into the urban planning and to provide relevant administration; to inspect construction projects for fitting to the

urban planning; and to direct and supervise landscape survey work for construction projects<sup>219</sup>.

After reviewing the evolution of administrative reform we can summarize different key components triggered the carrying out of the reforms. The first six rounds of Shenzhen governmental reform have focused on streamlining government organization and staff size to improve efficiency in coherent with the central policy of institutional reform which is mentioned in Chapter 6.2. At these stages, the key direction of government and institutional reforms was to support economic development. The government's function in urban development and urban planning is rather passive. Lacking consistent guidance by law from the central government, the reform of the municipal government was basically following the demands of locally predominant market mechanisms.

Gradually, the roles of decision-making, execution, and supervision became clear in the WTO era. The seventh round of reform in 2003 was aimed at strengthening public administration and services. After the transition of the Chinese leadership from the Third Generation to the so-called Fourth Generation, the "Program for Comprehensively Implementing Government Administration in Accordance with the Law" issued by the State Council in 2004 ushered a new era of administrative reform in China. According to this document, China will spend ten years constructing a rule of law government by 2015. "The document provided six basic requirements for a law-based administration: lawful administration; reasonable administration; rightful procedure; efficiency and provision of convenience for the people; honesty; and power and responsibility. It offers guidelines on other areas of administration to deepen the institutional reform in compliance with relevant laws" (Zou Keyuan 2006: 7).

In general, in comparison with the previous stage of reform, implementing law-based administration reinforces administrative transparency. Governments at all levels in China have to rethink and change their methods of administration and governance. From 2003 to July of 2007, 33 legislation proposals had been submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), and 125 administrative regulations were enacted. Among them were 52 laws and regulations on economic regulation and market supervision, and 106 on social management and public service (Wang Yukai: 3).

---

219

See "Shenzhen Municipal Bureau of Urban Planning," Shenzhen News (2006), available at [http://www.sznews.com/english/content/2006-03/29/content\\_69464.htm](http://www.sznews.com/english/content/2006-03/29/content_69464.htm).

The law is becoming more and more important in government management. The law also is designed to limit the government's power, to establish adequate administrative procedures, and to foster the concept of responsible governance. There are a number of special laws regarding administration in China, such as the Law on Administrative Licensing, the Law on Administrative Punishment and the Law on Civil Servants (Zou Keyuan 2006: 9).

#### 8. 2009 onward-

The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the 2nd Plenum of the 17th Communist Party of China Central Committee both made the important disposition of carrying out a "super ministry system"<sup>220</sup> to further the administrative system reform in 2008 (Xinhua news agency 2008a). "Opinions on Deepening the Administrative Reform" were passed by the Communist Party of China (CPC). The report states "China is facing a new circumstance and new missions" (Xinhua news agency 2008a). "The existing problems of the current administration include cross functions, separation of responsibility and authority power". The Party called for a new round of reforms in government functions. In March 2008, a new round of reforms was launched under the name of "Institutional Reform of the State Council" (Xinhua news agency 2008b).

This round of reforms emphasized improving people's livelihoods and strengthening social management. Reform of the "super ministry system" was borrowed from the United Kingdom (Dong 2010). Five giant-departments were set up on the central level: the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Industry and Information, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Urban-Rural Construction and Housing, and the Ministry of Transport (Xinhua news agency 2008b). The giant-department became the first step in separating powers in policy making, implementation, and supervision from each other with the expectation that further reforms will establish a perfect administrative system with Chinese characteristics by 2020 (Xinhua news agency 2008c).

Within this framework, Shenzhen, China's first Special Economic Zone (SEZ), and the first Chinese city to implement a policy of reform and open doors, published two guideline documents indicating a shift towards reform of the political system. On May 22, 2008, the Shenzhen municipal government website published a draft document

---

220

The giant department ("super-department or "mega-department") could possibly help counteract departmentalism, although supposedly unitary departments in their own rights, in practice, sometimes failed to develop cohesion. They were, moreover, difficult to manage. See Greenwood et al. (2001: 40).

outlining a 19-point reform program for Shenzhen. The first 8 points focused on political, governmental, and administrative reforms and the remaining 11 points dealt with economy, society, education, health, and culture. The points dealing with intra-Party democracy, grassroots democracy, and reform of the election mechanism attracted the most attention. In June, the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee adopted a resolution on adhering to reform and open doors. Provisions regarding the development of socialist democratic politics and the promotion of reform of the political system were included in the resolution, including reform of the mechanism for appointing cadres and making key policy (China.org.cn, 2008).

The practice followed the central policy of reform of “giant-departments”; Shenzhen pioneered this practice. The most prominent and ambitious item in this package is the reform of the administrative system, which divides the municipal government departments into three categories, namely decision-making, execution, and supervision. The specialty of this round of reform was tagged as an experiment in “separation of powers”. The draft of Shenzhen’s reform program focused on democratic politics and a service-oriented government, and presents 19 different systemic reform proposals, covering issues like the election of National People’s Congress (NPC) deputies, the selection and appointment of cadres, inner-Party democracy, reform of the judicial system, and anti-corruption measures<sup>221</sup>.

“It is the first time democratic politics has been given priority, and the first attempt to formulate a systematic reform of the national political structure”, Huang Weiping, director of the contemporary Chinese Politics Research Institute in Shenzhen, emphasized (Ma Yujia 2008). On the other hand, several Party leaders from other provinces and cities publicly expressed their reservations about the Shenzhen proposals. Doubts and debates rose high among the public (China news 2008).

Ma Jingren from Shenzhen University said that democratic politics is the key to moving the reform process forward. “If we allow citizens to participate in political management, we can push the reform process onto the next stage.” “This round of political reform in Shenzhen is still on the drawing board. It is a long way from implementation,” a local official told Caijing. Le Zheng, the director of the Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences, agreed. “Now is not the

ideal time to carry out political reform," he said. "I doubt there will be any big moves within the year<sup>222</sup>.

Since 2001, Shenzhen has carried out reforms almost every year, but mostly related to economic and administrative issues. Shenzhen's reform program indicates that the municipal government's leaders have a clear understanding of the obstacles to reform and the problems existing in the political system. However, in order to cope with the requirement of central policy and in balance with the local demands of the market economy, consistently adoption of the existing administrative structure is highly required.

In July 2010, Shenzhen announced the implementation of the eighth administrative reform, said Liu Yupu, Party Chief of Shenzhen government (NEWSGD 2009):

Shenzhen will streamline government institutions by more than 30 percent by the end of October, and officially launched China's first administrative structural reform, which is being called an experiment in "the separation of powers". The plan is intended to streamline an overlapping array of government agencies, with 46 departments to be incorporated into 31.<sup>223</sup> (...) All these changes would work toward making Shenzhen a public service-oriented government by 2013—seven years earlier than the nation had expected.

According to the "Shenzhen Municipal People's Government's Institutional Reform Program", which had been approved by the central and provincial government in 2010, after the reform, the municipal government was reshuffled into three major categories: decision-making, execution, and supervision. According to the positioning of departmental functions, three types of municipal government departments were installed, namely "Commission," "Administration or Bureau," and "Office". Under the mayor, there are Policymaking Commissions, under which there are Policy Execution

---

222 *China News*, Ma Yujia (2008) available at [http://www.china.org.cn/government/local\\_governments/2008-07/04/content\\_15955536.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/local_governments/2008-07/04/content_15955536.htm).

223 Newsgd.com, 2009.  
"The reshuffle excluded seven departments at bureau level—public security, education, civil affairs, justice, auditing, checkpoints and Taiwan affairs. Seven "policymaking commissions" under the mayor will be created around core issues such as development and reform, science and trade, finance, urban planning and State land resources, traffic, hygiene and birth control, and the environment. Under the commissions, there are "policy execution" bureaus. The reform will help the government run more efficiently and will also play a positive role in checking each branch to keep the government clean, Acting Mayor Wang Rong said. "

Departments. The existing Supervision Bureau and Audit Bureau are part of a single body, which takes over all supervision functions that were before exercised by various departments (Table 7.4).

Before reform		After reform
<b>Sectors</b>		
1	Development and Reform Bureau	Development and Reform Commission
2	Trade and Industry Bureau	Science, Industry, Trade, Information technology Commission
	Science Technology and information Bureau	
	High-Tech Office	
	Free Trade zone Bureau	
3	Financial Department	Finance Commission
4	Urban Planning Bureau	Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission
	Land Resources and Housing Administration Bureau	
5	Environmental protection Bureau	Human Settlements and Environment Commission
6	Traffic Bureau	Transport Commission
	Highway Bureau	
	Communication Administration	
7	Health Bureau	Health, Population and Family Planning Commission

*Table 7.4 Newly established Commissions after Shenzhen administration reform of 2009*  
Source: Shenzhen government. Summarized and constructed by author.

Seven newly installed “policymaking commissions” are responsible for the policymaking, planning, and providing of guidelines for core issues such as development and reform, science and trade, finance, urban planning and state land resources, traffic, hygiene and birth control, and the environment.

In addition, administrations and bureaus are responsible for the implementation and regulatory functions. Ten departments at the bureau level were established for public security, education, civil affairs, justice, auditing, checkpoints, and Taiwan affairs. Vertically, regarding the reinforcement of policy and execution between the commissions and bureaus, certain commissions are responsible for coordination of the cross-department affairs.

For historical reasons, administrative intervention had been the most important instrument of urban land use management and urban development in the pre-Maoist period (Han Haoying 2006: 5). In the case of Shenzhen, the evolution of administrative reform from the very beginning demonstrated how the decisive moments came from both top-down and bottom-up forces. This was the case during the second reform



conducted under the “law-based administration” by the central government and the recent initiative toward the third round of “testing political reform” by the local government based on the approval of the central government.

Overall, without the high praise and support of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the state, Shenzhen’s institutional innovation would not continue. Shenzhen’s experiences in institutional innovation have provided China with practical grounds for the revision of the Constitution and the Land Administrative Law. Shenzhen is also the first city in China to introduce the public bidding mode for construction projects. Many successful experiences have since been applied throughout China.

### § 7.2.2 Establishment of Planning System

---

In the domain of urban planning, a general top-down urban planning framework contributes to set up the outline of the urban development strategy, yet the urban planning in practice needs to confront many unexpected conditions originating from local initiatives. Urban development, land use management, and economic growth management in China involve both the central and local governments. In Chapter 7, I elaborate the overall planning system from the central level and perspective. Herewith, in the framework of central guidance and local execution concepts, three entities directly influence the evolution of the local planning practice. The first is the administrative structure of the government; the second one is embedded in the entire system of government sectors responsible for planning; the third one is the framework of the planning system. Each entity contains elements of the overall legal system of the local planning practice.

Firstly, to place Shenzhen in the framework of the broader administrative structure, one must recall briefly the administrative structure of the government<sup>224</sup>.

---

224

Since the founding of China, the designation of the central government entities corresponding to the development and changing political and economic situations have experienced adjustment. See more in Chapter 6.1.3.

The new Chinese Constitution<sup>225</sup> in 1982 reaffirmed that the local authorities at the province, municipality, county, district, and township levels consisted of the People's Committee and the People's Government. In this framework, the government entities were divided into five levels: national (central government), provincial, prefecture, county, and township (village). Each administrative level is well defined.

The provincial level is the highest level of local government and includes provincial, autonomous regions, and municipal governments (of the directly governed municipalities). A standard provincial government is nominally led by a provincial committee, headed by a secretary. The committee secretary is the first in charge of the province; second is the governor of the provincial government. The municipality (*Zhixiashi*) is the highest level of city and is directly under the Chinese government, with a status equal to that of the provinces. In practice, their political statuses are higher than common provinces. Administrative chiefs (mayors) of a municipality generally have the same rank as a division minister (*Buchang*)<sup>226</sup> of a national ministry. An autonomous region (*Zizhiqu*)<sup>227</sup> is a minority entity, which has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group along with a local government, and theoretically has more legislative rights than other local governments of the same administrative level. The governor of an autonomous region is usually appointed from the respective ethnic minority.

The second level is the city level and included cities under the jurisdiction of the provinces, prefectures, autonomous prefectures, and districts under the jurisdiction of the cities. Administrative chiefs (mayors) of prefectural level cities generally have the same rank as a division chief (*Sichang*)<sup>228</sup> of a national ministry.

When Shenzhen was established, its administrative rank was upgraded from county (Bao'an County) to the newly created category of cities separately listed in the province's economic planning as "city specifically designated in the state plan"

---

225 The 1982 Constitution was subsequently amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004, generally modifying the document in accordance with economic and political reforms over that period. The current compilation dates from March 14, 2004. See also Chiu Hungdah (1985).

226 *Buchang* (simplified Chinese: 部长; traditional Chinese: 部長).

227 Currently, there are five autonomous regions (*Zizhiqu*) in China: Xinjiang Uyghur, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Ningxia and Guangxi autonomous regions.

228 *Sichang* (simplified Chinese: 司长; traditional Chinese: 司長).

(*Jihuadanlieshi*)<sup>229</sup>, under the jurisdiction of Guangdong province. This category was newly installed in the 1980s to underpin the administrative status of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Due to their special roles in national plans, they are not exactly the same as prefecture-level cities. They were granted provincial level economic management authority, but not provincial level administrative authority. Unlike prefecture-level cities, Shenzhen in the very early period did not have to remit revenue to the provincial government<sup>230</sup>; instead, it was directly controlled by the central government. Until 1993, there were in total fourteen cities specifically designated in the state plan (*Jihuadanlieshi*): Chongqing (in 1983), Wuhan (1984), Shenyang (1984), Dalian (1984), Guangzhou (1984), Xi'an (1984), Harbin (1984), Qingdao (1986), Ningbo (1987), Xiamen (1988), Shenzhen (1988), Changchun (1989), Chengdu (1989), and Nanjing (1989).

In 1994, a level of administrative entity was created out of prefecture-level cities, namely, the sub-provincial level, similar to prefecture-level cities ruled by a province but administrated independently in regard to economy and law. Normally, a sub-provincial level refers to an administrative unit that comprises a main central urban area and its much larger surrounding rural area containing many smaller cities, towns, and villages. The mayor or chairman of a sub-provincial level is equal in status to a vice governor of a province. Its status is below that of municipalities, which are independent and equivalent to provinces, but above others; they are completely ruled by their provinces.

Within this framework, the original fourteen cities specifically designated in the state plan (*Jihuadanlieshi*) were identified as sub-provincial level cities, and two additional were added to the list: Hangzhou and Jinan. After 1997, Chongqing was made a directly governed municipality (*Zhixiashi*)<sup>231</sup>; reducing the remaining sub-provincial level cities to fifteen<sup>232</sup>.

- 
- 229 *Jihuadanlieshi* (simplified Chinese: 计划单列市; traditional Chinese: 計劃單列市).
- 230 Shenzhen enjoyed preferential treatment in tax and tariff reductions and exemptions as well as preferential fiscal arrangements.
- 231 The current on list directly governed municipalities (*Zhixiashi*) are: Beijing (1949-), Shanghai (1949-), Tianjin (1949-1958 and 1967-) and Chongqing (1949-1954 and 1997-).
- 232 The original fourteen sub-provincial cities were created on February 25, 1994 by the Central Organization Committee out of prefecture-level cities. Among them, the remaining five cities specifically designated in the state plan (*Jihuadanlieshi*) are Shenzhen, Ningbo, Qingdao, Xiamen, and Dalian, and the rest cities are the capitals of the provinces in which they are located. See Baidu Encyclopedia.

Shenzhen as a city specifically designated in the state plan (*Jihuadanlieshi*) had a special administrative and economic status and it was granted a specific government sector responsible for planning as that of sub-provincial level cities.

In Chapter 6 is shown that there are three major government sectors at the national level that control the urban-rural land use planning: the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHRUD); all three ministries and commissions have their corresponding local sectors to execute the land management function in Shenzhen.

After the administrative reform of Shenzhen in 2009, two corresponding local sectors were in charge of urban growth and development and management: the Development and Reform Commission (DRC) and the Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission (UPLRC).

The Development and Reform Commission (DRC) of Shenzhen Municipality is the local corresponding sector of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to undertake coordination of national economic and social development, responsible for implementation of national, provincial and municipal laws, regulations, and policies on economic and social development. It formulates the economic and social development strategies of mid to long term annual plans, carrying out the implementation of planning after approval and convergence of the overall urban planning, land use planning, human settlement development planning, and other special plans and regional plans.

Corresponding to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Development and Reform Commission (DRC) of Shenzhen Municipality ensures that the national economic and social policies are well carried out locally, following the Five-Year Plans (FYPs).

The second sector is the Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission (UPLRC) of Shenzhen Municipality. Before 2009, the execution of land-use development and urban planning development was divided into two different departments. One was the Land Resources and Housing Administration Bureau, which is in charge of the land-use management and housing development management and was the corresponding local sector of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) in Shenzhen. The second one was the Urban Planning Bureau. At the central level, housing management is normally under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHRUD).

The major functions of the Land Resources and Housing Administration Bureau are executing the state, province, and municipal laws, regulations, rules, and policies

on the administration of land, minerals, housing, and mapping; formulating and implementing local administration regulations, rules, and policies; organizing to draw up and implement overall plans for land exploitation and plans for state-owned land; drawing up plans for land development, exploitation, and renovation; managing land requisition, allocation, selling, transferring, and changing; auditing construction land projects and submitting these projects to higher authorities for approval; conducting overall management of the land and housing administration and registration in both rural and urban areas; being responsible for the confirmation, transfer, registration, and issuance of the licenses for land and house property rights; and investigating and arbitrating disputes of house property rights and of compensation for resettlement.

The Urban Planning Bureau was the main executive sector of urban construction before the 2009 reform. In general, its responsibilities can be summarized in three tasks: research and drafting plans, supervision of implementation of construction projects plans, and implementation of national and provincial regulations, policies, and guidelines on urban planning (Du 2006). In doing so, the Urban Planning Bureau took on the daily work of the Shenzhen municipal Urban Planning Committee.

Since the reform of 2009, to enhance administrative efficiency and to avoid the confusing overlap of responsibilities of the departments and the lack of coordination between land-use management and urban spatial planning and construction, Shenzhen Municipality merged the above-mentioned two different departments into one mega-commission, namely, the Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission. Following the decentralization policy, it set up the representative offices in different districts to be responsible for implementation and management of city planning within their respective administrative districts.

The Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission has six major duties: urban planning, land-use management, real estate management, mapping management, geographical environment management, and names management<sup>233</sup>. In this framework, all the plans that are related to the urban land-use development, urban construction development, urban renewal, and urban strategic development are operated under this commission. Its function is to provide a link between the drafting and directing of plans for the city by following the overall guideline of the socio-economic development plans down to the implementation status and providing supervision and monitoring of the implementation of construction projects.

The last entity regarding urban planning is the entire framework of the planning system: the socioeconomic development plan, the overall plan of land utilization system, and the urban and rural plan system.<sup>234</sup>

Following the Five-Year-Plans (FYPs) for the central socio-economic development, the local government is responsible for drafting guidelines to adopt local socio-economic development in the master plans, such as the socio-economic strategic plan drafted in 1982; the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Socio-economic Development Plan Outline and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Urban Development Strategy in 1989; the Ten-year Plan for Socio-economic Development in Shenzhen; the eighth Five-Year-Plan (FYP) in 1991; the Socio-economic Development Strategy and the ninth Five-Year-Plan (FYP) in 1996; and the tenth Five-Year-Plan (FYP) for Socio-economic Development in Shenzhen in 2000.

As stipulated in the Urban Planning Law, there was only a two-tier framework<sup>235</sup> in which the comprehensive plan and the detailed plan apparently lacked coordination.

Due to the pragmatic demands of efficiency and the technical feasibility to justify urban planning decisions being gradually weighted, according to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Urban Development Ordinance in 1989, Shenzhen evolved into the “three-tier five-phase” planning system.

During this period, at the top of the system is the City Comprehensive Plan that outlines the city’s general function, the planned target size of the city, the standards, norms, and criteria for main construction in the city, the land use structure, and the comprehensive transportation system. It also includes the objective of regional coordination with the other cities in the PRD. The second level is the Sub-regional Plan that coordinates the growth among different regions to ensure the continuity and integrity of the City Comprehensive Plan. At this time, the development of the urban area and the non-urban areas were not incorporated in one plan. The Sub-regional Plan can help to fill the gap between the areas covered and not covered in the Comprehensive Plan.

---

234 See Chapter 6:2.3 System of Plans.

235 Urban Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China, Art. 18.  
“The plan for a city shall as a rule, be worked out in two stages, i.e. comprehensive planning and detailed planning. For large and medium-size cities, district planning may be conducted on the basis of comprehensive planning in order to further control and define the use of land and determine the scope and capacity of each plot and to coordinate the construction of various items of infrastructure and public facilities.”

The third level, the Urban District Plan, sought to link the master plan with the needs of day-to-day development control. Although the Comprehensive Plan shows the future urban spatial structure, it does not specify the detailed land uses at the land parcel level. Urban District Planning, converting the master plan into urban land layout, attempts to complement the master plan by disaggregating land development into urban planning districts, and to achieve better coordination between master planning and detailed planning.

Under the Urban District Plan, there was a Regulatory Plan and Detailed Blueprints. Their function is to define the scope for the use of land for each construction project within the planned plot and provide the control of the utilities engineering and the plan for the site engineering. Regulatory Plans are the lowest level to control a concrete plan for the various construction projects to be undertaken in the immediate development area of the city.

From 1989 to 1997, Shenzhen experienced an enormous impact from the mechanism of the market economy in its urban development. Different explorations of urban planning approaches were applied, taken from urban planning systems from abroad, mainly from Hong Kong. Although Shenzhen had established a more advanced planning system than any other city in China at that time, negative effects were also apparent when the market force was too strong to force the adaptation of the plan (Wang Fuhai, 2000).

In 1995, Shenzhen began to draft the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality, enacted in 1998. Based on the Ordinance, Shenzhen introduced the Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*)<sup>236</sup>. According to Article 23, the techniques that formulate the Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) shall be prescribed by the Municipal Government separately. The next year, based on the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ)<sup>237</sup> promulgated the Rules for Formulating the Statutory Graphic Standard of Shenzhen to formulate the specific content of Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*). It showed that the planning system of Shenzhen had gone from technical to statutory.

The Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) System was introduced from Hong Kong. The Town Planning Board was the principal authority responsible for the statutory planning in Hong Kong. Its main duties included preparation of draft statutory plans,

---

236 *Fadingtuze* or Statutory Graphic Standard (simplified Chinese: 法定图则; traditional Chinese: 法定圖則).

237 Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ), <http://www.szpl.gov.cn/szupb/jgzr/>.

consideration of representations made in respect of the daft plans, and consideration of applications for planning permission and amendments to the plans under the provisions of the Town Planning Ordinance. The special aspect in comparison to the former stage is the integration of public participation in the planning process. The Town Planning Board is responsible for the development of Statutory Detailed Plans. According to the procedures, all Statutory Detailed Plans must be published in the Government Gazette and newspapers to inform the public and ask them for advice. In this way, the government can also balance the interests of all parties during development proposals.

Learning from Hong Kong’s Statutory Plans system, in the case of Shenzhen, the Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) was created between the existing levels of District Plans and Regulatory Plans. It further clarified the planning quality of land use functions, the development intensity, and supporting facilities. A Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) approved by the Urban Planning Board has the force of law and any unit or individual parcel cannot be changed without the approval of the Board. The Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) strengthens the spirit of the “rule of law” in urban planning and the public participation and understanding in the urban planning process.

According to the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen, the Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) comprises two parts: the graphic and the text. The Rules for Formulating Statutory Graphic Standard of Shenzhen were promulgated in 1999 and defined the content of text and graphic as follows (Table 7.5):

Text	Graphic
1 General Principle: Plot boundary and coverage	Land use property
2 Development objective and Urban function	Site plan
3 Land use type	Area number
4 Land development intensity: Floor-area ratio	Block division
5 Public utilities and facilities	Block boundary
6 Transportation system	Supporting facilities
7 Urban design	Traffic control
	Municipal Works

Table 7.5 Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) of Shenzhen City

Source: Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen, Shenzhen government. Summarized and constructed by author.

In 2000, Guangzhou’s municipal government drafted the Guangzhou Comprehensive Development Conceptual Plan, which was the first time the idea of conceptual plans and strategic plans were introduced in China. The Strategic Plan was immediately practiced in many different cities, although the Conceptual Plan and Strategic Plan



were not included in the statutory planning system. Yet it bridged the gap between the guidance of overall socioeconomic development and the implementation of spatial construction planning by providing a strategic vision for urban development. Within this framework, the aforementioned Shenzhen 2030 City Development Strategy was prepared for a long-term vision of the urban development strategy.

The new Urban and Rural Law enacted in 2007 defined a comprehensive planning system based on the concept of a coherent urban and rural entity. Following the administrative hierarchy from the national level to the local level, the establishment of the overall planning of a city or town, a township, or a village shall be based on the national socio-economic development planning as well as the overall of land use. In addition, in order to adopt the emerged urban challenges and local urban conditions, based on the Comprehensive Overall Planning system, various thematic planning systems also have been established by following national policies such as Urban Renewal Planning and Real Estate Planning. Gradually, the Shenzhen planning system was built by following every step of the administrative restructuring and embed this in the statutory framework (Table 7.6). Based on the entire planning structure, the next paragraph is to explore to what extent the body of the planning content can be put into an actual planning procedure.

National Level	Socioeconomic Development Plans				
	National Land and Resources Planning				
Provincial Level	Regional Plans (PRD regional Plans)		Guangdong Provincial Plans		
	Strategic Planning		Land Use Planning		
Shenzhen Municipal Level	Comprehensive Plans				
	1	Master Plans (period of 20 years)		Thematic Planning	
		Short-Term Construction Plans		Urban Renewal Plans	Real-Estate Planning
	2	Sub-regional Plans	Special Construction Plans		
		3 District Plans (Cluster Plans)			
	4	Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze)			
	5	Detailed Blueprints	Detailed Construction Plan		
Urban Design Guidance					

Table 7.6 Shenzhen Planning System

Source: Shenzhen government: <http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/>. Constructed by author.

### § 7.2.3 Planning Execution and Key Elements

---

According to the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality, the urban planning system of Shenzhen is centered on the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze), and defined by the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) through local legislation. The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is a decision-making board whose power lies mainly in the final review and approval of important regulatory plans in accordance with accepted statutes. This separates the acts of decision making and management in urban planning; it also makes the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) a legal organization affiliated with governmental authority as well as a decision-making organization authorized by the people's congress as an independent administrative entity. The major control of urban planning and urban-growth development occurs at the stage of regulatory plans and the final control and management of construction projects. Therefore, the creation of the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) and the establishment of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) played a crucial role in planning implementation to transfer statutory technical planning regulations to the actual execution of spatial construction. The following elaborates upon their respective functions and characteristics.

#### ***Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ)***

Although setting up this type of commission has not been the privilege solely of Shenzhen<sup>238</sup> in Chinese history, the role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is unique.

In general, the different types of urban planning boards in China are categorized according to the degree of support for local legislation and the decision-making authority in regulatory urban planning (Guo Sujun 2009; Li Kanjen 2008):

- Consultative and coordinating organization. This kind of urban planning board is common in China. Its major role is to provide advice on major urban planning and construction projects; however, as non-legal organization, its decisions are not incorporated into the governmental administrative process.

---

238

In China today, almost all the provincial capital cities and some prefecture-level cities have set up urban planning boards of various structures and functions.

- Legal review and approval organization. As its work is explicitly included in governmental administration processes, all its decisions have considerable influence in governmental decision-making; however, the final power to approve regulatory planning belongs to the municipal government and its urban planning departments.
- Legal decision-making organization. Besides its legal role of accessing and approving plans, this kind of urban planning board is established according to local legislation. It produces governmental decisions, rather than consultative opinions, that must be implemented obligatorily, which means it has the power to make the final decision to approve or override plans<sup>239</sup>. However, there still remains confusion over its nature.

To quote Chapter 2 of the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality<sup>240</sup>:

The Municipal Government shall establish an Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ). The primary duties of this Board shall be as follows: examining the drafts of a citywide overall plan, sub-regional plans, and district plans; examining the selected locations of major projects that have not been approved and are still under consideration by city planning; assigning a task to make an annual statutory graphic standard; examining and approving a statutory graphic standard, and supervising its implementation; examining and approving special plans; fulfilling other duties authorized by the municipal government.

The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) consists of 29 members, including both civil and non-civil servants. The number of civil servants among them shall not be more than 14<sup>241</sup> and non-civil servant members include experts and the public.

---

239 This type has more the characteristics related to the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ).

240 Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality. Available at [http://www.eduzhai.net/yingyu/615/763/yingyu\\_246857.html](http://www.eduzhai.net/yingyu/615/763/yingyu_246857.html).

241 The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) shall have posts of chairpersons held by the mayor of Shenzhen; the executive vice mayor; the vice mayor in charge of urban construction (vice-chairman); the administrator of each district; and representatives from municipal departments, including economy and trade, culture, education, sanitation, agriculture, and forestry and urban construction. [http://www.szpl.gov.cn/szupb/jgzn/201105/t20110506\\_63998.html](http://www.szpl.gov.cn/szupb/jgzn/201105/t20110506_63998.html).

The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) was established based on the promotion of decentralization, since the new demands of a market-oriented mechanism required a change to incorporate bottom-up processes. The role of urban planning jurisdiction is seen not only as an administrative and political endeavor, but also as a technical, social, economic, cultural, and legal embodiment. Decision-making should include officials, but also entrepreneurs, experts, and citizens. In this framework, legal access to the planning decision-making process is, importantly, open to the public.

The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is a legal body condoned by the people's congress. Thus, its authority is also endowed by the people's congress. This empowers the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) to become a legal deputy of the municipal government to make decisions regarding urban planning affairs as well as to provide a platform for experts and citizens to participate in a decision-making processes. Besides, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) was authorized as a decision-making body as part of the implementation of the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze), which makes it an intermediary in the transfer of power between the municipal government and the municipal people's congress. The approval process is distributed among three committees: the Development Strategy Committee, the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) Committee, and the Architecture and Environmental Art Committee (Guo Sujun 2009).

Although the pioneering role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is to promote democratization and expanded legislation in urban planning decision-making, this advanced local initiative is on many levels contradictory. Regarding the legal power of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) in the decision-making process, because political reform does not yet move forward equally at the central level, attempts to endow the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) with the power to review and approve Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) can be accomplished only within the framework of local legislation. Second, the unclear role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) results from the fact that while the power of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is granted by the People's Congress of Shenzhen, it is actually organized by the Shenzhen Municipal Government, most of whose members are civil servants. In addition, the nature of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) as either a legal organization or a governmental authority is vaguely defined; financially, it is not independent from the governmental administrative system but nevertheless it acts as an independent decision-making administrative entity. This conflict makes its identity rather confused. However, because of the socialist market economy and the centrally controlled political environment, such a contradiction is not surprising.

This contradictory relationship reflects the tension between economic reform and the Chinese political system. The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ), in

the attempt to legislate urban planning, will doubtless be affected by factors such as increased public participation, the development of non-governmental organizations, and the changing role of the government itself. At the frontier of the reform practice, such social institutions will need a long, gradual evolution. So far, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) and the local planning ordinance can be implemented only in regulatory planning supported by local legislation, so the question remains to what extent China's political reform will continue to support such local legislation initiatives.

Regarding planning implementation, the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality and the legal framework of Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) play an important and generally accepted role in regulating planning implementation in local urban planning practice.

As the pioneer urban planning board in China, it was inevitable for the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) to initially face challenges, but the inherent Shenzhen spirit always allows for improvement. In 2009, the recently revised Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality was specified following the spirit of new Urban and Rural Laws as well as the recent administrative reform based on the Institutional Reform Program<sup>242</sup>. In the revision of the ordinance, the emphasis on the separation of "plan examining and approving" and "urban planning management" is further clarified.

Within this framework, the new mega Urban Planning, Land, and Resources Commission (UPLRC) of Shenzhen Municipality, as the Shenzhen Municipal People's Government's administrative department of city planning, is responsible for citywide urban planning and construction management, including formulating plans, implementing plans, and approving construction projects. The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is responsible for examining and approving the drafts of plans.

In addition, under the Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission (UPLRC), the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Development Research Center is the first statutory body to meet the needs of the urban planning work in Shenzhen City. Based on performance of specific public functions as part of the market-driven management, its main functions include commitment to formulating the strategy of urban development in Shenzhen, overall urban planning, land use planning, zoning, statutory plans, special

plans, and providing technology, project and land management in urban planning.<sup>243</sup> This means that, within the commission, one major governmental agency is authorized to prepare draft plans and regulations for the entire city, and other departments are responsible for management and administrative work.

“Urban planning examination and approval” and “urban planning management” are integrated within the framework of four administrative procedures: presenting to the public for opinions, examining, approving, and public notice through the media.

The primary duty of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) is divided into two levels: examining and approving. 1) Examining. The Board is authorized to examine all the plans (including master plan, short-term plans and district plans, Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) and detailed blueprints) prepared by the municipal government. 2) Approving. The legal power to approve is limited to the special plans, Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) and detailed blueprints. The legal power to approve master plans, sub-regional plans, and district plans is still held by the People’s Congress and its standing committee, based on urban and rural law.

For example, the municipal government shall organize the formulation of a master plan. Before examining the draft of the master plan, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) shall exhibit its contents to the general public for at least 30 days and solicit suggestions from various circles and the public. The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) shall seek and consider all types of opinions, negotiate with various departments that have differing opinions on the draft plans, and arbitrate the various appeals of the public. After the examination by the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ), the master plan shall be submitted by the municipal government to the municipal people’s congress or its standing committee for examination and approval, and be reported to the state council after the Guangdong Provincial People’s Government has checked and approved the plan. After the state council’s approval of the master plan, the municipal government shall make its summary public through a notice to the media of the city within 30 days.

Strategic plans are examined and approved by the municipal people’s congress or its standing committee. While short-term plans and district plans are examined by the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) and approved by the municipal

---

243

The Shenzhen Urban Planning and Development Research Center is a think tank that, according to its characteristics, belongs to the official policy research institutes. Under Chinese law, an official policy research institute is regarded as a “government agency.” See Chapter 6.

government, only short-term plans that are part of the master plan need to be filed by the responsible department of the state council.

Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) provides technical standards for urban design and detailed blueprint plans. The process is similar to that of the master plan; the only difference is that final approval is authorized by the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ). Based on the planning implementation process, we can see that, even though they are constrained by the lack of clarity of political reform regarding to what extent local authority can be enhanced, Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) has much stronger legal force in Shenzhen to direct the actual spatial construction related to land use for construction projects. The statutory planning mechanism, created based on the demands of the Shenzhen Municipal Government's daily practice, is sometimes regarded as too advanced in China (Table 7.7).

	Shenzhen	Wuhan	Xiamen	Shanghai	Nanjing	Hong Kong	New York
<b>Nature</b>	Legal, non-standing committee and non-governmental	Legal, non-standing committee and non-governmental	Legal, non-standing committee and non-governmental	Legal, non-standing committee and non-governmental	Non-legal and non-standing committee	Legal, non-standing committee, and non-governmental	Legal, standing committee, and non-governmental
<b>Decision-making power (over regulatory plans)</b>	Review and approval (final)	Review	Review	Review	None	Review (the final review and approval is jointly made by the administrator and the legislative council)	Review (the final review and approval is decided by the council)
<b>Personnel</b>	Civil servants, experts and the public	Civil servants and experts	Civil servants, experts and the public (the ration of non-civil servant members is no less than 1/2)	Civil servants, and experts	Mainly civil servants	Director of governmental departments, officials, experts, and the public.	Chairman and six members appointed by the mayor; five members elected by five administrative districts, and one member elected by the public
<b>Main function</b>	Decision-making and consultation	Review and consultation	Review and consultation	Coordination and consultation	Consultation	Review and consultation	Legislative consultation
<b>Decision-making process</b>	Requires 2/3 majority vote	Requires 2/3 majority vote	Requires majority vote	Decision made by chairman after discussion		Requires majority vote	

Table 7.7 Types and features of Planning Committees in China and abroad  
Source: Guo Sujun (2009: 9).

	Shenzhen	Wuhan	Xiamen	Shanghai	Nanjing	Hong Kong	New York
<b>Subordinate organization</b>	Development Strategy Committee, Statutory Detailed Plan Committee, and Architectural and Environmental Art Committee	Standing Committee, Regulatory Planning Committee, and Expert Consultation Committee	Development Committee, Regulatory Planning Committee, and Building and Environment Committee	Expert Committee (three)		Metro Planning Committee, and Rural and New Town Planning Committee	
<b>Operating body</b>	Secretariat	Office	Office	Office		Secretariat	
<b>Office location</b>	Secretariat	Secretariat	Secretariat	Secretariat		Planning Department	
<b>Meeting</b>	The plenary session is held once every season; subordinate committee meetings held irregularly when necessary	The plenary session is held twice every year; the standing committee meeting is held once each month; subordinate committee meetings held irregularly	Every season	Irregularly		Regularly held on the second Friday of every month	
<b>Financing</b>	No independent finance source		Financial appropriation	No independent financing	No independent financing	Independent financing	Financial appropriation
<b>Person in charge</b>	Mayor	Mayor	Mayor	Mayor		Permanent Secretary of Housing and Planning Administration Bureau	
<b>Person in charge of operating body</b>	Director of planning bureau	Director of planning bureau	Director of planning bureau	Director of planning bureau		Deputy Director of planning department	
<b>Members</b>	29 (14 civil servants and 15 non-civil servants)	51 (31 civil servants, and 20 experts)	19 (8 civil servants and 11 non-civil servants)	About 12 (all are administrative leaders)		40 (33 non-government officials)	
<b>Member recruitment</b>	Appointed and employed by government	Appointed and employed by government	Appointed by government	Appointed by government		Appointed and employed by government	
<b>Term of office</b>	5 years	5 years	5 years			1-2 years	5 years

Table 7.7 Types and features of Planning Committees in China and abroad  
Source: Guo Sujun (2009: 9).



## ***Planning and Management of Land Use for Construction***

The last phase of planning implementation is related to the management of land use for construction projects. Since land is no longer distributed through a state-controlled mechanism, establishing the management of construction projects is one of the most important ways for the local government to control the final spatial realization. According to Urban and Rural Planning Law, “Proposal for Site Choice”, “Land Use Planning Permit”, and “Construction Project Planning Permit” are basic administrative instruments used by the local government to manage individual land lots.<sup>244</sup> In Shenzhen, this is divided into two steps: planning and management of land use for construction, and management of planned construction.

In order to enhance the efficiency, only certain types of construction projects need to submit a proposal for site choice for approval<sup>245</sup>. The procedure for obtaining a Land Use Planning Permit differs depending on how the right to use a public land was obtained. When obtaining the right to use a public land by auction bidding, the unit undertaking construction shall bring a Land Use Release Contract to get a Land Use Planning Permit; when by agreement, a unit undertaking construction shall apply to the city planning department or the representative offices for a Land Use Planning Permit before signing a Land Use Release Contract. The city planning department or the representative offices shall rely on city planning in the related area to examine and approve the design targets for planned construction land use, set the city planning design requirements, and issue a Land Use Planning Permit.<sup>246</sup>

Obtaining a Land Use Planning Permit and Land Use Release Contract is an important step in completing land acquisition. Once the use of the land is acquired, building can begin.

---

244 See Chapter 6.3.2.

245 See Urban and Rural Planning Law of PRC, Article 40. Available at [http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content\\_21899292.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21899292.htm).

246 Within 90 days after obtaining a land use planning permit, if a unit undertaking construction has neither been able to sign a land use release contract nor applied for an extension, the land use planning permit automatically becomes invalid.

The construction referred to in the ordinance includes building works and municipal works. The building works comprise buildings and structures not covered by municipal works.<sup>247</sup> Municipal works refer to public utility facilities within city planning areas. Any new construction, extended construction, and reconstruction of building works and municipal works within the city-planning region shall obtain a Construction Project Planning Permit.

The procedure to apply for a Construction Project Planning Permit shall be as follows. 1) An applicant shall bring the application, the document of approval of the construction investment, the Land Use Release Contract or the land use plan, the Land Use Planning Permit, and the statement of the related responsible specialized department evaluating the design plan and submit the design plan to the city planning department or the representative offices. Only upon approval of the abovementioned documents may preliminary design be started. 2) Preliminary designs shall be approved by the city planning department or the representative offices before the construction drawings can be started. 3) Upon approval of the first and second steps, a Construction Project Planning Permit can be issued. To avoid the situation in which land for construction projects is leased but construction is not completed on time, if construction has not been started by one year after obtaining the Construction Project Planning Permit, the permit automatically becomes invalid.

Based on the spirit of the Urban and Rural Planning Law, after a construction project is completed a unit or an individual undertaking construction shall bring a surveying and mapping report of the completed construction to the original department in charge of examination and approval and apply for check and acceptance. In this framework, Shenzhen introduced the Certificate for Check and Acceptance According to Planning. Without check and acceptance or with a conclusion of failure to meet the standard, the constructed building shall not be issued a certificate for check and acceptance according to planning and, as a result, also cannot be registered for real estate ownership or put into use.

There are three main stages during this process in which the urban planning department in charge of urban development can intervene in the design of proposed projects: 1) before the formal application takes place, the city planning department or the representative offices express their preferences; 2) when issuing the Proposal

---

247

Municipal works comprise roads, bridges, tunnels, rails, transit facilities, urban water supply, drainages works, flood-control facilities, electricity supply, lighting installations, postal and telecommunication services, cable TV, associated gas, pipelines and facilities of heating power, environmental works, sanitary facilities and other public utility facilities within the city planning region.

for Site Choice, the city planning department or the representative offices draw the design requirements from the relevant statutory graphic plan or urban design plan and, based on the submitted initial site design plan, formulate the planning and design conditions; and 3) when issuing the Land Use Planning Permit, the representative offices express detailed design requirements before the Construction Project Planning Permit is issued.

In the case of Shenzhen, the whole statutory urban planning system and the approval rights of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) have brought about a relatively transparent planning process. However, when facing a pro-growth urban development strategy, the urban design-control model does not always reach its full potential goal (Deng Zhaohua 2009).

First, the sequential design control procedure requires two-way negotiations between the developers and the local government, which means that, at each of these stages, the developer can negotiate the requirements with the city planning department or the representative offices. Therefore, the officials and planners are obliged and challenged to provide good-quality planning concepts and norms. The dilemma at this stage of control is often the extent to which compromises between the local government and the dominant developers will be made. For example, if market forces are weak and the local government has a strong desire to attract investors, it may compromise and allow developers more freedom to build more like what they want.

Second, the evolutionary urban development of Shenzhen has wrought an explosion in its population and economic indexes in a short time and, with it, the changes in local application of urban planning on a daily basis in order to resolve conflicts between state-led and market-driven policy. The city's transformation from a manufacturing zone to a regional nexus, from homogeneous to diversified, and from an industrial zone to an information-based society has been enlightening and inspiring. It demonstrates that cities like Shenzhen in contemporary China are becoming multi-dimensionally interdependent. Planning and building a city are highly challenging issues to city managers, designers, and planners, particularly in the last stage of the control process and the design outcome.

Third, diverse urban and social issues that have emerged in the transitional urban development of Shenzhen in the past few decades reflect the microcosm of transitional planning culture that contemporary China is gradually becoming. When comparing Shenzhen with typical Chinese socialist cities such as Beijing or Shanghai, or the other transitional cities in Eastern Europe and western capitalist cities, a new type of transitional city in contemporary China has risen.

Fourth, no matter how, the mechanism that China is applying cannot be easily defined based on any other mode of any country, even though the globalization of its economy pressured the Chinese government to transform its function and meet international standards of law-base framework. The speciality of Chinese reform is that some of the political factors in China's administrative reform were carefully avoided, Debates arise on whether this is the beginning of a new stage of Communist ideology (Zou Keyuan 2006: 23) like the quotation from the Asia Times states (Wang 2009):

In China, historically and at present, a government department is normally the policymaker, executor and supervisor in its jurisdiction. But some say this is a major cause of red tape, abuse of power and a lack of transparency and oversight. From this perspective, any reform that separates administrative powers would bring fundamental changes to the system of government—but it is by no means expected to lead to democratization.

I argue we would need to face the emerging term with "China's soft-landing". The concept of democratization that is defined by the Western needs to be (re-) interpreted into the Chinese context of "democratization with Chinese characteristics". A scenario that China continues to be run by an one-party regime that refuse open the political dissent, and yet continues to interwine with the rest of the world in terms of economic ties. It is still too early to say whether Shenzhen's spirit and speed create a new possibility for political reform in China. Nevertheless Shenzhen's innovative spirit can certainly inspire more reformists on all round level. The mode of further political reform in China is uncertain; for sure it is becoming an indispensable issue that China has to face in the near future.

In the next chapter, in order to deepen the understanding of the planning challenges and to confront the implementation of planning in practice, three thematic projects are chosen to illustrate in which way the production of social space has been incorporated or constrained by the planning interventions.

## 8 The Production of Space beyond Planning

The research of the Chapters 6 and 7 show that Chinese planning practice is theoretically a state-led, top-down system, which means the spatial appropriation follows the logic of the planned intervention. This precondition defines the political background in which the three projects are embedded and introduced.

In this chapter, the inquiry takes one step further to explore under the guidance of a relative successful Shenzhen planning spirit, to what extent is socio-spatial interaction integrated in the process of Shenzhen's urban development? What spatial meaning in the contemporary Chinese society can be retrieved or recognized?

To acknowledge Castell's (2005: 46) advocacy, "Spatial transformation must be understood in the broader context of social transformation: Space does not reflect society, it expresses it". Once the spatial appropriation begins to proceed, socio-spatial interaction also begins to evolve.

The socio-spatial interaction involves actors with various interests who are appropriating space simultaneously. Spatial transformation has a specific introverted mode of changing process that involves the interaction of both the participants/actors individually and collectively and their related re-creation of space (of places and flows) simultaneously and dynamically. How this integration is recognized in Chinese spatial appropriation?

---

### § 8.1 The Criteria of Selection of the three Projects

---

In this chapter, three thematic projects were chosen to show the range from the top-down to the bottom-up initiatives with regard to their effects on planning (design control) and design outcome. In particular, they examine to what extent the production of space is formulated within the planning domain. They demonstrate a common characteristic of how the top-down planning ideology is asked to adjust, coordinate, and compromise on the execution level in accordance with emerging bottom-up conditions.

Unexpected challenges emerging from bottom-up conditions are erroneously regarded as limiting the capacity of the planning approach. In the case of Shenzhen, they often stimulate new and innovative ideas. The emerging demands during the development of these three projects in particular have provoked heated discussions regarding new urbanization in China. They have triggered new applications of urban policy and design approaches that would not have been applied nationwide if not for the Shenzhen's model, where daily practice provided an opportunity to test the market. Therefore, the cases are thematically representative for crucial phenomena that have emerged in contemporary Chinese urban development. Indeed, for a city like Shenzhen, with such a short history, urban observation requires a certain passage of time, during which the execution and completion of projects can be assessed. This consideration is also one of the criteria for selection.

Let's recall the primary theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2.

(Social) space is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations (...) "space" is the production of society; it is the result of social production (...) Therefore, while "space" is produced, the society and the space begin to influence each other. In other words, space also continually reproduces society. The link between space and society (...) leads us to the understanding that "space" is the product of any activities that involve the economic and technical realms of the society, while at the same time also dwelling in the realm of politics. Thus, it is never a dead end; it is more akin to a dynamic producing and re-producing process (...) Therefore, (social) "space," as the (physical and virtual) body of society, is asked to respond permanently, within its own system, to the requirements of societal changes<sup>248</sup>.

In the following three projects, socio-spatial interaction is the key focus underpinning the findings. At the same time, they demonstrate the way in which urban planning, in the framework of the Chinese political environment, has been (re-)modified. A question common to these three projects arises as to whether Chinese planning modification follows the principal that is elaborated in Chapter 2: The planning mechanism cannot be guaranteed only by the political mandate but also relies on justice and public moral mentalities of public consensus even under the control of a top-down authority like China.

The discussions of these three projects illustrate the research question of how Chinese planning culture dwells in the political-socio-spatial domain primarily guided by the planning mechanism moving between the top-down intervention and the bottom-up initiative while the public and private initiatives are equally important.

The first project is selected based on the high degree of planned intervention and lesser degree of bottom-up initiative. It is the central district of Futian, the planned Central Business District (CBD) of Shenzhen. The second project, the OCT-Loft, is selected based on both its high level of planned intervention with innovative participation of a diversity of actors, including the general public, designers, planners, and governmental officials. The third one is selected because of the high level of bottom-up initiation and later strong focus on the discussion of the land reform system and urban renewal challenges regarding the phenomenon of Urban Villages.

---

## § 8.2 Central District of Futian

---

In the 1980s, the 53-story International Trade Building, together with old Shenzhen Town and Shekou industrial zone, let the world know that China was opening its doors to foreign investors and defined a preliminary commercial district. In the 1990s, the 385-meter-tall Diwang Plaza and its surrounding high-rise groups symbolized the initial success of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)'s economy and the shift of its economic structure from an industry-led export city to the creation of an international city. Entering the new millennium, the citizens and planners of Shenzhen anticipated that the city's ambitious superior infrastructure and environment would continue to attract international investors. With this perspective, the city needed a new approach to city branding: new marketing strategies to fit its future image, while urban features and forms had to be built in order to accommodate the comprehensive demands of future urban life and functioning. The city planners facing this challenge also faced the question: What morphology can Shenzhen use to instantiate the international city to anchor its planned functions now that the market system and land reform are already fairly mature?

## § 8.2.1 CBD, Foreign Concept and Local Implementation

---

Futian CBD and the city's central axis were originally proposed in the comprehensive plan in 1986 and the area is characterized by the most in-depth and comprehensive planning study in Shenzhen. After 20 years of planning study and development, most of the buildings in the central district are completed. Now the area is centered on the citizen center and surrounded by city-level cultural facilities, convention and exhibition centers, commercial and office buildings. The whole area suggests a new type of Chinese city and bypasses the socialist model by embracing globalization and influences from Western cities (Xue et al. 2011). The design and development of Shenzhen Futian CBD reveals how a Chinese city is learning to practice urban design on a broader scale. Shenzhen is the first city in China in which the statutory status of urban design is made through local planning legislation (Hao Tian 2004; Deng Zhaohua 2009).

The concept of the CBD has been widely implemented in other countries; it is not original to Chinese tradition. Historically, in the imperial period, the central area of the city served mainly political purposes. Later, in socialist society, urban development was guided based on state-controlled resource allocation. After the Opium War at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, modern planning concepts introduced by Western planners and Western-trained Chinese specialists were seen in China. But because of national and international conflicts and the breakout of the civil war, the implementation of modern planning concepts was limited<sup>249</sup>. Regarding CBDs in capitalist cities, theoretical perspectives tend to observe the following natural characteristics: a CBD is defined by its centrality, accessibility, and concentration of top-end businesses within a city; a CBD commands the highest land value and rent in an urban settlement, and intensification of land use and development density is more extreme in a CBD than in other parts of the city; the CBD dominates other areas in terms of its physical, economic, and symbolic significance; and competition of all sorts is likely to be the keenest within a CBD (Tang Bo et al. 2011).

In the early stages, because of local economic development conditions and a planning system still under construction, although the concept of the new Futian CBD had been brought up and the site of the planned area selected and defined in the Master Plan of 1986, design practice and control were still in a learning stage. During that same period, the concept of the CBD was introduced and became very popular in China. One



of the well-known cases is Pudong, Shanghai<sup>250</sup> (Xue et al. 2011). However, unlike typical CBDs in capitalist societies, socialist cities have distinctive political factors that distinguish them from capitalist societies: the property rights system and the role of the state.

The Chinese Party-led state has reformed the economic system, but politically it remains unchanged; it privatizes urban land by pay-to-use policy but retains partial government allocation and decentralizes decision-making power to the local level but retains strong central control of political appointments.

In general, the concept of CDB that was introduced in Shenzhen emerged gradually, with Shenzhen's municipal government following a learning curve through the evolution of its urban development by applying foreign concepts in combination with local legitimacy of implementation.

Before 1986, the city's early objectives and strategies did not diverge much from the other free zones, although it was a comprehensive economic development zone of considerable size. The city was originally thought of as an export-processing zone, where multinational capital could be attracted into Joint Ventures (JVs) with large State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). In the early creation phase the planning of Shenzhen focused on improving the investment environment: meeting the needs of growth and giving priority to industrial projects. This reveals why, from the very beginning, Shenzhen paid a lot of attention to traffic systems, infrastructure investment, and the improvement of living circumstances for investors. However, while the government's priority for urban development was infrastructure construction to draw foreign investment, urban design was neglected.

---


250

See Xue et al, (2011: 211).

"The development of Pudong originated in Lujiazui. In the late 1980s the general idea for a CBD in Lujiazui came into being. On 18 April 1990, the Premier of the State Council Li Peng announced the decision to develop Pudong, Lujiazui Financial District, thereby prioritizing the project for its task force teams. In 1992 an international urban design competition was held by the Preparatory Committee of Pudong New District, which was assigned by the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG). Several international architectural firms were invited to submit proposals for the design consultancy, including Richard Rogers from the UK, Dominique Perrault from France, Toyo Ito from Japan and Massimiliano Fuksas from Italy, jointly with the Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Institute (SUPDI). The general visions stemming from the competition entries gave rise to thoughts on the development of Pudong's physical form. These ideas were then linked to the prevailing economic and political climate, which together formed a viable environment for development. The impact of globalization and the subsequent positive reaction from China to the ideas adopted from Western cities, led to their inclusion in the Pudong development. The ideas were totally new to China and therefore unique when used in the physical planning process in Pudong."

The 1982 Master Plan apparently accelerated road construction, with 25 streets in progress simultaneously in one year. By 1985, 63 streets, totaling 90 km, were done. The comprehensive plan of 1982 vaguely pegged Futian as the city's new commercial business district, but the district's fleshing out was carried out really only after 1996.

In the 1980s, the original city center was in Luohu District, located next to the Shenzhen-Hong Kong customs checkpoint. As the city's industrial sector continuously grew, a new demand for industrial services emerged. With the municipality's strategy to promote real estate development and to establish a new urban image to attract more domestic investment, the Futian CBD was designated in early 1986, based on the Master Plan of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) 1986–2000. Futian CBD would be developed with an expectation of high environmental quality (Figures 8.1 and 8.2).



*Figure 8.1* The location of Futian Central Business District (CBD)  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 13).



Figure 8.2 Topographic map of Futian Central District in 1984  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 12).

Shenzhen would use the new Futian CBD to help the city transform to a regional financial, trade, and information center over the next 30 to 40 years. The total area of the CBD is 4.2 km<sup>2</sup>; it is bounded by Lianhua Mountain (140 m high) to the north; Bijia Mountain to the east; Mangrove Eco Protection District to the west; and Shenzhen Bay and Yuanlang of Hong Kong to the south, with a north-south visual and spatial axis perpendicular to east-west-running Shennan Boulevard.

In the early period, many offices and experts have participated in the central district planning study and have provided various schemes. The broader layout and street system of the Futian CBD was mainly decided before 1994 by a few conceptual master plans and transport studies, such as Futian District Plan (Cluster Plan) and the traffic system design plan of 1989, which was drafted in 1988 by Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute (Figure 8.3).



*Figure 8.3 Futian District Plan 1988*  
Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute.

In 1989, the Urban Planning Act was enacted. For the first time, a comprehensive urban planning system was set up by law in two tiers. Developing Shenzhen into a modern international city was first brought up in the report “Shenzhen Development Strategy in 1989” by the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Resources Bureau and the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute. To facilitate these aims, Shenzhen was taking progressive approaches to the practice of urban design. According to the city’s new goals, the entire area was intended to set new standards for urban planning. One of the first scratch areas would be built based on the strict application of the new urban planning approach.

In the same year, four design institutes were invited to present conceptual schemes for the whole area: Huayi Design Consultant from Hong Kong, PACT International Consultancy from Singapore, and two Chinese institutes: the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute and the Shenzhen Branch of the Architectural Design and Research Institute of Tongji University. Following the main layout of the master plan and district plan, the Chinese traditional urban layout was applied in combination with the concept of Feng Shui.

Based on these four conceptual schemes, in 1991 a new master plan was proposed by the joint venture between the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute and the Shenzhen Branch of the Architectural Design and Research Institute of Tongji University. The whole area was divided into 25 land parcels following the main axes of south-north and east-west. The clusters of buildings comprised an inner circle of commercial functions and an outer circle of mixed residential and commercial functions. The whole area was divided into a northern and a southern part. The northern area was used for public facilities and the southern area for business and commercial purposes. Along the two axes, large green areas were reserved for leisure.

Until then, all of the conceptual proposals actually tried to bridge the gap between the district plan and the detailed plan. They had a common purpose: to explore an appropriate urban design practice and prepare for the establishment of the statutory graphic plan.

In 1992, the Control Detailed Plan of Futian District was created by the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute. Furthermore, in 1993 the urban infrastructure design was completed by a joint venture between the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute, the Shenzhen Branch of Wuhan Steel and Iron Design Institute, and the Beijing Urban Infrastructure Design Institute<sup>251</sup>. The design adopted the proposal for high-density development, and the construction of various major and secondary streets began. Even though more detailed control of each parcel had been specified (for example, the original size of each block was too large, so greenery areas had been created in order to provide a more human scale in each block), the responsible department of urban planning and its planners were aware of the lack of urban design guidance at the level of the buildings that could also lead to a design outcome that was out of control.

---

251

Wuhan Iron and Steel (group) Corp. is one of the biggest State-own enterprises (SOEs) in China which was founded in 1955, and the Wuhan Iron and Steel Design Institute is later founded in 1966 as a kind of think tanks.



In 1994, based on the detailed plan, the urban design for Futian district was proposed by the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute. As a result, the idea gradually emerged to introduce an “urban design” approach into the development of the Futian CBD. At the end of 1995, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen suggested that international design consultations should be undertaken for the important parts of the Central District in order to acquire the best plans (Figure 8.4).




Figure 8.4 Urban design study of Futian Central District 1995  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 170-171).

## § 8.2.2 International Competition for Conceptual Design

Not only the concept of CBD was newly introduced from western countries, international consultancy was also a new experience in urban development. Today international design consultation is becoming a common strategy to generate broader conceptual ideas in China, but at that time it was a whole new experience for the planners and the local government. During the mid-1990s, however, market-oriented real estate that corresponded to the established statutory planning system in Shenzhen was practiced more maturely in the field of urban development. The

organization of such an event and the preparation of necessary materials and criteria for the competition were not part of the normal daily administrative work of the planning department and its planners, but because CBD development was strongly tied to the future development of the city, the local government was eager to learn from foreign experience. During the speedy urban development in China in the mid-1990s, Shenzhen had gradually lost its superior position, so city branding was embraced as a new strategy to boost local economic development.

Instead of continually building high, without a systematic spatial structure underpinning the future vision, the approach Shenzhen's municipal government took was to put more effort into making Shenzhen a city of environmental friendliness and efficient urban functioning by building a large-scale cultural and urban landscape infrastructure, including eco-parks, libraries, cultural centers, concert halls, and theaters as well as high-rise office towers. Eco-environment balanced by cultural facilities in a combination of high technology and informational networks would be the urban sectors emphasized.



*Figure 8.5* Aerial photo of the Futian Central District in 1996  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 14).



In 1996, an international urban design consultation for the Futian CBD core area was held. An international jury was set up, and four design firms, from America, France, Singapore, and Hong Kong, were invited to present their proposals. The concept of John Lee/Michael Timchula Architects, from the United States, was selected as the winning scheme. It featured a continuous, undulating central public park extending along the north-south axis and going through the major artery, Shennan Boulevard. The design distinctively interprets the significance of the natural environment by maintaining open space in the central axis and around Lianhua Mountain (Figure 8.5). Following this concept, the new city hall, one of the landmark buildings, was commissioned to John Lee/Michael Timchula Architects, with a 200,000 ft<sup>2</sup> curved roof atop of the center that represents the “gate” image on the central axis. The symmetrical curved roof was inspired by the wings of an eagle, a symbol of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) (Figure 8.6).




Figure 8.6 Shenzhen CBD Urban Design of 1996

Source: (a) and (c) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19 and 127), (b) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 127).



(c)

*Figure 8.6 Shenzhen CBD Urban Design of 1996*

*Source: (a) and (c) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19 and 127), (b) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 127).*

Overall this scheme followed the arrangement of a traditional Chinese urban layout, such as Beijing's Forbidden City, in combination with the grand attitude of the new Chinese socialist image. Symbolically, the orientation of the north-south axis from the highest point of Lianhua Mountain to Hong Kong was dedicated to a future connection to Hong Kong. High-rise buildings rose symmetrically alongside the north-south axis. The area was divided into the south area of Shennan Boulevard, an art and cultural center, and the north area for administrative functions.

The international consultation of 1996 provided the overall scheme of urban design, including further research on transportation and the subway; design of core areas, the commercial park, and cultural facilities; and the emerging study of urban renewal. Within this framework, design competitions in the fields of urban design, architecture, landscape, and urban regeneration were organized regularly by the Planning Bureau in Shenzhen.

In 1997, Kisho Kurokawa Architects, from Japan, was invited to plan the central axis public space system, the major public open space of the Futian CBD, and the greenbelt backbone. Kisho Kurokawa proposed his Eco-Media City Project Plan, which was based on his symbiosis theory and avant-garde ideas. He proposed a total area of 174 hectares with an open space 3 km in length and the new city hall at its center. Two traversing layers constitute the central axis, with the upper layer composed of man-made turf supporting a park. The facilities in the huge second layer of the city hall

would serve multiple functions, such as city offices, a business support center, an art gallery, a shopping mall, and so forth.

The concept is based on Confucius's Analects, "*Lun Yu*<sup>252</sup>," in traditional Chinese literature. Four parks followed the Confucian advocacy of "poetry" using the method of musical composition as an urban score (Tian Hao 2005: 115)

Kisho Kurokawa's clear intention was to incorporate ancient Chinese philosophy into the modern urban structure and to use the axes as an incubator for the creation of an ecological environment. Some eco-technologies were incorporated into this park, such as a rainwater collection system on the huge roof of the main building, which would be used for toilets in nearby commercial and office spaces; purification of exhaust gas from parking lots; and the installation of solar and wind energy. Whether or not the Kisho Kurokawa's main concept was drawn from the ancient Chinese philosophy of nature and landscape, the integration of ancient Chinese elements into the modern function of urban features was widely praised for its political appeal (Figure 8.7).




Figure 8.7 Central axis public space system of Futian Central District 1997  
Source: (a) and (b) Kisho Kurokawa Architects (Japan); (C) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 17).

The Shenzhen Cultural Center, consisting of a central library and a concert hall, was designed by the famous Japanese architect, Arata Isozaki, following the central axis scheme. These two buildings express Shenzhen's modern cultural perspective.

The Shenzhen Central Library is another one of the large modern cultural facilities looking towards the information era that has been invested in by Shenzhen municipal government. Covering an area of 2.96 hectares, with a total construction area of 35,000 square meters, the scale and scope are enormous. The library will be able to serve 8,000 visiting readers at a time and circulate 50,000 volumes per day after it is completed.

In 1995 Shenzhen began to draft the Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen Municipality, enacted in 1998. Based on the ordinance, Shenzhen introduced the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze). It enhanced the role of urban design within the urban planning system. At the same time, problems arose; because in the original layout of the master plan consideration was not given to neighborhood scale, each block parcel was divided into a giant parcels, and the lack of existing detailed city design guidelines resulted in almost every building attempting to claim its own prominence and maximize commercial return. This suggested that urban design control of building scale in individual blocks was urgently needed (Figure 8.8)




Figure 8.8 Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) (1999)  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19).


As a result, in 1998 a detailed urban design guideline for the large urban blocks 22 and 23 were commissioned to Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (SOM) (Figure 8.9). By skillfully modifying existing blocks and streets, their design changed the urban landscape, added value to the land, and provided a feasible guideline for building, with proportional characteristics, on each block and for the townscape. The concept was fully implemented in later years and strongly influenced later decision control practices. At the end of 1988, six government projects in the Futian CBD began. It marked the beginning of the implementation phase of Futian CBD planning and design. In addition, research into urban renewal of Gangsha village (an urban village), the only original village remaining in the central district, was also undertaken.



*Figure 8.9 Urban Design for Block No. 22 and 23*  
Source: *Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 18)*.

In the coming few years, organizing international consultation became one of the regular activities of the local planning department. In 1999, another international consultation for the urban design, traffic, and underground space of the entire Futian CBD was carried out. Furthermore, the German design consultant Obermeyer Planen + Beraten produced a comprehensive master plan for the entire Futian CBD with a more detailed sub-division of every urban block. The philosophy of this study showed a shifting emphasis in which rigorous design requirements for individual buildings had to incorporate the urban image as a whole and maintain its integrity. The master plan was claimed to reflect the character of a traditional Chinese city. The key principles were to introduce two rows of high-rise buildings along the north-south axis and a row of high-rise buildings along the east-west axis. The design concept was the application of the traditional nine-compartment Chinese chessboard. North-south high street walls, on which the image of “Waves of Dancing Dragons” was applied, defined the height of buildings along the central axis. Residences, less than 100 m high, were situated in the four corners and formed the urban feature of an ancient Chinese community surrounded by a fortress (Figure 8.10).





*Figure 8.10 Obermeyer's Remodification of Futian Central District 1999*  
 Source: (a) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 129); (b) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 19).

In 2000, the major task was to speed up the construction of the Futian CBD by optimizing all the urban planning schemes that had accumulated over the years, including the underground shopping street study, the water system feasibility study, the central plaza and the south axis detailed design, and the design of the blocks flanking the Futian CBD's south axis, among others. Within this framework, the site for the Shenzhen Conference and Exhibition Center was relocated to the south end of the Futian CBD in order to both stimulate a positive impact on the site development and commercial investment and to further formalize the layout of the central axis (Wang Peng 2002).


From 2002 onward, further refinements and implementation of the Futian CBD, including more detailed studies to improve the central squares and the pedestrian system, were carried out. The statutory graphic plan was updated and a detailed blueprint study was continued as specified. All projects in the new Futian CBD were required to be subject to design competition, including architectural design and landscape design. Shenzhen was becoming the experimental lab for new design concepts and architectural projects. Architecture and urban design quality has been seen by the Shenzhen government as complementary to rigidly controlled master plans, which quickly become outdated.

While the international consultation in 1996 emphasized design control of core areas and key public projects, refinements of the Futian CBD master plan particularly emphasized expansion of urban design control areas to private projects in individual blocks. Thus, the link between the realization of the statutory plans as a legal planning scheme and the adjustment required from the development of the individual projects underscored the importance of innovative urban management (Figure 8.11).



Figure 8.11 The future schema of Futian Central District made in 2002  
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 27).

For example, research of the China Phoenix Building by Deng Zhaogua (2009) shows how the traditional rigid zoning mechanism can be improved by pre-planning negotiations and how frequently revising the statutory plans with certain procedures can improve its flexibility. In order to strengthen the city's image, in June 2001 the government signed a land contract with Phoenix TV, an internationally known Chinese TV broadcasting company. The 22,000 m<sup>2</sup> site is located in the east end of the Futian CBD, next to the new city hall, facing south on the busiest arterial road—Shennan Boulevard. Because the location is outside the original core area of the Futian CBD, the site was not included in the Futian CBD core area international consultation; thus, clear building guidelines were lacking. The land contract allowed building up to 48,700 m<sup>2</sup>, with a floor area ratio (FAR) of 2.2 and building height of 90 m, but no floor space was allowed to be used commercially (Figure 8.12).



**Figure 8.12** Urban design study for Block 26  
 Source: (a) Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a: 27); (b) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM.  
 Note: (a) Location of Block 26 (26-3 and 26-4), and (b) Site of Phoenix TV.

The land contract contained general conditions such as the building setback, locations for tower and square, green ratio, and the requirement for a design competition. Additionally, as a potential contribution to the public, it required the broadcasting square to be open to the public. Under the negotiation, Phoenix TV was willing to change the land contract by increasing the FAR if additional commercial space could be developed. The planning bureau was willing to consent to this request; however, under the regulation of the statutory plan of Shenzhen, the change had to wait for a formal amendment to the statutory graphic plan.



The new Master Plan of 1999, created by the German design consultant Obermeyer Planen + Beraten, provided a chance to amend the Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*), adjusting the development on the Phoenix TV site to the preferred form, which could legitimize the proposed consent from the planning bureau. In order to enhance the skill and knowledge of negotiation with the developer on land release and planning control, in 2002 the planning bureau commissioned the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (Shenzhen branch) to carry out an urban design study on those quarters.

The principles and parameters of the study had to be in line with the Obermeyer master plan, with regard to the requirements brought forward by the developer and from liaising with the Planning Bureau. In this detailed master plan, a chessboard street structure is defined, with smaller blocks, street walls are regulated, and open spaces are provided among other items. However, another condition appeared because the change in the block parcel size needed the support of the surrounding traffic system; as a result, the developer agreed to comply with the new design parameters in order to allow the planning bureau to implement the proposed design plan. Under the agreement to increase the floor area to 80,000 m<sup>2</sup>, the developers' requirement, the plot size for Phoenix TV would be reduced. To legitimize the above urban design study, following a formal procedure, the CBD Statutory Graphic Standard (*Fadingtuze*) was amended. In 2002, a Land Use Planning Permit was issued according to the parameters in the land contract and the government regained the plot to the north of the site, and in return, the developer was allowed to increase the total floor area to 80,000 m<sup>2</sup> (Figure 8.13)




Figure 8.13 Re-modification of Block 26  
Source: Deng Zhaohua (2009: 128 and 130).

Note: (a) The site in CBD Statutory Map 1998. The site is bounded by Shennan Boulevard to its south and two access roads to its east and north. (b) Urban Design Study for Block 26. The study sub-divides the two large blocks into seven smaller plots containing some eight individual buildings.

In March 2004, a design competition was held following the design conditions from the study in combination with the preferred layout of the developer. The site was proposed to be occupied by three buildings, each with a maximum height of 100 m. A semi-public space was created between the three buildings that also made the whole site more permeable. In April 2004, the developer submitted the scheme for approval. With some minor amendments to the floor plans, the project was finally granted a construction-planning permit in September 2005 (Figure 8.14).



(a)

Figure 8.14 Illustrated images of Phoenix TV

Source: (a) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 131); (b) and (c) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM.

Note: (a) Ground floor plan of the winning scheme, by UDS Architects; (b) Central axis of open space and (c) 3D model of the site.



(b)



(c)

*Figure 8.14 Illustrated images of Phoenix TV*

Source: (a) Deng Zhaohua (2009: 131); (b) and (c) PHOTO. ZHULONG.COM.

Note: (a) Ground floor plan of the winning scheme, by UDS Architects; (b) Central axis of open space and (c) 3D model of the site.

Architectural landscape and planning and urban design should be regarded as an integrated entity. The development of the Shenzhen Futian CBD and the design control of individual plots provide a positive insight into the ability of urban planning control and urban design control within the statutory system of Shenzhen to be adjustable and reliable at the same time.

The role of the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute as a think tank, liaising with parties with differing interests in order to generate the acceptable outcome of practical solutions for development control, is a promising strategy. Giving priority to contracting out an urban design study enables the planning officers to deepen their understanding of the site; in this way, their knowledge can be transformed into a legitimate framework through strategic negotiation.

Political support from the city's mayor and a powerful forward-looking and risk-taking Planning Bureau in Shenzhen are the crucial behind-the-scenes forces underpinning the pioneering evolutionary urban planning in Shenzhen. Prior to 1996 there were no overall guidelines. In order to oversee the construction of the Futian CBD, a task force for development and construction, led by the mayor, was established in September 1996; namely, the Central District Office, which was directly responsible for land management, design guidelines, design review and approval, environmental inspection, and so on. In the case of Futian CBD development in particular, it reveals a progressive learning experience on urban design control from the perspective of the socialist aesthetic of the architecture of the grand square and boulevard, at the early stage, to the later control of spatial quality by using detailed urban design studies to address the quality of the public environment.

From the planning point of view, the Shenzhen Futian CBD development is undeniably economically successful. From the socio-spatial point of view, it may provoke some criticism.

In general, Shenzhen's urban design is in practice very much focused on building public spaces. Despite this, the preferred design style of the developer and government could be seen as questionable. The application of the super-scale urban structure of the Futian CBD might serve very well for the urban future image politically and commercially, yet one could argue that it does not take into account the human scale of open spaces demanded by its citizens<sup>253</sup>.

Shenzhen, as one of the first test sites for market reform, is now becoming an urban lab for new design concepts and an exposition of architecture. Building new projects through design competitions has given western star-architects and design firms worldwide the opportunity to participate. In the past few years, through design competitions, buildings designed by Arata Isozaki, Coop Himmelblau, Rem Koolhaas, Hans Hollein, Steven Holl, Chang Yungho, Massimiliano Fuksas, Norman Foster, Kisho Kurokawa, and Mecanoo have identified Shenzhen as the emerging showcase of who's who in architecture. Shenzhen's planning bureau has also encouraged the participation of emerging young architects<sup>254</sup>, fostering the development of new talent, whether local Chinese or from overseas. Audacious cosmopolitan sheen is rapidly becoming one of the most popular styles sprouting in the CBD district as well as in many other newly developed areas. It demonstrates a new trend in western architectural ethics: lining up to work for an autocratic regime, such as China, where socio-spatial meaning has been dangerously undermined in favor of the delusion of the aesthetic prowess of formality.

Nevertheless, the general urban structure based on the series of master plans is very much focused on building a livable and responsive environment such as the cluster structure in relation to the integration of the well-reserved green areas. While most Chinese cities suffer from rapid urban development, giving priority to economic development and promoting the generic urban image, Shenzhen's planners are gradually seeking opportunities to improve the quality of the public realm. While the special statutory planning system has so profoundly increased the transparency of the decision-making process that the amendment of the statutory graphic plan is no longer

---

253            However, in reality, since the Futian CBD is gradually shaping its urban feature, the liveable urban activities are gradually emerging in the central square as well. It is still too early to draw a finite judgmental conclusion at this moment.

254            Such as URBANUS, NODE (Nansha Original DDesign) and Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design Institute etc.

as easy as changing the detailed plan, the amendments to the statutory graphic plan allow, with a degree of certainty, flexible control.

---

### § 8.3 OCT-Loft Creative Park

---

A city like Shenzhen, with its extreme speed of urban growth over a period of less than 20 years, its booming economy, and its urban expansion that took space for new urban development, stimulates the metabolism of urban functions within its own spatial structure. After the rapid urban development of Shenzhen and the advocacy of the reform and opening-up policy by Deng Xiaoping, the city transformed from a manufacturing city into a creative city. However, this transformation also brought uncertainty to the existing factory compounds, which stand not only as the earliest industrial buildings in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), but also as the first generation of buildings in Shenzhen. As time passed, the former factory compounds became vacant and industrial activities declined. OCT-Loft (Overseas Chinese Town-Loft), an industrial area with warehouse lofts from the 1980s, is becoming an area of empty factory shells left behind.

Currently, the factories have a modest appearance in the midst of a mixture of both middle class residential areas, dormitories of the industrial workers and a Disneyland-type entertainment zone. Inevitably, and soon, urban regeneration will emerge as an issue in a city with a history of less than 30 years, new opportunity for constant demand for land. The former outlying area is now becoming relatively central in the city. The normal strategy of urban planning would be to demolish old construction for new in order to maximize the value of the land. But this was not the decision of the Shenzhen urban planners, in awareness of the lacking of memory in this young city. A creative renewal area was born, since by then the collective decisions of visionary planners and open-minded investors, and the conceptual contributions of a few young Chinese architects and artists could not be ignored anymore.

### § 8.3.1 OCT: The Overseas Chinese Town

---

The Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), *Huaqiao Cheng*<sup>255</sup>, was built during the export-led industrial promotion period of the mid-1980s with the idea of attracting overseas Chinese to invest in China after the economic reform. In the early stage of reform, although Shenzhen planned to attract foreign investment, inadequate physical and legal infrastructure deterred many potential investors, and only three of the ten planned industrial districts were completed and ready to host industries in 1985 (Wong 1985). Instead of attracting foreign investors fill the vacant sites and stimulate urban growth, strategically preferential policies were given to various ministries or provincial enterprises (or SOEs).

Extensive stretches of land were given to central ministries or their subsidiaries. With this background, under the auspices of China Travel, a travel company, the Central Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) government jointly commissioned a planning team headed by Meng Daqiang, from Singapore (born in Taiwan), and invited experts from America, England, and Australia to produce a concept plan for the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). In total, 4.8 km<sup>2</sup> of land was given to establish the OCT Economic Zone. Together with the land, the government also designated the development rights and planning approval authority to the OCT Group, which was established in 1986. Like most of the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, the OCT Group is one of the governmental planning and development enterprises. Here it is responsible for land allotment within the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), to all enterprises, for the city's infrastructure construction and for real estate development.

The Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) Economic Zone is located in the Nanshen District, which used to belong to the Shahe Industrial Area, one of the Industrial zones of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The area was divided into a south and a north district by east-west-running Shennan Boulevard and is bounded by Qiaoxiang North Road to the north, Qiaocheng East Road to the east, Shahe East Road to the west, and Shenzhen Bay to the south (Figure 8.15).





Figure 8.15 Aerial Photo of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) and the location of OCT-Loft  
 Source: Google map (2012), constructed by author.

The general conceptual plan of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) is based on the theory of the “large multi-function community”, with diverse projects financed by overseas investors in the initial stages. In 1986, the local government approved the master plan of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). Based on its principles, the planning scheme suggested an adaptive development intervention reacting to the local context and topography and a phasing strategy that allowed local developments to merge gradually into its final plan framework. On the other hand, the design concept was to promote the old Chinese philosophy of living in harmony with nature (Figure 8.16).



Figure 8.16 Master Plan of Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) 2005-2015.  
 Source: OCT Real Estates Co. Ltd. OCT Group.

Since the OCT Group is the only central enterprise that focused—and still focuses—on the cultural industry, promoting tourism became its initial strategy to stimulate the development of such a large area. In 1987, the OCT Group began building China’s first theme park—the Splendid China Miniature Scenery Park—using 28.6 hectares of hilly land to the south of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), bordering on Shenzhen Bay. Modeled on the terrain of China; the landscape consists of nine scenic groups placed according to their real locations in the country. The 74 scenes chosen for the first stage of the project are all well known national cultural sites. Some traditional residential houses were built around the northern site. The slogan was “Going back in History in One Step and Traveling across China in One Day”. Using the strategic model of Disneyland as a reference has proven successful and attracted an increasing number of visitors from China and abroad. Within a year and a half, the OCT Group had earned back its investment of more than 70 million RMB. The success of the theme park confirmed that the strategic direction of the development was correct and profitable

In the coming years, the OCT Group set up several other theme parks, including China Folk Cultural Village, Windows of the World, Wildlife Zoo, and Happy Valley, all of which have been among the most popular tourist sites of China, attracting 40 million visitors annually.

For example, adjacent to Splendid China, the China Folk Culture Village is an amusement park presenting China’s ethnic groups with their distinctive architectures and customs. The Windows of the World covers an area of 480,000 m<sup>2</sup> on the west side of the Splendid China Miniature Scenery Park and the China Folk Culture Village. A total 118 of the world’s most famous monuments and scenic wonders were placed divided into nine areas. The success of the theme parks, which corresponded with promoting the policy of privatizing the State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and a booming housing market provided a great opportunity for luxury real estate development (Figure 8.17). Luxurious apartment districts gradually appeared in the meticulously landscaped neighborhoods in the north district. Coexisting with this, two major industrial zones, belonging to Shahe Industrial Zone, to the east and west of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), were developed to facilitate the electronics industry, including warehouses and housing for workers.





*Figure 8.17 Variations in real estate developments and housing projects in Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). Source: Photos by author.*

Unlike traditional industrial zones, such as Sekou, the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) is a paradoxical “collage” of nostalgia and world architectural counterfeit; selling the illusions of the age of consumerism, centered in the amusement industry, and combined with exotic foreign styles of buildings such as Italian villas, Venetian hotels, Dutch windmills, Chinese-style restaurants and gardens. The result seems, ironically, to be in conflict with the OCT Group’s mission of promoting traditional Chinese culture as in the Splendid China and the China Folk Culture Village, and illustrated by the mission statement of the OCT Group:

Integrate the traditional Chinese culture, the Chinese folk culture with the World cultural essences, presenting a perfect combination of the natural landscape with humanistic landscape and adopting the modern scientific and technological expressive means of sound, light and electricity, etc., coupled with the opera and song performances in the oriental “Broadway”, highlighting the combination of the quiescent and dynamic exercises and a variety of new styles and patterns, thus causing a great attraction to the audiences.

Despite the criticism of the lack of identity with regard to introducing the alienating images of international styles, for a young city with a lack of tradition and high concentration of migrants, forging its own identity would likely require conditional compromises. As Xiaodong Li (2000: 399) pointed out:

Here, the adopted eclecticism was not a tool with which to perform a critique, rather an attempt to impose a visionary utopia out of their fantasies.

Surprisingly, instead of facing post-industrial deterioration, combining the development of an amusement industry with its comprehensive development model resulted in the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT)'s great commercial success. The Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) has become one of the only two "national cultural industry model gardens" in China, a popular tourist attraction, and a high-end residential district in Shenzhen. In 1994 Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) industrial enterprises had developed into a corporation with 55 companies under its umbrella. In this regard, Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) shows the speed of industrial growth in Shenzhen (and China in general). These industries are now increasingly shifting from secondary industrial production to tertiary, service-based economies. In view of the industrial transformation, in 1995 the modification of the master plan had maintained the main concept of natural landscape with humanistic landscape and correspondingly reduced the industrial areas, increasing residential development instead.

Because of industrial restructuring, the early manufacturing facilities have since relocated inland, leaving a large residual space surrounded by residential areas. The government and the developer from the OCT Group soon confronted the question of how to deal with these post-industrial warehouses (Figure 8.18).



Figure 8.18 Images of Post-Industrial Warehouses in OCT  
Source: URBANUS

### § 8.3.2 Grouping the Urban Fracture for Urban Creation

---

In view of the success of the real estate development, OCT Real Estates Co. Ltd., under the OCT Group, submitted a master plan to the Shenzhen Planning Bureau in 2002, with a proposal to demolish ten warehouses in the Eastern Industrial Area of Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), the former industrial area, for a new housing development. During the interview, Chang Jian, the planner who was in charge of approving this project, recalled during an interview that in 2002, he had just come back from New York City and was impressed by the SOHO area; he suggested to OCT Real Estates Co. Ltd. that renewing the abandoned warehouses could be an alternative to demolishing them for new housing development. Surprisingly, his spontaneous feedback convinced the developer.

In Overseas Chinese Town (OCT), where land resources are scarce, this block of abandoned industrial buildings could certainly have been torn down for real-estate development or other commercial uses, however, we decided to transform it into a district much like New York's SOHO, while preserving its original appearance.<sup>256</sup>

In conjunction with this, the He Xiangning Art Museum<sup>257</sup> was the first national gallery named after an individual and was also the second national museum of modern art<sup>258</sup> to be approved by the Chinese central government on May 13, 1995, to be located in Shenzhen. It opened in April 1997 in the south district of the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) along Shennan Boulevard.

The opening of the He Xiangning Art Museum paved the way for the promotion of Shenzhen as the creative cultural center of south China to become a reality. The city's cultural ambition was obvious and highly praised by the local government, developers, artists, and architects. However, by then the idea to renew the old warehouses for creative cultural activities was bold and there was no experience in how to do this in a young city like Shenzhen.

In 2003, the catalyst for the developer's decision was the decision by the He Xiangning Art Museum to establish a contemporary art center called OCT Contemporary Art Terminal (OCAT) in one of the old warehouses. The core mission of OCAT is to attract global resources earmarked for contemporary Chinese art and to promote cultural exchanges and interactions between China and the world. It aims, through exhibitions, forums, and artist-in-residence programs; to construct an institution that is about Chinese art yet demonstrates international vision and professionalism. It set out to function as a hub—a supply center and a departure point for contemporary Chinese art—and the concept of being an “international terminal” for contemporary Chinese art was evidenced by its name (Figure 8.19).

---

257 Information about the He Xiangning Art Museum, available at <http://www.hxnart.com/>.

258 The first one is the National Art Gallery in Beijing.



Figure 8.19 Images of OCAT  
Source: Photos by author.

Such a decision coupled well with the developer's idea to gradually transform this area into a trendy mixed-use district, with the construction of the art museum as the catalyst. Under the slogan "Shenzhen Huaqiaocheng Creativity and Cultural Park", the OCT-Loft established a close cooperation with the He Xiangning Art Museum, and the derelict factories were converted into a creative cluster in two phases: by 2007, 55,456 m<sup>2</sup> of the southern area was redeveloped, and afterward, from 2007 to 2011, an additional 95,571 m<sup>2</sup> in the northern area was added.

The plug-in of OCAT sets up an interesting paradigm in the beginning of the regeneration of the industrial areas. The master planning team's intention is fill the buildings by adjusting them spatially to accommodate the new use with small-scale operations and improvements to the infrastructure. Beginning with the addition of programs to the existing structures to adapt to the function of the art center, the empty lots between them are intended to be filled with galleries, bookshops, cafes, bars, artist ateliers, and design shops, along with lofts and dormitories.

The renovation of the old loft area applied certain methods from the participatory design and planning process. However, OCT-Loft is a completely privately owned development. To the developer, instead of inviting jump-in foreign designers, the whole process demanded a more on-site, participatory design approach. OCT Real Estates Co. Ltd. had commissioned URBANUS, one of the leading forces among China's young design firms based in Beijing and Shenzhen, to study the OCT-Loft renovation in the southern zone. URBANUS was founded in 1999 under the leadership of partners Liu Xiaodu, Meng Yan, and Wang Hui, three Chinese-born and -educated young and talented architects who obtained their master's degrees and initially practiced their design skills abroad. They represented exactly the generation that is experiencing Chinese urbanization and is able to participate in the broader context of globalization. The name of "Urbanus" derives from the Latin word of "urban", and strongly reflects


the office's design approach: reading architectural programs from the viewpoint of the urban environment in general, and the ever-changing urban situations specifically.

They promote the philosophy of "practice with critical thinking" and criticize the fact that contemporary architecture had already witnessed a shift from a critical notion of late modernism to a more neutral and non-critical relativism. According to them, architectural opportunities are turned into regrets, not only about the aesthetic dimensions but also about the content of urban life, under the pressure of the speed of development. Instead of being detached from reality, they regard themselves as critical practitioners. They advocate three principles of their critical practice: to restore urbanity within a climate of rapid and vast profit-driven development versus the spreading out and speeding up of irresponsible urbanism; to conduct an innovative and critical praxis with social responsibility versus performing a conventional service and repetitive practice; and to convert ordinary programs into active and interactive urban devices that can energize urban life versus making architecture, in a superficial way, into an art installation.

They tackle the urban issues from two approaches: "urban engagement" and "urban infill". "Urban engagement" refers to the initiation of urban strategies with support from the urban planning institution and "urban infill" refers to the effort to discover opportunities of significance to the city in areas neglected by others. Their principles are, without a doubt, socially responsible. Their philosophy regarding urban practice has been authentically transformed into their works on the OCT-Loft renovation (Figure 8.20).



*Figure 8.20* Images of warehouses after renovation  
Source: Photos by author.



*Figure 8.20* Images of warehouses after renovation  
Source: Photos by author.

Regarding the renovation of the OCAT, the warehouse shed was wrapped in metal mesh by URBANUS, an intensive and hands-on industrial product leaving the original exterior wall intact. The cavity between this wrapping and the existing wall contains all the mechanical systems.

Meng Yan (2007:92) noted:

When we first saw the factory buildings, we were disappointed. They had no big chimneys or huge spaces, just simple roofs, nothing like the 798 art factory in Beijing. So, during the process of renovation, we decided to give the buildings a style, distinct from the 798 art factory in Beijing, by trying our best to preserve their original structure and workshops.

As URBANUS emphasized, “by this wrapping, the existing structure is returned and monumentalized to its archetypal form—a basic shed, but now one for art.”

With regard to the spatial intervention, according to URBANUS (2007), the empty warehouses can be gradually filled with galleries, artists’ studios and design shops, along with lofts and dormitories. The new additions fill the open spaces and set up new relationships between buildings by wrapping them and penetrating the existing urban fabric. They also create a second layer of interconnected urban spaces and public facilities. The goal is to transform the area into an open platform for creativity. The master planning does not intend to define a clear boundary or fixed new forms; instead, it tries to set up a dynamic, interactive and flexible framework adapting itself constantly to the new conditions posed by the vast changes in the city (Figure 8.21 and Figure 8.22).






Figure 8.21 The concept of the OCT-Loft renovation in the southern zone  
Source: URBANUS



Figure 8.22 Design concept of southern and north zone of OCT-Loft  
Source: URBANUS

The approach of spatial grouping and filling had to be supported simultaneously by a series of cultural events initiated and organized by the governmental planning department, the OCT Group, artists, and curators. Curators and artists worked



with the architect and the developer on a broader planning strategy for the whole site that aimed to simulate the organic growth of a city. The other warehouses are being appropriated and new buildings are added between them; creating the rich experimental spaces found lacking in standard developments.

The approach of URBANUS reflects exactly their ideas about how to produce social space through participatory spatial intervention; critically, not only as designers/planners, but also as participants. To them, social-spatial production is the outcome of social participation. Spatial agents have to create their interventions in the spatial domain through participatory consensus and social criticism.

In 2005, the OCAT was officially opened. Its significance is that, under the umbrella of Shenzhen's He Xiangning Art Museum, it is the first such professional institution in China to be established in association with, and administrated by, a state-owned art museum. It has become an ambitious project that attracts artists to meet, explore and discuss etc. This excellent museum complex exhibits works of international and local contemporary Chinese artists. The surrounding former communist-era warehouses have been converted into artists' studios, hip cafes, and bars (Figure 8.23).



Figure 8.23 Images of exhibition, shops and café  
Source: Photos by author

In 2005, F1 (now a leisure and cultural space amid galleries, bookshops, restaurants, and cafés) became the main venue of the first Shenzhen Biennale (Curator: Yung Ho Chang, Theme: City, Open Door!). In 2007 the second biennale, which was the Shenzhen & Hong Kong Biennale (SZHKB) (Curator: Ma Qingyun; Theme: City of Expiration and Regeneration), reselected factory buildings (B10, etc.) adjoining the venue of the first biennale, and they were transformed into OCT-Loft soon afterward. All the biennales were substantially supported by OCT Group, and as an urban cultural event with great support, the Shenzhen & Hong Kong Biennale (SZHKB) activated old industrial factory buildings and pushed forward the transformation and updating into a creative space.

In 2007, after two years of renovation with a total investment of more than 30 million yuan (US\$ 3.9 million), the city's new community art park, OCT-Loft, was inaugurated in Overseas Chinese Town (OCT).

For the city administration, developing the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) is a key strategy for creating a local and global awareness of Shenzhen as a creative city. A subsequent step has been to join the UNESCO Creative Cities Network in 2010. This strategy is embedded in the governmental program "Study and plan on Shenzhen's industrial distribution" from 2007 and incorporates the shift "from processed in Shenzhen to manufactured in Shenzhen and finally to created in Shenzhen". Overseas Chinese Town (OCT) is a central vehicle for the last step (Zielke et al. 2012).

In 2007, the second stage of renovation was under preparation.

In the first phase of the regeneration, the renovation played a very important role in the revitalization of Shenzhen by suggesting a socially and economically sustainable model for both the developer and the city. It addressed the value of these industrial buildings and their extraordinary architectural quality, which provides flexibility for the coexistence of both industrial and creative occupants. In order to be a successful creative industrial park, the organizing entity was proposed to encourage the exchange of different types of institutions. It was a period of exploration based on experimental spirits.

Based on this perspective and the experience gained in the first stage, the second stage of the renovation aims to reposition the overall branding image, integrate different types of creative industries, and suggest a zoning strategy in order to upgrade the creative industrial park of the first stage from the perspective of building up a comprehensive plan for cultural programs and spatial intervention.

Within this framework, an exhibition called “Upgrade strategy: International Invitation Exhibition on OCT-Loft Concept Design” opened in 2011. The exhibition is based on the five international design firms that had been invited to present their ideas for the second stage of renovation.

Curator Li Sha explains the context of the exhibition:

Since 2004, OCT started to upgrade the remaining East Industrial Zone to the Creative Cultural Park (named OCT-Loft). The upgrade of the Eastern Industrial Zone in Overseas Chinese Town to the Creative Culture Park (OCT-Loft) shows it only took 26 years to complete the transformation of a European industrial city that was projected to take 100 years. The exhibition invited Bernard Tschumi Architects (New York / Paris), Dominique Perrault Architecture (Paris), MVRDV (Rotterdam), URBANUS Architecture and Design (Shenzhen / Beijing) and Sou Fujimoto Architects (Tokyo) to offer thoughts on the OCT-Loft conceptual plan and the renovation of B10 into the OCT Contemporary Art Museum, exploring the strategy for the active protection of the industrial building.<sup>259</sup>

The proposals from the five design firms are extremely diverse and independent of the extent to which the OCT-Loft will be transformed in the next stage. I would like to emphasize a new type of think tank, such as URBANUS, plays a crucial role in contemporary urban development, particularly who have their strong commitments to involve in the local development and participate in the local discussion and debate. In the new millennium, this type of emerging group is gathered from the new generation of Chinese architects, who can now participate in building contemporary China and bring in their creative and critical insights. With regard to their critical reflections, they are now acting like pioneers or mediums and no longer like imitators and followers.

(Re)inhabiting former industrial areas as art districts is common throughout Western cities, but they are still a relatively new phenomenon in China. Within this framework of cultural industries and creative economy—by turning strategic urban space into an art district and offering a contemporary cultural space previously lacking in the city—the regeneration of OCT-Loft is not one of the foremost pioneering projects in China with regard to its scope and scale. Hip areas with art galleries and design industries emerged in Shanghai, such as along Suzhou Creek, Monganshan Lu, Xintiandi, Bridge 8 and several others within the French Concession, and have gradually captured the attention

of government since 1990s (Liauw 2012). Other creative clusters had emerged in peripheral villages of Beijing. Among them, the defunct Mao-period factory known as “798” has been receiving the most media attention. The approaches that have been applied in each individual case are diverse and unique for the location.

I would argue, the specialty of learning from OCT-Loft is from the very beginning that the development strategy involved different parties: the developer, art museum, artists, curators, architects, and planners. The planning strategy was to stimulate the natural growth of the city, starting from the new additions to the existing warehouses that would accommodate the new art center—genuinely an art community, which is missing in 798. Although from the beginning both projects of 798 in Beijing and OCT-Loft in Shenzhen had emphasized the grass-roots efforts, the development of the 798 is now entirely under the control of officials and the district’s growth is no longer organic<sup>51</sup>. Similar to Xintiandi in Shanghai, OCT-Loft was a private-owned and private-developed asset. However, OCT-Loft applied a participatory approach by allowing initiatives of grassroots innovation more than considering it as a real estate development like Xintiandi. OCT-Loft has been successfully regenerated through a bottom-up small-scale development process; allowing the creative cluster as a form of production reflecting a grassroots lifestyle—an expression of individual freedom, which had been neglected in Xintiandi.

As Hong Kong’s Kenneth Ko, who established his career in the OCT-Loft in 2004, remarks, “The OCT-Loft is like a dry sponge, which can absorb anything you put into it.” (Huo, Shenzhen Daily 2007). Metaphorically, this remark can also describe Shenzhen society: Living and acting on daily challenges like a sponge, urban planners, developers, artists and ordinary citizens are now collectively creating and recreating the urban socio-spatial structure through the continual evolution of individual participation—thereby promoting the sense of belonging. This continual evolution scaled up into the environment when the city itself became a product of creative production and in such a creative city—a spatial sponge—anything put into it is possible.

The prevalent urban fact shown in the next thematic project vividly reflects this statement. An emerging phenomenon that is not limited to a bounded area or a limited time span or by a rationally planned intervention; it is a bypass product that resulted from the process of urbanization, but was not recognized in the beginning of the rural-urban development.

## § 8.4 Urban Villages—Village amidst the City

Land reform is key to economic reformation in contemporary China. Urbanization is a historic transformation process by which the means of production and people's lifestyles evolved from the country to the city. Urbanization taking place in contemporary China is based on multiple driving forces and has diverse features.

The economical background for urbanization is a massive rural population that no longer engages in the primary sector of industry (agriculture), leaves the rural area, and floods into cities to engage in a secondary or tertiary sector of industry. In China, urbanization focuses on the development of the urban economy and corresponds to the relaxation of migration; besides it combines an economic impetus and utilizes surplus labor forces from rural areas to develop non-agricultural production focusing on the development of a rural economy, such as the introduced system of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)<sup>260</sup>. These two impetuses of urbanization illustrate the aforementioned statement that urbanization means not only the statistical change of migration from rural to urban areas, it also means the overall change in living conditions shifted from rural-agricultural livelihoods to non-agricultural urban welfare.

Land reform allows a city newly built through land requisition to transform agricultural land into urban construction land. From 1980 to 2005, the Shenzhen city territory expanded from its previous 327.5 km<sup>2</sup> to 2,020 km<sup>2</sup>. With more than 20 years of development after reform and opening-up, urban construction developed at a very high speed, and in the process villages have been eclipsed by cities, so called "urban villages" that now have been brought into the city's scope while at the same time diminishing the area of agricultural land.

Against the backdrop of speedy urbanization, urban construction and constant expansion of urban land, the phenomenon of "urban villages" accompanied by fast industrialization and urbanization gradually aroused broader attention. In 2005, Shenzhen's mayor enunciated "four difficulties" facing the city: limited land, shortage of energy and water, demographic pressure, and environmental contamination. The foremost difficulty is the limited land for urban development. The former urban villages have interactively transitioned from the process of urbanization to participation in urban regeneration. The accumulated lands that once were reserved for the residential

function of the villages are now seen as valuable to economic accumulation for inward urban transformation (Ma hang 2006; Liu Xiaoming 2011; Pu Hao 2012).

### § 8.4.1 The Emerged Urban Villages: The Push and Pull Effect

---

In 1978, the percentage of non-agricultural land (mainly in towns in Shenzhen) was 2.29. This grew to 23.84 percent by 1990, and by 2000 it had reached 31.72 percent. At the same time, the amount of cultivated land dropped from 23.95 percent in 1978 to 6.03 percent in 1990; in 2000 it had dwindled to a mere 3.3 percent<sup>261</sup>. One simple fact emerging from this process is that rural land is gradually being taken over by urban construction. The former agricultural entity under the collective ownership of farmers (villagers) is now forced to participate in the urban economy directly or indirectly through land requisition and transfer. Depending on the economic forces of the cities or regions, the scenario of speedy urban expansion results in the phenomenon of “urban siege on the village,” later called “Urban Villages” or *Chongzhongcun* in Chinese<sup>262</sup>.

Before Shenzhen city was built, different villages were situated across the whole area. Most “villages” in Shenzhen are social groups formed by marital and consanguine relations. The clannish establishment is crucial for the survival of the villages while they face the challenges of natural and human environments. In order to survive, members in a clan normally should share the same values, individual psychology, and behavior identified based on the principle of benefitting the clan. With this tradition, clan properties are the common material foundation of maintaining basic living safety, confronting outside threats, and strengthening the clan’s political and economical power<sup>263</sup> (Ma Hang 2006).

---

261 The statistics are from China Statistical Yearbooks (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1990–2000).


262 *Chongzhongcun* or Urban Villages, Village in the City, Village amidst the City (Chinese: 城中村).

263 However, the relationships among the clans are complicated, and inward conflicts of interest exist. The whole clan consists of many independent core families that are also relatively economically independent units where strong coherence and centripetal forces exist among family members at the same time.

There are 320 villages in Shenzhen, and 91 villages are located in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)<sup>264</sup>. In 2004, the total area of villages is 93.5 km<sup>2</sup>, equivalent to 13.3% of the built-up land area and 50.3% of the residential land (Table 8.1). In the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), it is more than 8 km<sup>2</sup> and takes up 5 percent of the urban construction area. The villages are composed of approximately 350,000 buildings, with a total floor area of 106 million m<sup>2</sup> (Pu Hao 2012: 18). Most of the urban villages are located in strategic areas of the city; most of them are concentrated in the commercial areas, district centers, and adjacent to the two major checkpoints to Hong Kong (Figure 8.24).

Districts	Number of Villages	Land Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Plot Area (10 <sup>4</sup> m <sup>2</sup> )	Floor Area (10m <sup>2</sup> )	Number of Buildings (10 <sup>4</sup> )	Average Storey	Built-up Density (%)	Floor Area Ratio
Luohu	35	2.36	125	648	1.2	5.2	53%	2.75
Futian	15	1.96	107	669	0.9	6.2	55%	3.42
Nanshan	29	2.91	157	721	1.7	4.6	54%	2.47
Yantian	12	0.78	35	101	0.4	2.9	45%	1.30
Baoan	138	44.28	1476	4311	16.5	2.9	33%	0.97
Longgang	91	41.21	1371	4112	14.1	3.0	33%	1.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>93.49</b>	<b>3272</b>	<b>10562</b>	<b>34.9</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>1.13</b>

Table 8.1 Statistics of the physical characteristic of Urban Villages in Shenzhen, 2004  
Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau



*Figure 8.24* Distribution of Urban Villages in Shenzhen 2005  
 Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau

To accommodate investment and development, the government relies on urban development to convert periphery urban rural land into urban use. In this process, the government tends to requisition farmland rather than settlement components of the rural villages to avoid costly and time-consuming programs requiring the compensation and relocation of indigenous villagers (Pu Hao 2012: 34). Consequently, the settlement components of villages remain while their surrounding environment dramatically changes—rural land was requisitioned and native farmers were given urban status and land sites on which to build their houses. Under the dual track of the administrative system, the governance of urban villages fell under the rural administrative system in which their administration was left to joint-stock companies formed from the original village committees and as such the design and construction of building in the urban villages are not constrained by the procedures that are applicable in the rest of the urban area. As the city grows, indigenous villagers are maximizing their profits by constructing extra floor space in the form of sub-standard housing units, which helps alleviate the burden for the government to provide rooms for migrants and to generate extra income for landless peasants. As a result, the problem of the urban villages is becoming a double-edged sword. As these villages were beyond the scope of management by the municipal government, they gradually formed isolated socio-spatial entities that were interspersed among modern urban areas (Figure 8.25).





Figure 8.25 Images of Urban Village surrounded by high-rise Buildings  
Source: Photos by author.

In short, urban villages are special by-products of the rapid urbanization process and the complicated dual-track land ownership system in China. In the case of Shenzhen, there are roughly three stages of development<sup>265</sup>.

*From 1982 to 1992: The emergence of “Urban Villages”*

According to the dual-track land ownership system, there are two types of land ownership: urban land is the property of the state and rural land is collectively owned by villagers. In principle, farmlands formerly cultivated by villages were compulsorily purchased and turned into urban land by the government. Based on the Interim Regulations of Building Land of Villages in Cooperative in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which was promulgated in 1982, after the acquisition of farmers’ land the original villagers were allowed to preserve their habitation onsite in order to prevent the high social and economic costs of relocation. The regulation allowed each household could build its residential dwelling on a land area no bigger than 80 m<sup>2</sup>, with a total floor area of 150 m<sup>2</sup> and average height of 2 to 3 floors. In general, those villages retained the architectural forms of 2 to 3 floors buildings with a layout incorporating a courtyard as communal space. Because during this period the rental housing market was still weak, most of the newly built residential dwellings were used by the villages as their own houses.

However, after 1984, due to the speedy economic development, there was a large influx of immigrants into the city, and urban villages pushed upward and increased in density—at a rate even greater than the city’s expansion—because they became the key providers of cheap housing for immigrants and the poor. Buildings were increasingly built to 3 and 5 floors, although in 1986, stricter control of village housing was enforced at 40 m<sup>2</sup> per person. During this period, the government could not provide the full promised compensation to the villages while their farmlands had been expropriated; therefore measures to restrict illegal construction were vague and the power to exert control over the collective farmers’ land was weakened.

In 1989, the government promulgated the Provisions of Land Expropriation in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). In this framework, in addition to keeping intact a percentage of lands for the use of law-protected villagers’ residential lots, called “Housing Based Land (HBL)<sup>266</sup>”, the government agreed to return a certain percentage of the total requisitioned lands to the villages in order to compensate

---

265 Available at: [http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0704/11/5628579\\_131381304.shtml#](http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0704/11/5628579_131381304.shtml#).

266 *Zhajjidi* or Housing Based Land (HBL) (Chinese: 宅基地).

them for their loss of agricultural land. Those lands could be used for commercial and industrial development, which was called "Land for Collective Development (LCD)". The residential lots would be divided into smaller plots; a grid plan of 10 m x 10 m was the most common plan for the new Housing Based Land (HBL) areas, with a narrow alley in between. These areas were redistributed to villages for building their own dwellings based on the individual household, and the returned Land for Collective Development (LCD) would remain under the collective ownership of the villages and be run by the village's leaders groups or committees. While the demand for urban land for commercial or industrial development was increasing, Land for Collective Development (LCD) would be rented out in order to lessen the city's insufficient land supply. The collective business buildings on the Land for Collective Development (LCD), however, were used by villagers to run retail establishments in order to supply commodities for their own use. During this process, those original farmer groups re-formed into new corporations (Table 8.2).

During this period, the government applied the clearance-deportation model, which was simply to clear the area and deport migrants from outside the urban villages while maintaining indigenous villages and their housing on site. However, soon after the deportations, migrants returned, and sometimes brought along their family and friends, making the urban villages even more densely populated. Based on the division of Housing Based Land (HBL) and Land for Collective Development (LCD), the spatial layout of urban villages was formulated in Shenzhen (Pu Hao 2012: 24).










Mechanisms of Urban Villages			Phase		
Chinese Land	State Owned Land		Urban land (Commercial use, Residential Use, Office Use and mixed Use)	Urban Expansion	
	Collective Land		House Based Land (HBL)	Every villager household has one permanent House Based Land (HBL) land use right as long as they remain villagers; House Based Land (HBL) land use right can be transferred between villagers or be returned to the village collective.	
			Farm Land (FL)	Village collective land for growing crops	
			Reserved Collective Land	Village collective land that provides the collective facilities for the villagers.	
			Land for Collective Development (LCD)	After the government acquired the farmland from the village, 8 to 15% of the taken land is given back to the village for collective development.	

Table 8.2 Mechanisms of Urban Villages

Source: Berlage Institute Research Report (2005: 52-53 and 76-77). Edited by author.

### From 1992 to 2003: Unrestrained development

From 1990 onward, Shenzhen maintained a high speed of urban growth. Urban growth had stimulated the booming housing market, particularly in the rental-housing sector. Consequently, land became the main source of profit for real estate companies, villages, individual farmers, and all levels of government. The combination of a rental-housing market and a massive floating population provided the villagers the opportunity to rent out their spare rooms—their only alternative, since, because of the farmers' dwelling policy restriction, they did not have the right to sell their property. With a result that higher-density buildings were extruded vertically in the urban villages when the villagers became rich and needed more living space or wanted to rent out the flats to the floating population and 7- to 8-story dwellings were often seen.

The average FAR and construction density of urban villages in Shenzhen were 1.13 and 35 percent in 2004, respectively; both of which were higher than the average of the entire built-up area of the city<sup>267</sup>.

Gradually, due to the uncontrolled development and ignorance on the part of urban villages in the city, many of the urban villages spawned problem neighborhoods. Environmental problems emerged, such as heavily populated living environment, lack of urban utilities, overdevelopment with extreme plot density, and lack of open space and infrastructure. Aesthetically, they came to be seen as a scar on the city; socially, there were always problems because of loose management; and politically, they were regarded as a sort of time bomb due to social conflicts often happening in these areas.

While Shenzhen's modern image has gradually been established, the areas of the urban villages have become a seemingly unsolvable problem challenging the centralized urban planning.

In the booming real estate market since the 1990s, the clearance-deportation model was replaced by a demolition-redevelopment model. In this model, urban villages are designated as urban renewal districts, which would be gradually rehabilitated through a series of initiatives. In 1992 the government claimed that all the land within the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) belonged to urban land owned by the government in order to include urban villages into the system of urban land management. However, this announcement was completely; in reality, it did not have the power to regulate the illegal construction of villages as long as the rental-housing market was in such strong demand<sup>268</sup>.

In 1992, the government issued the "Bylaws of Housing Rental in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone" and "Bylaws of Registration of Real Estate in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone" in order to combat and restrict illegally rented houses, those without real estate registration were not allowed to enter the rental-housing market. However, the effect was very limited.

---

267 See table 9.1.

268 Before 1992, the government red-circled villages in order to define their boundaries and to prevent illegal land occupancy by the villages outside the red circles. However, there was no legal framework to regulate the building forms within the Housing Based Land (HBL) and Land for Collective Development (LCD).

The reason for this is a practical fact: in the face of the massive amount of migrants who are excluded from the formal urban housing market, urban villages become popular migrant enclaves as they provide them with affordable and accessible housing units. According to research by the Shenzhen Branch of the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, the cost of rental housing in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was around 1,200–1,500 RMB per 100 m<sup>2</sup> per month, and rental housing of the same size in the commercial housing area was around 1,800 to 2,200 RMB. Rental housing in the urban villages took up 70 percent of the total rental-housing sector, while almost 50 percent of the total temporary residential population are living in urban villages.

During this period, the major problem of the urban villages was that the villagers continually built unauthorized housing units in a high 3-dimensional density, largely because the supply of rental-housing from the formal urban housing market was still insufficient, and on the other hand because there was no incentive for the villagers to register their real estate. Once again, the government had been forced to relax its restrictions on housing in the urban village areas, and to allow increasing floor area by constructing new floors.

For those areas enjoying a strategic location in the city, this even resulted in single buildings rising to 12 to 15 floors and with a built-in elevator. The space between buildings on the 10x10 m grid is sometimes reduced to less than one meter; these “handshaking” buildings are everywhere. In 1999, Decisions on Prohibition Against Illegal Construction by the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen People’s Representatives Meeting showed the government’s decision to regulate the registration of unauthorized housing, and in 2002, the government issued its Decision on Management of Illegal Private Houses Left Behind by History in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and Provisions on Management of Illegal Construction of Production Operations Left Behind by History in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The government’s attempt to solve the risks presented by the urban villages inevitably resulted; however, urban villages were becoming disconnected urban fragments.

Politically, the dilemma is between social justice and urban development. Economically, urban villages are a main contributor to value accumulation that the government is not able to tackle—it helps to accommodate the economic development of the city unofficially. Socio-spatially, however, urban villages present an extraordinary vitality in their physical and spatial configuration, their local amenities and cheap shops, as well as the spontaneous creation of a very enthusiastic grassroots participatory urban movement.

These circumstances have forced the government, instead of enforcing regulatory measures, to reconsider applying urban regeneration, and invent creative urban renewal methods, which means, as with any urban renewal process, that an individual and locally adaptive approach is required.

*From 2003 to present: Regeneration of urban villages*

In 2005, the municipal government released the special Comprehensive Planning Guidelines for Urban Villages Redevelopment 2005–2010. (Table 8.3) These guidelines present four reasons to redevelop urban villages. First, as land is becoming scarce, the land covered by urban villages can be considered potential land stock via redevelopment. Second, illegal construction, chaotic land use, and social problems such as crime make urban villages the most prominent, complicated, and concentrated locations of urban problems. Third, urban villages are perceived to suppress the land value of their surrounding parcels; therefore, they limit the progress of the city's improvements to urban structure and efficiency. Fourth, urban villages are to some extent outside formal urban administration. Their house-rental business threatens that of competitors, and their land and housing market threatens municipal control and profit from the land and property market (Pu Hao 2012).

	Luohu	Futian	Nanshan	Yantian	Baoan	Longgang	Total
1. Demolish Land Area	30	40	80	30	410	300	890
2. Demolish construction Area	80	130	200	40	400	300	1150
3. Reconstruction Area	145	190	365	110	1030	750	2590
Residential Construction Area	100	125	310	90	920	670	2215
Office Construction Area	15	35	20	5	10	5	90
Commercial Construction Area	30	30	35	15	100	75	285
4. Integrated Construction Area	570	540	520	60	860	820	3370

*Table 8.3 2005-2010 Urban Village redevelopment area control (10,000 m<sup>2</sup>)*  
 Source: Liu Xiaoming (2011, Table 1).

Within this framework, the municipal government declared that 8.9 km<sup>2</sup> of urban village land, an area covered by buildings with 11.5 million m<sup>2</sup> of floor area in housing units, would be cleared between 2005 and 2010 in order to provide space for new buildings of at least 25.9 million m<sup>2</sup> of floor area (Pu Hao 2012: 27). The plan prioritized urban villages for redevelopment by emphasizing certain zones, such as ecological zones, commercial and industrial centers, and areas near to existing and future metro lines—as well as to emphasize the application of multiple redevelopment

models, of which, in general, there are three (Liu Xiaoming 2011). The first model is self-reconstruction, either with the support of the government or by the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) set up by the former villagers with collective funds and with ex-villagers become shareholders<sup>269</sup>. The second model is based on the corporation between a village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) and a real estate company, and in the third model the redevelopment is completely initiated by a real estate company. The application of the redevelopment model can vary depending on the situation. Urban renewal is still very much driven by economic incentive and governmental guidance<sup>270</sup> (Table 8.4).

Models		Definition	Methods
Model 1	Self-reconstruction	Un-marketization	All by Government By Village Joint Venture Enterprise (supported by government).
Model 2	Cooperation	Semi-marketization	Government supervised, developer operated and Village Joint Venture Enterprise participated. Cooperation between Village Joint Venture Enterprise and real estate company.
Model 3	Real-estate Development	Complete Marketization	The real estate company developed by itself

*Table 8.4 The different models for the renewal of Urban Villages*  
Source: Liu Xiaoming (2011: 16). Revised by author.

From the planning point of view, because of Shenzhen municipal government efforts, urban villages were included in the standard urban renewal process, meaning that urban villages were included in the urban land system and villagers became urban citizens. The government can thus include the collective land of urban villages into the urban land system through urban renewal.

269 This kind of model is compensated either by the government or relies on the decisions made by the village owners. Therefore the renewal process did not participate in the real estate market, unlike the renewal processes by the private developer.

270 See more in: Research on Different Models and Ownerships questions for the Urban Villages Renewal (in Chinese). Available at [http://www.mlr.gov.cn/wskt/ffg/201109/t20110906\\_938685.htm](http://www.mlr.gov.cn/wskt/ffg/201109/t20110906_938685.htm).



However, from the socio-spatial point of view, the opponents' view is that the majority of those who rely on low-rent residences are then excluded from their former neighborhoods. Nevertheless, a gentrification process is likely to happen in those areas (Pu Hao et al. 2011). When urban villages are replaced by commercial housing units, the living density of these areas will significantly decline in comparison with the former urban villages. Better-off residents who can afford to do so will replace the former low-income tenants. It would lead to immediate and significant housing stress in certain areas while many urban villages are critical sub-markets of urban housing, providing a realistic and effective affordable housing solution for migrants. In general, with an emphasis on improvement of the built-up environment, infrastructures, and the livelihood of indigenous villagers, there is no consideration for the tenants, and they do not receive any compensation<sup>271</sup>.

The pull-and-push effect that has emerged in different periods of urban village development demonstrates how deep and complex an urban objective confronts the planning authority.

#### § 8.4.2 From Urban Fringe to Urban Indispensability

---

Following government policy, overall reconstruction seems to be the easier solution for redevelopment as long as the real estate company and the village can come to an agreement and cooperate. However, the disadvantages include enormous cost and reinvestment, and in order to satisfy the requirements of both ex-villagers and developers, the floor area has to be intensified with the result being that the existing urban context and city life of urban villages is wiped out once and for all.

Alternative types of reconstruction can also be found that can lessen density by removing partial poor-quality houses and buildings in order to accommodate green space, widening the streets and alleys for admitting more sunlight and ventilation, and utilizing non-constructed lands available inside "villages" to relocate villagers who are being removed, or minimizing demolition when remote villages have less floating population and less conflicting with their surroundings. This type of village usually

---

271

During the interview with the planner from the former Shenzhen Planning Bureau, it was indicated that the municipal government is now focusing on transforming the former industrial-base Shenzhen into a high-tech metropolis, in which, naturally the low-income labor forces have been reduced since the city is focusing on attracting skilled talents.

possesses historical cultural value and other values that do not qualify the village for overall transformation. The intervention focuses on transforming illegal buildings and preserving most buildings in villages, repairing and unifying the overall external appearance and decorating the interiors (Ma Hang 2006).

Besides, the socio-spatial issue that emerged in urban villages is more complicated and not solved by providing a solution of physical redevelopment. The question remains: while the ex-villagers are expecting their unlawful and low-quality properties to become legitimate ones and for the value of their property to double (or triple) instantly once transfer of their properties into the commercial real estate market is allowed, is this distribution of wealth fair and in the urban public's interest? The answer to this question is complicated and varied in individual cases and within different contextual backgrounds as is illustrated by the following cases.

Regarding the location and status of redevelopment, three villages, namely Yunong village, Gangxia village and Dafeng village<sup>272</sup> are selected to illustrate the diverse approaches of renewal of the urban villages (Figure 8.26).




Figure 8.26 The location of Yunong village, Gangxia village and Dafeng village in Shenzhen  
Source: Google Map (2012). Edited by author.

In 1999 the Futian authority issued a policy statement that clearly spelled out a prohibition on leasing properties to non-villagers, together with an equally unequivocal intent to clear all illegal structures<sup>273</sup>. Instead of complying with this policy, Yunong villages, under the leadership of the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE), adopted the usual attitude of “policy from above and resistance from below” by replacing the current 52 low-rise buildings with 37 taller buildings. Their expectation was that if the authorities were serious about clearing the site, compensation would be increased because of the now much larger built-up floor area. Infuriated by this open defiance, and fearing

the loss of authority that might jeopardize other redevelopment plans, the Futian government took the unusually hard-lined approach of sending the police force to block the construction site and cutting water and electricity supplies to these new structures (Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011). However, the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) did not back down, mainly because of the expectation that the final compensation was going to be directly linked to the built-up area, legal or illegal. The ex-villagers did indeed convince the authorities that the urban villages were no longer an insignificant urban fringe. To the city and the government, their redevelopment was now an overwhelming fact of urban indispensability and could not be ignored no longer.

The stand taken by the ex-villagers forced the Futian government to lessen its reliance on power and to move towards the more collaborative approach of forging a partnership with the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE). At the same time, the government also learned the lesson that guidance regarding the urban villages, within the overall planning scheme, was crucial.

In this context, corresponding to the Comprehensive Planning Guidelines for Urban Villages Redevelopment 2005–2010, in 2004 a private-sector actor was enlisted to join the coalition. A tri-partner collaboration agreement was initially reached. An attractive addition to the relocation plan was the promise by the private developer and the authorities to return a new flat to each of the affected households in the new project. The Futian government also stationed staff members inside the village to deal with the issue and, in particular, to work closely with the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE). By the end of March 2005, all households involved agreed on the relocation and compensation arrangements, and this was followed in May by the so-called Number One Blast of China, the massive clearing of the site using dynamite (Figure 8.27).



*Figure 8.27* Demolition of Yunong Village  
Source: News Guangdong.

In comparison with the success in Yunong, from the viewpoint of the planning authority, Gangxia village demonstrated opposition and confrontation in its coalition working towards redevelopment. Gangxia village, located in the middle of the Futian central area, has an area of about 151,600 m<sup>2</sup> and a population of nearly 100,000. Unlike Yunong village, Gangxia village has a deeply rooted internal social history as all villagers have the same family name of “Wen”. This clan is larger than the local Wens and includes the oversea Wens, headed by the Hong Kong chapter. The clan division played a very crucial role in the decision of the coalition (Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011: 429).

Due to its strategic location, it was the first village targeted for redevelopment by the Futian government. Compared to the Yunong village, with a land area of 20,000 m<sup>2</sup> and a population of 9,000, Gangxia is a much bigger and denser area. The strategic location of Gangxia village enabled it to become one of the most desirable areas in the rental-housing market. For example, in 2003, the gross income of Gangxia village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) was 14.88 million, of which 96 percent came from property leasing and only 4 percent from other village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) investments.<sup>274</sup>

The success of the coalition in the Yunong partnership boosted the confidence of the Futian government. They tried to duplicate the same model in Gangxia by bringing in the same private-sector partner. A joint venture was formed with the private-sector partner and the Futian government, with the deputy party secretary of the Futian government as team leader. Unlike Yunong village, in Gangxia there had been a long-term political infighting between the villagers and the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) leadership as well as among villagers themselves; thus, the coalition that was formed between the private developer and the government did not include the Gangxia village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) at this stage.

In 2006, a more cooperative chairman of the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) was elected with the support of the Futian authority, which led to the signing of the initial redevelopment guidelines agreement by the three partners; namely, the government, the village joint venture enterprise (VJVE), and the developer. Yet some villagers suggested that the authority-supported election was unfair and activated the overseas network of the clans and soon appealed their new concerns on compensation, the plan, and relocation. They regarded their site as having a prime location, and given the generous package offered in Yunong, they wanted more (Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011).

The internal conflict between the elected village joint venture enterprise (VJVE) and the villagers resulted in the denouncement of the signed guidelines agreement.

During the same period, a case had, coincidentally, happened in a neighboring village. The owners of a “nail house”<sup>275</sup> had requested to be compensated by the developer for their 6-story house, which was built in 1997 for 1.2 million RMB, based on the market value of the surrounding real estate. In 2007, they successfully received 12 million RMB from the developer. This was the highest-ever compensation for a nail house in China at the time. This case had a big impact on the negotiations in Gangxia village; with the expectation of increasing the compensation that the developers would be willing to hand out in the process of redevelopment, the support for the agreement by the villagers of Gangxia dropped from 85 percent to less than half. Along with this, the stagnating negotiations were also frustrating the developer. At this point, another deadlock kicked in and no real progress was made.

In 2008, because of the decline in the global economy, a majority of villagers was now in favor of the redevelopment plan; suddenly, the original “unfair” compensation package suggested by the authority seemed very appealing. The divided villagers finally signed the compensation agreement one by one. By 2009, 56 percent of legal property owners in Gangxia, involving 275 buildings, had signed the contract, and by the 2009 deadline, the percentage was just over 91 percent. The whole process took more than 11 years (Li Ling Hin and Li Xin 2011) (Figure 8.28). The final redevelopment of Gangxia village had created many millionaires and billionaires in one night, and this phenomenon was described as “Hundreds of old buildings go down and hundreds of super-rich stand up”<sup>276</sup>.

---

275 A nail house is a Chinese neologism for homes belonging to people (sometimes called “stubborn nails”) who refuse to make room for development.

276 According to the developer, the compensation (in cash) is estimated 23,800 RMB per m<sup>2</sup> for commercial units and 12,800 RMB per m<sup>2</sup> for residential units.



*Figure 8.28* Images of the western section (Heyuan) of Gangxia village before (2009) and after (2011) demolition  
 Source: Pu Hao (2012: 26).

The differences between the cases' evolutionary processes can yield many scenarios, but one principle shared by the developers, villagers, and authority is never changed: to pursue and to maximize the accumulation of land value.

The pull-and-push effect of property-based economic activities between factors that are caused by the insatiable demand of land for urban development and by the incompetent rental-housing provision of the authorities is recognized in the development histories of the urban village—in particular in the redevelopment of Gangxia village. Its strategic location allowed Gangxia villagers to negotiate with the government and the developer in a much stronger position than in Yunong village, resulting a much higher financial and political cost. However, to the private developers and the villagers, the ultimate goal was definitely set on economic outcomes while for the authorities removing urban villages and converting rural land into state land will certainly also bring in financial benefits in terms of land revenue as well as economic return from a regenerated and better-planned new district.

On the other side of advocacy a warning is in order that the crisis beneath the simplified large-scale transformation could have negative long-term effects. In a city with a large floating population, houses in the rental market become the basic need of most of the floating population, and 63 percent of the population relies on housing by leasehold. Rental markets in Shenzhen can be divided into three categories: revolving housing provided by the government, commercial housing in the market, and rental housing in "villages". Statistics shows the revolving housing directly provided to the floating population by the government accounts for only 0.8 percent in the rental-market sector while this category of housing is reserved for civil servants and registered populations. The shortage of affordable rental housing is a constraint that was foreseen after the redevelopment of the urban villages. This has built up an undesirable result for those who have been completely excluded from the redevelopment of urban villages, such as ordinary urban citizens and tenants. While the developers paid exceptional compensation during the redevelopment process, all these costs would be transferred

to the commercial products that would be built and sold; in this case, the negative consequence of costs of production being passed along to consumers, the private home owners.

From different perspectives, a soft approach to achieving the rehabilitation has been the study and concern of designers and scholars. URBANUS advocated rehabilitation using an alternative method<sup>277</sup>. In interviews, many planning bureau officials shared the same view of considering the potential value for the city. Compared to those “well-designed” cities that are driven by urbanization and globalization, these villages represent an extraordinary vitality in their physical and spatial configuration. They are not only places to live; they are also a basic workplace for the inhabitants. Residents can live and start small businesses in the same location—a situation that, under normal conditions, commercial areas cannot provide. And, as the inevitable outcome of the process of urbanization in China, urban villages are regarded as one of the basic housing types in the contemporary city.

One example of the relative success of renovation under the “soft” approach of regeneration is Dafeng village. Unlike the two aforementioned cases, Dafeng village is located just outside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). With less market advantage in real estate development, Dafeng village seems to evolve itself in another direction.

Shenzhen was previously a beleaguered city located between the first and second frontier. Customs and checkpoints on both frontiers were passageways, connecting the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) to hinterland China and Hong Kong, around which a series of open or secret “economic zones” involving border trade gradually emerged<sup>278</sup> (Jiang Jun 2011: 9). With regard to the rural development, the Chinese government promoted the pattern of “one brand in one village<sup>279</sup>” which is driven by the market, guided by the government, and corresponding to land reform in rural areas. The seemingly unlimited supply of rural surplus labor liberated from new rural policies combined with cheap land and foreign investment formed the dynamic model of China’s industrialization and urbanization in the first few decades of reformation and opening up. On this common ground, Dafeng village is nothing more than an emerged

---

277 See URBANUS, *Village/City: City/Village* (Beijing: CEPP Press, 2006).

278 For two decades, in the 80s and 90s, after the creation of SSEZ, people from the hinterland needed to hold a “border permit” to enter SSEZ; they passed through the “second frontier” checkpoint guarded by the army.

279 “One brand in one village” (Chinese: 一村一品).



representative of China's rural industries, which is composed of many variously specialized industrial villages. However, one of the main successful factors of Dafeng regeneration is its geographic location.

Dafeng village, located at the foot of the mountains along the line of the second frontier just beyond the outskirts of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). It covers an area of 0.4 km<sup>2</sup> with approximately 300 native born villagers. During the late 80s, thanks to its position nearby the second frontier, Dafeng benefits from both Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and has become a foreign capital investment target in the backyard of a global market, since it is located outside of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), it is able to import labor resources from hinterland very conveniently.

In 1989, Huang Jiang, an art dealer from Hong Kong came to Dafeng, employed a few students to help with the fulfillment of an order for a series of oil painting and later brought the special industry of "oil painting reproduction" to Dafeng<sup>280</sup>. The increasing profits and orders attracted more and more workers. Similar to other township industries, after training the peasant workers into competent, artistically skilled workers, Dafeng integrated cheap labor from the hinterland and cheap rent in the urban villages, and pored out a vast amount of low-priced oil painting products entering the global market through convenient trade corridors (Zhou Hongmei 2011).

Dafeng village is situated at the interface between external capital and internal labor force, creating the conditions to establish "informal special zones" from the bottom up (Jiang Jun 2011). It was gradually transformed from countryside to industrial village and then to urban village. At the time, it was a totally spontaneous market behavior without establishing a systematic industrial cluster or industrial chain, relying mainly on traditional manufacturing industry. The per capita income was fairly low (Zhou Hongmei 2011: 21).

---

280

Huang Jiang moved in, taking about thirty apprentices with him. They specialized in producing copy paintings. Clients supplied the image and painters reproduced them by hand, often in large quantities. To increase efficiency, ensure uniformity and raise quality, Huang Jiang applied the principle of division of labor in the production process – apprentices were assigned and trained to paint specific parts of a painting. The production-line model became highly successful and orders poured in from America and Europe through intermediaries in Hong Kong. In 1992, Huang Jiang established his own company and employed over 2,000 workers. Many of his apprentices soon started their own galleries and shops in Dafeng, recruiting migrants from Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei and China's inner provinces that flooded into Guangdong in search of work. Art Radar Asia 2012, available at <http://artradarjournal.com/2012/02/29/dafen-art-village-part-i-from-copy-to-creative-in-shenzhen/>.

While the significance of the coastal Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) was gradually weakened when its experimental experience was promoted throughout the country, Shenzhen had to search for a more sustainable development model beyond its glorious “border economy.” Shenzhen was eager to reorient itself into a “cultural industry base” as the prototype for policy support<sup>281</sup>. In Dafeng, the oil painting industry was also challenged by relentlessly rising rents. The Shenzhen government realized that guiding the village appropriately was a key factor for Dafeng’s future and that it was necessary to improve the oil painting industry chain and enhance the originality of the local industry. With these two considerations, the municipality of Shenzhen put in some investment, activated the urban space, restored the aged houses and improve the infrastructures etc. The “Dafeng model”, which is “driven by the market and led by the government”, was appropriately set up (Zhou Hongmei 2010: 22) (Figure 8.29).



*Figure 8.29 Images of Dafeng Village*  
Source: Photos by author.



Figure 8.29 Images of Dafeng Village  
Source: Photos by author.

As the development of Dafeng village continued, in 2007, the Dafeng Art Museum invested was established and invested in by the government, as a symbolic “strong heart” for Dafeng village. This assignment was designed and implemented by URBANUS.<sup>282</sup> Their strategy was to create a hybrid mix of different programs, including museum, shops, galleries, and other venues, with the intention to stimulate the interactive connections between the existing urban village and the new function of the museum. The main purpose was to create a breeding ground for contemporary art and also take on the more challenging role of blending the museum with the surrounding urban fabric in terms of spatial connections (Figure 8.30 and Figure 8.31).



Figure 8.30 Site map of Dafeng Art Museum  
Source: URBANUS



Figure 8.31 Connections between the Dafeng village and the newly developed housing project  
Source: URBANUS

With more than 800 galleries and 10,000 artists in Dafeng, 60 percent of the paintings are sold overseas and 40 percent in China. Dafeng village has become part of the Chinese export machine that makes Shenzhen one of the richest cities in China, and it is now recognized as a creative industry powerhouse.

What can be learned from Dafeng village is the force of informal, self-taught urbanism in urban villages, which was produced by a grassroots development that in turn seem to produce a whole—a community full of vitality. Diverse elements have contributed

to the “Dafeng model”: the self-stimulated transformation and upgrading of a creative industry, the appropriation of government involvement, and the introduction of a new community revitalization mode by including the participation of the villagers as well as the migrants. In addition, coming from outside Dafeng village, art dealers, buyers, and suppliers have all been participating in creating Dafeng’s informal urbanism and determining how this village is used and built, how it has made itself culturally unique and a place growing out of creation.

Dafeng was chosen as Shenzhen’s exhibition theme in the Urban Best Practice Area at World Expo 2010 Shanghai. It took two years for Shenzhen to obtain the chance to participate in World Expo 2010 after going through four rounds of planning and application. It tried to invoke the bottom-up narrative of the Chinese multi-dimensional social transformation process. Shenzhen, over the past thirty years, and Dafeng, over twenty years, have embodied the repetition and fragmentation to compose their own original images. The transformation of the city and its image, through, produces a driving force in the cultural transformation of people and socio-spatial productions.

As Liauw Wei Wu (2010:14) remarks, “the question of how original is Shenzhen or Dafeng therefore become less important than understanding how creative are the processes of change and transformation”. The simple fact is that the informal, unstable, flexible, absorptive process of urbanization can only be sustained through constantly changing what comes in and what comes out of the city in which the original pioneering spirit of Chinese urban planning culture can be sustainably carried on.

---

## § 8.5 A few Points for Reflection

---

Learning from the evolutionary process of developing and planning the CBD district of Shenzhen in the socio-spatial domain, some may argue that in the socio-spatial domain the production of space in the contemporary era manifests neoliberal tendencies. At first glance, the changes to China’s economy and society since 1979 indeed seem to suggest a neoliberal trajectory—although its ethical status has not been demonstrated to be moving towards the kind applied in capitalist countries—but the important is that socio-spatial mode of the CBD in Shenzhen is rooted in very different soil in comparison with the Maoist period.

As Wu Fulong (2007: 9) argues, Chinese cities have been integrated into global commodity production. It is this tight association with global production circuits that has laid down political and economic conditions similar to those at the core of

Western economics. The production of urban space is part of the new use of space as a medium to expand value accumulation. As a result, the shifting accumulation strategy is intensifying the competition for space. Because the city or its CBD is at the center of accumulation, the outcome is a severe economic competition between cities and within the city. The government and its planning department are now becoming the local “entrepreneurial agents” facilitating the realization of the shift in accumulation. Therefore, the new use of space as a medium to expand accumulation profoundly changes how the space is produced as well as the meaning of space. From state-led industrialization to urban-based accumulation, the city is used as a “fix” to absorb capital.

In addition, Chinese cities are now the testing ground for a new urbanism; whatever can be found in the world can almost all be found in Chinese cities also. Such a sense of ever-present newness is vividly illustrated by a senior planner in Shenzhen, talking about his attitude toward “foreign expertise” in urban design: “If foreigners want to come here to exchange their views, that’s fine. If they want to teach us how to do urban design, I don’t buy it. Here in Shenzhen we have done all the fanciest stuff that is just being talked of in the West.” (Wu Fulong 2007: 17).

The message clearly claims that, underneath the façade of the freedom to test foreign concepts in contemporary Chinese urban planning practice, urbanism is still under the authority of local implementation in which the invisible hand, in the form of planning control, depends not necessarily on the capital of a laissez-faire market alone but is certainly still under political control. In addition, despite criticisms that arose regarding the production of space in contemporary China, the appearance of the Generic City, as in many other cities in China, may not be a completely blind mistake of the planning authority, promoting the grandeur of socialist China without political awareness. Rather, it is often the authority’s allowance of leeway that determines the checks and balances of market-led versus politically led interventions.

OCT-Loft provides another insight into how the production of social space can be alternatively created in a context of innovation within the same socio-political system.

The success of the first phase of the OCT-Loft renovation has to be credited to diverse actors, new concepts, and a creative design approach. The originality of OCT-Loft was a unique phenomenon; a innovative creation based on the conjecture and spontaneous decisions of the developers and planners in combination with critical impetus from anyone participating in the process of building and using the space. Artists, designers, owners of shops, and citizens, whether staying for a long or short time, enjoy the ambiance of OCT-Loft. They come to appropriate the space in their own way and continue to reshape it. Contrary to the Futian CBD, OCT-Loft shows to a certain degree how spatial appropriation can be realized based on a collective participatory approach of urban development. In addition, the multi-functional program and the

human-scale spatial composition in combination with the promotion of the creative industry contributed to the rich and diverse spatial qualities of a new type of urbanity in Shenzhen—a city so far lacking of cultural accumulation.

If the Futian CBD and OCT-Loft have shown how urban planning and design can be manageable to mediate the expectation from two planning forces with different intentions: intervention based on the top-down planned-interest, and flexible planning based on the ability to adjust to the bottom-up forces. The arising phenomena of urban villages—created as the by-products of Chinese rapid urban development—show a much wider scope in their social-spatial trajectories. The destiny of urban villages is closely connected to the greater transformation of China: the birth of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), land reform, rural industrialization, rural migration and urbanization etc. Their (re)development reveals truly the complexity and hybridity of the contemporary urban questions, which have been left behind by the planning authorities in the earlier stages of speedy urban development.

The urban evolution of Shenzhen, to a certain degree, represents the alignment of the contemporary urban evolution based on China's self-exploration of modernization; it helps us to indicate almost all the key concepts emerging during the great transformation from planned-economy rural China into an market-oriented urban one: experimental economic zones, rural-urban land reform, real-estate development, industrialization and rural-urban migration, emergence of the new phenomenon of the urban village, administrative decentralization etc., are continually challenging the overall legitimacy of the special Chinese political mechanism.

To maintain the political ideal of centralization and allowing the emerging urban culture to develop from an agricultural economy into a multi-functional economy, can contemporary China continue surpass beyond its own limits? It is a critical confrontation in reality, formed step-by-step through progressive reform. The theory of "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" as practiced in China has to confront a fundamental issue of balance—for the economy in general and urban physical construction in particular—whether maintained by central planning or market mechanisms, and consequently the relationship between the state and the market, between the political authorities and the civilians; at this moment the definite picture cannot as yet be drawn. It shows conflicts with ideological inclinations as well as practical solutions.

To pursue progression beyond the economic success, the circumstances of socio-spatial interaction are becoming much critical than ever in Chinese society. To retrieve the socio-spatial meaning for the people, in my opinion, is a much more powerful force to achieve the goal of political stability in a long-term perspective. The planning intervention confronts, in three projects, inevitably process of negotiation and compromising with involved actors. This learning process of socio-spatial interaction

is giving benefit not only to the planners who are now having more opportunities to realize and explore planning methods and approaches for building modern Chinese society, but also to civilians who are now playing important roles in shaping space and place that new social meaning can be retrieved. This social-spatial interaction shall be able to evolved in a relative stable political-economic framework in order to give the society enough space and time to reflect on what is the true meaningful space and place for modern China. This reflection shall be based on the review of the traditional value and access them in a systematic manner. The special historical evolution of Chinese civilization with the break of continuity shall be recovered by cultural resurrection and the gaps occurred by the historical matters shall be sutured by the awakening of people and by pursuing ethical value in Chinese tradition. Only by doing so, Chinese culture can become revival in the sense of being an entity of convergence and no longer a eclectic bricolage of *Man han quan xi* (a Chinese banquet)<sup>283</sup>.



PART 5 **Outline of the Chinese  
Planning Culture**

Paddling between Flexibility and Reliability



# 9 Conclusions

This chapter comprises three parts. The first part is to answer the research questions based on the findings from the investigations and analyses. The second part is to elaborate further the research findings in relation to the three entrances of the theoretical review. Both parts together bring the research conclusions about the Chinese planning characteristics between flexibility and reliability and provide an outline for the planning culture of the contemporary Chinese urban development.

---

## § 9.1 Answering the Research Questions

---

Following the main research question, “*How does urban planning in contemporary China face the challenges of the emergent urban evolution under the (internal) initial conditions and within the (external) global society?*” sub questions are proposed in relation to the research hypotheses, which reflect three research entrances of the transformation of the society, the transformation of the planning system and the implementation of the planning system in practice. In the following, they are answered and elaborated according to their respective order.

### § 9.1.1 The Transformation of the Society: Critical Modernization

---

**Sub-hypothesis 1:** The transformation of the Chinese society under the conditions of urbanization and globalization triggers the emergence of a new societal culture. This transformation cannot break off the evolution of modernization in relation to the historical roots, traditional norms and value systems of Chinese society.

**Sub-question 1:** *What is the characteristic of the recent “cultural turn” of contemporary China?*

Whatever the factors involved, the urban structural changes needed to be validated by some instrument of authority if they were to achieve institutionalized performance. Whatever decision is made on the city, it is “ultimately political” even if it may be called economic (Heng 1999: 208).

Despite other criteria that had contributed equivalently to speeding up the process of reform, political transcendence under the regime of Chinese communist leadership was one of the foremost crucial accelerators that triggered contemporary urban transformation—defined in this research as the “cultural turn” of Chinese society. In general, the transformation of contemporary China cannot be separated from the continuous evolution of Chinese modernization, which is situated within the broader context of the global society. Neither can it be disconnected from the root of Chinese tradition and history over the long course of its evolution. More precisely, this accelerated evolution formulates a critical<sup>284</sup> modernization within contemporary China, which is a product of Chinese tradition as well as an alternative to Western paradigms. In comparison to other modernization movements that have taken place in Chinese modern history, the critical modernization of its current evolution has derived various meanings.

Firstly, all initiatives of the modernization movements—at the stage of the first modernization of Westernization; during the second stage of the Reform Movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century as well as during the May 4th Cultural Movement at the beginning of the twentieth century—were commonly triggered by the stance on European modernity<sup>285</sup> (Golden 2006: 8) and by the forces of foreign invasion that had provoked a painful experience as a result of Chinese colonialism<sup>286</sup>. The critical modernization of contemporary China refers to the current period in which the seed of modernity can be bred under a relatively stable socio-political environment. Although globalization worldwide and the urbanization of China are bringing China both challenges and opportunities in relation to general modernization, its relative political stability has also allowed Chinese modernity to evolve its own course without being dramatically traumatized by other arbitrary forces. Moreover, for the first time, it has provided Chinese society an opportunity for the movement of modernization to evolve its natural course, based on self-initiative of the people, although it is confined within a more complex global society.

---

284 Lefavre Liane and Tzonis Alexander (2003) *Critical Regionalism*. New York: Prestel Verlag

285 Modernity in the Western context is a product of the historical and cultural forces that produces the enlightenment, forces of European histories and cultures that were different from those of China. Investigations of Chapter 3.1.2 illustrate the differences of recognition of subjectivity and objectivity between the Chinese and Western tradition.

286 See more about Chinese modernization movements in Chapter 4.1.1.

Secondly, under the circumstances of a transitional evolution, resistance to accepting the paradigm of European modernity as being “universal” is also one of the consequences of the critical modernization within contemporary China. A debate emerged about “Asian values” or “Chinese values” that has become a flourishing component of the current discourse. The reason for this development is that a very large portion of the world’s population is not willing to consider values that have been inherited from the European discourse as universally applicable, as many have suffered from the consequences of imperialism and (post-)colonialism. In this sense, the specific historical evolution stands in relation to the challenges of China’s current position. It has reinforced a critical modernization to evolve in an inevitable process of self-exploration in order to bridge the break in the cultural evolution and to simultaneously revamp the traditional values. This self-exploration, which tries to find a new position of cultural equivalence within the global society, while being confronted with forces of internal and external circumstances, is similar in countries such as China that were influenced by post-colonial conditions in their urban developments.

Thirdly, the critical modernization of contemporary China has great impact on the shifting interests in political decision-making, social critique and the people’s value systems. The last four decades allowed China to evolve its critical modernization in a relatively stable socio-political environment. This has changed the general positions and insights of the people towards the predominantly Western-centered value system as well as traditional Chinese norms and self-awareness. While being aware of and learning from its very own history of modernization, China has learned to sustain the evolution of modernity. China is following is a gradual reformation based on various stages of liberalization step by step as shown in Chapter 5. This way it avoids past mistakes and a potentially abrupt collapse of political institutions as well as the sudden demise of the entire system. This gradual reformation allows the market-oriented economy to be much slower and cautious than elsewhere in the post-communist world. As a result, based on the political accountability achieved by new modes of enhancing political guidance and public participation, a fusion of socialism with Chinese characteristics is gradually unfolded, although its essential meaning has not yet been interpreted comprehensively in the discourse.

Fourthly, for a country like China which has experienced numerous societal set-backs, the provision of social stability seems to be convincing the majority of the Chinese people that a political system with only one ruling party could be maintained for a long time. However, one can already detect the challenges of this system. Although the Communist Party conveys the people its sincerity in pushing forward diverse reformation policies<sup>\$1</sup>, a fundamental understanding regarding questions in relation to the Western concept of democracy are still vague and weak in current Chinese society. Nevertheless, cautiously the reciprocal relationship between social progression and political legitimacy is a consensus among the current Chinese leaders, which had been ignored by former feudal regimes as well as under the Maoist advocacy of class struggle.

### ***Sub-question 2: How is it related to the specific development of Chinese society?***

Despite the abovementioned derivations, similar to any other transitional period in Chinese modern history, critical modernization has a fundamental characteristic of being transitive and culturally inalienable. This means that the current situation of critical modernization is embedded within a similar formation as in the past stages of modernization. This transitive characteristic like any other early stage of modernization movement is identified in the following as a Chinese specificity.

Firstly, although the current Chinese society seems to become more open to the global society and to its people, the remaining political and ethical spirit of contemporary China is not much different from the situation that these regimes have shared commonly, striving to survive potential forfeiture of their legitimate right—in order to maintain the “routinization of charisma” (Weber 1947), which has been elaborated in Chapter 3.2.1.

Secondly, throughout the consistent institutional reformations that are guided by the Communist Party, the self-initiated political reformation proves to be able to generate for the overall majority of the people—at least in general terms on a countrywide level—economic benefits. On the one hand, the importance of this political effort apparently shows that the Chinese government has played a very pro-active role as initiator in the framework of institutional reform since 1978<sup>287</sup>. On the other hand, following the track of reformation, China, by political enunciation, re-entered the world-system in 1972 from a relatively stronger economic and political strength. These actions were not taken without deliberate steps by the collective leadership of the Communist Party, as Perry Anderson (2010: 77) argued:

At the gateway to their reforms, perhaps the most decisive of all the differences between Russia and China lay in the character of their political leadership. In command of the PRC was not an isolated, inexperienced functionary, surrounded by aids and publicists infused with a naïve Schwärmerei for all that was Western, but battle-hardened veterans of the original Revolution, leaders who had been Mao’s colleagues, and had suffered under him, but had lost none of their strategic skills or self-confidence (...) Collectively, they were in a strong position, enjoying not only the prestige of their roles in the Civil War and building of the nation, but the popularity of having brought the Cultural Revolution to an end, which was met with a surge of relief in the cities.

From the perspective of the ruling classes, this collective leadership of the Party-state led by Deng Xiaoping and reformists had crucially learned its lessons from Chinese history of modernization: in order to secure their political legitimacy, it is crucial to sustain the national economy, and for the people to overcome a miserable state of poverty which stemmed from a crucial failure that the former regimes had been unable to avoid.

From a public perspective, only a small minority of marginalized academics have publicly spoken about democratic regime changes through the introduction of a multi-party system. The majority of intellectuals, however, discuss political reforms within the framework of a single party system (Golden 2006). Similar ethical values towards politics can be recognized from the majority of intellectuals in the second modernization<sup>288</sup>. It provides a cogent illustration of the Chinese philosophical root: the inherent right of authority based on Tian-Ming (the Mandate of Heaven), which has been elaborated in Chapter 3.1.2. This means that in Chinese tradition it is only allowed to overthrow the reigning monarch by replacement if a regime fails to fulfill its duty, thus the forfeiture implies the “legitimate” right to rebel against the sovereign. This also confirms the legitimacy of its ruling status; the communist leadership has to fulfill the overall responsibility by aiming at the common prosperity of all people, continuously raising the material and cultural living standards of the people.

From a philosophical standpoint, based on Confucius’ advocacy of the social order and moral and ethical value, in Chinese tradition, the ethical spirit emphasizes the value of communalism more than that of individualism. Individualism and liberalism are two important elements of Western civilization. The concept of freedom can be described as one of the main ideological pillars of Western society. On the contrary, the Chinese ideal of liberalism is more a unity of social morality, which is underpinned by proper social relationships—social manner, responsibility and status—between the different social classes to build up a social order in which a society is based on the unity of Ren (benevolence) and Li (propriety), which has been elaborated in Chapter 3.1.2.

Although the critical modernization of contemporary China has produced various new meanings for the Chinese people, in general, the fundamental ethical spirit of Confucianism has deeply influenced the structures of their mentalities and thus has become and still is a sort of collective sub-consciousness. In that sense, the pattern of political ethics among the current Party-state Communists is similar to that of the

Maoist period and feudalism. In fact, the political formation has been a fusion between dynamic influences of internal and external factors over time. Yet the transition within a critical modernization in the context of the particular political and administrative formation under the current structure of Party-state Communism is still exhibited and bound up with a special Chinese value system, which never really disappeared.

The pattern of political ethics implies that the Confucian ethical spirit regarding the social order and the legitimate right of the ruling classes inherent from Tian-Ming (the Mandate of Heaven) is still strongly influencing today's political ethics and public consensus. The current communist regime regards its legitimacy as being empowered by the Li (propriety) as long as it can fulfill its legitimate role by providing Ren (benevolence) to the people. In this sense, the application of reform to improve the country's overall economy and people's living conditions are regarded as the political approach of Ren (benevolence).

Hence, the cultural transition dealing equally with modernization and tradition can be described as one coin with two opposing sides.

Tradition is not an unchangeable matter, but rather a living existence that is continually reinterpreted in the evolution of civilization, also in China. Tradition illustrates that the cultural continuity that extends into the evolution of a civilization is a valuable entity far beyond the way a temporary political break could ever really cause traumatization. As we interpret the meaning of modernization in contemporary China and try to compare it with the discourse of Western modernity, the overriding importance of culture and tradition should be fundamentally taken into account.

Modernity is originally referred to as a break in Western history that occurred during the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation when science began to flourish in contrast to religion and superstition as an alternative system of knowledge. Hubert-Jan Henket (2202:6) argued that,

(...) continuity and tradition, the two strongholds which had thus far guided communal and individual life, were increasingly pushed aside by progress, dynamic change and transitoriness; a fleeting state of being with enormous consequences for politics, economics, the sciences, the arts, religion and morality.

The current situation of the influence of critical modernization in contemporary China may be compared to the Tang-Song transition and other transitional periods in Chinese history. To respect the transitive and inalienable characteristic of the critical modernization of contemporary China is how the "cultural turn" is defined in this research. The "cultural turn" implies that the cultural and traditional continuity is evolving from the past to the present on the one hand, and refers to its transitive and impulsive characteristics of transformation that is mediating towards the future development on the other.

Foremost, the special characteristic of the “cultural turn” have to mediate change from past to future and to confront traditions with liberal ideas, resulting in the critical modernization of contemporary China containing several contradicting values.

Different traditions, and different patterns of modernization can result in social processes that are varied distinctively in individual societies. In general, however, modernization has certain universal value standards. Shang Zhiying (1997: 51) has listed:

1) Knowledge: rational methods, sciences and the spirit of science; 2) politics: democracy and rule by law; 3) economy: competition, standardization and specialization of production, revolution of sciences and techniques are the major agents of economic development; 4) society: urbanization, bureaucratic administration, contractual association; and 5) mind: the full development of individuality, a spirit of self-realization, awareness of competition.

In contrast to these standards, negative aspects can be recognized in the Confucian ethical spirit. In order to smooth the transitional process of the critical modernization of contemporary China and avoid contradicting values, inevitably, Chinese tradition must begin a dialogue with modernization and carry out a dialectic interrelation. Within this process a new ethical spirit, outlook on values, and moral norms can arise.

China’s political, social and cultural formation is still under development. Therefore, different scenarios are advocated by those who plead for either liberalism or anti-Westernism and nationalistic standpoints. Among Chinese intellectuals both remain respectable values. I am convinced that the enrichment of a dialectic approach is one of the core mechanisms of the current critical modernization that could ease the overwhelming cultural turn of contemporary China.

It is the first time in Chinese history of modernization that such spirit does not necessarily fall into the side of contradictions between a distinct rightness and wrongness but transcends the recognition based on the evolution of self-exploration and self-awareness. In contrast, it opens a channel for possible dialogue and creative transformation countrywide and worldwide, between tradition and modernization. It is in such a dialectic spirit of critical modernization and the correspondent cultural turn that planning culture of the contemporary China is nurtured.



## § 9.1.2 The Transformation of the Planning System: Establishing the Law-and-Plan-based System

---

**Sub-hypothesis 2:** The transformation of the Chinese society—defined as the “cultural turn”—is an on-going process that is leading the country towards a society in which urban development and spatial planning are confronted with the increasing tension between the public and private claims.

**Sub-question 3:** *Which changes and challenges have the “cultural turn” generated for Chinese urban development and planning?*

Almost immediately, an overwhelming reformation was taking after the late 1970s in many dimensions. Chapter 5 provides extensive descriptions of how based on the changing political, economic and social circumstances, urban development is guided by step-by-step political intervention and supervision.

First of all, the dualistic land system between the urban and rural developments is now becoming a topic of political concern with regard to the socio-spatial integration. In particular, in the process of Chinese urbanization urban-rural land reform inevitably has to seek the balance between the increasing demands for future urban development and the living circumstances and property rights of the rural inhabitants.

Economic reform based on the early stages of promotion of foreign direct investment and the opening-up of the Chinese economy to the world market, generated a particularly drastic impact on the Chinese political and economic decision-making process. This further increased after China became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001<sup>289</sup>. While foreign competition has provided a powerful force in reducing bureaucracy and inertia within Chinese economic institutions, it also triggered an institutional reform of the economy such as the reformation of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) by increasing efficiency through privatization and decentralization in correspondence with economic reality. In parallel, however, firms that fail to compete are forced to find ways to downsize, reorganize or adopt new technologies and new ways of management in order to survive (see Chapter 5.3). Nationwide, further pressure arises from outside as various states are asking China to adapt its legal and economic system. These requests are mostly in relation to lowering import-tariffs and providing legitimate investment mechanisms in order to permit

foreign firms to sell directly on the Chinese market. It has also given reasons for the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).

On the other hand, the economic transformation impacts socio-spatial aspects as well. In combination with sequential effects and impacts from external and internal forces as well as local initiatives, it has consequently created a cultural fusion of hybridity in contemporary Chinese society, thereby changing the life-styles of people and the way in which spatial environments are perceived. Socially, the Hukou system reform had resulted in massive rural-to-urban migration (see Chapter 5.4) and emerged urban villages (see Chapter 8.3.) Spatially, the emergence of urban agglomerations has produced new economic poly-centralities as new emerging urban conditions (see Chapter 5.5) and the application of the CBD concept for economic accumulation (see Chapter 8.1) as well as the promotion of cultural industry and creative districts for city branding like the OCT-Loft in Shenzhen (Chapter 8.2).

In the earlier stage of reform, domestic sources of investment were the main means that were urged into the market economy. Within this framework, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) played an important role. However, there is a double meaning behind this development.

Firstly, even though the path of self-exploration of the economic formation based on the advocacy of Deng Xiaoping was defined, relatively new mechanisms still needed to be built up. Further, to what extent the new market-oriented economy can be realized within this fusion with the existing planned economy system is still uncertain. Therefore, activating the former State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to pilot the testing market was a less risky approach.

Secondly, from an outsider's perspective on China, there were still high doubts about its silent reforms as China began opening up its markets. It shows that an important factor that has a decisive influence on the reform lies in the political accountability under which the role of the government can be transformed from controllers and regulators to market-oriented constructors. Under socialism with Chinese characteristics, as part of the changing role of the government, reform and privatization of the former State-owned enterprises (SOEs) system have demonstrated the political determination for economic reform, which has become one of most crucial initiatives in the process of marketization, although large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) still remain under the management of the central government<sup>290</sup>.

Furthermore, in rural and urban land reforms that have been illustrated in Chapter 5.1 in general, and in Chapter 7.1 with the Shenzhen experimental approach in particular, one group of participants that experienced strongly the effects of market reformation were the rural residents and peasants. Both the land tenure system of the rural area and the transfer of land as a commodity into the market in urban areas had great impact on the land expropriation and distribution system. Urban villages, as shown in Chapter 8.3, prove to be a representative evidence of such push and pull effects between the urban and rural development. Being aware that the rural reform is critical for the long-term evolution of Chinese urbanization, the obstacles and challenges will most likely not be less than the with reform in the urban areas.

In addition, housing reform had a big impact on the former housing distribution system. In the first stage of policy-oriented housing reform, the government had to deal with the interrelationship between the state, worker's unions and individuals and their respective interests. In the second stage, when housing became a genuine commodity, workers were able to afford market housing of their choice based on increased wages. Today, this has reached the stage of a matured market economy in which private investors and developers have largely taken over the provision of housing. Certainly, learning from the three selected case studies, both constraints and progressions are recognized. For example, large-scale housing construction does not substantially reduce the housing shortage in urban China. The rapid increase of housing prices and speculation in the housing market can possibly lead to the development of a housing bubble with detrimental effects.

Real estate investment and trading is becoming a speculator's game that is played by the state, other government levels, citizens, investors, developers and planners. Nevertheless, China is a large country with substantial differences that exist between cities regarding social and economic development. A specific policy can be very successful in some cities and yet fail in others. In the case of housing reform, for example, if the housing policy at the national level is stipulated in detail, it might turn out to be impractical at local levels. In order to confront the diverse groups of participants who are involved in the planning process, great efforts carried out by the local government can be recognized in the case of Shenzhen. Chapter 7.2 "Planning Shenzhen in Practice" shows that during the past forty years abundant local ordinances, regulations and plans were drafted, prepared and issued by the local government in order to bridge the gap between the theoretical plans of the central government and actual local practices. Many bold and creative instruments of planning application, which were developed first based on the Shenzhen experience were later introduced on a national scale.

Being embedded in the context of critical modernization of contemporary China, the role of planning gained its new meaning and is no longer merely an instrument to serve the planned economy but is rather becoming a new discourse of knowledge. In

general, political interests imply that planning policy still serves to provide an executive framework for the economy, including allocation of resources, regulations and laws, yet the current economy is no longer the closed system it used to be during the period of the planned-economy. Instead, the market economy requires a multi-dimensional approach and guidance. Under these circumstances, planning has to cope with multiple dynamic factors as well.

In addition, regarding decentralization the market economy allows planning professions to spread their influence throughout the socio-spatial domain more than ever. The wider-range of public participation in the planning domain asks for a system of openness, fairness, justice, legalization, rationalization and sensibility. This has challenged the former planning system to become more transparent and regenerative. In other words, urban planning is becoming a part of the socio-spatial activities of a society in which the aforementioned continual process of critical modernization is evolving.

In order to serve public policies and to evolve as a part of its social activities, the new planning discourse has to reflect and articulate Chinese conditions and challenges. It must relate to a fusion of the complex characteristics of contemporary China in particular and the global society in general.

Planning decisions, as an influential mechanism of directing socio-spatial results, often have to be made based on a reflexive capacity in mediating between “desirable” and “undesirable” interests, traditional and newly emerging values and norms, as well as internal and external influences and public and private demands. Therefore, very often the driving forces behind planning implementation lead to many incoherent prescriptions. This requires the current premature state of the Chinese planning discourse to be reconstructed and permanently adjusted based on considering compromises between the alternatives. This spirit of a reflexive evolvement with possible contradicting characteristics is often recognized in Chinese urban development as well as in planning approaches.

***Sub-question 4: How has the planning system been adapted to the new situation?***

(What kind of planning institutions has been installed? What are the responsibilities and tasks? What kind of plans has been developed?)

As Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are taking these questions into account from the central and local scope respectively, hereby they are elaborated in a rather more reflexive manner.

In general, political reform is the key initiative for an opening-up policy. Chapter 5.2 Political Reformation and Chapter 6.1.3 Hierarchical Structure of Governance provide extensive illustrations of the major methods that China has adapted to confront these new situations. On a political level, the central policy applied to the overall reformation

is based on a “gradualism” and “learning by doing” strategy. However, it is important to specify its essence of spirit, as it is not as simple as it appears to be. It is neither a conventional approach nor is it a “laissez-faire” attitude. On the contrary, it is a very bold progression with highly reflexive control mechanisms within the Party-state led government.

For example, in relation to the steps, which were taken by the Party-state led government during the typical Five-Year Plans (FYPs) (see Chapter 6.2.3 System of Plans) it shows how permanent adjustments were applied in policies. Reflexively, the key emphasis was given to testing each step in particular projects before they could be implemented throughout the country. Although mistakes and problems had been made and recognized, this experimental approach and the strong synchronization between policy-adaption and a careful monitoring of social development contributed to the reduction of high failure risks. Currently, the power of control on a macro-scale is still in the hands of the Party-state government. Nevertheless, the efficiency and the result might either be positive or negative, as phrased in Deng Xiaoping’s own words that “a certain degree of leeway is unavoidable”.

Among all of the reforms, one of the main evidences that reflect such political spirit is the revision of the Constitution. Seen as the “mother of all laws” in China, the Chinese Constitution sets the framework for legal developments. Since its adoption in 1982, it has in total been revised four times.<sup>291</sup> With each amendment, a breakthrough in the setting of the amendment has been significant for the further development of the country<sup>292</sup>.

For example, amendments adopted in 1988, 1993 and 1999 reflect a continuing conceptual evolution of socialism in China. The 1999 amendments prove the existence of a consensus among the Communist Party of China leadership on the nature of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which provides further legal protection to “capitalist” economic practices. Then the revision of 2004 indicates a certain distinct confidence of the Chinese leadership in pursuing its own vision of socialism. It shows that the revision of the Chinese Constitution highly reflects the demands of the situation. It carries a strong political message that can be revised based on providing the overall framework for the legal development and status when it is necessary, and this “immediate call for reversion” can be recognized in Chapter 5. 2 Political Reformation.

---

291 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004.

292 See more information about the amendment of Chinese Constitution, Chen Jianfu (2004).

Based on the significance of the Chinese political situation and particularly after the phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” advocated by Deng Xiaoping, the interrelation between the function of planning and its political status has even been better defined. Planning approaches and the adjustment of planning methods respond to the new confrontations in the spirit of “gradualism”, “learning by doing” strategy and an “experimental” approach. Based on this foundation, new planning approaches and methods are created and practiced.

In general, the new establishment of institutions and plans can be summarized in two categories and within two hierarchies:

The two categories are the law- and the plan-based system with each its responsible institutions. These two established categories are embedded within the hierarchical structure of the central administrative and the local administrative systems.

Due to the evolution of the market-oriented economy, a law-based planning system is becoming more and more important. Illustrations of the planning system in Chapter 6.2 show that China’s transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy has necessitated the development of a legal system capable of fostering and protecting economic headway. Since China’s reform and opening up in 1978, its legal system has undergone an unprecedented expansion with the promulgation of a multitude of commercial and civil laws at a national and local scale. In the early stage of reformation, largely because of a shifting distribution of authority among the National People’s Congress (NPC), the State Council and sub-national people’s congresses, the legislative arena was populated by actors with self-interests and uneasy power relationships who were engaged in institutional wars at virtually every stage of the law making process. Faced with the possibility of legislative disorder derailing modernization, in the early 1990s, China’s leadership gradually began to consider a law on law making to set out a clearly defined and uniform legal hierarchy. This includes three levels: 1) the Chinese Constitution and all laws that are based on it; 2) the administrative ordinances declared by the State Council; 3) the local ordinances declared by the local people’s congress, the local regulations issued by the local government and the sectional regulations issued by the ministries and committees of the State Council (see Chapter 6.2.2).

Following the same law-based spirit, in the planning domain two major milestones of planning legislation were defined: the Land Management Law and the Urban Planning Law (Urban and Rural Planning Law). Within this framework, Chapter 6.2.2 Legal System and Administrative System of Planning, shows how the legal system of urban planning is divided into a vertical and horizontal structure. It also shows how the relative authorities and their responsibilities are defined based on the legislative system.

Chapter 6.2.3 System of Plans shows three major components of plans that are related to China's spatial policies. Clearly defined from the macro- to the micro-economic scale, the main priority of spatial policy is to strengthen the integration of land use planning in urban and rural areas. This policy also reflects the reformation of the administrative system in relation to spatial planning. Corresponding to the vertical hierarchical administrative system from the national to the local level, the structure of statutory plans is defined.

Furthermore, the implementation of urban planning also is regulated by the law-based framework as well. Three steps of implementation including "Proposal for site-choosing", "Land-use Planning Permit" and "Construction-project Planning Permit" are installed in order to compensate for the lack of supervision power among the local government in the market-oriented planning system. Newly installed systems to monitor and evaluate the planning procedures and implementation underline the importance of public participation. This can only be sustained by addressing the law and protecting it in the Constitution.

All the efforts are aiming to leading Chinese society towards a "democratic centralism", science and legalization. The process of planning formulation, decision, administration and supervision is based on the same principle.

### § 9.1.3 The Implementation of the Planning System in Practice: The Conception of a New Urbanism

---

**Sub hypothesis 3:** The implementation of planning in practice in China now is facing the challenge to keep a balance between political and societal demands in relation to the planning outcome.

**Sub-question 5:** Which new challenges have the implementation of the planning system confronted on the level of local execution?

The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) demonstrates to other countries that the market-oriented economy has been practiced under "democratic centralism" China. In comparison to the former Maoist period, the most rigid change among all other factors is to allow new user groups participation in the urban development process. However, the real boost of the market upheaval took place after Deng Xiaoping's "south tour" in 1992. It reveals the important breakthrough of Deng Xiaoping's advocacy on the definition of "socialism with Chinese characteristics". By recalling his renowned phrase "the practice of using a planned economy is not equivalent to socialism because there is also planning under capitalism; but the

practice of using a market economy is not equivalent to capitalism because there are also markets under socialism”<sup>293</sup>, it becomes clear how much he had broken through the shackles of all political confusions at that time in relation to the debate on which direction was supposed to be followed as this had been uncertain among the group of leaders in the earlier stages of reform.

Being embedded in “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, since the first day of the establishment, urban planning in Shenzhen has always been about “trying by doing”. On the one hand, it has to fulfill the mission of being the testing ground for market economy in China, at the same time it is asked to follow the overall economic framework of the planned economy. On the other hand, the role of Shenzhen as an experimental base is to spontaneously adapt to the local conditions of market demands, yet it still has to be controlled by the central government. Very often, decision-making and planning formation have to bridge the conflicts between these two demands, either by compromising or with creative innovation and ideas.

Accordingly, since the first day of its establishment up until today, the build up of an experimental spirit, based on an efficient administrative planning system, has become the main challenge for the Shenzhen municipal government and its planners. Frequent administrative reforms, analyzed in Chapter 7.2.1 Planning Administration and Management” show that planning practice in reality cannot solely count on rigid and descriptive policies. Instead, a bold and open-minded learning by allowing for bottom up initiatives is weighted as equally important. Plans and regulations had to be prepared and adjusted consistently in order to meet the radical urban development and growth.

The establishment of the Statutory Graphic Standard (Fadingtuze) System and the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) as a legal organization for planning approval and review is a crucial step to transfer statutory technical planning regulations to the actual execution of spatial construction. In particular, it that recognized in the planning procedures and decision-making processes, varied participants, including officials, developers, experts and citizens have to be included. However, this bold urban planning jurisdiction is constrained by the specific Chinese political system, which reflects again the contradictions between the aforementioned planned and market system<sup>294</sup>.

---

293 See Chapter 7.1.1

294 See Chapter 7.2.3.



The spirit of the Shenzhen approach has been revealed both in Shenzhen's planning system and the planning implementation, which were built up based on local initiatives in order to confront emerging conflicts within the daily planning practice.

Unlike the planning system on the central level, planning system and planning implementation on the local level of execution has to deal with the emerged demands between the public and private realms on a daily basis, while it also has a direct influence to shape the social spaces and to confront the individual actors who are now allowed to participate in the process of urban development. In the case of Shenzhen and in the political framework of China, we can conclude that planning organizations on the municipal level play an important role to mediate the spatial demands of the collective actions of the "individuation" and "communalism" from the bottom up.

However, no matter if the approaches could be described as a trial and error process, the current situation is characterized by a more informal, unstable, flexible and absorbing process of urbanization that can only be sustained through continuous changes. To a certain degree, these changes relate to the uncertainty of what comes in and out of the city and are the foremost challenges for Chinese urban development, in particular for the local execution in planning practice.

***Sub-question 6: How does the planning intervention contribute to the reshaping of the socio-spatial urban development between different spatial demands of actors?***

Based on the analyses of the three projects that are selected for socio-spatial inquiries, the development of these three projects illustrates how the flexible planning approach can contribute to shaping the urban development in a completely different way.

In the case of the Central District of Futian, the scale is far bigger than in the other two cases. The force of the planning intervention is very much based on the top-down approach—a clear political and economic vision—in a span of more than 20 years and from a regional down to a detailed plan scale as well as building construction implementation. In the different stages, planning concepts and planning methods were used in order to boost the site development from scratch. Clearly, the long-term future vision was given in the master plan, which was made in 1986. However, the different moments where international consultants were involved as well as the introduction of urban design can be regarded as the most decisive elements that have made the project a real breakthrough.

What the planners and investors have learned is that under such planning control, reality does not always follow the blue print. The case of Phoenix Service shows that planning intervention does not need to be implemented in a hard way. On the contrary, negotiation skills sometimes can result in a better solution. The art of negotiation and compromise is becoming a crucial instrument of urban planning and urban design

practice, and now is recognized as such by Chinese planners, designers and investors. It is a new learning experience for the Chinese planners, in particular compared to the generation who had obtained a planning education and experience in practice that was still based on the political ethics of the Maoist planned-economy. Throughout the process of planning intervention, social concerns in the spatial domains gradually became the core subject of urban planning and urban design.

The case of OCT-Loft has many interesting elements of how a creative project is born. The creativity has been expressed not only in its spatial quality but also in the process of its production. Urban regeneration and urban renewal are among the important subjects in contemporary urban development. However, in Chinese experience, very often these have been misunderstood as conservation. This makes the OCT-Loft project a special case. Within a young city like Shenzhen, which permanently tends to pursue the newest developments, nobody expected that such a creative project based on the local history could be realized. It shows from the very beginning that the development strategy of OCT-Loft involved all parties: the developer, the art museum, artists, curators, architects, planners and inhabitants. The success of the OCT-Loft renovation has to be accredited to a diversity of actors, new concepts and a creative design approach in general. For example, the commissioned architectural firm URBANUS proposed an appropriate design concept which enabled the preservation of the old warehouse buildings while transforming the area into a recreation center for Shenzhen. This open-minded approach appears to have been presented among all the parties involved and in charge at that time. It reveals further evidence of how a participatory planning mechanism is developed among the diverse actors. A dynamic participation of different actors under a flexible mechanism of the planning intervention enabled the originality of the OCT-Loft project. And within this evolution, planning has to be able to give space to unexpected creativity and synergies. Creativity only has effect, if creative ideas also can be realized. That means city also has to offer space for implementation. This space first of all has to be affordable, in particular space for new and small enterprise, where start-ups of creative industry can grow. It represents perhaps the epitome of how a city could or should evolve that the availability of public space for encounter, communication, exchange, but also for exhibitions, presentations and all kinds of the diverse activities that people can create and develop.

The third case of the urban village has the most radical characteristics and unique constellation. The cases that have been shown in Shenzhen are not representative for other regions in China. Furthermore, different processes and results have been distinctive among the villages in one city. One should be aware that each is an individual development, even though the source of the cause is similar to many others.

Urban villages are the by-products of urban development in general. Normally, this type of by-product is the most challenging for the planning discipline. The main issues that urban villages have provoked are far beyond what local planning interventions

are able to solve. It involves entire national policies regarding the rural and urban development. As a result, the socio-spatial complexity, which emerged in the evolution of the urban villages, asks for far more than just physical redevelopment. Furthermore, in comparison with other cases, the problems that emerge in the urban villages are the most critical issues that the Chinese government must urgently respond to. It reveals a critical issue in which the central leadership is apparently still awaiting a manual that can be followed similar to that of Deng's bold statement in 1992. The question of how to deal with social justice is still a very sensitive issue in China, especially because it involves massive numbers of farmers and their collective land rights.

In the case of Shenzhen, the extremely dynamic adjustments required within the planning interventions are obvious. In the early stages, the government had to compromise the restrictions on housing in the areas of the urban villages due to the fact that low-cost housing was in such extreme demand on the rental market. Consequently, urban villages are continually becoming disconnected urban fragments. When the Comprehensive Planning Guidelines for Urban Villages Redevelopment 2005-2010 was released in 2005, it showed a clear political determination to react to circumstances in practice for the first time. Based on this guideline and taking into account the practical problems of everyday life, the government is reconsidering the application of urban regeneration and creative urban renewal methods instead of referring to further enforcement of regulatory measures. This means that in any urban renewal process an individual and adaptive approach is required. This individual adaptive approach can be recognized in the three selected urban villages.

From the three selected projects, one can recognize that a decisive trend is gradually emerging in the process of planning and design evolution. The negotiation skill and urban design that have been applied in the Central District of Futian, or the dynamic participation in the flexible planning interventions of OCT-Loft, and the locally specific fine-tuning approach of the regeneration of the urban villages, together reveal that participatory planning is becoming part of the formal planning mechanism. It also confirms that planning embodiments (method, ideology, aims and instruments) must be understood and used not only as instruments for a top-down political intervention, but also as spatial agents, confronting the changing socio-spatial demands embedded in the cultural domain.

In many cases, the result of the fast urbanization has been the demolition of existing, most often, historical urban structures and buildings. To retrieve the meaning of tradition within urban transformation and to appreciate the concept of historical continuity has been neglected under the name of the "Modern Movement". With regard to the long-term evolution of the critical modernization, efforts relating to a new urbanism have to be made to avoid the memory crisis and to evaluate historical continuity. As Henco Bekkering (2007: 44) pointed out, "in each human being there is an accumulation of knowledge and information within a given cultural context that he or she cannot deny" and that is part of his/her identity.

The retrieval of urban meaning is exactly one of the most crucial values that the critical modernization of contemporary China should acknowledge within the planning and design evolution. In particular, China has to avoid making the same mistakes, as made during the modern architectural and urban movement of in Western industrialized countries decades earlier.

The planning discourse of contemporary China does not have its own voice yet, even though efforts have been made under political initiatives in an unprecedented way. Thus, the transformation of planning from top-down initiatives (elaborated in chapter 6) corresponding to the emergence of the planning implementation with the demands of compromises and negotiations (elaborated in Chapter 8) are often recognized in many situations. It has proven to be the current challenge that Chinese planning culture still has to overcome.

Nevertheless, the on-going evolutionary process and dynamic initiatives of reformation are demonstrating that it is possible in China for a new urbanism to emerge in a non-Western oriented planning culture. Planning professions must deal with characteristics of a critical modernization and the contextual background of a cultural turn within contemporary China. The new urbanism of contemporary China including the application of urban planning and urban design has to fulfill the demands of mediating both the hard way and soft way the impacts in both the political-economic and the socio-spatial domains. This has to be realized by taking a hybrid problematic and layered historical Chinese context into account.

To build up the mechanism of a new urbanism is indeed one of the major challenges that has emerged in the transitional moment of the cultural turn. Within this process the idea of a new planning culture begins to be recognized.

---

## § 9.2 The Planning Culture of the Chinese Contemporary Urban Development

---

Global forces corresponding to the emergence of the world society as defined by Beck (1992) might prove to be one of the momentums that influenced the Chinese reformists to launch an open door policy. However, the direct distinct connection is not as strong as it was thought to be in the outside world. The evidence shows that the reformation of the Chinese political system during the 1980s has been effectively disguised as an internal impetus of picking up the unfinished modernization movement that had been traumatized by many “undesirable” historical events prior to the 1980s. The characteristic of the cultural turn in the 1980s is not a process whereby the state intends to serve a newly emerging middle class in China, but rather one

whereby it tries to maintain its own legitimacy. This fundamental issue to “consolidate the state’s position” has a decisive power over any path of reform that the country is taking. It is also the major reason why the special path of so-called “gradualism” that China’s reform has successfully applied could make the reform result in something very different from the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia and Central Europe, because this self-initiated “gradualism” approach can avoid any sudden collapse of the regime.

Within this framework, the application of a market re-orientation is a means to underpin the Party-state’s legitimacy serving as a societal modernization project rather than an intended future goal. The advocacy of Deng Xiaoping’s phrase is a decisive confirmation to clarify the confusion that emerged among the leading group of the Party by integrating after the 1990s the two extreme positions into one. One could say that the application of the market re-orientation in the 1980s under “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is not much different from the 1950s. In other words, by developing socialism with Chinese characteristics based on Marxist and Leninist principals, both market re-orientation and Marxism-Leninism are practiced in China as a societal modernization project. This is therefore consistent with the Chinese Communist Party’s effort to modernize China and to consolidate its position in the state.

Any individual and dynamic modernization project of a society that has been installed by following a specific political consideration such as market re-orientation and Marxism-Leninism cannot inhibit that society to follow its natural path of evolution. In this sense, a modernization movement is a continual socio-political movement, no matter whether its flag is flapping in red or blue, whether it is self-initiated or based on mutual integration or whether it is undertaken by others or by the society itself. Collectively, the coaction between the consensus of intra-society evolution and the global-political entity triggers the emergence of a cultural turn, which is a crucial part of the cultural evolution of a society.

Within the planning domain, planning has to serve public policy and evolve in social activities. Compared to the essence of the ethical spirit, a dialectic spirit was not emphasized in Chinese tradition. In each transitional period of the modernization movement, opposition between the ruling class and incoherent public interests intensified the socio-political dialectic spirit which either is provided by a legal enforcement or comes out of resistant forces in a peaceful formation of negotiation and participatory approach or in a radical formation of revolutionary protest, such as in the first and second modernization movement. Throughout the modernization movement, the dialectic spirit between the two impetuses—that most of the time is in conflict with each other—has been gradually accepted by Chinese culture, particularly in the transitional periods of cultural turn.

To a certain degree, this argument also confirms Mannheim's (1935) advocacy of the two parameters in his four types of propositions regarding the planning decision-making processes. Even though it is difficult to quantify the characteristics of the two parameters "participation" and "centralization" in any political formation precisely, nevertheless, by comparing the Maoist period of the planned-economy with Deng's reformist period of market-economy, one can recognize that there is a tendency to integrate centralization and participation dynamically. For example, one can see the consensus of public participation in the urban development after the reformation is increasingly profound. However, it does not undermine the central power of control. On the contrary, the political control has been transformed into a smart web of dynamic soft mechanisms including judicial, plan-based and market systems, which have been illustrated in the case of the Shenzhen planning system as well as by the three selected cases. This intelligent web of dynamic and soft mechanisms officially, to a certain degree, "allows" the public debate and participation to sometimes appear as a result of strong political compromise.

On the other hand, political preference may appear as a dominant force that triggers the turn. It is the society that accommodates the cultural continuity and allows for the cultural turn to be evolved. Even if people everywhere may be subject to the same political mode, this is no guarantee that they will react the same way or are able to express their preferences without the resources needed to command them. To smooth the confrontation between the political and societal embodiment is necessary for a society to enrich its cultural continuity.

One could say to a certain degree that Mannheim's "democratically planned society" against the "either-or" dualism definition between the top-down approach of the fascist dictatorship and the "laissez-faire" attitude of the liberal market economy finds a relevant match in Deng Xiaoping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics", by arguing to take into account the cultural formation of a society instead of only considering the political formation in relation to the planning system. It provides a better interpretation than imposing neoliberalism to the current Chinese situation, even though the changes to China's economy and society since 1970 seem to suggest a neoliberal trajectory.

The role of planning in the socio-spatial domain has been redefined within the new planning culture that is emerging in contemporary China. Planning as a political tool is now strongly linked to serve political purposes and influence the socio-spatial structure more than ever. The role of planning, as redefined, has gained new meanings that enhance the transformation from a political intervention instrument to a dynamic socio-spatial mechanism.

From the studies of the three selected cases, links between planning interventions and spatial implementation illustrate the fact that the emerged spatial articulation has been made possible through the diversification of planning approaches. In this sense,

the planning system has the role of a socio-political medium in order to fulfill not only the political functions but also to provide balance and preserve for social stability. This process of social-spatial evolution is not developing in one direction only. In other words, reversely, a socio-spatial emergence can also enforce political readjustments through the medium of the planning mechanism by transacting the by-product of this cycle: the production of space. (Social) space is becoming a substance for socio-political negotiation, such as the informal space that emerged in the urban villages and several times after planning adjustments in the Central District of Futian. This spatiality is simultaneously the medium and outcome that is incorporated as it is socialized and transforms both physical and psychological spaces. In this sense, it proves that both the political and societal embodiment contribute to the formulation of the planning culture within the domain of socio-spatiality.

The interactions between the involved actors who are participating in the evolution of the abovementioned dialectical process is what I define in this research as “the new application of the idea of planning culture”, which means that the idea of planning culture is not only an analytical framework for pursuing the understanding of the planning discourse. Rather it is a microcosm of dialectic political, social and spatial evolution processes that have emerged in a specific transitional society. Particularly, in the case of the Chinese modernization evolution, being embedded in the particular Chinese political formation, planning as a legitimate political tool indeed helps us to “decode the myth of China’s exceptionalism”<sup>295</sup> (Wu Fulong 2010: 620).

In the 1980s, not only was Chinese society confronting a national reformation with regard to the necessity of economic and political survival, but it also received external influences from the global society.

Within this framework, the emergence of the new “cultural turn” in contemporary China had to respond to the confrontation by combining both building modernization upon traditional culture and by paying more attention to building up a civilization based on a modern spirit as well as developing its material counterpart. This meant that a civilization that had faced a long period of colonialism, fascism and totalitarianism as well as class discrimination had to be liberated based on the confluence of diverse criteria of liberal openness. Hence, progress here must be seen as a long historical process, which requires continuous and vigorous efforts.

---

295

Wu Fulong used different references, such as according to David Harvey (2006: 34), for example, China is an outcome of a “particular kind of neo-liberalism interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control”, or—paraphrasing Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”—“neoliberalization with Chinese characteristics”.

Learning from this research, to define the status of an open society in Chinese tradition may not be simply the application of Western standards. Like the two sides of a coin, effects of risk and opportunity can be found simultaneously. Especially for China, as an agricultural country with a less developed economy and historically self-imposed isolation, the revolution of modernization, e.g., science-technology, democracy and industrial revolution cannot be created homogeneously but has to be imported heterogeneously.

Without a doubt, after years of practices in a better and more stable environment, Chinese modernization has taken a turn towards progression in many aspects. Practice in contemporary urban development in China shows that the reform can provide a thriving vitality to society, such as importing advanced technology and science, establishing experimental special economic zones, and importing foreign capital, that together indicate the new perspective of the openness. It is important to highlight that beyond the core efforts of urban development and planning intervention a positive and reflexive civil society based on the advocacy of a citizen's city is gradually emerging in the urban planning domain. Despite the dominance of the political-ethical values under the guidance of the Party, the modernization of thoughts and ideas slowly is sprouting among the people, resulting in a Chinese version of the civil society.

At this moment, for the first time, Chinese civilization can evolve its modernization based on a self-initiated exploration. It is a perspective of some sort of "Renaissance" that had never grown maturely before and it is now possible to lift such an age-old civilization to a completely new level.

However, no matter to what extent the further course of China is set, for an agricultural country composed largely of small family-farms, the realization of democracy is a long process and faces a lot of obstacles. Furthermore, without a fundamental improvement of the backward-oriented agriculture and taking care of the small family farmers, who represent the majority of the people, it is impossible to realize democracy thoroughly. To a certain degree, all these factors have to be supported in parallel by the willingness of undertaking bold political reform of the current Party-led Communist government.

At this very crucial transitional moment, the traditional values of this age-old civilization need to be revitalized and a smooth transitional process for the current development is critically needed. It can lead the country a step further towards a more open society, but there is also the risk of failure.

Therefore, an open society in Chinese terms should not be limited and defined by the breadth of political action or by the planning implementation of interventional parameters, nor by the economic indication of growth or by a glamorized spatial appearance. Instead, beyond all of these criteria, it is an on-going collective social programme to civilize the people, to regain its self-awareness, to be able to continue the evolution of humanity emphasized in Chinese tradition and to rebuild the self-consciousness as well as to enrich



efforts of natural and technological science. Above all, it should be a goal to respect the tradition. After all, “tradition means to pass on the fire, not to worship the ash.”<sup>296</sup>

---

### § 9.3 Paddling between “Flexibility” and “Reliability”

---

“Every cloud has a silver lining” is an old saying of Chinese philosophical thinking<sup>297</sup>. It means that while there are risks, there are new opportunities as well. With all the before mentioned aspects, China is yet in transition. From the internal eagerness of accumulating wealth to the external strength of investment interests, both pressures are interacting enormously with each other in the evolution of Chinese critical modernization. Driven by the confluence of these two forces, the situation of the current and foreseen challenges of contemporary China can be metaphorically compared to the condition of mixture elements that has created a phenomenon of fusion.

Water is the softest thing, yet it can penetrate mountains and earth. This shows clearly the principle of “softness overcoming hardness” in the famous philosophical thinking of Lao Tzu. He emphasized the power of water in its softness overcoming hardness, which could help to explain what we have witnessed in the past forty years in how the rural-urban development has been progressing countrywide in China.

Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the way to lead the country through the mist of confusion in his time is very much based on the same idea of Lao Tzu about the characteristic of water. His phrase “cross the river by groping the stones” is very different from the “class struggle” spirit that Mao promoted, although they mandate the same communist regime. In the sense of maintaining the legitimate power of the regime from different angles, Mao’s advocacy is a “hard” way while Deng Xiaoping’s approach has a “soft” core. This fundamentally different spirit can be recognized through the whole planning reform if we compare the top-down blue print of the Maoist period with that of Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and the varied stages of other reforms that have followed.

---

296 Austrian composer Gustav Mahler says in the German version: “Tradition ist die Weitergabe des Feuers, nicht die Anbetung der Asche.”

297 Lu You (1125-1209 A.D.) A Visit to a Village West of the Mountains. This proverb is usually said as every bad situation has some good aspect to it.

In addition, if we decode the “socialism” within the framework of “Chinese characteristics”, we can immediately link them to the Chinese philosophical root of social order, in which a society is based on the Li (principle) which is very much emphasizing how to maintain social stability by defining the individual’s social function, obligation and status. In this sense, the current group of communist leaders regards its superior authoritarianism as the sole mandate of the country, and as such is very similar to feudalism.

The leadership from generation to generation is passed on through a party merit system. The leadership among the group of Chinese leaders of different generations is not empowered by one person’s mandate as was the case in feudalism, but the decision-making structure is based on a limited number of people in a small political circle and in which the political striving still remains in the spirit of the Chinese political realm. It is now only hidden smartly in the depth of its own camouflage of reformation.

Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” can explain how planning culture in contemporary China is moving dynamically by paddling between “flexibility” and “reliability”, keeping a dynamic balance. This softness overcoming hardness, emphasized in Chinese philosophy by Lao Tzu, has led the reformation of the country to an unprecedented progression, probably because it is close to the Chinese tradition of humanity, particularly for Chinese people after having lived for decades a miserable life of national hardship.

Reliability means to ensure the progression of the country. It is an overall demand on a countrywide scope. This cannot be achieved without a long-term framework of guidance and vision; yet, action has to be taken by local empowerment. Flexibility means, in the planning domain of city making, giving space to almost unforeseen challenges on a daily basis, and is becoming a crucial urban condition of the local empowerment. As Hsia Chu-joe (2009: 76) emphasized: “To pursue the livable city, the sustainable city, the feminist city, the fascinating city and even to defeat the effects of social exclusion (...) The potential grass-roots empowerment of a citizen’s city (...) is the necessary historical power for urban reform.”

It remains unclear to what extent the grass-roots empowerment of a citizen’s city can be bred in the context of Chinese culture, nevertheless, as a convincing alternative—a principle of hope—for the further urbanization in China (and in Asia), Jürgen Rosemann (2012: 19) further emphasized, “(...) a citizen’s city is not first of all a commodity for economic development and entrepreneurship (...) it becomes a place of permanency and sustainability, in which local culture can be protected and revitalized in their meaning”. Although the social movements are an important historical power for urban reform, urban and regional development cannot be limited to the grass-roots dimension. It is necessary to find a bridge between the contradictory aims, and to connect the local conditions with the global demands and to retrieve the balance

between flexibility and reliability. In other words, the citizen's city neither is a museum for cultural conservation, nor a niche for grass-roots communities.

In view of the increasing competition on an international level, good governance and a strong government on a local and regional level is necessary. To serve that perspective, the understanding of the new planning culture can be a medium and a useful framework to fulfill contradictory demands. Based on the Chinese experience, the use value of urban space and the innovative value of planning culture would support the function of a node for the milieu of innovation for other learning regions in the world as well.

However, "while there are risks, there are new opportunities" is not an irreversible term. The water that carries the boat is the same that swallows it. Risks and failures are both recognized. Paddling between "flexibility" and "reliability", the current transition of contemporary China should evolve by following the spirit in the sense of Mannheim's (2001: 194) own words,

The ideal subject enacts a world, which changes both him and the world within which he acts. But at the same time, he perceives both himself and the world within which he acts as an object, thus creating a distance (...) the claim that destination can be turned from being a (malign) destiny into being an enactment that leaves the agent capable of further enactments at a higher level of self-control is the central argument of the sociological project.

Finally, the prospective group of the fifth generation Chinese leaders inherits their predecessors' path; yet forty years later, the young generation has no reason to carry the burden of their parents who were born or grew up in the post "cultural revolution" period. The new group of Chinese leaders will definitely have to confront their "people" of the new generation and to make sure that the next critical modernization will be continued, hopefully, in a more civilized and reflexive dialectical path between the contradictory interests and demands. For its survival, a critical modernization is recognized and the challenges in relation to it shall be overcome, —in the words of Beck (1986)—a reflexive modernization is necessary, i.e. a self-transformation of the modern society that continuously reflects on its own conditions—originally, to retrieve the essential Chinese philosophical thinking of paddling like the moving water—the highest excellence defined by Lao Tzu<sup>298</sup>.

## 10 An Unfinished Project and the Way Forward

Over the course of the last 40 years, urban development in contemporary China has gradually disassociated itself from the dominant Western-centered discourse on the urban model. Scholars and professionals have been busy defining new urban meanings for modern Asian cities through the exploration of different tools, research methods, theories, and practices. The results are abundant but have not yet been reviewed in a systematic manner. In the hope of demystifying this contemporary Chinese reformation and the evolution of its planning culture, one of the goals of this research is to collect refined materials and assessing their scale and scope. It aims to alleviate some of the weightiness of the Chinese planning discourse in the context of the national and international exchange of ideas.

Because the research materials are confined mainly to the planning domain, in-depth social and spatial factors have been less analyzed. In addition, with regard to the acquisition of material, there are a few more practical limitations that were imposed in particular by private developers and governmental institutions. URBANUS has generously given their support for this research by providing their abundant drawing material. However, in the case of OCT Loft, the interviewees were not allowed to release plans and drawings to the public without an official permission from the company. Another constraint was that once an official interview was arranged through personal connections in Shenzhen, the challenge remained of how to distinguish between a tale of opinion, propaganda and scientific fact. In China, as a rule, an official interview is regarded as highly suspicious by the interviewee, very often resulting in the conveying of only safe, standardized, and less critical information. Fortunately in the case of Shenzhen, the help of some rather critically minded officials, institutional researchers, architects, and public citizens allowed that some useful information could still be dug out of the mud.

The confined course of urban planning evolution allowed the researcher to pass over a certain amount of literature and studies that had no direct relevance. However, a few inquiries and studies have helped to keep this research on the main track. Even though they had no direct association with the research, they provided a fruitful, contextual underpinning that paved the way, and in many cases allowed the researcher to bypass abundant material on cases that had already been explored. If the outlining of planning culture in this research provided the main structure for building up the debate on planning discourse that is based on and part of Chinese critical modernization, then these inquiries and studies should be regarded as fresh material that led the way forward and provided the means to overcome the inadequacy of an unfinished

project on urban studies in China. In particular, these inquiries and studies raised questions that are a response to the new urban demands of Chinese society after the reformation, and many of them by Chinese scholars. They provide unique insights in comparison to those studies that have been conducted by foreign scholars because of the advantage of access to original, local archives and because of their different angles of interpretation. I found that they were valuable and crucial and deserved to be highlighted and mentioned.

The first of these components is in the field of top-down, urban policy implementation such as urban governance and management, and planning organization and instruments.

The second component emerges based on the interest in bottom-up phenomena; it focuses on inquiries into the new phenomena of urban socio-spatiality, urban culture, and urban history.

These clusters either address the essential course of foreseen challenges within the existing planning system or comprise reflections on the emerging socio-spatial challenges and problems that are of concern within and outside the country. They are regarded as important research subjects that will need more attention in the form of debate and dedicated research in the future.

### **Urban Governance and Urban Management**

The changing role of the government in relation to new planning challenges is one of the foremost reforms in contemporary China.

In the blueprint era, the government played its role as a planner, operator, and investor, and monopolized national planning resources, including land distribution and land ownership. Master plans were created as tools to legalize the restructuring of the land. In the post-blueprint period, the government is no longer the almighty controller, and with its limited economic resources, the making of planning decisions is more and more becoming a process of negotiation and collaboration with other actors. Spatial restructuring now depends on the demands of the market and the contributions of different parties. The former top-down planning approach that was formulated by the strong, hierarchical, and bureaucratic system during the Maoist regime has been challenged by the emergence of the new, divergent collective interests of the different players involved. The planning skills and attitudes of the government changed and had to adapt to the new demands of society. Within the context of the progress of the reform of the market economy system, the problem of governmental functioning has come to the fore as the government seeks to implement its new role of managing “economic regulation, market supervision, social administration, and public service” (Gao Sujun 2009). In addition, the changing role of the government needs to be

supported by an advanced administrative reform and the reflexive establishment of law, based on the adaptive mechanisms of implementation<sup>299</sup> (Chou Baoxing 2005; Feng Xianxue 2006; Peng Kuntao 2007; Mao Qizhi 2008; Li Guangbin 2010).

Subsequently, the demands on multi-level governance have become increasingly important because of the tendency toward polycentric development (Yang Chun 2008; Hall 2009; Xu Jiang and Yeh 2009). It suggests a development of a reasonable division of authority in a vertical structure, including solidifying the relationships between state, province, and city planning departments and simultaneously straightening out the administrative system in a horizontal structure, including building the relationships between planning departments in different fields

### **Urban Planning Instruments and Urban Planning Organization**

#### *Invalidation of the master plans and outdated planning methods*

Since the 1990s, discussions have arisen focusing on the validity and sufficiency of the master plan (Pei Xinheng 2007; Wang Guangtao 2008). In the traditional urban planning approach, city scale was defined by two criteria: planned growth of the population and the proportion of built-up areas in relation to the expected population. In order to claim more land for urban expansion and future use, local governments have exaggerated the expected population growth in their master plans, resulting in inefficient land use and huge overhead costs as a result of investment not only in land, but also in public facilities when the “expected” result did not take place or the market did not perform according to expectation.

Evidence has supported the invalidation of the master plan in multiple dimensions. This has occurred primarily in those regions and cities with an unexpected rate of accelerated development where the estimate of population growth in the master plan is much lower than in reality. That is to say, the master plan is not able to cope with the speed and demands of real development. This has brought enormous pressures on planners who are confronted with a continuous change in circumstances that was a new and unknown experience for them compared to the Maoist regime. Advocates have emphasized the need to introduce and enhance a more scientific indexing system of urban master planning that incorporates scientific compilation techniques and monitoring as objective requirements. In order to build a well-off society in an all-around way and establish socialist harmony, the government has adopted remote

sensing and GIS technologies for use in urban planning and management (Chen Shupeng et al. 2000) and has included the environmental index of the eco-city and the low-carbon concept in city development (Baeumler et al. 2012). In order to integrate these diverse applications into the process of urban development, it is important to encourage adequate initial studies on the revision of the urban master plan, planning methods, and tools in order to overcome unhealthy tendencies in urban planning and construction (Chou Baoxing 2005; Wang Guangtao 2008).

### *New planning organization and planning process*

Socio-economic development and the establishment of a market economy have significantly influenced Chinese urban planning administration. Planning administrators are faced with new situations and problems, and many measures that were applied in the past are no longer effective. Problems of a different dimension are recognized. For example, a complete spatial planning system has not yet been established and its functions are distributed over several divided departments with overlapping responsibilities under disjointed and inconsistent laws and regulations. Comparable problems also come up as a result of the incoherent territorial division between urban and rural areas, each with its own rules and regulations (Gao Zhonggang 2008).

New urban phenomena have also triggered the reformation of planning organization and planning approaches. For example, in 1993, the Shenzhen Master Plan (1996-2010) was followed by the Regional Plan for the Pearl River Delta in 1995. Seven years later, in the year 2000, the State Council finally approved it. In order to bridge the gap caused by the long procedure of approval, the local government had to adapt reflexively to local demands. During this period, a new system of scrutiny was introduced and for the first time the public's general opinion was integrated<sup>300</sup>. Furthermore, the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) was set up<sup>301</sup>, and its members included both city officials and—for the very first time in China—stakeholders who represented local business interests.

---

300 The draft of the Third Master Plan was scrutinized for a 30-day period by the general public. Cadres and scholars from neighboring cities were invited to comment on the draft.

301 See more on the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen in Chapter 7.2.3. The assigned role of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen was to reconcile district level plans with the municipal Master Plan.

Although, by then, many Shenzhen planners considered the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) a nuisance, deeming this attempt at enlisting the participation of a limited number of private stakeholders in the planning process as “too advanced” for China. As a result of this experience, an efficient and more transparent planning process is becoming a more critical criterion for evaluating the planning evolution of Chinese urban development. Regarding actualizing this long-term progression, Chinese urban planning still has limited effective control in land applications, and its due role has yet to be fulfilled (Friedmann 2005; Gao Zhonggang 2008; He Zizhang 2009).

### *Demands of integral urban planning*

It is generally accepted by Chinese society that the reformation of urban planning, policy, and law should be carried out. The need for integral urban planning is accepted by the government, professionals, and scholars. Many types of suggestions have been made, including establishing an urban planning administrative framework with a separation between decision-making and execution; clarifying the governments’ role of “economic regulation, market supervision, social administration and public service” to build “limited government” as well as “positive government” (Feng Xianxue 2006: 79), and providing institutional guarantees for administration by law. (Gao Zhonggang 2008; Geng Huizhi 2008; Li Kanzhen 2008).

Building up an integral urban planning system involves not only the reform of planning institutes and organizations and the readjustment of governmental roles and management. It also involves the development of a reflexive urban concept and urban philosophy—a new urbanism. This fundamental urban philosophy has to be embedded in China’s urban society and its cultural context to support the contemporary urban evolution. Yet, currently this embodiment of knowledge is still being established, following its own path of dynamic development. It has to be supported by enormous efforts of collective research and studies to reveal the essential course for the future. Fortunately, researchers are now contributing to building up the discourse on urban socio-spatial development within the Chinese context, and such research is receiving more attention from scholars.

## **Urban Paradigms and Urban Socio-Spatiality**

### *Urban development and urban evolution*

Over the last few decades, governmental planners, professionals, and scholars have devoted themselves to studies of the Chinese urban paradigm. Particularly useful for the further development—and for this research—are contributions from Chinese scholars and those whose subjects are related to socio-spatial study. Debating the Asian urban paradigm is becoming critical. It has been established that the diversity of Asian urban development cannot be understood from the Western-based urban



discourse due to the completely different urban and historical contexts (Ginsburg et al. 1991; Lin 2002; Perera 2003, 2007a). About the urban political-economic paradigm, T. G. McGee (1991: 5) argues:

The Western paradigm of the urban transition, which draws its rationale from the historical experience of urbanization as it has occurred in Western Europe and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is clearly not nearly transferable to the developing countries' urbanization process. The uneven incorporation of these Asian countries into a world economic system from the fifteenth century onward created divergent patterns of urbanization, which reflect the different interactions between Asian countries and the world system.

"Desakota" (city-country)<sup>302</sup> and "extended metropolitan regions" are terms that refer to regions that comprise an intense mixture of agricultural and nonagricultural activities that often stretch along corridors between large city cores. Aspects of this uniqueness have begun to be identified in many Asian countries (Ginsburg et al. 1991).

Similarly, George Lin's (2002) research elucidated the on-going process and evolving patterns of Urban-Rural Integration (*Chengxiang Yitihua*)<sup>303</sup> in the extended metropolitan regions of China that have demonstrated a complex relationship between agriculture, industrialization, and urbanization in different political economies. He has questioned the adequacy of the widely accepted urban-rural dichotomy. Lin (2002: 383) argued, "the intrusion of global forces has not homogenized local particularities. Global capitalism had to seek shelter from locally specific conditions in order to take root in socialist soil." A similar advocacy can be found in the research of Nihal Perera (2007b), who emphasized that even though Asian urbanization is following Western models, fitting well within a large West-centered urban structure, the social and spatial transformation in these cities seems to go in varied directions. The local people are not passive recipients of global and dominant forces, but create and negotiate spaces for their social and cultural practices.<sup>304</sup>

---

302 An Indonesian term that was coined from the words kota (town) and desa (village). See more about the characteristics of Desakota in Norton et al. (1991: 17).

303 *Chengxiang Yitihua* or Urban-Rural Integration (simplified Chinese: 城乡一体化; traditional Chinese: 城鄉一體化)

304 Nihal Perera (2007a) argues that the social transformations of Asia are indeed paralleled by spatial transformations. The social and spatial transformations are not isomorphic or isotemporal, but take their own forms. The transformation of the Asian city is far more complex than the hegemonic discourses of modernization and globalization suggest.

## *Urban model and urban form*

One of the most important tasks for planners is to determine what urban forms are achievable and sustainable in the future (Jenks et al., 2000). Urban growth and urban form have been main subjects of interest for urban planners, geographers, and economists for decades. One cluster of research focused on the interrelation between the reform of administrative systems and the modes of establishing cities and towns (Gu Chaolin and Pu Shanxi 2008).

The second cluster of research focused on the urban model. The debate between centralists and de-centralist has been going on for years. Currently, the centralists have the upper hand because space consumption by urban sprawl and the over-dependence on automobiles have become a major concern all over the world. The concept of sustainable development has become increasingly significant as a means for creating a better future for the world economically, socially, and environmentally. There is a widespread belief that compact urban development is a more sustainable model than urban sprawl (Jiang Xiaolei, 2009). Due to the emerged definition of mega-regions and the measuring of polycentricity, the concepts of the city region and polycentric development are also becoming very popular subjects. The study of inter-city relations and city networks based on spaces of flow is becoming a significant field involving the probing of urban and regional spatial evolvement<sup>305</sup> (Castells 1996). Along with the deepening of regional unbalances caused by globalization, polycentricity is becoming a major goal most cities and regions aim for in the process of pursuing a balanced development (Hall and Pain 2006; Xiong Guoping 2006). The evidence shows that the works of regional and thematic focus are concentrated in the core areas of the coastal regions<sup>306</sup> or in the globalizing urban regions of China. These regional preferences are due to their advantages in accessibility, data availability, local collaborations and geo-political emphases (Yeung and Lin 2003; Luo Zhendong 2008, 2009).

The third cluster has been newly established in recent years. Such as studies combining the application of remote sensing, spatial metrics, and urban models to analyze urban form. Urban growth provides indications of the aggregate size of cities and the rate at which other land, such as agricultural land, is converted into urban uses. To predict

---

305 Castells put forward the theory that in an informational economy, the rise of network organization causes the emergent “space of flows” to dominate established politico-territorial spaces that are defined by jurisdictional and administrative boundaries. Whereas systems of governance remain strongly attached to territorially bounded places, new urban economy related to the process of production is shaped by transcontinental, networked, spaces of flows.

306 The most recognized regions in China are Greater Beijing, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta.

future urban morphologies and to compare the spatial patterns of urbanization, simulation methods are needed. On the other hand, landscape ecology, focusing on the interactions between spatial patterns and ecological processes, has brought about a number of new methods that can be conveniently used for studying urban areas. Similar research methods have been applied to address the question of urban transport and land use models (Herold et al. 2003; Deng 2004; Zhao Jiang 2010).

## **New Urban Phenomena and Urban Culture**

### *Urban reservation and urban renewal*

In addition to the studies of urban development in term of spatial forms, the soft parts of urban phenomena and urban culture have become an all-around concern. Under the circumstances of rapid urban development, urban deconstruction should be one of the main concerns for Chinese cities. The emphasis on the revival of urban culture by Wu Liangyong (1999) in his design of the former courtyard settlement “Juer Hutong” in Beijing has demonstrated his idea of integrating cultural values into urban development, which is becoming a critical and crucial strategy for Chinese urban development. In a related area, gradual housing renewal and the reform of China’s former housing system has drawn the attention of the government and scholars as well (Zhou Jiang 2007; Lu Junhua and Shao Lei 2007; Hui Xiaoxi 2012).

Urban renewal and urban regeneration have been taken into account as an important index of the master plan. In addition, new urban phenomena like “urban villages” have triggered the enhancement of civil participation, and emphasize a human and just planning process, which have finally gained a position in the main stream of urban studies and have gradually been integrated in Chinese urban policy and urban planning (Him Chung 2004; He Zizhang 2009).

## **The Way Forward**

The abovementioned investigations regarding diverse urban subjects and urban challenges are only a few examples of what is taking place. They can only present pieces of the whole picture, which cannot yet be portrayed fully. Within only a few decades, the accumulation of the many investigations and built up documentations show the hybridity of Chinese urban characteristics and are also a relevant epitome of Asian urban development. This is in agreement with the theory and presupposition that Chinese contemporary urban planning and development still have a long way to go and this can only be achieved through “learning by doing”, maintaining a balance between flexibility and reliability, and can only be realized based on collective efforts of exploring in an open dialectical spirit.

The research supports very much the advocacy of an integral, self-exploring approach based on a dialectical spirit within an open global debating context. Never in human history have we been faced with a comparable global effect on such a large scale. In recent years, China's development has been closely interlinked with the rest of the world in an overwhelming way. In actual spatial construction, the results impact more than one billion people. Norton Ginsburg (1972: 128), writing about Asia, described what planning could contribute to this overwhelming transitional process.

Planning for the future of the Asian city is planning for change (...) that is planning not only for the cities as they are, but for the cities as they seem to be becoming (...) that it is planning not only at the scale of the city and its' parts, but also at regional and national scales, where the functions and the benefits and cost of urbanization assume quite different proportions (...) that it is planning not only for the physical city, but, more important, for the kinds of people who will be residing in it (...) that it is planning for modernization, for development, and for urban forms which need not duplicate those of the West and which indeed may vary significantly from country to country within the region. Even as they are, cities are the centers for change in Asia. The challenge and the opportunity lie in molding that change for the benefit of two-thirds of mankind.

In view of this very special moment, the same spirit of devoting oneself to the open ocean of the unknown and to changes should continue to evolve through the human exploration of urban culture and in many other un-explored urban territories. In a broader scope, the survival of our urban planet requires dedicating oneself to the courage to explore the beyond, and importantly, to retrieve the meaning of balance and harmony—as simple as a fundamental principal of any existence, and we are no exceptional to that. To respect this fundamental principal in general, and to fulfill our discipline in particular, is an unfinished project that needs to be continually carried on—with a great responsibility—and fortunately we are one of those who have the opportunity to make it.

# References

## Chapter 1

---

- Castells, Mannul (1989) *The informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Hou, Youbin (2003) Retrospect and Prospect: Speech at the International Symposium for the Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia in the 20th Century. In Zhao, Chen and Wu, Jjiang (eds.), *Research on China' Modern Architectural Academia*, 23-25. Beijing: Beijing China Architecture & Building Press.
- Lin, George C. S. (2002) Urbanization and the changing System of Cities in Socialist China: A historical and Geographic Assessment. *Ren Kou Xiao Kan* 人口學刊, 24, 89-139.
- Logan, John R. (ed.) (2002) *The new Chinese city: Globalization and Market Reform*. London: Blackwell.
- Heberer, Thomas and Schubert, Gunter (2006) Political Reform and Regime Legitimacy in *Contemporary China*. *Asien* 99, 9-28.
- Dittmer, Lowell (2003) Leadership Change and Chinese Political Development. *China Quarterly*, (146), 903-925.
- Harvey, David (2005) *A Brief history of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bergère, Marie-Claire (2000) Civil Society and Urban change in Republican China. In Wakema, Frederic J.R. and Edmonds, Richard Louis (eds.) *Reappraising Republican China*, 55-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nonini, Donald M. (2008) Is China Becoming Neoliberal? *Critique of Anthropology*, 28, 145-176.
- Wakema, Frederic J.R. and Edmonds, Richard Louis (eds.) *Reappraising Republican China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wu, Fulong (2010) How Neoliberal is China's Reform? The origins of Change during Transition. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 51, No. 5, 619-631.
- Friedmann, John (2005a) Globalization and the emerging culture of planning. *Progress in Planning* 64, 183-234.

## Chapter 2

---

- Alexander, Christopher (1965) *The City is not a Tree*. Quoted from: Charles Jencks, Karl Kropf (eds.) (2006, second edition), *Theories and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture*. Chichester.
- Alexander, Christopher (1977) *A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings and Construction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ascher, François (2003) Multi-mobility, multispeed cities: a challenge for Architects, town planners and politicians. Speech at 1st International Architecture Biennial Rotterdam, May 2003. Published on: <http://www.scielo.cl/fbpe/html/arq/n60/body-i/art02-i.htm>.
- Ascher, François (2007) Mobility, ecology and metropolisation: the social construction of the environmental market. In Rosemann, J. (ed.) (2007) *PermaCity*. Delft: IFoU.
- Beck, Ulrich (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Beck, Ulrich (2000) *What is Globalization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beck, Ulrich (2007) *World at Risk*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bekkering, Henco (2007) On Permanence in Urban Design. In Rosemann, Jürgen (ed.) *PermaCity*. Amsterdam: IFoU.
- Brech, Joachim (1993), *Neue Wege der Planungskultur: Orientierungen in der Zeit des Umbruchs*. Darmstadt: Verlag für Wissenschaftliche Publikationen.
- Boyer, M. Christine (1994) *The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press.
- Boyer, M. Christine (2001) The Urban Question in the 21st Century. Presented to the Inaugural conference, 2001 in TU Delft.

- Boyer, M. Christine (2005) *Playing with information: Urbanism in the 21st Century*. In Read, Stephen, Rosemann, Jürgen and Van Eldijk, Job (eds) *Future City*. London and New York: Spon Press.
- Boudourides, Moses A. (2001) *Networks, Fluids, Chaos*. Presented in International Conference "Spacing and Timing", Palermo, Italy.
- Campbell, Scott and Fainstein, Susan S. (eds.) (1996, 2003) *Reading in Planning Theory*. UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Campbell, Scott and Fainstein, Susan S. (eds.) (2001) *Reading in Planning Theory*, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Castells, Manuel (1977) *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*. London: Edward Arnold Ltd.
- Castells, Manuel (1989) *The informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Castells, Manuel (1996), *The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. 1*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Castells, Manuel (1997) *The Power of Identity, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. 2*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Castells, Manuel (1998) *End of Millennium, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture" Vol. 3*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Castells, Manuel (2005) *Space of flows, space of places: materials for a theory of urbanization in the information age*. In Sanyal, Bishwapriya (ed.) *Comparative Planning Cultures*. London: Routledge.
- Cherry, Gordon E. (1972) *Urban Change and planning: a history of urban development in Britain since 1750*. Henley-on-Thames: Foulis.
- Chatterjee, Partha (1993) *The Nation and its Fragment: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. N.Y.: Princeton University Press.
- Davidoff, Paul (1965), *Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning*. *Journal of the American Institute of planners*, 31, 331-338.
- Dicken, Peter (2003) *Global Shift*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Edmonds, Bruce (1999) *What is Complexity? - The philosophy of complexity per se with application to some examples in evolution*. In Heylighen, Francis & Aerts, D (eds.) *The Evolution of Complexity*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Ellin, Nan (2006) *Integral Urbanism*. New York: Routledge.
- Ellin, Nan and Farhang (ed.) (2011) *Paul Ricoeur: Honoring and Continuing the Work*. London: Lexington Books.
- Fainstein, Susan S. (2005) *Planning Theory and the City*. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 25, 121-130.
- Faludi, Andreas (1973) *Planning Theory*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Faludi, Andreas and Van der Valk, Arnold (1994) *Rule and Order: Dutch Planning Doctrine in the Twentieth Century*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Faludi, Andreas and Waterhout, Bas (2002) *The making of the European Spatial Development Perspective: No Masterplan*. London: Routledge.
- Fishman, Robert (1977) *Urban Utopias: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier*. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
- Fishman, Robert (2003) *Urban Utopias: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier*. In S. Campbell, and S. Fainstein, (eds.) *Reading in Planning Theory*. UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Friedmann, John (1987) *Planning in the Public Domain*. Princeton University Press.
- Friedmann, John (1988) *Life Space and Economic Space: Essays in Third World Planning*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction books.
- Friedmann, John (1993) *Toward a Non-Euclidian Mode of Planning*. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 59(4), 482-5. Chicago: American Planning Association.
- Friedmann, John (2002) *The Prospect of cities*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Friedmann, John (2005a) *Globalization and the emerging culture of planning*. *Progress in Planning* 64, 183-234.
- Friedmann, John (2005b) *Planning Cultures in Transition*. In Sanyal, Bishwapriya (ed.) *Comparative Planning Cultures*, 29-44. London: Routledge.
- Friedmann, John (2005c) *China's Urban Transition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gartman, David (1998) *Postmodernism; or, the Cultural Logic of Post-Fordism*. *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 119-137.
- Giddens, Anthony (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hall, Peter (1984) *The World Cities*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Hall, Peter (1988) *Cities of Tomorrow: an intellectual history of urban planning and design in the twentieth century*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Hall, Peter (1991) Moving Information: A Tale of Four Technologies. In Brotchie, John, Batty, Michael, Hall, Peter, Newton, Peter W. (eds.) *Cities of the 21st Century: New Technologies and Spatial Systems*, 1- 21. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Hall, Peter (1997) Megacities Cities, World Cities and Global Cities. Speech at The first Megacities Lecture February, 1997, Rotterdam.
- Hall, Peter (1998) *Cities in Civilization*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Harvey, David (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Harvey, David (1990) *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Harvey David (2005) *A Brief history of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Henket Hubert-Jan and Heynen, Hilde (eds.) (2002) *Back from Utopia: The Challenges of the Modern Movement*. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
- Heng, Chye Kiang (1999) *Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrat: The development of Medieval Chinese Cityscapes*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Hsia, Chu-Joe, The Formation of the West Coast Metropolitan Region of Taiwan in the Network Society. In: Rosemann, Lei, Sepúlveda (eds.) (2009), *The New Urban Question. Urbanism beyond Neo-Liberalism*. Delft:IFoU.
- Hubbard, Phil and Kitchin, Rob (eds.) (2011) *Key thinkers on space and place*. London: SAGE Publication Ltd.
- Hudson, Barclay (1979) Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts and Contradictions. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 387-398.
- Jacobs, Jan (1961) *The death and life of great American cities*. N.Y.: Random House.
- Jones, Steven G. (eds.) (1994) *CyberSociety: Computer-Mediated Communication and Community*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Knieling, Joerg and Othengrafen, Frank (2007) Concept for an analytical model for comparative research on planning cultures: and first empirical findings of CULTPLAN. PPT presented to Symposium planning Culture in Europe, Hanburg, 2007.
- Keller, Donald; Koch, Michael and Selle, Klaus (eds.) (1993) *Planungskulturen in Europa. Erkundungen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und der Schweiz*. Darmstadt: Verlag für Wissenschaftliche Publikationen.
- Knieling, Joerg and Othengrafen, Frank (eds.) (2009) *Planning Cultures in Europe. Decoding Cultural Phenomena in Urban and Regional Planning*. England: ASHGATE Publishing Company
- Koolhaas, Rem and Mau, Bruce (1995) *S.M.L.XL*. New York: The Monacelli Press.
- Kostof, Spiro (1991) *The City Shape: Urban Pattern and Meaning Through History*. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd.
- Leaf Michael (2005) Modernity confronts tradition: the professional planner and local corporatism in the rebuilding of China's cities. In Sanyal, Bishwapriya (ed.) (2005) *Comparative Planning Cultures*. London: Routledge.
- Loader, Colin and Kettler, David (eds.) (2001, 2003) *Karl Mannheim, Sociology as Political Education*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Lauria, Mickey (ed.) (1997) *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Lefebvre, Henri (1991) *The production of Space*. (Translated by Nicholson D). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Lindblom, Charles (1979) Still Muddling, Not Yet Through. *Public Administration Review*, 39, 517-526.
- Lynch, Kevin (1994) *Good City Form*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press.
- Madanipour, Ali (2006) Urban planning and development in Tehran. *Cities* 23 (6), 433-438.
- Mannheim, Karl (1935,1940) *Man and society in an age of reconstruction*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Mass, Winny and Van Rijs, Jacob MVRDV, (1998) *FARMAX: Excursions on Density*. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
- Mitchell, William J. (1999) *E-topia*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Mitchell, William J. (1995) *City of Bits: Space, Place and infobahn*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Mitscherlich, Alexander (1965) *Die Unwirtlichkeit unserer Städte*. Anstiftung zum Unfrieden. Frankfurt (Main).
- Newman, Peter and Thornely, Andy (1996) *Urban Planning in Europe: International Competition, National System & Planning Projects*. London: Routledge.
- Ng, Mee Kam (1999) Political economy and urban planning: a comparative study of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. *Progress in Planning*, 51 (part 1), 1-90.
- Park, Robert (1916) The city: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment. *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 20, 577-612.
- Polanyi, Karl (1968) *The Great Transformation*. (Introduction by R. M. Maclver). Boston: Beacon Press.

- Popenici, Stefan and Tat, Alin (eds.) *Romanian Philosophical Culture, Globalization and Education: Romanian Philosophical Studies, VI*. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Portugali, Juval (2000) *Self-organization and the city*. Berlin and New York: Springer.
- Dezzani, Raymond J. and Chase-Dunn, Christopher (2010) *The Geography of World Cities*. Blackwell Reference Online.
- Read, Stephen, Rosemann, Jürgen and Van Eldijk, Job (eds) (2005) *Future City*. London and New York: Spon Press.
- Read, Stephen and Pinilla, Camilo (eds.) (2006) *Visualizing the Invisible: towards an urban space*. Amsterdam: Techne Press.
- Redfield, Robert and Singer, Milton (1954) The Cultural Role of Cities. In Richard Sennett (ed.) 1969, *Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Ricoeur, Paul (1965) Universal Civilization and National Cultures. In Ricoeur, Paul *History and Truth*. Evanston: North Western University.
- Rosemann, Jürgen (2005), Introduction. In: Read, Rosemann, van Eldijk (eds.), *Future City*. Abingdon, New York.
- Rosemann, Jürgen (ed.) (2007) *PermaCity*. Delft: IFOU.
- Rosemann, Jürgen, Qu Lei and Sepulveda Diego (eds.) (2009) *The New Urban Question: Urbanism Beyond Neo-Liberalism*. Delft: IFOU.
- Rosemann, Jürgen (2012) Generic City versus Citizen's City. Speech at Conference of An Un-finished Project, Taiwan.
- Rusk, David (1993) *Cities without suburbs*. Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Sandercock, Leonie (1998) *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities*. N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons.
- Sannet, Richard (eds.) (1969) *Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Sannet, Richard (1970) *The Uses of Disorder; Personal Identity and City Life*. New York: Norton
- Sanyal, Bishwapiya (ed.) (2005) *Comparative Planning Cultures*. London: Routledge.
- Sassen, Saskia (1991) *The Global City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, Saskia (2001) *The Global City*. New York, London, Tokyo and New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, Saskia (2006) *Territory, Authority, Rights: from medieval to global assemblages*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Saunders, Peter (1981) *Social Theory and the Urban Question*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Schelling, Thomas C. (1971) On the Ecology of Micromotives. *The public interest*, 25, 61-98.
- Shibata, Kuniko (2008) The origins of Japanese Planning Culture: Building a Nation-State, 1868-1945. Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis, no. 128. Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
- Sieverts, Thomas (2008) Where we live now. In Stadler, Matthew (ed.) *Where we live now: an annotated reader*. www.suddenly.org.
- Simmel, George (1950) The Metropolis and Mental Life. In Wolff Kurt (eds.) *The Sociology of George Simmel*. New York: Free Press.
- Soja, Edward (1989) *Postmodern Geographies. The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*. London, New York.
- Soja, Edward (1996) *Thirdspace: Journey to Los Angeles and other real-and -imagined places*. Oxford, GB&Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Stead, Dominic, and Nadin, Vincent (2008) European Spatial Planning and Welfare Systems. *disP* 172 (2008): 35-47.
- Stead, Dominic, and Nadin, Vincent (2009a) Planning Cultures between Models of Society and Planning Systems. In Knieling, Joerg and Othengrafen, Frank (eds.) *Planning Cultures in Europe. Decoding Cultural Phenomena in Urban and Regional Planning*. England: ASHGATE Publishing Company.
- Stead, Dominic, and Nadin, Vincent (2009b) European Spatial Planning and Welfare Systems: the Case of the Netherlands. *Urban Planning International*, Vol. 2 (2009): 71-77.
- Stiftel, Bruce (2000) *Planning Theory. The National AICP Examination Preparation Course Guidebook*. Chicago: APA Press.
- Sutcliffe, Anthony (ed.) (1980) *The rise of modern urban planning 1800-1914*. London: Mansell.
- Taylor, Peter J., Catalano, Gilda and Walker, D. R. F. (2002) Measurement of the world city network. *Urban Studies*, 39, 2367-2376.
- Taylor, Peter J. (2005) Leading World Cities: Empirical Evaluations of Urban nodes in Multiple Networks. *Urban Studies* 42 (9), 1593-1608.
- Tilly, Charles (1995) Globalization Threatens Labor's Rights. *International Labor and Working-Class History* (47), 1-23.



- The Athens Charter (1943), translated by J. Tyrwhitt from: La Charte d'Athenes (1933). Paris. Harvard University, The Library of the Graduate School of Design.
- Thomas, Lum (2011) *Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy*. Congressional Research Service.
- UN-Habitat (2012), State of the World's Cities 2012/2013. Prosperity of Cities. Nairobi.
- UNFPA (2007), State of the World Population 2007. Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth.
- Van Berkel, Ben and Bos, Caroline (UN Studio), (1999) *Move: Liquid politic*. The Netherlands: Rosbeek.
- Weber, Max (trans. Parsons, Talcott) (1958) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York, Scribner Library.
- Wired 4.07 (July 1996), From Bauhaus to Koolhaas. Interview with Rem Koolhaas

### Chapter 3

- Ali, Jason R. and Hill, Ronald D. (2005) Feng Shui and the Orientation of Traditional Villages in the New Territories. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 2005, V. 45, 27-39.
- Baum, Richard (2004) Ritual and Rationality: Religious roots of the Bureaucratic State in *Ancient China*. *Social Evolution and History*, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2004, 41-68.
- Chen, Kuide (1989) Man vs. Nature and Natural Man: One aspect of the Concept of Nature in China and the West. In Tang, Yi-Jie, Li, Zhen, George F. McLEAN (eds.) *Man and Nature: The Chinese Tradition and the Future (Cultural Heritage and Contemporary life series III, Asia, Volume 1)*, chapter 10. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Chen, Yulin. (2010) Shan-Shui-City: A Chinese Spatial Planning Tradition and Its Implication on Urban Sustainability. Paper presented to the 46th ISCOARP Congress 2010.
- Fu, Shulan, (2009) Revival of Shan-Shui idea as a sustainable urban form-a case study on Hangzhou. In Rosemann, J., Qu Lei and Sepulveda D. (eds.) *The New Urban Question-Urbanism beyond Neo-Liberalism*. Delft: IFOU.
- Heng, Chye Kiang (1999) *Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrat: The development of Medieval Chinese Cityscapes*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Liu, Fangtong, Huang, Songjie and McLean, George F. (eds) (1997) *Philosophy and Modernization in China (Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III, Asia, Vol. 13)*. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Nelson, Charles M. (1988) Urban Planning in Pre-Industrial China. *US-China Review*, Vol. XII, No. 2, 17-21.
- Reinders, Eric (1997) Ritual Topography: Embodiment and Vertical Space in Buddhist Monastic practice. *History of Religions*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 244-264.
- Ringmar, Erik (1980) Metaphors of social order in Europe, China and Japan. In Terrell Carver & Jernej Pikalo (eds.) *Politics, Language and Metaphor*. New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Sheng, Qiang (2010) *Changing Centralities under Urban Configurational 'Scale-structure'- Pondering the spatial conditions for market and retail areas in Beijing*. Delft: IFOU.
- Tan, Jonathan Y. (2003) Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism. *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 2nd, Vol. 4, 95-99.
- Tang, Yi-jie; Li, Zhen and McLEAN G. F. (eds.) (1989) *Man and Nature: the Chinese tradition and the future (Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III. Asia, Vol. 1)*. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Zhang, Dainian (1989) Theories concerning Man and Nature in Classical Chinese Philosophy. In: Tang Yi-Jie; Li Zhen and Mclean, George F. (eds.) *Man and Nature: The Chinese Tradition and the Future (Cultural Heritage and Contemporary life series III. Asia, Vol. 1)*, chapter 1. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Zhang, Shiyong (1989) The development of the principle of Subjectivity in Western Philosophy and of the theory of Man in Chinese Philosophy. In Tang, Yi-jie; Li Zhen and McLean, George F. (eds.) *Man and Nature: the Chinese tradition and the future. (Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III. Asia, Vol. 1)*, chapter 12. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Wang, Chiu-yuan (2010) Confronting New Planning Culture towards an Open Society in Contemporary China- Reflections on Three Projects, the Challenges and Opportunities. In Gonzalez Brun, Adriana et. al. (eds.) *Global Visions: Risks and Opportunities for the Urban Planet*. Delft: IFOU.
- Wang, Miaoyang; Yu, Xuanmang and McLean, George F. (eds.) (1997) *Chinese cultural traditions and modernization (Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III. Asia, Vol. 10)*. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

- Weber, Max (1974) *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, (trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons) pp. 358-392. New York: The Free Press.
- Wu, Liangyong (1996) Architecture culture, city pattern and protection measures of Guilin city. In *Urban research papers of Wu Liangyong (1986-1995): meeting the new era*, 238-336. Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press.
- Wu, Liangyong (2001) *Introduction to Science of Human Settlements*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Wu, Liangyong (2007) Ecological Unit and Urban and Rural Spatial Form in China: A case study on the Traditional Town Development Pattern in Yangtze River Delta Region. Speech at PermaCity Conference, TU Delft.
- Wu, Liangyong (2011) *Nan Jing Dream of Red Chamber Museum*. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press.
- YU, Kongjian (2006) The Art of Survival: Positioning Landscape Architecture in The New Era. Paper presented at 43rd IFLA World Congress, Minneapolis, USA.

#### Chinese Literature

- Chang, Yongho 张永和 (1997), *Fei Chang Jian Zhu 非常建筑*. Harbin: Heilongjiang Science and Technology Press.
- Wang, Gui Xiang 王贵祥 (2007), *Guan Wu Zhong Guo Gu Dai Gong Dian Jian Zhu Qun Ji Zhi Gui Mo Wen Ti De Tan Tao* 关于中国古代宫殿建筑群基址规模问题的探讨. Paper presented at Zhong Gu Zi Jin Cheng Forum, Beijing.

## Chapter 4

---

- Bai, Shouyi (ed.) (2002) *An outline history of China*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
- Bergère, Marie-Claire (2000) Civil Society and Urban change in Republican China. In Wakema, Frederic JR. and Edmonds, Richard Louis (eds.) *Reappraising Republican China*, 55-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chan, Wellington K.K. (1977) *Merchants, Mandarins and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Chen, Xianming and Parish, William L. (1996) Urbanization in China: Reassessing an evolving model, In Gugler, Josef (ed.), *The Urban Transformation of the Developing World*, 61-90. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cody, Jeffrey W. (2003) Architectural Butterfly: William Chaaund's Manifesto about Modern Architecture, 1919. In *Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia* (2003): 14-19.
- Fan, Cindy, C. (1995) Of belts and ladders: state policy and uneven regional development in post-Mao China. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 85(3), 421-449.
- Fan, Cindy, C. (1997) Uneven development and beyond: Regional development theory in Post-Mao China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 21(4): p 620-639.
- Ji, Zhaojin (2003) *A history of modern Shanghai banking: the rise and decline of China's finance capitalism*. Armonk, New York, London, M. E. Sharpe M. E. Sharpe Inc.
- Jia, Beisi and Jian Yuayan (2003) Modernism or Revolution: The Dilemma of China's Architectural Pioneers. In Zhao Chen and Wu Jjiang (eds.) *Research on China's Modern*
- Jia, Ruixue (2011) The legacies of Forces Freedom: China's treaty Ports. Paper presented to Asia-Pacific Economic and Business History Conference.
- Kuroishi, Izumi (2003) Beaux-Arts outside of France: A comparative study of the inventive modification in Paul Phillip Cret and Junzo Nakamura's ideas and methods in Architectural Education. In Zhao Chen and Wu Jjiang (eds.) *Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia*. Beijing China Architecture & Building Press.
- Liang, Sichen (1986) Address on the Housing Standard and Art Issues Conference (originally published in *Architecture Journal* 6 (1959)), *Liang Sicheng Wen Ji* (writing of Liang SiCheng), V4. Beijing: China Construction Press.
- Lin, George C. S. (1998) China's industrialization which controlled urbanization: Anti-urbanism or urban-biased? *Issues and Studies* 34 (6): 98-116.
- Lin, George C. S. (2002a) Urbanization and the changing System of Cities in Socialist China: A historical and Geographic Assessment. *Ren Kou Xiao Kan* 人口學刊, 24, 89-139.
- Murray, Pearse and Szelenyi, Ivan (1984). The city in the transition to socialism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 8(1), 89-107.

- Mo, Weimin (1992) Two aspects of modernization. In Liu Fangtong, Huang Songjie and George F. McLEAN (eds.) *Philosophy and modernization in China, Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III, Asia*, Vol. 13, chapter I.
- So, Billy K. L.; Yip, Honming; Shiroyama, Tomoko and Matsubara, Kentaro (2011) Modern China's Treaty-port Economy in Institutional Perspective. Paper presented at the Panel on The legacy of Treaty Ports, Asia-Pacific Economic and Business Conference.
- Twitchett, Denis and Fairbank, John K. (1978). *The Cambridge History of China*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wagner, Rudolf G. (2010) The Moral Center and the Engine of Change: A Tale of Two Chinese Cities. In Vöckler, Kai and Luckow, Dirk (eds.) *Beijing Shanghai Shenzhen: Cities of the 21st Century*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Wang, Ping (1992) Tradition, modernization and human existence. In Liu Fangtong, Huang Songjie and George F. McLEAN (eds.) *Philosophy and modernization in China, Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III, Asia*, Vol. 13, chapter VIII.
- Wang, Xinsheng (1992) Overcoming Nihilism and the Modernization of China. In Liu Fangtong, Huang Songjie and George F. McLEAN (eds.) *Philosophy and modernization in China, Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III, Asia*, Vol. 13, chapter VIII.
- Wei, Dennis, Y. H. and Ma, Laurence J.C. (1996) Changing patterns of spatial inequality in China, 1952-1990. *Third World Planning Review*, 18(2): 177-191.
- Wright, Mary Clabaugh (1957) *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Cchih Restoration, 1862-1874*. CA: Stanford University Press.
- Zhang, Pomerantz-Linda (1992) *Wu Ting fang 1842-1992: Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History*. Hong Kong University Press.
- Zhu, Jianfei (2003) Politics into Culture: History Formation of the National Style in the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937). In Zhao Chen and Wu Jjiang (eds.), (2003) *Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.

#### Chinese literatures:

- Hou, Youbin (2003) Retrospect and Prospect: Speech at the International Symposium for the Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia in the 20th Century. *Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia*, 23-25. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Hua Lanhung (2006) *Reconstruier la Chine*. Beijing: San Lian Bookstore.
- Lai, Delin (2003) An Ideal Underlying the Eclectic Design: a study on the proportions of Yang Tingbao's architecture. In Zhao Chen and Wu Jjiang (eds.) *Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press (in Chinese).
- Su, Ze Min 蘇則民 (ed.) (2008) *Urban Planning History of Nanjing Ancient Times, Modern Times* 南京城市規劃史稿. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Wang, Haoyu (2003) Architects in Modern China: Their Collective Character and Their Time. In Zhao Chen and Wu Jjiang (eds.) (2003) *Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Wu, Liangyong 吳良鏞 (2005) *Zhang Jian and Nantong City, a Pioneering City of Modern China* 張謇與南通. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Zhao, Chen and Wu, Jjiang (eds.) (2003) *Research on China's Modern Architectural Academia*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Zhuang, Lin De and Zhang, Jing Xiang 庄林德 張京祥 (eds.) (2002) *Zhongguo Chengshi Fazhan Yu Jianshe Shi* 中國城市發展與建設史. Nanjing: Southeast University Press.

## Chapter 5

- Bruce, John W. and Li Zongmin (2009) Crossing the river while feeling the rocks": Incremental Land Reform and its impact on Rural Welfare in China. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00926.
- Burns, John P. and Shen Chauching (2004) China. In Manning, Nick and Parison, Neil (eds.) (2004), *International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Brown, Lester (1995) *Who will Feed China? Wake-up call for a Small Planet*. New York: Norton.
- Cao Yuanzheng, Qian Yingyi and Weingast, Barry R. (1997) From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style. Working Paper, The University of Michigan.

- Chan, Kam Wing (1988) rural-urban Migration in China, 1950-1982: Estimates and Analysis. *Urban Geography* 9 (1): 53-84.
- Chan, Kam Wing and Li, Zhang (1999) The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes. *The China Quarterly* 1999, 818-855.
- Chen, Jianfu. (2004) The revision of the constitution in the PRC: a great leap forward or a symbolic gesture? *China Perspective* (53), 15-32.
- Chinese State Statistic Bureau [CSSB] (2011) *Zhongguo chengshi tongji nianjiang (China Urban Statistic Yearbook (2011))*. Beijing: China Statistic Press.
- Chinese State Statistic Bureau [CSSB] (2007) *Statistic Communique of the (2007)*. Beijing: China Statistic Press. <http://www.stats.gov.cn>.
- China Academy of Urban Planning & Design (2002) *Zhongguo Chengshi Guihua Ziliaoji (China Urban Statistic Yearbook (2002)) Vol. 1-4*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Chinese State Statistic Bureau [CSSB] (2001) *Zhongguo chengshi tongji nianjiang (China Urban Statistic Yearbook (2001))*. Beijing: China Statistic Press.
- Chinese State Statistic Bureau [CSSB] (1999) *Zhongguo chengshi tongji nianjiang (China Urban Statistic Yearbook (1999))*. Beijing: China Statistic Press.
- Chiu, Hungdah. (1985) The 1982 Chinese constitution and the rule of law. *Contemporary Asian Studies*, 4, 1985.
- Chow, Gregory C. (2004) Economic Reform and Growth in China. *Annals of Economics and Finance*, 5 (2004), 127-152.
- Chow, Gregory C. (2005) *Corruption and China's Economic Reform in the Early 21st Century*. Princeton University: CEPS Working Paper No. 116.
- Deininger, Klaus; Jin, Songqian; Xian, Zude and Rozelle Scott (2004) Implementing China's New Land Law: Evidence and Policy Lessons. Working Paper, Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies, Stanford University.
- Deng, Lan; Shen, Qingyun and Wang, Lin (2009) Housing Policy and Finance in China: A literature Review. Report prepared for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- Ding, Chengri (2003) Land policy reform in China: assessment and prospects. *Land Use Policy* 20 (2003) 109-120.
- Ding, Chengri (2009) Policy and planning challenges to promote efficient urban spatial development during emerging rapid transformation in China. *Sustainability Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 384-408. <http://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability>.
- Elman, Benjamin A. (2000) *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Fewsmith, Joseph (2003) The Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee. *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 9, 1-9.
- Golden, Seán (2006) The modernization of China and the Chinese critique of modernity. *Revista HMiC*, numero IV, 7-22.
- Goetzmann, William and Koll, Elisabeth (2003) The history of Corporate Ownership in China: State Patronage, Company Legislation, and the Issue of Control. *National Bureau of Economic Research*, 149-184.
- Guo, Xibao. (2004) The reform of China's Rural Land System. *China and World Economy* / 62-73, Vol. 12, No.6, 2004, 62-73.
- Ho, Peter (2001) Who owns China's land? Policies, property rights and deliberate institutional ambiguity. *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 166, 394-421.
- Hong, Bo (2009) *Ownership Structure and Performance of Chinese SOEs*. Master thesis of Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand.
- Huang, Youqin (2006) Urban Development in Contemporary China. In Veeck G., Pannell C. W., Smith C. J. and Huang Youqin (eds.) (2006) *China's Geography: Globalization and the Dynamics of Political, Economic and Social Change*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Architectural Academia. Beijing China Architecture & Building Press.
- Jiang, Binghai, (1997) The cultural tradition of China and modernization. In Wang, Miaoyang; Yu Xuanmang and McLean George F. (eds) *Chinese cultural traditions and modernization in Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III. Asia*, Vol. 10. Chapter 5. Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Kang, Yong; Shi, Lu and Brown Elizabeth D. (2008) *Chinese Corporate Governance: History and Institutional Framework*. RAND Corporation.

- Koshizawa, Akira (1978) China's Urban Planning: Toward Development Without Urbanization. *Developing Economics* 16 (March 1978): 3-33.
- Kostof, Spiro (1991) *The City Shaped: Urban Pattern and Meaning Through History*. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd.
- Lee, James and Zhu, Yapeng (2006) Urban Governance, Neoliberalism and Housing Reform in China. *The Pacific Review*, 19, 39-61.
- Li, Peter (2007) Housing Reforms in China: A Paradigm Shift to Market Economy. *Pacific Rim Property Research Journal*, volume 9, number 2, June 180-196.
- Li, Ping J.D. (2003) Rural Land Tenure Reforms in China: Issues, Regulations and Prospects for additional Reform. *Land Reform 2003/3* special edition: 59-72.
- Li, Rongxia (1998) Residential houses going to the market. *Beijing Review*, 41(20), 14-17.
- Lichtenberg, Erik and Ding, Chengri (2008) Assessing Farmland Protection Policy in China. *Land Use Policy* 25(2008) 59-68,
- Lin, George C. S. (2001) Metropolitan Development in a Transitional Socialist Economy: Spatial Restructuring in the Pearl River Delta, China. *Urban Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 384-406.
- Lin, George C. S. (2002b) The growth and structural change of Chinese cities: a contextual and geographic analysis. *Cities*, Vol. 19, No. 5, 299-316.
- Lin, Justin Yifu (1987) The Household Responsibility System Reform in China: a Peasant's Institutional Choice. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 69 (2): 410-415 Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Lin, Justin Yifu (1988) The Household Responsibility System in China's Agricultural Reform: the Theoretical and Empirical Study. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 236, No. 3, S199-S224.
- Lin, Justin Yifu (1992) Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China. *American Economic Review* 82 (1): 34-51.
- Lin, Justine Yifu; Fang Cai and Li Zhou (1996, 2003) *The Chin Miracle*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Lin, Justin Yifu (2003) *The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Lin, Justin Yifu; Tao, Ran and Liu Mingxing (2003) Decentralization, Deregulation and Transition in China. Presented at the Decentralization Conference, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics, London, 2003.
- Liu, Hongyu (1998) Government Intervention and Performance of the Housing Sector in Urban China. *Journal of the Asian Real Estate Society*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 127-149.
- Logan, John (ed.) (2002) *The new Chinese city: Globalization and Market Reform*. London: Blackwell.
- Ma, Laurence J.C. and Lin, Chusheng, (1993) Development of towns in China, A case study of Guangdong Province. *Population and Development Review*, 19 (3), 583-606.
- Ma, Laurence J. C., and Fan, Ming (1994) Urbanization from below: The growth of towns in Jiangsu, China. *Urban Studies* 31 (10): 1625-45.
- Mackerras, Colin; McMillen, Donald H. and Watson, Andrew (eds.), (1998) *Dictionary of the Politics of the People's Republic of China*. New York: Routledge.
- Manion, Melanie (1985) The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders. *The China Quarterly*, No. 102, 203-233.
- Spence, Jonathan (1999) *The Search for Modern China (2nd edition)*. New York: Norton.
- Prasad, Eswar (ed.) (2004) *China's Growth and Integration into the World Economy: Prospects and Challenges*. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Qian, Yingyi and Xu, Chenggang (1993). Why China's Economic Reforms Differ: The M-form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector. *Economics of Transition*, 1, 135-70.
- Qian Yingyi and Wu Jinglian (2000) China's transition to a Market Economy: How far across the River? In Nicholas C. Hope, Dennis Tao Yang and Mu Yang Li (eds.) *How Far Across the River?* Stanford University Press.
- Sappin, Edward J., (2004) *Corporate Governance Reform in the People's Republic of China*. Johns Hopkins SAIS.
- Szamosszegi, Andrew and Kyle, Cole (2011) *An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China*. Washington dc: Capital Trade, Incorporated.
- Tang, Kai (2004) Urban Planning System in China- Basic Facts and Reform Progress. Paper presented to the International Conference on China's Planning System Reform, Beijing.
- Thomas, Heberer and Gunter, Schubert (2006) Political reform and regime legitimacy in contemporary China. *Asien* 99, 09-28.

- Trichur, Ganesh (2012) East Asian developmental path and land-use rights in China. *American Sociological Association*, V. XVIII, No. 1, 69-89.
- Yardley, Jim (2008) Chinese Economists Hope Land Reform Will Lead to Larger Farms. *The New York Times* (2008). <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/world/asia/19iht-land.2.17077479.html>.
- Yeh, Anthony G.O.; Xu Jjiang and Liu, Kaizhi (2011) *China's Post-Reform Urbanization: Retrospect, Policies and Trends*. London: IIED and UNFPA.
- You, Ji (1998) *China's Enterprise Reform: Changing State/society relations after Mao*. London: Routledge.
- Yu, Huai (1950) The National Bourgeoisie in the Chinese Revolution. *People's China*, Peking, January (1950). <http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/archive/huai.htm>.
- Yu, Wujing (1992) Modernization and the conflict of individuality and totality in Chinese culture. In Liu Fangtong, Huang Songjie and George F. McLean (eds.) *Philosophy and modernization in China, Cultural heritage and contemporary change series III, Asia*, Vol. 13, chapter II.
- Yu, Xiaohua (2009) Chinese Agricultural Development in 30 Years: A literature Review. *Frontiers of Economics in China*, Vol. 4 (4): 633-648.
- Vermeer, Eduard B.; Pieke, Frank N. and Chong, Woei Lien (eds.) (1998) *Cooperative and Collective in Chin's Rural Development: Between State and Private Interests*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Vöckler, Kai and Luckow, Dirk (eds) (2010) *Beijing Shanghai Shenzhen: Cities of the 21st century*. Frankfurt/ New York: Campus Verlag.
- Wallen, Minna (2009) State Policy and Internal Migration: A Study of the Household Registration System in China. Master thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, Lund University.
- Wang, Feng (2003) Housing Improvement and Distribution in Urban China: Initial Evidence from China's 2000 Census. *The China Review*, 3(2), 121-143.
- Wang, Xiaozu, (2003) *State-owned Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance of China*. Shanghai: Fudan University.
- Wang, Yaping and Murie, Alan (1996) The Process of Commercialization of Urban Housing in China. *Urban Studies*, 33(6), 971-990.
- Wang, Yukai (2008) The Past and Future of China's Administrative Reform: Retrospect and Prospect of Administrative Reform under the reigning Government. Paper presented to International Forum on Economic Transition.
- Wang, B. S., and Q. Z. Cui (2006) *Principles on China's Company Law*. Beijing: China Social Sciences Academic Press.
- Wallen, Minna (2009) State Policy and Internal Migration: A Study of the Household Registration (Hukou) System in China. Master thesis of Department of Social Anthropology Lund University.
- Walker, Anthony and Li, Ling Hin (1994) Land use rights reform and real estate market in China. *Journal of Real Estate Literature*, 2 (2), 199-211.
- Weitzman, Martin and Xu, Chenggang (1994) Chinese Township Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 18. April, 121-45.
- Wu, Jinglian and Bruce, Reynolds (1988) Choosing a Strategy for China's Economic Reform. *The American Economic Review*, 78 (2): 461-466.
- Wu, Liangyong (1999) *Rehabilitating the Old City of Beijing: a project in the Ju-er Hutong Neighborhood*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Wu, Weiping (1999) *Pioneering economic reform in China's special economic zones*. UK: Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing.
- Xu, Chenggang (2008) The Institutional Foundations of China's Reforms and Development. Discussion paper, CEPR No. DP7564.
- Yang, Chun (2008) Multi-level Governance of the Polycentric Cross-border City-Region: the Case of the Great Pearl River Delta. *Urban Planning International*, No. 101, 79-84.
- Yeh, Anthony G.O.; Xu, Jjiang and Liu, Kaizhi (2011) *China's post-reform urbanization: retrospect, policies and trends*. IIED and UNFPA.
- Yeung, Yue-man and Hu, Xu-wei (1992) *China's Coastal Cities: Catalysts for Modernization*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Yu Huai (1950) The National Bourgeoisie in the Chinese Revolution. *People's China*, January (1950).
- Zhang, Xin-Qiao (1997) Urban land reform in China. *Land Use Policy* 14 (3), 187-199.
- Zhang, Li (2002) Spatiality and urban citizenship in late Socialist China. *Public Culture* 14 (2): 311-34.
- Zhang, Hongye; Li, Xiaofeng and Shao, Xiaomei (2006) Impact of China's Rural Land Policy and Administration on Rural Economy and Grain Production. *Review of Policy Research* 23 (2): 607-624.

- Zhu, Keliang; Prosterman, Roy; Ye Jianping; Riedinger Jeffrey and Ouyang Yiwen (2006) The Rural Land Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations based on a Seventeen-Province Survey. *New York University Journal of International Law & Politics* 761, 38 (4), 807-822.
- Zhu, Xufeng (2006) China's Think Tanks: Roles and Characteristics. EAI Background Brief No. 306. <http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB306.pdf>

Chinese literatures:

- Chou, Bao Xing 仇保兴 (2005) *Zhongguo Chengshihua Jin Cheng Zhong De Cheng shih Gui Hua* 中国城市化进程中的城市规划变革. Shanghai: Tongji University Press.
- Feng, Xianxue 馮現學 (2001) *Huai Su Cheng shih Hua Jin Cheng Zhong De Cheng shih Gui Hua Guan Li* 快速城市化進程中的城市規劃管理. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Liang, Sichen (1986) Liang Sicheng Wen Ji (writing of Liang SiCheng. Architecture Journal, 1959 [6] V4. *China Construction Press*, 162-173.
- Liu, Weixin and Xie, Jingrong (1994) *Zhong Guo Tu Di Zhu Shui Fei Ti Xi Yan Jiu* (Research on Chinese Land Rent, Tax, and Fee Systems) 中国土地租稅費体系研究. Zhong Guo Da Di Publisher, Beijing, China.
- Wang, Tao (2007) *Deng Xiao Ping's last twenty years*. Beijing: Xinhua press.
- Wu, Jinglian (1999) *Dangdai Zhongguo Jingji Gaige: Zhanlue Yu Shishi* (The contemporary Chinese Economic Reform: Strategy and Implementation. Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishing House.
- Xiong, Guo Ping 熊國平 (2006) *Dang Dai Zhongguo Chengshi Xing Tai Yan Bian* 当代中国城市形态演变. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Xu Jilin (1996) Wenhua rentong de kunjin---90 niandai Zhongguo zhishijie de fanxihua sichaog (Las dificultades de la identidad cultural: la tendencia ant-Occidental en la vida intelectual china de los años 90). *Zhanlue yu guanli* 18 (1996): 100-101.
- Zhang, Yiwu (1995) The Anxiety of Interpreting China (Chanshi Zhongguo de jiaolu). *Twenty-First Century* 28, April.
- Zhao, Shi Xiu 赵士修 (1999) Cheng Shih Gui Hua Liang Ge Chun Tian De Pian Duan Hui Yi 城市规划两个“春天”的片断回忆. *Cheng Shih Gui Hu*, Vol. 10, 1999 城市规划 第10期 1999.
- Zhu, Baoshu and Guoqian Gu (1991) Renkou qianyi fenxizhong de diyu koujing wenti (The spatial specification in the migration analysis). *Renkou Yanjiu* (Population Research) 6:28-34.

Laws:

- Constitution of The People's Republic of China (adopted 1982)
- On Regulations of Further Expansion Autonomy of State-owned Enterprises, 1984
- Land Administration Law, 1986
- Constitution of The People's Republic of China (adopted 1988)
- Implementation Plan for a Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns, 1988
- The Provisional Regulation on the Granting and Transferring of the Land Rights over State-Owned Land in Cities and Towns, 1991
- Regulations on Transforming the Management Mechanism of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises, 1992
- Agricultural Law of the People's Republic of China, 1993
- Companies Law of the People's Republic of China, 1993
- Basic Farmland Protection Regulations, 1994
- The Decision on Deepening the Urban Housing Reform, 1994
- A Notification from the State Council on Further on Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System and Accelerating Housing Construction, 1998
- Land Management Law

## Chapter 6

- Abramson, Daniel B.; leaf Michael and Tan Ying (2002) Social Research and the Localization of Chinese Urban Planning Practice: Some Ideas from Quanzhou, Fujian. In Logan, John R. (ed.)(2002) *The New Chinese City*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
- Cai, Ymei, Zhang Wenxin and Zhao Yanwen (2009) Discussion on Evolution of Land-use Planning in China. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 18, No. 1, 2009, 32-37.



- Chen, Xiaoyan (2009) Monitoring and Evaluation in China's Urban Planning System: A case Study of Xuzhou. Case study prepared for Planning Sustainable Cities: Global Report on Human Settlements. Available from <http://www.unhabitat.org/grhs/2009>.
- Chiu Huangdah (1985) The 1982 Chinese Constitutions and the Rule of Law. *Review of Socialist Law* 11, No. 2, 1985, 143-60.
- Chou, Gregory C. (2004) The Role of Planning in China's Market Economy. Paper presented to the International Conference on China's Planning System Reform. Beijing.
- Chung, Him (2004) *China's Rural Market Development in the Reform Era*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Cong, Yanguo and Wei, Lihua (2009) Review on Land Issues in China since 2003. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 18, No. 1, 2009, 24-31.
- Ding, Chengri and Knaap, Gerrit (2003) Urban Land Policy Reform in China. *Land Lines*, Vol. 15, No. 2.
- Fan, Cindy C. (2006) China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): From "Getting Rich First" to "Common Prosperity". *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 47, No. 6, 708-723.
- Gore, Lance (2007) *China's new cadre evaluation system*. Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.
- Han, Haoying and Nishimura, Yukio (2006) Central Government's role in urban land growth management: the perspective in China. Paper presented to Mexico: World Planning Schools Congress, 2006.
- Lee, Hong Yung (1991). From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1991 1991. Retrieved from <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9n39p3pc/>
- Li, Cheng (2009) China's New Think Tanks: Where Officials Entrepreneurs, and Scholars Interact. *Chinese Leadership Monitor*, No. 29.
- Liu, Yun and Peng Chong (2008) Impact Analysis of the Town and Country Planning Act on the Smart Growth of Small-size City in China: Case study of Lianjiang County Town's Master Planning. Paper presented to the 44th ISOCARP Congress 2008.
- Lu, X. and Wu, W. (2007) On the evaluation of urban plan implementation. *City Planning Review* 30(11): 41-45
- Logan, John R. (eds.) (2002) *The New Chinese City*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
- Martin, Michael F. (2010) Understanding China's Political System. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress.
- McGann, James G. (2012) Think Tank, Policy Advice and Global Governance. Working paper, Research Center for Chinese Politics and Business.
- Osborne, David and Plastrik, Peter (1992) *Banishing Bureaucracy: Five Strategies for Reinventing Government*. New York: Penguin Group.
- Paler, Laura (2005) China's Legislations Law and the Marketing of a More Orderly and Representative Legislative System. *The Quarterly*, No. 182, 301-318.
- Pan, Wencan (2004) Implement Scientific Development and Improve the Plan of National Land Recourses. Paper presented to the International Conference on China's Planning System Reform. Beijing.
- Pfaar, Michael and Wang, Xiaodan (2011) Chinese Bonded Areas: Choosing the Right Location. *Tax International*, Jan, 2011, 57-72.
- Pu, Hao (2007) Monitoring and Analyzing Unplanned Land Development of Transitional Chinese City: Case Study of Shenzhen. Master thesis of International Institute for Geo-information Science and Earth Observation.
- Roach, Stephen S. (2011) China's 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics. Working paper, U.S.-China Economic and Security.
- Seasons, Mark (2002) Evaluation and municipal urban planning: practice and prospects. *The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation* 17(1): 43-71
- Sun, S.W. and Zhou, Y. (2003) Theories and measures of evaluation in urban planning. *Urban Planning Forum* 144: 15-27
- Talen, Emily (1996) Do plans get implemented? A review of evaluation in planning. *Journal of Planning Literature* 10(3): 248-259
- Tang, Kai (2004) Urban Planning System in China. Paper presented in the International Conference on China's Planning System Reform.
- Tisdell, Clem (2009) Economic Reform and Openness in China: China's Development Policies in the Last 30 Years. *Economic Analysis & Policy*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 271-294.



- Wu, Jiannan and Ma, Liang (2009) Does Government Performance Really Matter? An Event History Analysis of the Promotion of Provincial Leaders in China. Paper presented to 10th Public Management Research Association Conference, October 1-3, 2009, John Glenn School of Public Affairs, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
- Zhao, Min and Wu Zhicheng (2005) The Legislation of Property Right of China & Its Implications to Land System and Urban Planning. *Urban Planning Forum*, 3, 52-58.
- Zhong, Yang (2003) *Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below*. New York: M.E. Sharp.
- Zhu, Xufeng (2006) *China's Think Tanks: Roles and Characteristic*. Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.
- Zhu Jieming, Liu Xuan and Tian Li (2007) The Relationship between Land Use Planning and Individual Land Rights: The impact of Law of Property Rights on Urban Planning. *Urban Planning Forum*, 4, 56-64.

Chinese Literatures:

- Cao, Hong Tao曹洪濤(1999) Yu Cheng Shih Gui Hua Jie Yuan De Nian Sui與城市規劃結緣的年月. In Wan, Li 万里 (1999), *Wan Li We Xuan: Wu Shi Nian Hui Mou Xin Zhongguo De Chengshi Gui Hua* 万里文选：五十年回眸新中国的城市规划. Beijing: Chinese Academy of Urban Planning.
- Feng, Xianxue馮現學 (2006) *Huai Su Cheng shih Hua Jin Cheng Zhong De Cheng shih Gui Hua Guan Li* 快速城市化進程中的城市規劃管理. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Jian Zhu Chuang and Zuo Za Zhi (eds.) 建筑创作杂志社编 (2009) *Jian Zhu Zhongguo Shi Jian Juan Liu Shi Nian: 1949-2009* 建筑中国事件卷六十年1949-2009. Tianjin: Tianjin University Press.
- Li, Kan Zhen李侃禎 (2008) *Research on The Integration of Plan-Making & Plan-Implementation* 城市规划编制与实施管理整合研究. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Wan, Li 万里 (1999) *Wan Li We Xuan: Wu Shi Nian Hui Mou Xin Zhongguo De Chengshi Gui Hua* 万里文选：五十年回眸新中国的城市规划. Beijing: Chinese Academy of Urban Planning.
- Zhao, Shi Xiu赵士修 (1999) Cheng Shih Gui Hua Liang Ge Chun Tian De Pian Duan Hui Yi城市规划两个“春天”的片断回忆. *Cheng Shih Gui Hu*, Vol. 10, 1999城市规划 第10期 1999.

Laws and regulations:

- Organizing Law of All Levels of Local People's Congress and Local Governments, 1979
- Urgent Notice on Forbidding Invasion of Farm Land for Building Houses in Rural Areas, 1981.
- Constitution of The People's Republic of China (adopted 1982)
- Regulations on Land Management for House Building in Villages and Towns, 1982
- Regulations on Requisition of Land for State Construction, 1982. Notice of Strengthening Land Management and Forbidding Abused Occupation of Land, 1986
- Land Management Law, 1988
- Urban Planning Law, 1990
- Provisional Regulations on Land Supervision, 1995
- Chinese Legislation Law, 2000
- Urban and Rural Planning Law, 2007
- Regulations on Examination and Approval of land-use Planning
- Measures for Examination of Land-use Planning at Provincial Level
- Notice on Strengthening Management of Recording the Land-use Planning Files and Outcomes,
- Opinions about Implementation Management of Land-use Planning
- Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. Urban and Rural Planning Law, 2008
- Administrative Regulation on Country and township Construction Plans
- Websites:
- [http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/15/content\\_18253.htm](http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/15/content_18253.htm)
- <http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6495>.
- <http://China.org.cn>
- <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229722.htm#7>

## Chapter 7

---

- Burn, John P. (1993) China's administrative reforms for a market economy. *Public Administration And Development*, Vol. 13, 345-360
- Chiu, Rebecca L. H. (1993) China's Housing Reform: the Experiments in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. *Asian Geographer*, Vol.12, Nos. 1& 2, 47-56.
- De Jong, Martin (2013) China's art of institutional bricolage: Selectiveness and gradualism in the policy transfer style of a nation. *Policy and Society* 32, 89-101.
- Deng, Zhaohua (2009) Design Control in post-reform China; A case study of Shenzhen's commercial office development. *Urban Design International* (2009) 14, 118-136.
- Du, Jenny (2006) Shenzhen Municipal Bureau of Urban Planning. Retrieved from SENEWS, March, 2006. Available at [http://www.sznews.com/english/content/2006-03/29/content\\_69464\\_2.htm](http://www.sznews.com/english/content/2006-03/29/content_69464_2.htm).
- Friedmann, John (2005a) Globalization and the emerging culture of planning. *Progress in Planning* 64, 183-234.
- Greenwood, John; Pyper, Rpbert and Wilson, David (2002) *New public administration in Britain third edition*. London: Routledge (3rd ed).
- Guo, Sujun (2009) Reflections on China's institutional reform on urban planning decision-making: a case study on Shenzhen Urban Planning Committee. *China City Planning Review*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2009:
- Harvey, David (2005) *A brief history of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford.
- Han, Haoying and Nishimura, Yukio (2006) Central Government's role in urban land growth management: the perspective in China. Paper presented to Mexico: World Planning Schools Congress.
- Lai, Hongyi, Harry (2003) Local Governments and China's WTO Entry. *American Asian Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Fall, 2003), 154-58.
- Lai, Hongyi, Harry (2006) SEZs and foreign investment in China: Experience and lessons for North Korean development. *Asian perspective*, Vol.30, No. 3, 2006, 69-97.
- Lardy, Nicholas R. (2002) *Integrating China into the Global Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Lau, Kwokyu (1997) Housing Inequality and Segregation: an Exploratory Study on Housing Privatization in Shenzhen City of the People's Republic of China. Working Paper Series, Department of Public & Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong.
- Logan, John R. (ed.) (2002) *The new Chinese city: Globalization and Market Reform*. London: Blackwell.
- Ma, Yujia (2008) Shenzhen drops a hint on Political Reform. *China News* July 4, 2008.
- Maddison, Angus (2008) The West and the Rest in the World Economy: 1000-2030. *World Economics*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 75-90.
- NEWSGD. (2009) Shenzhen starts Administration Reform. *Daily China News Brief*, August 04, 2009.
- NG, Mee Kee (2005) Planning cultures in two Chinese transitional cities: Hong Kong and Shenzhen. In Sanyal B. (ed.) (2005) *Comparative Planning Cultures*. London: Routledge.
- NG, Mee Kam and Tang, Wing-Shing (2004) The role of planning in the development of Shenzhen, China: Rhetoric and Realities. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 45, No. 3. V. H. Winston & Son, Inc, 190-211.
- Ota, Tatsuyuki (2003) The Role of Special Economic Zones in China's Economic Development as Compared with Asian Export Processing Zones: 1979-1995. *Asian in Extenso*, March 2003.
- Paler, Laura (2005) China's Legislations Law and the Marketing of a More Orderly and Representative Legislative System. *The Quarterly*, No. 182, 301-318.
- Ren, Zhonyi (2000) Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles Reconsidered (translation version). *Southern Weekly*, (May) 5.
- Schenk, Catherine (2010) Economic History of Hong Kong. Retrieved from EH.net February, 2010.
- Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau, Shenzhen 2030 Development Strategy: Towards a Pioneering Global City with Sustainable Development. Retrieved from <http://www.szpl.gov.cn/main/sz3/index.html>.
- Shenzhen Municipal Statistics Bureau; Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in Shenzhen, *Shenzhen Statistics Yearbook 2006*. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 2006.
- Shenzhen Municipal Statistics Bureau; Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in Shenzhen, *Shenzhen Statistics Yearbook 2008*. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 2008.
- Tian, Hao (2005) *The development of the Contested City form of Shenzhen, China*. MIT Press.
- Wang Fuhai (2000) From planning system to planning institution—the development of urban planning for Shenzhen. *Urban Planning* No.1, 2000.

- Wang, Yukai (2008) The past and future of China's Administrative reform: Retrospect and prospect of administrative reform under the reigning government. Paper presented to International Forum on Economic Transition.
- Wong, Kwanyiu (1987) China's Special Economic Zone Experiment: An Appraisal. *Geografiska Annaler Series B, Human Geography*, 69, 1, 27-40.
- Wong, Ngai-ching (1994) *Housing reform in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: an Analysis and evaluation*. Master thesis of *Housing Management*, University of Hong Kong.
- Xie, Liou and Sit, Victor F. S. (2007) A transitional city of China: the case study of Shenzhen, China, 1980-2005. Master thesis of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong.
- Xinhua News Agency (2008a) The communiqué of the second plenum of the CPC 17th Central Committee (2008, February 27). Available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com>. Accessed at 16, August, 2010
- Xinhua News Agency (2008b) The reform plan of the State Council, March 15, 2008, available at [http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content\\_921411.htm](http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content_921411.htm). Accessed at 25, August, 2010
- Xinhua News Agency (2008c) The Conference communiqué of the Third Plenum of Seventeenth CPC Central Committee 12, October 2008. Available at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-10/12/content\\_10183504.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-10/12/content_10183504.htm). Accessed at 25, August 2010.
- Xu, Jiang (2008) Changing spatial relationship Between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta. *Urban Planning International*, No. 101, 70-78.
- Yeung, Yuetan; Lee, Joanna; Kee, Gordon (2009) China's Special Economic Zones at 30. *Eurasian Geography and Economic*, 2009, 50, No. 2, 222-240. Bellwether Publishing, Ltd.
- Zhu, Jieming (1996) Denationalization of Urban Physical Development. *Cities*, 13, 3, 187-194.
- Zou, Keyuan (2006) Administrative Reform and Rule of Law in China. *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 24.

#### Chinese Literatures:

- Guangdong Dangshi (2010) *The History of the CCP in Guangdong*. Available at [www.gddsw.com.cn](http://www.gddsw.com.cn).
- Li, Jia-lin (1999) The Trend of Real Estate Development in Shenzhen. Paper presented at Seminar for the Real Estate Development in Shenzhen, The China Business Centre of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 14 May.

#### Laws:

- Guideline of SSEZ Socio-economic Development Plan of 1982
- Shenzhen Special Economic Zone socio-economic Development Plan Outline, 1982
- Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Land Management, 1988.
- Housing Reform Scheme in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1988.
- Urban Planning Law, 1989.
- Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Urban Development Strategy, 1989
- Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Urban Development Ordinance, 1989
- Ten-year plan for social-economic development in Shenzhen and the eighth Five-Year Plan, 1991
- Urban Planning Ordinance of Shenzhen, 1998
- Rules for formulating Statutory Graphic Standard of Shenzhen, 1999
- Implementation Measures for the Integration of Shenzhen into the Pan-Pearl River Delta, 2005.

#### Websites:

- <http://www.gddsw.com.cn>
- <http://www.china.org.cn/e-china/openingup/sez.htm>
- [http://english.people.com.cn/200201/18/eng20020118\\_88932.shtml](http://english.people.com.cn/200201/18/eng20020118_88932.shtml)
- [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-02/21/c\\_131422589.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-02/21/c_131422589.htm)
- <http://www.olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/dengxp92.htm>
- [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/23/content\\_704704.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/23/content_704704.htm)
- <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm>
- [www.sz.gov.cn](http://www.sz.gov.cn)
- <http://www.szpl.gov.cn/>
- <http://www.szpb.gov.cn/>
- [http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0704/11/5628579\\_131381304.shtml#](http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0704/11/5628579_131381304.shtml#)

## Chapter 8

---

- Bauhinla Foundation Research Center (2007) Building a Hong Kong – Shenzhen Metropolis Research Report. Retrieved from <http://www.bauhinia.org/publications/BFRC-HKSZ-ES-ENG.pdf>.
- Berlage Institute Research Report (2005) *Village in The City: Unknown Urbanity in China*. Rotterdam: Berlage Institute.
- Burns, John P. and Shen, Chauching (2004) China. In Manning, Nick and Parison, Neil (eds.) (2004), *International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Castells, Manuel (2005) Space of flows, space of places: materials for a theory of urbanization in the information age. In Sanyal, Bishwapriya (ed.) *Comparative Planning Cultures*. London: Routledge.
- CCPR (China City Planning Review) (1987) Special double issue on Shenzhen. *China City Planning Review*, 3, Nos. 1-2.
- Chiu, Hungdah (1985) The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law. *Contemporary Asian Studies*, No. 4, 143-156.
- Currier, Jennifer (2012) Selling place through art: the creation and establishment of Beijing's 798 Art District. In Daniels, Peter w.; Ho, K.C. and Hutton, Thomas, A. *New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: From industrial restructuring to the cultural turn*. New York: Routledge.
- Daniels, Peter w.; Ho, K.C. and Hutton, Thomas A. (2012) *New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: From industrial restructuring to the cultural turn*. New York: Routledge.
- Ding, Chengri (2002) Land policy reform in China: assessment and prospects. *Land Use Policy*, 20 (2003), 109-120.
- Ding, Chengri (2009) Policy and planning challenges to promote efficient urban spatial development during emerging rapid transformation in China. *Sustainability Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 384-408.
- Fan, Cindy, C. (1997) Uneven development and beyond: Regional development theory in Post-Mao China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 21(4), 620-639.
- Friedmann J. (2005b) *China's Urban Transition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Guo, Xibao (2004) The reform of China's Rural Land System. *China and World Economy* / 62-73, Vol. 12, No.6, 2004, 62-73.
- Ho, Peter (2001) Who owns China's land? Policies, property rights and deliberate institutional ambiguity. *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 166, 394-421.
- Horsley Jamie P. (2009) Public Participation in the People's Republic: Developing a more participatory governance model in China. Retrieved from Chinawater Risk.
- Huo, Newman (2007) Shenzhen Launches OCT-LOFT. Shenzhen Daily (2007). Available at <http://paper.sznews.com/szdaily/20070208/ca2580732.htm>.
- Jiang, Jun (2010) A Village by the SEZ: The Dafen Sample of China's Urbanization. In *Special Publication for World Expo 2010, Shanghai* Vol. 1. Pp. 08-16. Hong Kong: Wen Wei Publishing Co. LTD.
- Lai, Yani and Choy, Lennon H. T. (2012) Property Rights and Industrial Land Use Efficiency. Presented to the 2010 Shanghai Workshop on Institutional Analysis.
- Li, Ling Hin and Li, Xin (2011) Redevelopment of Urban Villages in Shenzhen, China-An Analysis of Power Relations and Urban Coalitions. *Habitat International* 35, 426-434.
- Li, Xiaodong (2000) The Celebration of Superficiality: Chinese Architecture since 1979. *The Journal of Architecture*, Vol. 5, 2000.
- Liang, Yaowen (2009) Background briefing on the outline of the plan for the reform and development of the Pearl River Delta, 2008-2020. Speech of Mr. Liang, Yaowen, Director General of the Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation of Guangdong province, 28 April.
- Liau, Laurence, Wie Wu (2010) Village becoming a city: Dafen as Transformer. In *Special Publication for World Expo 2010, Shanghai*, Vol. 1., 41. Hong Kong: Wen Wei Publishing Co. LTD.
- Liau, Laurence, Wie Wu (2012) Shenzhen's evolution from tabula rasa laboratory of new Chinese urbanism to creative post-industrial UNESCO CITY of Design. In Daniels, Peter w.; Ho, K.C. and Hutton, Thomas A., *New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: From industrial restructuring to the cultural turn*. New York: Routledge.
- Liu, Xiaoming (2011) *The role of Urban Villages in China: Case study from Shenzhen*. Master thesis of KTH architecture and the built environment.
- Ma, Hang (2006) *Villages in Shenzhen: Persistence and transformation of an old social system in an emerging mega city*. Doctoral thesis, Bauhaus-Universität Meimar.

- Ma, Hang (2008) Villages in Shenzhen-typical Economic Phenomena of Rural Urbanization in China. Paper presented to 44th ISOCARP Congress 2008.
- Mahbub Uddin Ahmed, A.I. (2004) Weber's Perspective on the city and Culture Contemporary Urbanization and Bangladesh. *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*, Vo. 1. No. 1. January 2004.
- NG, Mee Kam (2002) Sustainable development in rapidly growing socialist market economy of Shenzhen. *DISP* 151, 42-50.
- Oi, Jean C. (1999) Two Decades of rural reform in China: an overview and assessment. *The China Quarterly*, No. 159, Special Issue: The People's Republic of China after 50 Years, 616-628.
- Pu, Hao (2012) *Spatial Evolution of Urban Villages in Shenzhen*. Doctoral thesis, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University.
- Pu, Hao; Sliuzas, Richard and Geertman, Stan (2011) The Development and Redevelopment of Urban Villages in Shenzhen. *Habitat International*, 35 (2011), 214-224.
- Shen, Juanga (2002) *Urban and Regional development in post-reform China: the case of Zhujiang delta*. Elsevier Science Ltd.
- Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau, Shenzhen 2030 Development Strategy: Towards a Pioneering Global City with Sustainable Development. Retrieved from <http://www.szpl.gov.cn/main/sz3/index.html>.
- Shenzhen Municipal Statistics Bureau; Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in Shenzhen, *Shenzhen Statistics Yearbook 2006*. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 2006.
- Shenzhen Municipal Statistics Bureau; Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in Shenzhen, *Shenzhen Statistics Yearbook 2008*. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 2008.
- Sung Yu-Wing and Wong Kar-Yiu (1998) Growth of Hong Kong before and after its reversion to China: the China Factor. This paper was presented at the Joint Session of American Economics Association and Chinese Economics Association in North America at the ASSA meeting in Chicago.
- Tang, Bo B. S.; Yeung, Stanley Chi-Wai and Li, Weiwen (2011) Central Business District Development in a Transition Economy: Case Studies of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, China. Working paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic University of Hong Kong
- Thomas E. Kellogg. (2008) Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics?: Constitutional Development and Civil Litigation in China. Working paper, Research Center for Chinese Politics and Business.
- URBANUS (2006) *Village/City: City/Village*. Beijing: CEPP Press.
- URBANUS (2007) *URBANUS*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Wang, Stephanie (2009) Shenzhen to Test-Run Political Reform. *Asia Times*, 2009. Available at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KF13Ad01.html>
- Wong, Francis and Hui, Eddie (2002) Housing Reform in Southern China: Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Published on Wiley Online Library.
- World Bank World Development Report (2009) *Reshaping Economic Geography*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Wu, Jjianglian (2009) China's Economy: 60 Years of Progress. *Caijing Magazine*, October 2009. Available at <http://english.caijing.com.cn>.
- Xue, Charlie; Zhai, Hanlin and Mitchener, Brian (2011) Shaping Lujiazui: the formation and building of the CBD in Pudong, Shanghai. *Journal of Urban Design*, Vol. 16. No. 2, 209-232.
- Yeung, Yuman and Hu, X W (eds.) (1992) *China's Coastal Cities*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI.
- Zhang L.; Zhao, S. X. B. and Tian, J.P. (2003) Self-help in housing and Chengzhongcun in China's urbanization. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 27 (4), 912-37.
- Zheng, Yang (2011) *Transforming the Urban Village in Guangzhou into an Urban Park*. Master thesis of Landscape Architecture, Ball State University, Indiana.
- Zhu, Jieming (2004) Local Developmental State and Order in China's Urban Development during Transition. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 28, 424-447.
- Zhou, Hongmei (2011) Shenzhen Dafen: The Regeneration Story of A Village by the SEZ. In *Special Publication for World Expo 2010, Shanghai* Vol. 1. Pp. 17-26. Hong Kong: Wen Wei Publishing Co. LTD.

#### Chinese Literatures:

- OCT Group, *Glory of OCT*. Shenzhen: OCT Group.
- Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010) *Fifteen years reform of Shenzhen City: 1980-1995深圳改革开放十五年的城市规划实践: 1980-1995*. Shenzhen: Hai Tian Press.

- Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002a) *Land and Resources Commission; International Design Consultations for the Central District of Shenzhen City* 深圳市中心核心地段城市设计国际咨询. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002b) Land and Resources Commission; Urban Design and Architectural Design for Block No. 22 and No. 23-1. In Shenzhen Central District: 深圳市中心区 22, 23-1 街坊城市设计及建筑设计. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Shenzhen Municipal Urban Planning (2002c) *Land and Resources Commission; The Design for Central Plaza and South Axis of Shenzhen Central District* 深圳市中心及市民广场设计. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Shih, Tsuen Miao (2010) The creation of special economic zones: Open a new pattern of economic change. *Guangdong Dangshi (The history of the CCP in Guangdong)*. Available at [www.gddsw.com.cn](http://www.gddsw.com.cn).
- Wang, Peng (2002) A Summary of Urban Planning and Architectural Design for the Shenzhen Central District. In *Shenzhen Municipal Planning Bureau (2010) Fifteen years reform of Shenzhen City: 1980-1995 (Shenzhen Gai Ge Kai Fang Shi Wu Nian de Cheng Shi Gui Hua Shi Jian: 1980-1995)*, 13-27. Hai Tian Press.
- Wang, Tao (2007) *Deng Xiao Ping's last twenty years*. Beijing: Xinhua press.
- Wang, Tao (2010) Application of special policy and flexible measures to enable Guangdong to take one step ahead. *Guangdong Dangshi (The history of the CCP in Guangdong)*. Available at [www.gddsw.com.cn](http://www.gddsw.com.cn).
- Wu, Xiaosong; Mao, Chunshenzg and Zhang, Ying (2008) Comparative Study between Statutory Chart and Land Development Framework. *Xian Dai Cheng Shi Yan Jiu* (12).
- Xi, Zhongxun (2010) I Want to See the Development of Shenzhen 2010. Available at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-08-25/181020974306.shtml>

## Chapter 9

- Anderson, Perry (2010) Two Revolutions: Rough Notes. *New Left Review* 61, 59-96.
- Beck, Ulrich (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Chen, Jianfu (2004) The revision of the constitution in the PRC: a great leap forward or a symbolic gesture? Post at: <http://chinapaperspectives.revues.org/2922>
- Day, Alexander (2008) The End of the Peasant? New Rural Reconstruction in China. *Boundary 2*.
- Dickens, Charles (1958) *A tale of Two Cities*. London: Chapman and Hall.
- Friedmann, John (1993) Toward a Non-Euclidian Mode of Planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 59(4), 482-5.
- Golden, Sean (2006) The modernization of China and the Chinese critique of modernity. *Orientalis*-2006.
- Harvey, David (2006) *Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Development*. London, UK: Verso.
- Henket, Hurbert-Jan and Heynen, Hilde (eds.) (2002) *Back from Utopia: The Challenges of the Modern Movement*. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
- Hsia, Chu-joe (2009) The Formation of the West Coast Metropolitan Region of Taiwan in the Network Society. In Rosemann, Jurgen; Qu, Lei and Sepulveda, Diego (eds.), *The New Urban Question, Urbanism beyond Neo-Liberalism*. Delft: IFOU.
- Lefavre Liane and Tzonis Alexander (2003) *Critical Regionalism*. New York: Prestel Verlag.
- Mannheim, Karl (1935,1940) *Man and society in an age of reconstruction*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Mannheim, Karl (2001) *Sociology as Political Education*, ed. and trans. D. Kettler and C. Loader. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Rosemann, Jurgen (2012) Generic City versus Citizen's City. Speech at Conference of An Un-finished Project, Taiwan.
- Shang, Zhiying (1997) An Axial-Interpretation of the Confucian Ethical Spirit. In Wang, Miao yang; Yu, Xuanmeng and McLean, George F. (eds.) *Beyond Modernization: Chinese Roots for Global Awareness, Chinese Philosophical Studies*, XII. Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Vlaues and Philosophy.
- Wu, Fulong (2010) How Neoliberal is China's Reform? The Origins of Change during Transition. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 2010, 51, No. 5, 619-630.

## Chapter 10

---

- Baeumler, Axel; Ijjase-Vasques, Ede and Mehndiratta, Shomik (eds.) (2012) *Sustainable Low-Carbon City Development in China*. The World Bank.
- Castells, Manuel (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. 1*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Chen, Shupeng; Zeng Shan and Xie Chuangjie (2000) Remote Sensing and GIS for Urban Growth Analysis in China. *Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing* Vol. 66, No. 5, 593-598.
- Cheng, James and Masser, Ian (2003) Urban growth pattern modeling: a case study of Wuhan City, PR China. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 62(4), pp. 199-217.
- Deng, Frederic F. and Huang, Youqin (2004) Uneven land reform and urban sprawl in China: the case of Beijing. *Progress in Planning*, 61(3), pp. 211-236.
- Friedmann, John (2005) *China's Urban Transition*. London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1989) The End of History? *The National Interest* 1989.
- Gao, Zhonggang (2008) Innovation of Urban Planning Administration System of China. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 17, No. 2, 24-32.
- Ginsburg, Norton (1972) Planning the Future of the Asian City. In Dwyer D. J. (ed.) *The City as a Center of Change in Asia*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Ginsburg, Norton; Koppel Bruce and McGee T.G. (eds.) (1991) *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Gu, Chaolin and Pu, Shanxi (2008) A New City Model: City Under County. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008, 33-39.
- Guo, Sujun (2009) Reflections on China's institutional reform on urban planning decision-making: a case study on Shenzhen Urban Planning Committee. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 18, No. 3, 2009, 8-16.
- Hall, Peter (2009) The Polycentric Metropolis: A Western European Perspective on Megacity Regions. Speech at the International Symposium on Mega-city regions: Innovations in Governance and Planning, Hong Kong.
- Hall, Peter and Pain, Kathy (2006) (eds.) *The Polycentric Metropolis: Learning from Mega-City Regions in Europe*. London: Earthscan.
- Herold, Martin; Goldstein, Noah C. and Clarke, Keith C. (2003) The spatiotemporal form of urban growth: measurement, analysis and modeling. *Remote Sensing of Environment* 86 (2003), 286-302.
- Him, Chung (2004) *China's Rural Market Development in the Reform Era*. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Hui Xiaoxi (2012) *Housing, Urban Renewal and Socio-Spatial Integration*. Doctoral dissertation of Faculty of Architecture, Delft University of Technology.
- Jenks, Michael and Bruggess, Rob (2000) *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries*. London and New York: SPON Press.
- Jiang, Xiaolei (2009) Urban Form for China's Larger Cities: the Example of Beijing Municipality. Master thesis of the European Spatial Planning Programme, Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden.
- Lin, George C. S. (2002) The growth and structural change of Chinese cities: a contextual and geographic analysis. *Cities*, Vol. 19, No. 5, 299-316.
- Lu, Junhua and Shao, Lei (2007) Evolution of Policies & Theories of Planning & Design of China's Urban Housing During 1978-2000. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 16, No. 3, 2007, 30-39.
- Luo, Zhendong and Zhang, Jingxiang (2009) The Development Characters and Trends of Yangtze River Delta from the Global City-regions Perspective. *Urban Studies* (2009-09).
- Luo, Zhendong; He, Heming and Geng Lei (2011) Analysis of the Polycentric Structure of Yangtze River Delta based on Passenger Traffic Flow. *Urban Planning Forum* (2011.02).
- Mao, Qizhi (2008) Outline of Urban Development in China 2007. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008, 64-72.
- McGee, T.G. (1991) The Emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: Expanding a Hypothesis. In Ginsburg, Norton; Koppel, Bruce and McGee, T.G. (eds.) *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Perera, Nihal (2003) The Transforming Asian City: The Challenges and Potential for Planners. In Chandrashekhhar, Divya and Charkraborty Poulomi (eds.) *National Organization of Students of Planning Forum*, 11-15.
- Perera, Nihal (2007a) New Directions in Urbanism and Planning in Asia. In Perera, Nihal and Wing-Shing (eds.) *The Transforming Asian City: Innovative Urban and Planning Practices Conference Proceedings*, 116-133. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University.

- Perera, Nihal (2007b) Asian Urbanization and Planning: Viewing the Production of Space from the Spaces of Production. Keynote address at the 19th International Congress of Asian Planning Schools Association, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
- Trichur, Ganesh K. (2012) East Asian Developmental Path and Land-Use Rights in China. *American Sociological Association*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 69-89.
- Wang, Guangtao (2008) Development Scientific Index System of Urban Master Planning. *China City Planning Review* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008, 14-23.
- Wu, Liangyong (1999) *Rehabilitating the Old City of Beijing: a project in the Ju-er Hutong Neighborhood*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Xu, Jiang and Yeh, Anthony G.O. (2009) Spatial Reconstruction and Regional Governance of Urban Agglomeration Planning in the Pearl River Delta. *Journal of Urban and Regional Planning*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Series No. 6, 2009, 67-83.
- Yang, Chun (2008) Multi-level Governance of the Polycentric cross-border city-region: the case of the Great Pearl River Delta, China. *Urban Planning International*, No.101, 79-84.
- Yeung, Henry Wai-chung and Lin, George C. S (2003) Theorizing Economic Geographies of Asia. *Economic Geography*, 79, 2:107-128, 2003.
- Zhao, Pengjun (2010) Managing urban growth in a transforming China: Evidence from Beijing. Land Use Policy (2010). Available at doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2010.05.004.
- Zhou, Jiang (2007) Policy Suggestions on Further Improving China's Housing Guarantee System. *China City Planning Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2007, 40-43.

Chinese Literatures:

- Chou, Baoxing 仇保兴 (2005) *Zhongguo Chengshihua Jin Cheng Zhong De Cheng shih Gui Hua* 中国城市化进程中的城市规划变革. Shanghai: Tongji University Press.
- Feng, Xianxue 馮現學 (2006) *Huai Su Cheng shih Hua Jin Cheng Zhong De Cheng shih Gui Hua Guan Li* 快速城市化進程中的城市規劃管理. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Geng, Huizhi 耿慧志 (2008) *Cheng shih Gui Hua Guan Li Jiao Cheng* 城市规划管理教程. Nanjing: Dong Nan University Press.
- Gu, Chaolin, Yu, Taofang, Zhang, Min et al. (2009) Urbna Agglomeration Spatial Planning in the Yantze River Delta. *Journal of Urban and Regional Planning*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Series No. 6, 2009, 39-66.
- He, Zizhang 何子张 (2009) *Policy Analysis of Spatial Benefit in Urban Planning Regulation*. Nanjing: Dong Nan University Press.
- Li, Kanzhen 李侃禛 (2008) *Research on The Integration of Plan-Making & Plan-Implementation* 城市规划编制与实施管理整合研究. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.
- Li, Guangbin 李广斌 (2010) *Li Yi Bo Yi Shi Jiao Xia De Qu Yu Gui Hua Zhuan Xing* 利益博弈视角下的区域规划转型. Nanjin: Nanjin University Press.
- Pei, Xinheng 裴新生 and Wang Xinzhe 王新哲 (2007) (eds.) *Xin Xing Shi Xia De Cheng shih Zong Ti Gui Hua* 新形势下的城市总体规划. Shanghai: Tongji University Press.
- Pei, Xinheng 裴新生 (2007) Issues in Present Urban Master Plan. *IDEAL Space* No. 20, 6-8.
- Peng, Kuntao 彭坤焘 (2007) Research on the Implementation of Master Plan. *IDEAL Space* No. 20, 11-13.
- Peng, Zhenwei 彭震伟 (2007) Making Urban Master-plan under the Guidance of the scientific concept of Development. *IDEAL Space* No. 20, 6-8.
- Xiong, Guoping 熊国平 (2006) *Dang Dai Zhongguo Cheng Shi Xing Tai Yan Bian*. Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press.



# Chinese Index

B		
Ba Gua	八卦	97
Bachubaijia, Duzunrushu	罢黜百家，独尊儒术；罷黜百家，獨尊儒術	139
Baihuawen	白话文; 白話文	161
Banfa	办法; 辦法	248
Bu	步	111
Buchang	部长; 部長	328
C		
Chengxiang Yitihua	城乡一体化; 城鄉一體化	447
Chongzhongcun	城中村	388
Chunguan Zongbo	春官宗伯	107
D		
Danwei	单位; 單位	173
Dao	道	93
Di	地	95
Diguan Situ	地官司徒	107
Diyidai	第一代	157
Dongguan Sikong	冬官司空	107
Dongguan Kao Gong Ji	冬官考工纪; 冬官考工紀	107
Du	都	126
Dui	兑; 兌	108
F		
Fa	法	248
Fadingtuzhe	法定图则; 法定圖則	333
Fei Nongye	非农业; 非農業	198
Feng Shui	風水	120
G		
Gacha	嘎查	231
Gen	艮	108
Gong	工	140
Guando Shangban	官督商办; 官督商辦	135
Guanshang Heban	官商合办; 官商合辦	135
Guanxi	关系; 關係	226
Guanwai	关外; 關外	306
Guiding	规定; 規定	248
Guihua	规划; 規劃	213
Guize	规则; 規則	248
Guo Jia Ji We	国家计委; 國家計委	241

H		
Huaqiao Cheng	华侨城; 華僑城	372
Hukou	戶口	198
J		
Jiating Lianchan Chengbao Zerenzhi	家庭联产承包责任制; 家庭聯產承包責任制	170
Jian Gong Bu	建工部	241
Jihua	计划; 計劃	213
Jihuadanlieshi	计划单列市; 計劃單列市	329
Jinshi	进士; 進士	152
Jueyi	决议; 決議	248
Jueding	决定; 決定	248
K		
Kan	坎	108
Kanyu	堪輿; 堪輿	120
Kao Gong Ji	考工纪; 考工紀	110
Ke	克; 剋	108
Keju	科举; 科舉	136
Kun	坤	97
L		
Li	礼; 禮	96
Li	离; 離	108
Li	理	105
Li	里	111
Li Ji	礼记 ; 禮記	103
Lianzhi	良知	105
Lun Yu	论语; 論語	361
M		
Man Han Quan Xi	满汉全席; 滿漢全席	158
Mingling	命令	248
N		
Nong	农; 農	140
Nongye	农业; 農業	198
P		
Paichiachengming	百家争鸣; 百家爭鳴	95
Q		
Qian	乾	97
Qi	气; 氣	104
Qi	旗	231
Qiang Xu Hui	强学会; 強學會	136
Qiuguan Sikou	秋官司寇	107

R		
Ren	仁	100
S		
Shan	山	115
Shan Shui Hua	山水畫	115
Shang	商	140
Shang Shan Ruo Shui	上善若水	441
Shang Shan Xia Xiang	上山下乡; 上山下鄉	165
Sheng	生	108
Sheng	省	231
Shi	士	140
Shui	水	115
Sichang	司长; 司長	328
Sumu	苏木; 蘇木	231
T		
Tao Te Ching	道德经; 道德經	93
Tao	道	93
Tao Hua Yuan Ji	桃花源记; 桃花源記	118
Taioli	条例; 條例	248
Tian	天	95
Tian Li	天理	95
Tian Ming	天命	100
Tian Tzu	天子	100
Tianguan Zhouzai	天官冢宰	107
Tai Zi Don	太子党; 太子黨	227
W		
Wei Xin Yun Dong	维新运动; 維新運動	135
Wu Wei	无为; 無為	95
Wu Xing	五行	108
X		
Xi Ming	西铭; 西銘	97
Xiagang	下崗	191
Xiangxi Guihua	详细规划; 詳細規劃	266
Xiao Jing	孝经; 孝經	97
Xin	信	103
Xin Xue	心学; 心學	105
Xiguan Sima	夏官司马; 夏官司馬	107
Xize	细则; 細則	248
Xue	巽	108

Y		
Yi	义; 義	103
Yi	邑	125
Yi Li	仪礼; 儀禮	107
Yi Jing	易经; 易經	97
Yi Zhuan	易传; 易傳	97
Yin Yang	阴阳; 陰陽	115
Z		
Zhajidi	宅基地	392
Zhen	震	108
Zhi	智	103
Zhiku	智库; 智庫	236
Zhong Yong	中庸	103
Zhi Xing He Yi	知行合一	105
Zhou Li	周礼; 周禮	110
Zizhiqu	自治區; 自治區	231

# Acknowledgements

This book represents the journey that I had evolved in seeking personal evolution as well as in pursuit of intellectual progression during the past few years of living and working in the Netherlands. It is a journey of receiving supports and encouragements from many people. For this special reason, I acknowledge them gratefully.

First and foremost I own my sincerest gratitude to the supervisor of my doctorate research, Prof. Henco Bekkering and Prof. Chu-Joe Hsia. Prof. Bekkering served not only as my main supervisor by providing sound advice but he shared also his friendship with unlimited supports to guide me through many decisive moments. His graciousness reveals in particular when he gave me free spaces of working in his chair and at the same time supported me to devote myself to establish International Forum on Urbanism (IFoU). At the same time, as a distinguished expert on Asian urban transformation and a respectable senior friend, Prof. Hsia inspired me with his passion of non-occidental urban studying and social engagement. This book could not have been written without their guidance.

During the period of working in TU Delft, I had privilege to know and to work with many senior scholars, they might not directly involve in my research and life; however, I were guided by their charismas and inspired by their spirits: Prof. Han Meyer, your special sense of humor to me, barely through language but there are moments you comfort me with your kindness; Fokke, your protection and sincerity; Akkie, Diego, Lei Qui, Qian Sheng, Sari and Gerhard, your warm hearts and friendships. In addition, colleagues in the chair of urban design: Willem, Frank, Stefan, Luisa, Maurice, Ekim. Thank you for your patience and tolerance when I was not able to fully participate in sharing the workloads in our chair. Not to forget the team of secretary, Amber, Linda, Marleen, Daniëlle, Margo, Karin, Astrid who gave me a hand when it was needed.

Beside my research task, to have an opportunity to initiate and establish International Forum on Urbanism (IFoU) is a mission I am deeply indebted to scholars who had made the name possible. Respectable Prof. Liangyong Wu, Prof. Chu-Joe Hsia and Prof. Jürgen Rosemann, from the very beginning whose long-term vision of insisting on the intellectual exchange shall be sustained beyond the political boundary, have founded the essential core value of IFoU. Further, with the coordinated supports of Prof. Joaquim Sabaté Bel who inspired me enormously, Prof. Bernardo Secchi, Prof. Jin-Yeu Tsou, Prof. Chye Kiang Heng, Prof. Wenyi Zhu, Prof. Qizhi Mao, Prof. Jian Dai, Prof. Karin Hofert, Prof. Paola Vigano, Prof. Jo Santoso, Prof. Thorsten Schuetze, Rob Doctor and other IFoU board members: Prof. Jian Wu, Prof. Yukio Nishumura, Prof. Uosang Yoo, Prof. Feng-Tyan Lin, Prof. Flavio Janches, Prof. Mooyoung Han and Prof. Kees Christiaanse, IFoU can move forward. I am honored to have many opportunities to

be closely working with them; they lift me up to a different level of insight intellectually as well as spiritually.

On the other hand, I am genuinely full of gratitude to those who have been working together with me outside TU Delft, Jian Liu, Hendrik Tieben, Adolf Sotoca Garcia, Aya Kubota, Françoise Vos for their sharing and pursuing the same goal for good. I am very lucky to have opportunity to know you and later become your friend as well.

One person, in particular I would like to mention is Xiaoxi Hui. With his abundant knowledge of Chinese history, I have the privilege to discuss and access materials that would be impossible without his knowledge. Since the first day we met, we are companionate in many dimensions: together, building up IFoU, discussing Asian urban issues and sharing supports and visions. For sure, Xiaoxi is my life long friend and a friend of my family.

I have mentioned, this acknowledgments is not particularly dedicated to the result of the research work, however, I am grateful to all my Doctoral Committee members. Some of their names have already been aforementioned. My special appreciation to Prof. de Jong and Prof. Nadin, their comments eventually stimulated me with a new angel of reflection. Not to forget to mention, authors and scholars whose abundant works had been used in this book as references. Their works had laid the ground for me to explore further.

Furthermore, my deeply gratitude to those who support me during my field works in China: Prof. Huasheng Sun and Rongyuan Zhu from China Academy of urban planning and design, Shenzhen planners Jian Chang and Fei Feng, Xiaochun Yang from Shenzhen university, Zhongping Xu, Bing Zou and Weiwen Huang from the Shenzhen government, Yan Meng, Xiaodu Liu and Yun Zhang from URBANUS, Heng Liu from CUHK. In addition, Lei Zhao from Southern Metropolis Daily and Han Yu from Chinese Society for Urban Study. Without their useful information, inputs and treasurable time, it is impossible for me to achieve the goal of this research. Besides, Chialing, Masa and Véro helped me with the editorial work and the book design.

Living abroad is not always easy. I am grateful to meet people who support me on daily basis, being my close friends Wenqian, Liang, Andrea, Jason, Nana, Liang-I, Job, Tina and Arno, Anna and Lex, Chenkun, Chingwen and many others, your friendships made my living in the Netherlands a feeling of home.

Using gauche language to express a life-long gratitude within limited time is impossible. To my families and friends whom I cannot address here individually, it does not mean I do not think about you, but there is always a space for you in my heart and the connection is there and you should know it.

I have travelled a long way emotionally and physically, by leaving my parents and country to the Netherlands for a reason of ideology. My father gives me his strength while my mother embraces me with her unconditional love, teaching me not to constrain myself to follow the direction that people set for me, but to be conscious enough of seeing through fears from within and to be able to transform them into the wisdom of life. Their teaching is not typical Chinese parents would do, in particular to a daughter. My father is liberal and wise and my mother is compassionate. They gave me my root of my being. This exploration of Chinese planning cultures began with searching the root of my father, who was born in China. It is his motherland, where his adventure begun and without an opportunity to complete it. With a bit delay, but it is never too late, this book serves for the memory to my father, and many people of his generation who shared the same fate of leaving home young.

In the very end, there is a special person who makes me grow and evolve, influences my emotion and life. By taking from the father's hand, he is where I land, my anchor of soul. Jürgen, this is dedicated to you.





# Curriculum Vitae

Dr. Chiu-Yuan, Wang received her education as architect and urban planner in Taiwan and in the Netherlands. She obtained her Master and Doctoral degree (specialization in Urbanism) respectively in 2002 and 2013 from the Faculty of Architecture, Delft University of Technology. Between 2004 and 2013 she held the position of researcher and teacher at the Department of Urbanism, Delft University of Technology. In this period she initiated the collaboration between European and Asian Universities in the field of urbanism, which resulted in 2005 in the foundation of the International Forum on Urbanism (IFoU). Since then she serves as director of this organization, which currently comprises 17 leading universities mainly in Asia and in Europe.

Her main field of research focuses on changing planning cultures under the influence of societal and economic transformations, urban management and strategies for spatial planning. Her research provides special insight on non-occidental urban transformation and in particular, the transformation of planning culture of contemporary China. Beside her scientific work she also promotes integral urbanism as professional mechanism for urban development and spatial design. In 2014 she started the IFOU CONSULTANCY Pte. Ltd., a consultant firm for urbanism in Singapore, in addition to IFoU. Before she went to the Netherlands, she was the principal and co-owner of J&V Interior Design Pte.Ltd., an office for interior design in Taipei.

